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Chapter One. 
Introduction: trade unions and their 'enemies front line troops'. 
Why study the relationship between trade unions and the mass media, yet again? After 
all, the question of how trade unions were represented in the news media was all but 
fully exhausted almost twenty years ago. Since then, unions have hardly acquired 
greater political significance, as their membership bases have haemorrhaged and they 
have been bounced off the political centre stage by a government determined to re-cast 
workplace relations in ways which afford trade unions only a 'supporting' role at best. 
They are regarded by journalists, particularly those who cut their professional teeth 
during the height ofMrs Thatcher's 'reign', as relics from an earlier and quite 
different historical period. And now, as a consequence of the huge erosion in 
membership, even the TUC, itself, is having to implement major cut backs in 
resourcing and impose a cost-saving re-organisation of its departmental structure. There 
is no better symbolic representation of the TUC' s recent history than the changes which 
have occurred at its London headquarters, Congress House, where the TUC's own 
administrative apparatus has shrunk from four floors to two and rooms along empty 
corridors are now rented out to commercial companies. 
At first glance, then, there seems little justification for rehearsing old arguments and 
exploring dated material. However, while the status of union elites as 'political 
insiders' in the past might be questioned, there seems little doubt that unions now must 
be regarded as 'outsiders' (1). There remains quite a lot that media sociology has yet to 
explore concerning the nature of the relationship between the news media and 
politically marginalised groups. How do such groups seek access to the news 
production process and how successful can they hope to be? 
At an even more fundamental level these questions point to issues which should 
always be of concern to sociologists and those interested in how societies reproduce and 
disseminate ideas. Seventeen years ago Golding and Murdock complained that, too 
often, a sociology of the mass media was severed from wider questions regarding 
stratification and power (1977:2-13). It remains as true today that, 
"Groups can remain dominant only if they have the resources to 
reproduce their dominance. This is not only true economically, 
but also socially, culturally, and especially ideologically." 
(Van Dijk,l991:32). 
The mass media in general and the news media in particular, will inevitably reflect the 
most important relations of domination and subordination in society and will play an 
important part in their reproduction. As such relations change, so such changes will be 
reflected in the politics and practices of news production. An interest in the ways in 
which subordinate groups mobilise symbolic, communicative and material resources to 
intervene in the news production process should be a perennial preoccupation not only 
for media sociologists but for all those concerned with the ways in which power is 
reproduced. 
Relations between capital and labour remain not the only but one of the most crucial 
patterns of domination and subordination in late capitalist societies, such as Britain, and 
continue to be characterised by both material and symbolic conflict. Trade unions have 
long played an important part in defending the interests of labour against capital but 
they have also played a part as ideological agencies in the continued reproduction of 
such patterns of subordination. Although Engels described unions in England as 
'schools of war', according to Hyman they should be regarded as 'at one and the same 
time, part of the problem and part of the solution, a form of resistance to capitalism 
and a form of integration within capitalism' (Hyman 1985:123). Of course, the view 
that trade unions help to incorporate oppositional sections in the workforce, as well as 
articulate their demands, is hardly a new theme. A variety of writers have sought to 
describe the politically contradictory position that unions may find themselves in, both 
at the structural level (for example, Anderson,1967; Coates and Topham,l980; 
Milliband,1991: ch3) and in terms of the micro-politics of the workplace (for example, 
Lane and Roberts,l971; Nichols and Benyon,l977). As the political relationships of the 
post-war settlement crystallised, so the contradictory position of trade unions was 
thrown into sharper relief, prompting theorists of corporatism to describe formal union 
organisations in terms of an integrative politics (for example, Middlemas,1979) and 
writers further to the left, to describe unions as 'the brokers between labour and the 
state' (Milliband,1982:56). 
So in the past, formal union organisations have often generated contradictory 
political impulses, expressed both in terms of the mobilisation of material and symbolic 
resources. However, relations of domination and subordination are never static and 
over the last fifteen years, both formal and unofficial union organisations have been 
subjected to a ferocious political assault directed from the centre of government which 
has, paradoxically, delineated more clearly the traditional political role of unions in 
defending the interests of labour. 
Given the role of the mass media in both reflecting and reproducing the most 
important patterns of domination and subordination, the heightened tensions and shifts 
in the balance of forces between capital and labour will find expression in the work of 
the news media. If such conflicts are of both a material and symbolic nature then it is 
likely that the news media, themselves, will be identified as an arena through which 
material and symbolic resources will be mobilised by the groups engaged in conflict. 
This is not to suggest that the news media can be conceived as neutral arenas or 'level 
playing fields',- particular news media will be characterised by particular ideological 
configurations which present specific difficulties and opportunities for those seeking 
access to the process of news production. Neither is it to suggest that such processes are 
new. The reverberations of the conflicts between capital and labour are always likely to 
surface through the practice and output of the news media. However, in times of 
exacerbated conflict such reverberations are louder and the strategic political 
importance of the news revealed all the more clearly for those groups engaged in 
conflict. This is why the issue of news communication is always likely to be identified 
by both trade unionists and the representatives of capital as of particular importance 
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during periods of heightened industrial tension as in, for example, the 1890s (Harrison, 
1974: chs 8 and 9) or 1926 (Curran and Seaton, 1985:67-68) and why, as will be 
discussed below, during the late 1970s and 1980s, the issue of news communication 
became a sharper political issue within the workplace, itself. 
In the period after 1979, the trade union movement experienced more rapid rates of 
change in the political and economic landscape. These changes were important not only 
for the ways in which they refashioned the political environment for trade unions and 
posed particular problems of communication and ideological construction, externally, 
but also because they prompted important questions concerning the values and 
commitments which formed the internal ideological framework of the labour 
movement. During this most recent period, then, trade unions have been compelled to 
address issues of communication and the deployment of symbolic and material 
resources in communicative activity in terms of both external and internal 
environments. The survey of union journal content in chapter three clearly illustrates 
this. In terms of the external environment, for example, we find a number union 
journals attempting to reconstruct the language and vocabulary of trade unionism in 
response to the ideological legacy of the 1979 'Winter of Discontent' and the 
accumulation of negative imagery deposited by the news media over several decades 
(2). In the work of the union press officers (chapters four and five) we find a concious 
and explicit attempt to counter this imagery through the application of particular 'news 
work' skills in the course of their work in presenting their unions to the outside world . 
As we shall see, the communications strategy employed by the ambulance workers 
unions, during the 1989 dispute, to secure more favourable external communication 
treatment was regarded as sufficiently important to shape the industrial tactics 
employed (chapter nine). 
On the other hand, the crisis brought about by economic structural change and 
hostile political intervention also triggered internal conflicts within the labour 
movement and these, too, found expression in symbolic as well as material form. For 
example, the conflicts generated by the rise of 'new realism' in the 1980s were 
articulated partly through the journals and media work of the unions involved. As some 
prominent unions sought to establish a position of hegemony within the labour 
movement so, too, the associated political struggles found expression through union 
communication work (3). Changes in the economic structural position of unions, 
their relation to the state, and in their place in the relations of domination and 
subordination between capital and labour, have compelled unions to re-think and revise 
their approaches to issues of communication (chapter two). 
There is, though, another compelling set of reasons why not only media 
sociologists but also those interested in the workings of power and democracy should 
take more than a passing interest in the attempts made by trade unionists to come to 
terms with an era of 'media saturation'. 
Trade Unions, the News Media and the Public Sphere 
In his earliest formulation of the concept, Habermas suggests that the public sphere, 
'may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a 
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public ... ' (1989:27). That is to say, through the productive energies unleashed by 
seventeenth and eighteenth century capitalism in Europe (economic relations orientated 
towards the market rather than the household, the emergence of printing and 
publishing industries, and the creation of new forums for the exchange of ideas 
including the salon, the coffee house and the theatre) a new space located between the 
'private realm' of market transactions and bourgeois family life, on the one hand, and 
the 'sphere of public authority' (the state and the monarchy) on the other, emerges in 
which for the first time not only 'the general rules governing ... commodity exchange 
and social labour', but the very authority of the state to regulate public discourse 
become the subject of public debate (1989:27). For Habermas, while these 
developments are inextricably bound up with the development of a political 
consciousness and the implicit delineation of political interests, nonetheless the nature 
of such debate was characterised by both a rationality (in the sense that ultimate 
authority was assumed to rest not upon a doctrine of absolutism but rather reasoned 
argument) and a commitment to the principle of universality in terms of participation 
(1989:53). 
The criticisms of Habermas' early formulation are familiar. It rests upon an 
idealised vision of 'a golden age' which underestimates the extent to which bourgeois 
class interests were successfully represented as a public interest and the extent to which 
voices other than those of the male bourgeoisie were excluded (Garnham,1986:44). 
Similarly, it may exaggerate the degree to which debate within the early 'public sphere' 
was characterised either by reasoned debate or a commitment to the principle of 
universalism (Dahlgren, 1991:5). Certainly, the omission of any sustained discussion of 
the forums in which alternative class interests might be articulated leaves the historical 
account incomplete (Curran: 1991:40). This is curious given Habermas' 
acknowledgement of the existence of a 'plebeian public sphere' and the work of the 
Chartist Movement in the preface to 'The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere' (1989:xviii). Habermas makes it clear at the outset that he is concerned only 
with the 'bourgeois public sphere'; the 'plebeian public sphere' he argues, made only a 
brief historical appearance before being suppressed. And yet, given his view of the 
'public sphere' as a forum through which 'private people come together as a public'; 
that is as a mechanism for harnessing the power of a multitude of individuals each 
contributing to rational but critical debate, it is surprising that the role of trade unions 
in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, together with other communicative 
activities within the 'plebeian public sphere', are not accorded a greater recognition. 
For Habermas, by the end of the nineteenth century (at the time that trade unions 
in Britain were discovering a political voice), the energies within European capitalism 
responsible for promoting and expanding the 'public sphere' were now contributing to 
its terminal decline, as new and reinvigorated market energies (the growing importance 
of advertising, and the expansion of commercial markets in the nineteenth century; 
twentieth century tendencies towards concentration and conglomeration in media 
ownership) 'invaded' the public sphere and placed new limitations upon the circulation 
of ideas and the possibility for rational debate. Most importantly, the growing 
dominance of public relations as part of both commercial and state activity brought 
about a 'refeudalisation' of the public sphere, as authority bestowed by reasoned 
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argument was supplanted by a return to forms of authority secured through rituals of 
representation (1989: 195). 
To the critics, just as Habermas idealises the public sphere of the eighteenth 
century, by the same measure he underestimates the vitality and diversity of public 
spheres to be found in societies of advanced and late capitalism (Curran,l991). While 
the pressures and constraints imposed by the dominance of private capital and 
commercial energies upon the mass media should not be underestimated, it is still 
possible to point to 'micro-spheres' within the bourgeois public sphere and to 
'alternative public realms'(Downing, 1992), where reasoned debate can be extended 
beyond the boundaries defined by political and commercial public relations. In this 
context, trade unions have, potentially, an important part to play. Not only have they 
historically provided a 'plebeian public sphere' in which private working people 'came 
together as a public'. Trade unions also provided one channel through which the 
debates and concerns of the 'plebeian public sphere' could be presented to the 
bourgeois or mainstream 'public sphere'. In this sense, the question of the position of 
trade unions in relation to the news media is also a question of citizenship and 
enfranchisement 
Despite the weaknesses in Habermas' early formulation, the concept of the public 
sphere remains an important analytic category, not to be abandoned (Gamham, 1986). 
For the purposes of this study, it reminds us that a sociology of news sources presents a 
series of important questions for the study of mainstream politics and the democratic 
process. Trade unions continue to represent the main channel through which the 
aspirations and interests of those located in the workplace can be presented in the public 
domain and directed towards the formal political system. They continue to represent 
thirty-six per cent of the working population (Central Statistical Office,l995:74). 
Beyond this, they have an important role to play in the marshalling of arguments in 
current debates concerning the future of public institutions and public services,-
arguments which properly should be made if such institutions and services are not to 
fall victim to the advocates of radical marketisation by default. In the contemporary 
political climate, one of the most prominent features of a healthy 'public sphere' 
should be a sustained debate regarding the future of public provision of services and 
facilities, involving a wide and diverse range of voices, not merely those 'loud' voices 
with a predatory interest in privatisation. The extent to which trade unions can secure 
the coherent presentation of their agendas and an effective representation of their 
perspectives is one indicator of the health of the mainstream public sphere and, of 
course, the news media have a crucial role to play in this respect. 
This is particularly important given the decline of the 'plebeian public sphere' with 
the loss of the Daily Herald and the difficulties in sustaining an alternative, left wing 
press. In the experience of trade unions in Britain in recent years there are grounds to 
support the pessimism of Habermas' picture of the public sphere in the twentieth 
century. National broadcasting has offered only infrequent opportunities for trade 
unions to construct coherent presentations of their arguments. Despite considerable 
lobbying effort being expended by the TUC, Channel Four scrapped 'Union World' in 
the late 1980s and live coverage of the TUC conference continued to diminish 
throughout the same period. Popular national newspapers take less interest in labour 
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news; some no longer employ industrial correspondents and broadsheet papers devote 
less space to the reporting of industrial affairs. Yet, in terms of national news 
coverage, it is only the broadsheet papers, with their comparatively low circulations, 
which unions can depend upon as channels of access to the public sphere. 
The historic paradox for trade unions is that their new found interest in 
communication strategies, news media work and the arts of presentation has arrived just 
at the point when their access to the public sphere is diminishing both for the specific 
reasons noted above and as a result of the broader threats to the public sphere arising 
from deregulation of media markets, increasing commercial pressures and the frailty of 
public sector broadcasting,- the patterns Habermas anticipated in his account of the 're-
feudalisation' of the public sphere. It is now fashionable to present a picture of the 
media and media practices as disconnected from their material context. Such an idealist 
account has been encouraged both by certain developments in social theory (the 
growing influence of postmodernism) and by the enormous expansion in the 'public 
relations industry', which in promoting itself, highlights the • skills of PR' whilst 
masking the question of the distribution of resources,- economic and political, as well 
as symbolic, - which is both likely to determine the success of any communications 
strategy and which acts to disadvantage and exclude particular social groups and 
communities. To the extent that a few trade unions have embraced the philosophy of 
corporate public relations, they have accepted a 'postmodern prescription' for their ills. 
In contrast, Habermas formulates the question of access to the public sphere in 
essentially material terms and, consequently highlights, 'the need to consider the future 
of democratic politics, and of the institutions and practices of public 
communication .. .in terms of the allocation of scarce resources'(Garnham,1986:43). 
Habermas' formulation directs our attention to questions of how economic, political 
and symbolic resources can be deployed in the attempt to secure access to the public 
sphere, and to the nature of the social practices involved in such processes. And yet, as 
Garnham argues, a weakness of Habermas' account is that he, himself, is reluctant to 
formulate questions in these terms. There is little consideration of the process of 
political mediation (Garnham, 1986:44), through which particular sources of 
information or knowledge secure privileged positions in relation to the public sphere, 
effectively acting as 'knowledge brokers'. 
In seeking to describe the attempts of trade unions to come to terms with the news 
media this study may contribute towards a critical assessment of the value of 'the 
postmodern prescription' or corporate public relations diagnosis for trade union ills. 
More importantly, it will seek to describe the concrete, material practices through 
which a still important representational group seeks to secure access to the public 
sphere. The nature of the obstacles and constraints which impede such attempts will 
provide some guide, at least, as to the degree to which the pattern of relations between 
the news media, political institutions and representational or pressure groups can 
sustain an inclusive, universalistic and open public sphere, regarded as desirable in a 
democracy. 
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Trade Unions and their 'front line enemies.' 
The original plan for this research was prompted by events during the Coal Strike of 
1984-85 and a series of exchanges which appeared in the Guardian between journalists 
and Nell Myers, assistant to the President of the NUM and the official responsible for 
the union's press and media work. Patrick Wintour (The Guardian 20th May 1985) 
took the view that the public relations performance of the NUM had been ineffective 
and that with the application of more efficient techniques for dealing with the news 
media the union would have been able to secure more favourable news coverage. 
Greater attention to press and media work; more briefings, a greater willingness to 
respond to journalists' enquiries, a recognition of the appetites of news organisations 
for daily supplies of fresh information would all have helped to reverse the tide of 
hostile or ill-informed coverage. This view was later endorsed by other industrial 
correspondents (Torrode 1985;Adeney and Lloyd 1986; Jones,N,1986). Nell Myers 
argued, however, that there was little to be gained for the NUM in investing greater 
effort or resources in media work. The representation of the dispute through the 
national news media had to be placed in the context of dominant political and economic 
structures and the distribution of power in a capitalist society: 
"The industrial correspondents, along with broadcasting technicians 
are basically our enemies' front line troops. They are used as 
canon fodder by editors and proprietors who throughout the strike 
were in regular consultation with Cabinet Ministers and Coal Board 
chiefs." (Nell Myers, The Guardian 3rd June 1985) 
No amount of energetic media work, careful presentation, briefmg of industrial 
correspondents, or investment in corporate communication strategies would alter the 
'inevitable' ideological representation of the union, given the location of the news 
media in relation to the main centres of economic and political power. 
This debate touched upon a number of enduring sociological issues relating to the 
nature of power, the effectivity of structure and the role of the news media. It also 
prompted questions about the importance of pressure groups, trade unions and similar 
organisations as sources of news. In the late 1980s there remained an absence of much 
empirical research on the relationship between organisations as news sources and 
journalists, - a gap only just beginning to be filled through the work of Tumber and 
Schlesinger (1995), Anderson (1991 and 1993), Schlesinger et a! (1991), Ericson et a! 
(1989). And yet, it was widely recognised by academics employing a variety of 
perspectives that the news media were becoming increasingly important as a central 
arena of political activity (Newton, 1988). In other words, groups organised around 
particular clusters of interests might invest significant energy and resources in seeking 
access to the process of news production as a primary objective. Lobbying might 
involve lobbying the news media as well as the government. And yet, as Nell Myers' 
response above suggests, there are good grounds for doubting the effectivity of such 
strategies for groups positioned politically on the margins of conventional Westminster 
party politics. For many, the ideological and structural position of news media 
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institutions; their dependence upon the 'primary definers' of the state, their restricted 
lists of' accredited witnesses' and the integration of many news organisations within 
formidable structures of private economic ownership, would imply the 'inevitable' 
futility of attempts, however fashionable, to make public relations work for the groups 
and organisations of the left. 
The present research represents an attempt to explore empirically, on a small scale, 
these 'big' issues. Although there is now a huge literature on the sociology of 
journalism and news production, little has been written on the strategies employed by 
non-official sources to overcome the obstacles of structure, ideology and organisation 
which confront them in the routine practice of the news media. The 'media work' of 
environmental pressure groups and outsider groups in the sphere of crime and penal 
policy is now beginning to be reported but despite the obvious interest, given the 
ideological and political positioning of trade unions, in exploring the effectivity of 
union news media strategies, not much progress has been made in the last twenty years 
beyond the first tentative steps taken in the preliminary work of the Glasgow University 
Media Group (1976:ch 6; Philo and Hewitt,1976). The whole question of the 
representation of the labour process in the news media has been out of academic 
fashion, of course, for most of this period and is only now beginning to re-awaken the 
interest of media researchers (Puette, 1993;Philo, 1990; Douglas, 1986). For the first 
time in a number of years academic and political interests have coincided to focus upon 
the relationship between trade unions and the news media (4) but the specific question 
of the role of trade unions as sources and, in particular, the work of trade union press 
and media officers, remains neglected. 
In some ways, this is rather surprising because there has been an explosion in both 
the public relations industry and in the voluminous literature on 'do-it yourself' public 
relations for non-commercial organisations. The huge growth in state sponsored public 
relations over the last two decades has been noted by Golding (1992:507) and Altheide 
and Johnson (1980); a comparable tendency in local government charted by Franklin 
(1986). In tandem with the familiar growth in corporate and fmancial public relations 
(The Economist,l989; Newman,1984), it is now common place for all manner of 
occupational groups and voluntary organisations to engage in public relations work. 
Thus, there is a literature on how best to 'handle the media' for groups who may feel 
exposed by the harsher ideological winds of the right blowing through much of the 
news media in recent years, including social workers (Walder,1991; Dossett-
Davies,1987; Eastman,1987), probation officers (Smyth,l990), voluntary organisations 
(Jones,1984), 'workers and community activists' (MacShane,1983), health authorities 
(Hyde,l987), scientists (Jerome,1986), and even sociologists (Gans,1989). The 
literature extends beyond the ideologically vulnerable to those groups who may 
normally feel quite comfortable when subjected to the gaze of the news media,-
including prison officers (Deas,1988) and the police (Fry,l991; Hyder,l989; 
Hodges,1987). 
The problem, of course, with the majority of 'do-it-yourself' public relations guides 
is that they are rarely theoretically informed and frequently grounded in only the most 
insubstantial, anecdotal empirical material. The result is, too often, a discussion 
characterised by a naive account of the process of political communication in which the 
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problems ideologically marginalised groups experience are judged to be the result of a 
failure to communicate rather than the consequence of the institutionalised practices of 
news production or the structural positioning of news sources and news organisations. 
For example, a recent handbook on public relations for the 'human services' tells us 
that: 
'Many of the barriers that exist to the achievement of positive 
media treatment of human service topics are primarily psycho-
logical in nature.' (Brawley,1983:13). 
Gloomy social workers, too often on the defensive, have underestimated the extent to 
which the mass media can represent an opportunity rather than a threat, the handbook 
insists. The task must be to break down the 'barriers to communication' - the 
'professional insulation' of social workers and their unhelpful reluctance to discuss 
their work in terms of simple news friendly propositions (Brawley,1983:34-35). While 
the popular news values of news organisations are recognised as a problem for which 
an appropriate public relations strategy must be devised, the aim must be to project a 
'clearer image' of social work in order to alter the stereotyped image of the profession 
(1983:27-35). Why and where from these stereotypes have arisen is not discussed. In 
order to answer these questions, it would be necessary to apply a theoretical lens which 
permitted discussion of the political context and ideological structures governing the 
social representation of welfare provision at specific historical moments (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982). After all, according to Franklin and Parton, for much of the news 
media social workers have become "a metaphor for the entire public sector, 
personifying the 'evil' which the political new right presumes to be inherent therein" 
(1991:9). This is not to dismiss, out of hand, the techniques advocated in such 
textbooks,- one of the central themes in this study is to consider their effectivity in the 
context of union communications. However, an approach which fails to empirically 
explore the politics of source and news media interaction or to place such interaction in 
the wider context of power distribution, organisational structure and ideology, will be 
unable to grasp the complexity of the news communication process. 
It is common to find empirically unsubstantiated assumptions about the effectivity of 
pubiic relations work in even the more theoretically sophisticated accounts of how 
marginal and ideologically vulnerable groups may engage with the news media. To take 
the example of social work briefly once more, Franklin and Parton note that voluntary 
and private sector social work enjoys 'a much more positive media representation ... ' 
which they attribute to 'the much more proactive public relations strategies ... ', that 
organisations, such as the NSPCC and the Save the Children Fund have adopted in 
contrast to the statutory sector (1991:44). Little hard empirical evidence is offered to 
support this explanation. Later, however, in the same chapter they appear much less 
confident regarding the effectivity of proactive public relations, suggesting that media 
coverage of social work reflects 'circumstances of political, economic and ideological 
change ... ' and that only: 
' ... structural changes in the nature of social work, or in 
the political economy and the new welfare consensus , might 
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radically shift media presentations of the profession. But such 
reasoning smacks of determinism and recourse to a media strategy 
of passive fatalism. A proactive media relations policy may be 
able to achieve only limited objectives, but these are extremely 
valuable and there appear to be few alternatives.' 
(Franklin and Parton, 1991:52) 
This encapsulates precisely the question which requires empirical exploration. Between 
the 'doomsday' scenario of Nell Myers and the gung-ho naivety of the public relations 
textbooks, lies the middle ground reality of structural and political limitation, on the 
one hand, and the impact of agency and skilled intervention, on the other. The 
ambivalence in Franklin and Parton' s final conclusion arises from the uncertainty of 
concrete, empirical circumstances. Much has been written on the ways in which we 
should describe, theoretically, the relationship between the news media and their 
political and economic environments. We know a great deal now about the routine 
practices of news journalists. We know much less about the effectivity of the 
techniques and strategies marginal or unofficial news sources may use to negotiate the 
various structural, political and ideological barriers which may obstruct their attempts 
to offer alternative perspectives and agendas through the news media. 
This chapter will now briefly consider what bodies of theoretical literature are 
available to assist in the analysis of the relationship between news sources, such as 
trade unions, and the national news media. The conclusion to be drawn is that this area 
has been, until very recently, neglected both empirically and theoretically. 
Trade union communications: a gap in the literature. 
In beginning to consider the relationship between unions and news sources we might 
anticipate relevant concepts and insights to be offered by three research traditions: 
i) Conventional pressure group theory. 
ii) The sociology of industrial relations. 
iii) The sociology of journalism and news production. 
If, as Schlesinger suggests (1990), one of the problems with much of the sociology 
of journalism is its 'media-centrism', then equally the problem with a great deal of the 
work on pressure groups is its 'state-centrism'. A common assumption running through 
much of the conventional pressure group literature is that the primary objective of any 
pressure group, sectional or promotional, insider or outsider, is to secure influence 
within the central or local state. Thus, in the early post war 'classic' accounts we find 
Finer defining pressure groups in terms of their attempts 'to influence the policy of 
public bodies in their own chosen direction' (1966:3), while Eckstein even more 
emphatically insists that, 
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'Basically, it is always the interplay of government structures, 
activities and attitudes which determines the form of pressure 
group politics .. .in a given society' (1960:17). 
There seems little scope for the exploration of source media relations in these early 
approaches. More recently Richardson and Jordan insist that organisations only count 
as pressure groups if their main aim is to attempt to persuade 'the authorities in the 
political system or sub-system' [that they] 'should make an authoritative allocation' 
(1985: 16) and even the most recent pressure group textbooks retain similarly narrow 
definitions (see, for example, Smith,l993:2). 
Such state or government-centric definitions almost preclude the possibility of 
theoretically constituting the mass media as an additional arena for lobbying activity. 
And yet, there are very good grounds for developing just such a theoretical model. 
Some political organisations appear to have much wider ambitions than simply winning 
influence within government or amending particular legislative paragraphs. The 'new 
social movements', for example, have much broader agendas concerned with 
encouraging wider changes in values and lifestyle (Roche,1995; Scott,1990) and the 
mass media are often identified as playing an important part in this process. Even on a 
less ambitious scale, a number of groups who are ultimately concerned with securing 
influence within the state, identify the mass media (rightly or wrongly) as offering an 
important tool in cultivating an appropriate climate of opinion as a pre-condition for 
more focused lobbying of the state. The National Union of Communication Workers, 
for example, has recently been identified by political correspondents as the organisation 
behind a successful lobbying campaign to obstruct government plans to privatise the 
Post Office. The Daily Telegraph was targeted as a key news medium because it was 
likely to be read by large numbers of voters living in the constituencies of back bench 
Conservative MPs. 
Beyond this, there are a number of lobbying groups which have at times explicitly 
identified mass media organisations rather than the policy making institutions as their 
prime targets for political activity including, for example, groups campaigning against 
sexism and racism in the media or against the misrepresentation of unions or other 
groups (Manning,1991). Broader definitions of pressure groups and more flexible 
approaches to the study of the lobbying process in the pressure group literature would 
allow a deeper and more fruitful investigation of the relationship between such political 
organisations and the mass media. The typologies conventionally used to classify 
pressure groups also tend to deflect rather than concentrate theoretical attention upon 
the mass media. Simple dichotomies between 'promotional' and 'sectional' 
(Potter, 1961 : 25) or between non-economic and economic interest groups 
(Moran,l989:123; Marsh,l983) focus attention upon the values and ambitions of 
members in relation to state policy, not the strategies employed. In turn, the various 
relationships which may exist between pressure groups and the mass media are 
frequently entirely over-looked. 
Yet, these relationships in their own right can be crucial in determining the options 
open to particular groups. Golding and Middleton show that journalists frequently 
distinguished between the 'reliable' and the 'unreliable' political axe-grinding groups 
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(1982: 119). A 'legitimacy' on the pages, particularly, of the broad sheet press is likely 
to be of assistance in achieving legitimacy in the eyes of ministers and officials within 
state departments, too. We know, for example, that the CPAG, Shelter and some other 
groups in the 'poverty lobby' were able to accumulate political capital through the 
shrewd use of media campaigning in their early years during the 1960s and early 1970s 
(5). Both Shelter and the CPAG ensured that their headquarters were located in very 
close proximity to Fleet Street, despite the very high office rents, because as Des 
Wilson explained, ' ... it would cost us a lot more if were not there. Shelter has been 
built by, and around, the communication world, and it owes a lot to its close proximity 
to the media' (Wilson,l970:158). 
In recent years an alternative way of classifying groups in terms of their proximity 
to the departments of state has become widely accepted. Grant (1990 and 1985) 
distinguishes between 'insider groups' who enjoy regular access to government 
departments and 'outsiders' who are denied such privileged access. However, he 
further subdivides insider groups into 'prisoners', dependent upon government for a 
variety of reasons and 'low profile' or 'high profile' groups. 'Low profile groups' opt 
for behind the scenes negotiation with government officials while 'high profile' groups 
seek to exploit the mass media to strengthen their position. 'Outsiders' are also sub-
divided into 'potential insiders', 'outside groups by necessity' (these groups lack the 
required skills or resources to win insider status though this may simply mean 
formulating politically 'unrealistic' demands) and 'ideological outsiders' who prefer to 
remain on the outside, rather than embrace the 'rules of the game' which govern 
relations between government and 'insider groups'. What is important about Grant's 
typology is that it directs attention towards questions of ideology and legitimacy as 
well as access. If, as Grant implies, those groups who project 'radical' values and 
objectives, are less likely to enjoy 'insider' status, this suggests that the mass media 
may play a crucial part in 'constructing' the ideological and political status of such 
groups. We know, for example, that both the CPAG and Shelter were careful to 
publicly distance themselves from the more militant wing of the poverty lobby (Whitely 
and Winyard, 1984:35-36; Seyd 1975:426). 
Although the insider-outsider typology is suggestive and prompts further questions 
regarding the 'politics' of source-media interaction, these are rarely explored in the 
conventional pressure group literature. The insider-outside model might usefully be 
applied to news media organisations, themselves. Journalists frequently distinguish 
between sources whose track record of 'reliability' and 'usefulness' normally ensures 
that they can secure a correspondents attention and those 'axe-grinding' groups who 
lack sufficient political credibility to command the attention of news journalists and 
consequently, remain on the 'outside'. To secure media attention these groups have to 
work harder, organise publicity stunts and generate high profile 'celebrity' status 
(Gitlin 1980:ch 5) though the danger is that such strategies can further reinforce an 
ideological marginality (Greenberg, 1985). 
What is required is a model of the political process which describes the dynamic 
inter.play between the political standing of groups in the eyes of government, their 
status in the eyes of the news media and the skills and strategies (the 'political and 
cultural capital') which particular groups can draw upon. Beyond this level, of course, 
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deeper questions of power and structure have to be addressed. Unfortunately, the roots 
of conventional pressure group theory in pluralism have, in the past, tended to 
encourage a narrow focus upon the empirically measurable process of decision making 
and away from the broader questions of power (broadly defmed), ideological 
legitimacy (Dearlove and Saunders 1984:68) and the work of the news media (6). As 
has been frequently pointed out, a narrow focus on decision making and political 
outcomes is likely to ignore the dimension of non-decision making and agenda setting 
(Crenson, 1971). 
Even where the role of the news media is included in a model of the decision 
making process, the methodology of pressure group theory is unlikely to capture either 
the processes through which the news media might impact upon the state or the 'media 
work' undertaken by pressure groups in the process. Kingdon, for example, simply 
asked the U.S. government officials involved in his case studies of transport and health 
policy, whether or not they had been consciously influenced by media coverage to 
which the majority, not surprisingly, replied in the negative (Kingdon, 1984). Grant, 
himself, has studied those pressure groups broadly representing the interests of capital 
(1987;1983 and 1977) and yet without including a sustained empirical investigation of 
the ways in which the significant command over resources, enjoyed by these groups, 
can be deployed in media work or the 'cultivation of opinion' preceding decision 
making (or non-decision making). Noting the dissatisfaction of the Chemical Industries 
Association with news coverage of industrial issues is not an adequate investigation of 
the ideological 'pull' which capital may exert over the processes through which news is 
represented and nor is it sufficient to refute the main thrust of the Glasgow University 
Media Group's work (Grant 1987:31-35). Too many questions are left begging. 
Infrequency of coverage of particular sections of capital or of other powerful groups 
does not, in itself, prove a lack of influence. This is precisely the point Crenson 
(1971) seeks to establish in his 'classic' study of 'silent' agenda setting; a large steel 
corporation can exert influence over the public sphere, including the news agenda, by 
simply having a presence in a local community. It may not have to lift a finger. 
At the same time, however, the conventional pressure group literature frequently 
pictures the mass media as 'channels of last resort'. The 'state centrism', characteristic 
of conventional pressure group theory, leads writers to conclude that resort to 'high 
profile' media campaigning is an indication that an 'insider' group's influence is on the 
wane (Grant 1990:ch 1; 1985). Far better to be on the 'inside' enjoying quiet dialogue 
with government. Only groups lacking real influence in government will go public. The 
bizarre appearance of the President of the CBI on the Jimmy Young radio show a few 
years ago is understood by Grant, for example, to be a sign that during the Thatcher 
years even the CBI experienced a distancing from government. This common 
assumption can be found in much of the writing on pressure groups dating back to the 
early postwar 'classic' texts (Rose 1974:252; Finer 1966:83; Eckstein,1960:73). 
However, just as a low media profile may not indicate either a lack of ideological 
'gravitational pull' or, indeed, confirm a powerful influence in government, so the 
application of 'high profile' media techniques may not automatically imply that the 
doors of the state are shut. We have already noted that in the pre-Thatcher era, the 
poverty lobby used carefully calibrated news media campaigning to accumulate political 
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capital and establish credentials in the eyes of relevant state departments. Far from 
representing the channels of last resort, the news media may offer one set of routes 
through which power can be consolidated. This may be even more true in the 
contemporary political environment in which public relations techniques and spin 
doctoring now represent central processes at the heart of government (Golding, 1992). 
To summarise, for the purposes of this study, the weakness of conventional 
pressure group theory lies in its privileging of state orientated political activity above 
all other forms and its consequent failure to recognise the central importance of the 
news media as an arena for political work, independent of, but related to the state. 
Indeed, the news media represent not one but several distinct arenas (Cracknell, 1993). 
It is for this reason, that important empirical questions concerning the nature and 
effectivity of media strategies and interventions into the news production process by 
pressure groups and sources are rarely posed. 
(ii) Industrial Relations Theory. 
Demanding of researchers and theorists in the field of industrial relations that they 
should have anticipated the growing importance of communications might be compared 
to condemning modem European historians for not anticipating the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. It might be argued that there was very little in the routine of British industrial 
relations in the first two decades after the Second World War to suggest the dramatic 
growth in commercial and corporate public relations in the 1980s. It is clearly the case 
that most representatives of both sides of industry continued to largely ignore the issue 
of communication for a very a long time. As far as journalists were concerned, 
managers and the representatives of capital were habitually much worse at public 
relations than their trade union counterparts (Adeney, 1983). And although we know 
that large corporations were beginning to study the example of corporate America in 
the use of public relations campaigns to, for example, ward off the threat of 
nationalisation, as early as the early 1950s (as noted by Finer, 1966), these strategies 
tended not to touch the routine working lives of most managers or union 
representatives. 
Thus, there was little in the empirical nature of the field to prompt a sustained 
interest in either trade unions or business organisations as sources of news. And the 
central thrust of the dominant theoretical influences within the field also directed 
attention away from questions of communication and the mass media. Nevertheless, the 
growth of white collar unionism, which was noted and identified as of major 
significance, was crucially assisted by the use of public relations techniques, as 
pioneered by certain white collar unions including the NUT, NALGO and, of course, 
Clive Jenkins at the ASTMS (the history of union communication strategies is discussed 
further in the next chapter). The absence of sustained interest in issues of 
communication in the early post-war literature is more difficult to understand in the 
light of the development of white collar unionism. 
The direction of enquiry was determined by a number of theoretical traditions, each 
of which implicitly prompted some attention to communication, but rarely privileged 
communication issues, over other 'determinant' variables which appeared to loom 
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much larger in the processes of bargaining and the eruption of industrial conflict. 
Limitations of space prevent more than a brief identification of each. On the one hand, 
human relations theory, in presenting an alternative to the economic and technical 
determinism of much pre-war industrial relations theory, implicitly offered an agenda 
for the exploration of industrial communication issues but from within the enterprise, 
rather than through external relations, and certainly not in terms of union concerns. 
Thus, the propensity for strikes to erupt might be described as a function of 'work 
place community integration' (Kerr and Siegal, 1954) but the immersion of employees 
in a wider symbolic and ideological environment ignored. The alternative major early 
influence is to be found in various versions of structural and systems theory. In the 
consensual version, an emphasis upon the capacity of the normative order within the 
industrial relations environment to regulate interation between managements and unions 
(Dunlop,l958; Flanders,l968) encouraged a search for the mechanisms through which 
equilibrium was maintained within the workplace. As Eldridge comments (1968:20), 
Dunlop's systems model invites connections to be made with the external environment 
and for questions to be posed regarding the relationship between industrial actors, the 
internal normative order within the enterprise and ideological structures in society. 
However, these themes are not developed and the opportunity to formulate specific 
questions about industrial communication strategies not taken. As Banks notes, such 
models rarely explore the connections between industrial relations systems and wider 
structures of political power and economic ownership in society (Banks 197 4: 18) , let 
alone power in relation to symbolic representation and communication. 
An alternative theoretical tradition which does acknowledge the importance of wider 
structures of political and economic power, identifies conflict as an essential feature of 
the industrial relations system (Allen,1971; Hyman,l984). However, conflict is 
normally defined in industrial rather than ideological terms. The movement away from 
theories of system and structure represented an attempt to avoid the dangers of socio-
economic or technical determinism and to place in the foreground the dimension of 
social action. Batstone et al (1978), for example, argued that while 'structural and 
general theories', might 'point to the conditions under which strikes occur ... strikes 
involve groups of workers making common decisions ... ' (Batstone et al1978:223). It 
was to this level of social action, involving group dynamics and the exchange of 
meaning to which theories of industrial relations should address themselves. Again, a 
focus upon the meanings and definitions which shape patterns of action within the 
workplace might prompt questions relating to workplace internal communications and 
the possible contribution of the external symbolic and ideological environment to the 
definitions which workers employed. After all, Batstone et al spend considerable time 
exploring the vocabularies and rationales used by participants to make sense of 
industrial action (1978: 54-55). Even when employing the social action perspective to 
explain the rise of white collar unionism, theorists were reluctant to privilege 
communication or high profile recruitment strategies over the familiar neo-Weberian 
concepts of work situation and economic situation. As Bain comments, for example, 
the former are, 'most of very secondary importance' (Bain 1970: 120). 
So, much of the literature of the period between 1950 and 1980 rested upon 
theoretical frameworks which prompted potentially illuminating questions about trade 
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unions and issues of communication. However, the empirical absence of much formal 
public relations work in the field together with the traditional uses to which these 
theoretical frameworks were put, encouraged researchers to attach little importance to 
the issue of communication strategies or relations with the mass media. Only theorists 
influenced by conventional pressure group theory were prompted, through the case 
study methodology, to make a start in examining these questions. Coates, for example, 
in a study of the teaching unions describes, in passing, their external communication 
strategies and the internal organisational arrangements for press and publicity work. 
Most of the teaching unions recognised the need to employ publicity along two 
dimensions; to exert short term pressure upon government but also 'in order to generate 
a more long term climate of opinion favourable to educational expansion' (Coates 
1972: 17). The NUT, for example, upgraded its press bureau to departmental status in 
1959 before launching the innovative 'Campaign for Education' which made some 
impact upon the agenda of the 1964 general election. The other two main case study 
approaches to trade union organisation drawing upon pressure group theory, produced 
during this decade (May, 1975; Moran, 1974) , similarly explored issues of 
communication in only the most tentative way. Moran, for example, spent little time 
in considering external communication in a study of the Union of Post Office Workers 
and was primarily concerned with the techniques the union employed to secure 'the 
compliance of membership' (1974: 1) which directed research inwards to the problem of 
internal politics and communication between leadership and 'ordinary' members. 
While in these studies, the theoretical framework does prompt a consideration of the 
relations between unions and their ideological and symbolic environments, the analysis 
is left, at best, at the stage of a communications audit. The structure of the relevant 
departments and their responsibilities are noted but more fundamental issues are left 
unexplored. What is the nature of the relationship between unions, as organisations, 
and news organisations? What processes of interaction occur between union officials 
and journalists on the labour beat? Given the ideological and political map of the news 
media, how might trade union officials 'target' particular news or publicity outlets? 
Above and beyond these dimensions, the issue of news source activity has to be placed 
in a broader structural context. How do the ideological, political and economic 
structures which impinge upon news production offer up or limit opportunities for 
unions to communicate their agendas? 
A decade later, as the growing use of public relations techniques and communication 
technologies in many aspects of organisational life grew more and more common, the 
'empirical significance' of internal and external communications for unions compelled 
a critical response. Writers such as Jones (1986) and Sherman (1986) began to address 
these issues but without the benefit of the insights to be gained from the application of 
academic theory. Conventional pressure group theory and industrial relations theory, 
then, have offered insights but little empirical research or sustained theorising. With 
the exception of the preliminary Glasgow University Media Group research (Philo and 
Hewitt, 1976), surprisingly as we shall see next, the sociology of news sources and 
news production is little more helpful. 
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(iii) The Sociology of News Sources and News Production 
Blumler commented fourteen years ago that we should ... 
"expand the range of actors whom we are prepared regularly to 
take into account when conducting research into mass communi-
cation as a social process. That is, we should increasingly 
be treating mass communication as a 'three-legged stool', 
involving not only journalists and audiences but also all 
those political and other interest groups that strive to 
reach audiences by developing strategies for influencing 
journalists. So a more full and rounded version of agenda 
setting still awaits in the wings to be called onto the 
research stage." (Blumler,l980:373) 
A sociology, informed by a theoretical awareness of the nature of power and control 
over symbolic resources, but capable of empirically exploring the strategies through 
which potential news sources sought to negotiate and influence journalists, was a timely 
suggestion. Surprisingly, it has taken almost a further decade for researchers within the 
sociology of journalism to turn Blurnler's 'three-legged stool' into a research agenda. 
Of course, there are a number of distinct theoretical traditions which inform the field, 
each of which offers a particular vantage point. Golding and Middleton usefully 
distinguish 'biographical' accounts which stress, in an overly-simplistic way the overt 
bias and ideological predisposition of individual journalists; 'organisational' 
explanations which point to the routine rhythms and dynamics of news organisations 
and finally, 'ideological' explanations which may incorporate a number of elements 
identified in the first two explanatory types but which seek to subsume these within 
broader accounts of the part the news media play in lending 'form and authority' to 
'dominant values in British society' (Golding and Middleton, 1982: 113). A similar 
'map' is provided more recently by Schudson (1989) who adds a 'political economy of 
news' to the 'social organisation of news work' tradition and 'culturological 
approaches' , broadly Golding and Middleton' s 'organisational' and 'ideological' 
explanations respectively. 
The earliest 'gatekeeper' models of news production did focus exclusively upon the 
selection criteria of particular journalists ( for example, White 1950) and they find their 
parallel in some of the more naive contemporary public relations textbooks. As Elliott 
and Golding comment with an appropriate aphorism; ' ... the obvious weakness of this 
explanation is that news changes very little when. the individuals who produce it are 
changed' (1979:207). A 'political economy' approach, on the other hand, in 
emphasising the way in which news production and communication generally is 'shaped 
at every level by the structured asymmetries in social relations' (Golding and Murdock, 
1991: 18), insists upon the need to place the activity both of individual journalists and 
the social relationships through which they produce news in a wider social and 
economic context. In Schudson's critical review, it is recognised that 'the more 
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sophisticated versions [of political economy] not only add to but are essential to an 
understanding of the generation of news' (1989:267). 
However, Schudson also notes a number of 'possibilities' which the 'political 
economy' approach, he believes, is inclined to overlook. One is the, perhaps, 
increasing frequency of occasions when the news media 'turn upon' governments and 
institutionalised authority in ways allegedly inconsistent with the interests of the 
economically powerful. Critical coverage of Watergate and the Vietnam war are 
offered as examples. This criticism conflates the instrumental and structural dimensions 
of the political economy approach, condemning both with the 'sins' of the cruder 
versions of the former. But perhaps, more importantly , it misses one of the essential 
points of the political economy of news production,- a market driven system of news 
production is most unlikely to weave a seamless ideological web. There will be 
frequent occasions when the imperative to compete in ever sharper circulation and 
ratings battles generates corrosive news values which override the more conservative 
inclinations of editors and proprietors, as the British Royal Family and successive 
Conservative cabinet ministers have recently discovered to their cost. And some of the 
other 'omissions' Schudson notes; little discussion of either the characteristic 
dependence upon official sources or the predilection for 'news bite' formats, are not 
unrelated to such pressures either. 
Nevertheless, for Schudson 'the failure' of political economy to pursue enquiries 
into the news room is a significant weakness. It thwarts a sustained investigation of the 
possibility of 'ideological contestation' and the 'institutional mechanisms', 'cultural 
traditions', and 'contradictions of power' which 'provide room for debate and revision' 
(Schudson,1989:270). In other words, there are always possibilities and opportunities 
for those, outside the sphere of the dominant political and ideological elites, to make 
interventions within the news production process and to present alternative political 
agendas but for Schudson these are only accessible through an analysis of 'the social 
organisation of news work'. While Schudson recognises the importance of the 
processes political economy seeks to describe, he fails to do justice to the subtlety of a 
sophisticated political economic analysis. For Golding and Murdock, we should 'think 
of the economic dynamics as defining key features of the general environment within 
which communicative activity takes place, but not as a complete explanation of the 
nature of that activity' (1991: 19). There is plenty of scope, then, for exploring the 
social relationships of news journalism, the organisational dynamics of news production 
and the politics of journalist-source interaction within such a framework. At the 
broadest level, this is 'the picture' of the place of the news media within society which 
is assumed at the beginning of this project. The task is to trace the possibilities for 
'ideological contestation', 'debate and revision' as they emerge through the politics of 
labour journalism and within the constraints of the political economic environment. 
The role of the state, too, is often highlighted in political economic accounts of 
media production. In this project, also, the state is found to play an important part. The 
fortunes of the labour correspondents as an occupational group were strongly associated 
with the growing and then diminishing political potency of trade unions, on the one 
hand, and changes in the political composition of government, on the other. And, of 
course, government had a lot to do with the fortunes of trade unions, in the first place. 
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In turn, the media work of trade unions in seeking to gain access to the news media, is 
inextricably bound up with the fortunes of labour and industrial journalism. So at both 
instrumental and structural levels, the presence of the state cannot be ignored. 
The 'ideological' or 'culturological' approach identified above 'emphasises the 
constraining force of broad cultural symbol systems regardless of the details of . 
organisational and occupational routines', according to Schudson (1989:266). Some of 
the examples selected by Schudson are a little unrepresentative here, too. While Stuart 
Hall, for example, has been associated with debates over the nature of 'dominant 
ideologies' and the role of the media in their reproduction, the importance of the 
concrete, material and organisational context is frequently acknowledged (Hall et a!, 
1978). However, it is the case that there are difficulties in seeking to 'read off' or make 
inferences about the politics and social relations of news production on the basis of the 
analysis of ideology as it 'appears' in media content (Elliot, 1981; Cottle, 1993:9). For 
the purposes of this study, the importance of journalists' 'inferential frameworks' is 
recognised as, for example, they relate to trade unionism and industrial relations, but 
these are placed within the context of the politics and day to day routines of labour and 
industrial journalism. Undoubtedly, the significance of generalised values and 
ideological perspectives in shaping the practice of news journalism has to be 
acknowledged but there is a danger in beginning an analysis at this level. From this 
starting point, it is easy to slip towards an account of ideological reproduction which 
pictures ideology as an enveloping blanket and overlooks the tensions, conflicts and 
struggles involved in all communicative activity, including union media work and 
labour journalism. 
This is the source of difficulty with the concept of 'primary definers', a concept 
deduced from 'reading' the ideological nature of media texts, rather than through 
empirical investigation of the concrete practice of sources and journalists. In the work 
of Hall et a! (1978), it is assumed that the state and its associated agencies will act as 
'primary definers' of events and agendas in the news, given their privileged, strategic 
ideological position. A sociology of news sources, however, is likely to reveal that in 
particular circumstances, it is possible for non-official sources to exploit opportunities 
to intervene in the news production process and to counter 'official' definitions of 
events, as in the case of environmental politics (Anderson 1993:53; 1991). As 
Schlesinger comments, too often in employing the concept of 'primary definers' 
research reveals a disappointing lack of curiosity about the nature and effectivity of 
source strategies ( 1990 : 68). 
Further to this, as Schlesinger argues (1990:62-69), models based upon the concept 
of 'primary definition' are by implication 'uni-directional' with the flow of 'definitions' 
travelling always outwards from the state to the media and little allowance being made 
for the possibility, however rare, that media coverage may impact upon the state and its 
'accredited witnesses'. It is also possible to find plenty of instances when 'primary 
definers' are not wholly satisfied with the 'defmitions' communicated as in the case, for 
example, of social policy coverage (Golding and Middleton,1982: 114-117). 
The concept also tends to over-emphasise the cohesion of the state as a structure. As 
this study explores through a brief history of labour and industrial correspondents, 
some of the most valuable source material for journalists is produced through the 
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tensions between departments of state and the contradictory 'definitions' which may 
emerge, on and off the record. Recent work on the 'representation' of the 'poll tax', 
vividly illustrates how things can go wrong from the point of view of the government 
as a 'primary definer', if tensions 'within the power structure' (Deacon and 
Golding, 1994:202) begin to generate a critical discourse which undermines the primary 
definition of policy or events. As Deacon and Golding demonstrate, the 'seeds of 
dissent' regarding the poll tax, 'were sown by other elite sources' (1994:202), 
including from within the Conservative Party, and subsequently reported by the news 
media. 
There are difficulties in drawing up the boundaries between those agencies regarded 
as 'primary definers' and those on the outside, and use of the concept without historical 
context will fail to capture the processes of political change through which 
organisations may lose or gain media authority. In this study,· for example, it becomes 
clear that the TUC and contacts within the larger trade unions were integrated into the 
labour beat from the very earliest days of pre-war labour journalism. Where, then, 
should trade unions be located in terms of the distinction between 'primary' and 
'secondary definers'? Reflecting both the corporate tendencies in British politics two 
decades ago and the theoretical influence of Althusser' s approach to the state, Hall et 
al have no hesitation in identifying trade unions within the category of 'primary 
definers' (Hall et al, 1978:58). Now, of course, the picture looks rather different. Two 
questions have to be asked. Where even during the height of the 'beer and sandwiches 
at Number Ten' era, was the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary definers' to 
be drawn within the trade union movement? If senior trade union figures enjoyed 
'media authority', such accredited status was certainly not extended to all shop floor 
activists or 'ordinary' trade union members. Secondly, if the elite within the labour 
movement no longer enjoys a 'primary' authority how has this come about and how 
were the changes in relationships between journalists and members of the union elites 
managed? 
Schlesinger recognises that 'the way in which journalistic practice is organised 
generally promotes the interest of authoritative sources, especially within the apparatus 
of government and the state' (1990:69) but the task must be to explore how both this 
occurs and how, at the same time, it is possible for alternative definitions to be 
promoted by sources outside this sphere, through an empirically constituted sociology 
of journalism and news sources (7). As Deacon and Golding emphasise, the capacity 
of primary definers to establish a favoured interpretative framework (agenda), does not 
necessarily mean that the dominance of such an interpretative framework is maintained 
beyond the 'generative' or initial phases of news coverage, or that within a particular 
interpretative framework, the evaluation of issues will reflect their perspectives 
(1994:202). It is one thing to successfully place one set of issues on the news agenda, it 
is quite another to influence how those issues are assessed. Primary definition, 
according to Deacon and Golding, involves a continuing interpretative and evaluative 
contest between news sources. 
This brings the discussion back to Schudson' s third approach, the study of the 'social 
organisation of news work'. One of the difficulties here, of course, is that within this 
broad category, there a number of quite distinct theoretical orientations including 
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phenomenological and ethnomethodological investigations into the social processes 
through which journalists 'construct' meaning in interaction with sources (for example, 
Tuchman,l972; Molotoch and Lester,l974; Chibna11,1977;Fishman,l980); 
dramaturgical perspectives which frame journalist and source relations in terms of 
elaborate front stage/ back stage impression management (Altheide and Johnson,l980; 
Ericson et al,l989); organisational perspectives which place interaction with sources in 
the context of the organisational imperatives of news production (for example, Tunstall 
1971; Schlesinger,l978; Cottle,l993; Negrine,l993), not to mention research which 
draws upon political perspectives (mainly varieties of pluralism) to explore the role of 
political elites in news production (for example, Seymour-Ure,l968; Gerbner,l969; 
Tunstall,l970; Sigal,l973; Cockerall et a1,1984; Cracknell,l993). Space precludes an 
extended discussion of each. 
However, it is important to note that each implies a particular view of the balance of 
power between source and journalist. Schlesinger has criticised the 'media-centric' 
nature of most research in the area of media-source relations (Schlesinger et a11989; 
Schlesinger,l990). In the main, the research focus has been from the perspective of 
journalists and news organisations, rather than the sources themselves (Ericson et a! 
1989:24). The strategies and techniques journalists employ to re-work and 'make sense' 
of source material are described; the ways in which the organisational imperatives of 
news production imprint themselves upon journalist and source interaction are 
observed. From these perspectives, the frequent conclusion drawn is that ultimately 
official sources are in the driving seat and that the nature of journalism as an 
occupation encourages official source dependency (for example, Althiede and Johnson 
1980; Fishman 1980; Siga11973;Chibnalll977). For Fishman, journalists spend quite 
a lot of time actually 'repairing' official and bureaucratic accounts, as part of their 
'account constructing work' (1980: 135). Cottle stresses the restrictions of resources, 
staffing and time which encourage official source dependency (though he also stresses 
the variety of communications which emerge from this) (1993:50-52); Altheide and 
Johnson argue the time and space limitations imposed by most news media formats 
prevent the emergence of critical contextualising analysis in coverage of official 
'propaganda' (1980:75). For Chibnall, if crime correspondents established 'exchange' 
relationships with official sources, their exclusive dependence upon the police for 
information was always likely to lead to subcultural 'assimilation' and ultimately 
'manipulation' (Chibnall, 1977: 225). 
And yet, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the nature of the conditions in 
which specialist journalism in some fields is practised means that the balance of power 
does not without interruption favour the interests of the powerful and ideologically 
privileged. Tunstall argued that while journalists working in specialisms directly 
related to revenue goals might be disadvantaged in their dealings with key sources, 
correspondents working in specialisms relatively insulated from revenue goal pressures, 
were less vulnerable to the dangers of source-dependence (Tunstall,l97l:ch 5). In the 
area of social policy correspondents may turn to non-official sources in order to frame 
stories in terms of 'balance' and 'diversity' of perspective (Golding and Middleton 
1982:114-124). Even Molotoch and Lester's concept of 'parallel needs' implies an 
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interdependency between the 'producers, promoters and assemblers' of news 
(1974: 106). 
Most recently, in employing a consciously 'anti-mediacentric' [my term] research 
perspective which seeks to explicitly adopt the perspective of social control agencies as 
sources of news, Ericson et al find that these agencies feel themselves to be at the 
mercy of the news media, having to work within their 'frames' and accept their format 
constraints (Ericson et al1989:378). For Ericson et al, a great deal depends upon the 
concrete circumstances in particular news communication contexts: 
'There is considerable variation in who controls the process, 
depending upon the context, the type of sources involved, 
and what is at issue'. (1989:378) 
What is required is an approach which addresses this empirical activity and variation 
within the structural constraints of economy and polity described above. As 
Schlesinger argues, 'there is the potential for opening up a distinctive problematic: that 
of the social organisation of non-official sources and the ways in which they achieve 
(or fail to achieve) their impact' (1990:71). Some work has already begun along these 
lines in the area of environmental news coverage where the source strategies of 
environmental pressure groups have been recently examined (Anderson,1993; 1991) 
and greater weight attached to the influence of non-official sources (Dunwoody and 
Griffin,1993) and green 'issue entrepreneurs' (Cracknell,l993) in the communication of 
environmental news. Anderson, for example, argues that where official sources are 
slow to react to news events and where there is sufficient weight of public opinion, it is 
possible for non-official sources, such as Greenpeace, to establish an agenda on their 
terms (1993). The degree to which such successes can be maintained over an extended 
period of time is another matter. 
However, considerably more work is required in exploring the range and effectivity 
of the strategies employed by news sources outside the sphere of state, parliamentary 
party and institutionalised power. If access to the news media is 'structured' 
(Schlesinger 1990:75), how do sources negotiate these structures and what resources, 
material and symbolic, are most useful in assisting them ? How much difference do 
inequalities in the distribution of symbolic and material communication resources make 
for groups seeking access? How do journalists respond in particular circumstances to 
the strategies employed by groups engaged in media politics? How do the broad 
structures of political and economic power impact upon these processes? To pursue 
one theme in a little more detail, how do groups experiencing political and ideological 
marginalisation attempt to counter this process,- a question particularly pertinent for 
trade unions? 
Access to the news media is partly governed by 'political credibility', a resource not 
necessarily monopolised by the agencies Hall describes as 'primary definers'. 
According to Molotoch and Lester (1974), the only device which may open up access 
for groups without 'sufficient political credibility' is the mounting of 'disruptive events' 
and yet as Greenberg (1985) and Gitlin (1980: eh 5) note, cultivated notoriety is a 
double-edged sword,- it may purchase short term access to the media at the long-term 
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price of even greater political marginalisaton. Is the choice for marginal groups quite so 
bleak? Some work has been conducted into the relationships between marginal groups 
such as Friends of the Earth,- before the sudden success of green parties in Europe in 
the late 1980s (Greenberg,l985), 'resource poor' community groups 
(Goldenberg,l975) and civil rights and political reform groups (Paletz and 
Entman,l981), and the news media. 
One point to emerge is that marginal groups will vary 'in their capacity and ability 
to exploit the mass media's interests and practices' (Paletz and Entman,l981:124). In 
other words, the agendas of such groups may or may not lend themselves to 
presentation in terms of the conventional news values and frameworks employed in the 
news media. By 'individualising' and 'personalising' key issues, the poverty lobby, for 
example, has achieved some media success in Britain but other marginal groups will 
experience greater difficulty in translating their concerns into appropriate news frames. 
Secondly, the extent to which marginal groups can offer knowledge, information or 
recognised expertise will determine the level of interest specialist correspondents will 
take in their communicative work (Greenberg,l985; Goldenberg,l975:ch 4). A 
research department which enjoys credibility and can respond to the needs of 
· journalists is an important resource but this is not a realistic option for many marginal 
groups. Goldenberg, however, argues that while, 'status, officiality, knowledge and 
money' are 'in short supply for most resource-poor groups', other relevant resources, 
such as 'size, legitimacy and credibility' may be more abundant and all will assist in 
allowing 'group leaders' to gain access to the media (Goldenberg,l975:47). 
Questions are begged here concerning how 'legitimacy' and 'credibility' are 
achieved; which institutions have the power to confer such status positions and what 
interests are served in the process? Nevertheless, Goldenberg' s research is particularly 
useful in distinguishing between types of newspaper. He examines four 'resource poor' 
groups and three metropolitan newspapers in Boston, two of which were conservative 
in editorial outlook but one of which ('The Globe') had an unusually liberal approach 
in hiring radical staff and encouraging 'advocacy journalism'. Goldenberg' s analysis 
attaches appropriate weight to the inequalities in communication resources between the 
'resource-poor' and more powerful conventional sources; he charts the ways in which 
revenue goals and advertising imperatives shape editorial policy, particularly in the case 
of the conservative papers and he explores the ways in which the beat system, the 
organisation of journalistic specialisms and the organisational requirements of daily 
newspaper journalism work against the attempts of 'resource poor' groups to gain 
access. But, at the same time, Goldenberg fmds there are some limited opportunities, 
particularly for groups establishing contact with journalists at 'The Globe'. Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of the commercial and organisational environments, 
Goldenberg pays particular attention to the disposition of key journalists and specialist 
correspondents because ... 
' ... certain properties of reporters affect the likelihood 
that resource-poor groups can gain access to them and through 
them to their newspapers. In spite of the constraints placed 
upon reporters by their newspaper organisations, they still 
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have considerable leeway and discretion.' (1975: 109) 
The 'reporter is the key media person for resource poor groups, the major filter in the 
access process' (1975: 145). Goldenberg argues that gaining access to the press once 
was easily achieved. The problem for 'resource poor' groups was in 'regularizing' 
contacts with the press and in securing 'continuing access'. 'Resource-rich' groups 
enjoyed considerable advantages in initiating and then sustaining press and media 
contacts because they possessed greater amounts of the political, symbolic and material 
resources identified above. Given four 'resource poor' groups and three daily 
newspapers in Goldenberg's study, only three out of the possible twelve 'interactions' 
became 'regularized' (1975: 137). In some cases, the 'resource poor' groups lacked 
even the resources required to begin to identify who the sympathetic journalists on 
particular newspapers might be. Where sustained 'regularized' contact was established, 
this was often on the basis of 'bargains' being struck between sources and reporters 
(1975:36) in which sources could provide exclusive information or privileged 
interviews with leaders and a guarantee of accuracy. In return, reporters would submit 
stories in ways which acknowledged the source perspective and agenda. 
The value in Goldenberg's study is that it acknowledges the importance of the 
political and economic context and the organisational environment of newspaper 
production, whilst seeking to explore empirically the strategies which are available for 
marginal groups in seeking access. Two parts of the story, however, are left 
unexplored. More needs to be said about the processes through which groups can 
secure important resources like 'legitimacy' and 'credibility' before they seek access to 
the news media at any particular moment. Schlesinger, for example, suggests the 
concept of 'cultural capital' as a way of describing the distribution of authority and 
legitimacy (1990:81) in society which in turn implies reference to fundamental 
structures of power. In their study of political reform groups, Palentz and Entman point 
to the importance of visible contacts with political elites in securing legitimacy in the 
eyes of correspondents (1981:141). In focusing empirically upon the media work in 
which sources engage with journalists, it is important not to lose sight of the wider 
picture of political interconnections which may privilege or disadvantage particular 
groups in terms of direct influence and symbolic capital. While it may be possible for 
non-official sources to secure some 'media work' successes, they frequently remain 
disadvantaged by virtue of their politically subordinate positions. The 'power to create 
and distribute meaning still resides with centres of material and political power' 
(Deacon and Golding, 1994: 203). Given such centres of power, it remains the case 
that non-official sources must struggle harder and make more concessions in the effort 
to win credibility in the eyes of journalists. As Anderson (1993), for example, 
illustrates in the arena of environmental politics and media work, green pressure groups 
continue to be identified as 'axe grinders', or 'advocates' in Deacon and Golding's 
terms, rather than authoritative sources, despite occasional successes in promoting 
particular news frames. 'Axe grinders' are unlikely to exercise sufficient authority or 
credibility to significantly shift dominant news agendas. 
Secondly, Goldenberg's study tells us little about how sources may modify their 
agendas,- the content they seek to present to the news media,- according to their 
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understanding of 'what is possible' and how their agendas relate to the distribution of 
legitimacy or 'cultural capital'. Gitlin (1980:ch 5) and Palentz and Entman (1981:130-
131) have explored the ways in which media coverage may have an impact upon the 
strategy of marginal groups. Essentially, marginal groups face a crucial dilemma in 
seeking access to the media precisely because of their ideologically marginal status. 
Seeking regular access to the news media will inevitably involve compromise in terms 
of political strategy and the message communicated. An uncompromising radical stance 
may generate transitory initial coverage, as Goldenberg notes, but after a process 
whereby the radical is 'appropriated as spectacular entertainment' (Palentz and 
Entman,1981:131) the radical group is consigned to the ideological waste lands. On the 
other hand, accommodation to the news criteria, news frames and inferential structures 
of the news media also presents dangers. Typically, news frames limit the discussion 
of 'social process' and the dimension of power (Elliott and Golding,1979:209); news 
is rarely historically informed in anything other than a superficial manner which may 
render the action of radical groups 'incoherent' or 'irrational' (Hartmann 1975; 
Glasgow University Media Group 1976; Downing 1980, etc) (8). Even within the news 
media, a commercial logic drives news selection criteria towards entertainment and a 
concentration upon the atypical which, through the relatively constant flow of news, 
comes to appear as the 'typical' (Golding and Middleton, 1982: 128-129). Radical or 
marginal groups have to consider the extent to which they 'format' their messages to 
suit these patterns in coverage or attempt to undermine them. Too great a resistance to 
conventional news formats and formulae is likely to result in failure, too great an 
accommodation to the 'needs of the news media' may result in 'incorporation'. 
To take one example, from a recent article advocating the use of modem public 
relations techniques to assist the media work of one ideologically beleaguered group of 
public agencies, local authority social service departments. Walder claims that is 
possible to modify potential dominant story lines selected by the press and provides as 
an example a 'story' she handled in Bradford as press officer for Bradford social 
services. Following comments made by a local politician, local media developed the 
theme of Bradford as the 'child sex capital of Europe'. National tabloid and 
broadcasting jouroalists picked the story up but through a process of 'negotiation' with 
the media, Walder was successful in persuading them to drop the 'child sex capital of 
Europe' headline, in return for some documented cases and an interview with the 
director of social services (Walder, 1991:211). The headline may have been amended 
but the original news agenda and frame remained unmodified and legitimacy given to 
the story through the case studies and interview with the director of social services. 
This could be regarded as a public relations success but equally it involves a process of 
'media incorporation' in which news values and journalists' inferential structures are 
allowed to 'frame' the main elements of the communicative work undertaken by the 
sources. 
Further to this, a 'holistic' perspective is needed which places the media strategies of 
source organisations in the context of their overall objectives and broader political 
strategies. What impact, for example, does anticipation of the likely news frames and 
interpretations have upon broader strategy and practice? There is evidence in the areas 
of social policy (Seyd, 1975 and 1976; Whitely and Winyard,1983 and 1984), crime 
25 
·• 
and criminal justice (Schlesinger et al,1991) and environmental politics 
(Cracknell, 1993) that anticipation of media responses can shape and constrain the 
political strategy of source groups in significant ways. Is it the case that media 
incorporation can go hand in hand with political incorporation? Possible incorporation 
along either political or media dimensions has been given relatively little explicit 
attention in either the developing empirical work on source media interaction 
(Goldenberg,1975; Anderson,1993) or the theoretical manifestos for future research 
(Schlesinger, 1990). 
This section has described how the theoretical framework for a sociology of sources 
and news work has emerged in recent years and the extent to which empirical research 
has illuminated our understanding of the social practices of news sources in their 
contact with the news media. It has pointed to some of the ways in which this work 
may be related to the broader structures of political and economic power in which such 
source-media interaction takes place. Schlesinger suggests that the work of 'internalist' 
researchers, those engaged in exploring the accounts of journalists, editors and those 
directly engaged in the production of news, needs to be supplemented with an 
'external' account, ' a thorough going analysis of the strategic and tactical action of 
sources in relation to the media' (1990:72). The intention of this study is to employ 
both 'internal' and 'external' perspectives in exploring the relation between unions as 
sources and journalists working for the daily press. 
Research Questions and the Changing Research Focus 
The present research grew out of these theoretical and empirical concerns. In the 
complaints expressed by Nell Myers in her battle with the NUM's 'front line troops', it 
seemed that all the difficulties of a non-official source with limited symbolic or cultural 
capital were being expressed. An important task appeared to be to consider the position 
of trade unions as news sources; determine their preferred news agendas and assess the 
problems they experienced in offering these agendas to the news media. What strategies 
could secure access to news media coverage or to what extent was the 'structural 
pessimism' of Nell Myers warranted? In turn, this involved tracing the nature of the 
relationships established between union press officers, officials and journalists on the 
labour beat, whilst at the same time, in the light of the theoretical discussion above, not 
losing sight of the political and economic context in which news media work occurs. 
In the end, in order to address these themes the research required substantial 
empirical investigation in four areas; a content analysis of union journal content, a 
series of fifteen interviews with trade union press officers, a series of nineteen 
interviews with current and former specialist newspaper correspondents, and a 
substantial qualitative case study of newspaper coverage of the 1989 Ambulance 
Dispute. In addition, considerable work was invested in exploring historical materials, 
documents and biographical accounts in order to place both the development of union 
communication work and the development of labour and industrial journalism in a 
historical context. More details are provided in appendix three. 
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The most significant anticipated limitation at this stage was the position of the 
researcher, employed full-time as a lecturer in a college of higher education but with 
only limited resources in terms of time and support at his disposal. Without access to 
the extensive video recording facilities and staff support required to undertake a 
quantitative analysis of broadcasting news output it was decided to concentrate upon 
daily newspaper coverage which was amenable to quantitative and qualitative analysis 
through a 'low cost' research design. 
Further information on the selection of unions for the panel and the research 
methodology is supplied in appendices one to three. However, at this stage it is 
necessary to explain why the study did not attempt to provide a narrowly defined and 
precise measure of 'news work' (9) performance, but rather opted for a more widely 
focused account of the work of trade union press officers and their relationships with 
journalists, together with a qualitative assessment of news work strategies. It became 
increasingly clear as the study developed that at each stage the most interesting 
questions to pose were not necessarily quantitative in nature. At the very beginning it 
was assumed that differences in material resourcing for media work would be a very 
significant variable and accordingly a quantitative assessment of communication 
resourcing for all unions with a membership above 45,000 was undertaken as a 
preliminary step (10). However, as the research progressed it became clear that while 
quantitative differences in resourcing were significant, they were by no means 
determinant and that the nature of the strategies employed by press officers, the politics 
and internal organisation of particular unions and the expectations of journalists were 
far more important. In any case, the arrival of the cheap FAX machine was, at the time 
the research was being undertaken, actually producing an equalising effect. Prior to 
this, some unions did invest more heavily in facilities such as a Universal News 
subscription (very expensive relative to the budgets of most union press and publicity 
sections). However, a simple and inexpensive FAX machine combined, perhaps, with 
an 'intelligent' dialling mechanism would serve as a more effective alternative for a 
fraction of the price. Over the course of the research period, all but one of the unions 
in the study began to use this system as their main mechanism for disseminating press 
releases and information to journalists. On the other hand, the number of staff with 
relevant expertise employed in press and media work was and is a significant material 
factor. Yet again, in the course of the research (which as the product of a part-time 
researcher necessarily had an 'extended temporal dimension'), an equalising effect was 
produced as more and more unions hired at least one full time press officer. 
So it was clear that while the possession of certain material resources was 
important, particularly staff numbers and access to basic communication technology 
such as a FAX machine, differences between unions selected for the panel in these 
areas were growing less pronounced and that a number of the most interesting 
differences between unions (in terms of the strategy and techniques of press officers 
and the internal politics of particular unions) were more appropriately explored in 
qualitative ways, although quantitative evidence was still likely to be relevant. 
Secondly, a quantitative analysis of union journals and newspapers might be useful 
and informative but certainly would not represent a comprehensive measure of each 
union's preferred agenda for the national news media. This is for the simple reason that 
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union memberships and the general audience for news are two distinct target audiences. 
A union might have one agenda for members, quite another for the general public or 
sections of it and, perhaps, another for key 'opinion leaders' within political and media 
elites. Clearly, a second 'measure' of each union agenda was required and this was 
obtained through qualitative, semi-focused interviews with union press officers and 
officials. 
Thirdly, it was expected that much of the research with trade union media workers 
would be of a qualitative nature. However, as this work was undertaken more and more 
questions emerged regarding the nature of the relationships between union staff and 
journalists. What, for example, did journalists want from their relationships with union 
press officers? How did journalists, themselves, evaluate the work of union press 
officers? What criteria were employed and in terms of these criteria who performed 
best? Most significantly, it was clear that a majority of experienced union press officers 
recognised the concept of a 'bargain' in their relationships with journalists. Was this a 
concept shared by journalists and correspondents? As we have seen, there are few 
studies which have addressed source-journalist relationships from both sides. It seemed 
important in this study to do exactly that. 
However, the study continued to evolve. In talking to contemporary labour and 
industrial correspondents (and union officers), it became clear that there was a general 
recognition that the occupational specialism of labour reporting was experiencing both 
change and decline. To take one example, it became clear that most labour and 
industrial correspondents were having to re-define and extend their 'beats', though they 
also felt themselves to be becoming more desk bound. This had important implications 
for the nature of the relationships between union officers and journalists. And yet it was 
difficult to assess the significance of such changes without employing a historical 
perspective through which to trace the emergence of labour reporting as a specialism 
and the changing geography of the labour beat. The review of existing literature on 
media-source interaction (above) has pointed to the importance of retaining an 
awareness of the political and economic context within which media-source interaction 
occurs. A further exploration of the history of labour and industrial reporting appeared 
to offer one way in which the effect of broader political and economic forces could be 
traced through to the daily practice of journalists and sources. The contours of the 
labour beat, for example, were partly shaped historically by the arrangement and 
orientation of the departments of state and the political organisation of the labour 
movement. Yet again, though, this pushed the research design in a qualitative 
direction. 
Finally, as more was learnt of the objectives of different union press officers, the 
strategies they employed to try to achieve those objectives and the nature of the 
'bargaining' which occurred between union staff and journalists, it became clear that a 
quantitative content analysis of newspaper content was unlikely to capture the possible 
'effectivity' of a union media strategy. Inevitably the coding categories employed in 
most content analyses are fairly rough measures of 'meaning', unlikely to capture the 
inflections which a union press officer might seek to inject into a story with the view, 
for example, to 'damage limitation'. Few union press officers believed that 'any 
publicity was good publicity' and accordingly simple frequency counts of the number 
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of occasions either the name of a union or a union official appeared were going to miss 
the point. No union press officers expected newspapers to incorporate, unmodified the 
direction and detail of a particular 'union line'. In most cases, they perceived the task 
to be one in which the predictable features of labour reporting were 'harnessed' as 
effectively as possible to communicate the union view. In these circumstances, an 
evaluation of the effectivity of a particular media strategy was likely to require a close 
consideration of the text to determine the extent to which either unions, employers or 
government were successful in inserting elements of their preferred agendas and 
interpretative frameworks, in this process of 'harnessing' the news format. Once again, 
this suggested a qualitative approach. 
Through the evolution of the study and the attempt, at each stage, to grapple with the 
problem of describing, understanding and analysing the communicative work of trade 
unions as sources of news, it became clear that the research process was essentially 
qualitative in nature,- a view which, perhaps, the researcher should have recognised at 
the beginning when this research first began in the second half of the 1980s. Certainly, 
this is a conclusion anticipated by Schlesinger who points to the difficulties, amongst 
others, in defining quantitative criteria of media 'success'. As Schlesinger implies, a 
quantitative research design based upon measures of source 'input' and media 'output' 
is unlikely to do justice to the complexity of the social relationships - and the 
possibilities and constraints which these entail- involved in source-media interaction. 
'As for applying cost-benefit analysis, despite its heuristic 
value, we would be well advised to be cautious. The reason 
for this is the difficulty of establishing unambiguous criteria 
of success in the realisation of communicative goals, and 
indeed, in ranking such goals themselves.' (1990:80). 
The study, then, is broadly qualitative in nature though quantitative evidence is used in 
appropriate places. The focus of the research is upon the use made by trade union 
personnel of material and symbolic resources and strategies in their efforts to gain 
access to national daily newspapers; the response of journalists, particularly labour and 
industrial correspondents to these interventions; aspects of the political and economic 
environment as they impinge upon these processes through the history of the 
organisation of labour journalism as a specialism, and the fmal evaluation of the 
effectivity of union news media strategies in a case study of newspaper coverage, the 
1989 Ambulance Dispute which involved four of the unions selected in the original 
panel (11). This is informed by what the contemporary union journals had to say about 
these matters and the accounts of the relevant union press officers. 
A formal list of research questions for this study can be tabled as follows: 
1. As politically marginalised, non-official news sources what strategies are employed 
by trade unions in the attempt to present elements of their preferred agendas to the 
national newspapers and to secure more favourable coverage? 
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2. Are there differences in the nature of the strategies employed by unions? To what 
extent do differences in material, political and symbolic resources advantage or 
disadvantage particular trade unions in these attempts? 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between those at the 'interface' between trade 
unions and national newspapers, - in other words, those positioned strategically in 
relation to the flow of information generated by trade unions and received by national 
newspapers? In contemporary circumstances, this question involves examining the 
nature of the relationship between trade union press officers and specialist 
correspondents, particularly those working the labour and industrial beats. 
4. Given that 'access' to the news media is structured, what difficulties do trade unions 
face in employing strategies to present their agendas to national newspapers and in 
seeking to secure favourable coverage? Are these difficulties related to the political and 
economic environment in which labour and industrial news is produced and in what 
ways? Have historical changes in the nature of the political and economic environment 
impacted upon relationships between trade union personnel and newspaper 
correspondents? 
5. What costs (material, political or ideological) do trade unions incur in seeking to 
employ news media strategies? 
6. What can an assessment of newspaper content tell us about the effectivity of news 
media strategies as employed by trade unions? 
The organisation of the chapters is self-explanatory and follows the evolution of each 
research stage. Chapter two completes the introduction to the study by considering the 
recent history of British trade unions' growing interest in communication and news 
media work. In section two, chapter three describes the sample of union journal content 
and considers the question of what it is that trade unions wish to communicate. Chapter 
four also deals with the unions' preferred agenda while beginning to explore the 
practice of trade union press officers within their union organisations. Chapter five 
examines the practice of trade union press officers in their dealings with the external 
environment and in particular the nature of their relationships with labour and other 
specialist correspondents. Section three focuses upon the history of labour journalism in 
the context of the changing political and economic environment in which labour news is 
produced. Chapters six and seven develop a historical dimension to trace the 
development and contraction of labour and industrial journalism as a national 
newspaper specialism. Chapter eight examines contemporary union-newspaper relations 
from the point of view of labour and other specialist correspondents. Section four 
draws the various threads of this study together with two final chapters. Firstly, chapter 
nine briefly reviews the research literature dealing with the representation of labour and 
trade unionism in the news media before describing newspaper coverage of the 1989 
Ambulance Dispute as a qualitative 'case study'. In this way the news media strategies 
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of five unions can be assessed in the context of what we know of the general patterns of 
labour and industrial news coverage. Finally, chapter ten attempts to provide more 
general answers to the questions posed in this introduction. 
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Chapter Two 
Trade Unions: structure, power, ideology and communication. 
'Trade unions must inevitably find new ways of speaking to their members 
and their potential members. Twenty years ago you could probably recruit 
a hundred people by standing outside the factory gates at 5.30am and hand-
ing out a few leaflets saying, " That person in there is a bastard, you need 
us." There are smaller units now, it is far more difficult trying to recruit 
two or three people working in a small office in Beaconsfield than it used 
to be to recruit two or three hundred at Camel Laird. Industry has changed 
and trade unions have to change with it, which means that your communi-
cation techniques have to change. More and more people get their infor-
mation from television, radio, papers and magazines, and that means that 
there are becoming more and more important ways to communicate with any 
potential recruitment audience.' (Adrian Long, Media Officer at the GMB). 
'A union is not a marketing operation. i.e. we are often reacting to an 
agenda not set by the union itself. A union can't be sold like a commodity. 
Press enquiries reflect what's going on in the real world.' 
(Eddie Barrett, Press Officer at the TGWU). 
British Unions in a Changing Environment 
It is not possible, of course, to provide one definitive historical account of 'what 
happened in the 1980s'. Already, there are differences of emphasis and theoretical 
orientation, in the range of social and political interpretations available. For example, 
the most visible political factor shaping the social and economic landscape during the 
last decade has been Thatcherism as an ideological force. A number of writers have 
taken this as their starting point in attempting to understand developments within 
Britain during the 1980s (Kavanagh, 1990; Jones, 1989;Riddell, 1983 and 1989) while 
some have pointed to the social and economic forces underpinning Thatcherism but, 
nonetheless, have still emphasised the particular political potency of Thatcherism as an 
ideological force in its own right (for example, Hall and Jacques,l983). The 
implication of this approach is that we must understand the fortunes of trade unions and 
patterns of industrial relations in the 1980s as being shaped primarily by the policies 
and intentions, the political project of the Thatcher Government. It is certainly the case 
that the Government has identified industrial relations and a weakening of trade union 
power as a primary objective in its economic strategy. 
However, other theorists would place a greater emphasis upon less visible but, 
perhaps, more permanent developments in the nature of capitalist production; the 
impact of the introduction of new technologies to the workplace, and the re-structuring 
of labour markets. After all, a number of crucial structural patterns (decline in 
manufacturing employment, growth in unorganised service sector work, feminisation of 
specific labour markets, etc) are features to be found appearing in many advanced and 
late capitalist societies and early signs of their emergence can be traced back to the 
1960s and before (Edwards et al,1986:5). There are those who commence their 
analysis by describing changes in the nature of production, specifically from Taylorist-
Fordist to Post-Fordist organisation, and then trace the effects and future implications 
of these outwards, in terms of patterns of employment, industrial relations, 
consumption patterns, and so on (Aglietta,1982; Offe, 1985; Lash and Urry, 1987; 
Hall and Jacques, 1989 and Murray 1989)(1). These writers have devoted a 
considerable amount of time to discussing the implications of a shift towards post-
Fordist production and the structures oflate 'disorganised' capitalism for trade unions 
and workplace social relations. Most agree that such shifts bring with them an enhanced 
capacity on the part of employers to control workp1ace relationships and limit union 
influence. It is suggested that this, in turn, is likely to herald the collapse of traditional 
unionism and labourism, forcing upon trade unions the inevitability of re-thinking their 
roles and strategies (for example,Lash and Urry,1987:ch 8; Brown,1986, or Foster 
and Woolfson, 1989). 
Another point of departure for the analysis of recent change is with the structure of 
labour markets, themselves. Goldthorpe, for example, argues that a tendency towards 
'dualism' is now characteristic of most late capitalist economies where private capital 
and the state may respond to the power of organised interest groups representing 
sections of labour, not by directly confronting such power but by taking steps to 
encourage the expansion of secondary labour markets, characterised by the exclusion of 
workers from the rights and rewards of those located in primary markets, including the 
protection afforded by union membership (Goldthorpe,l984.) While the government in 
the hands of Mrs Thatcher did, at times, appear to relish the prospect of directly 
confronting and weakening the power of organised labour, there is some evidence that 
a number of large employers in the private sector were not so combative in their 
treatment of unions and did, indeed, choose rather to encourage the development of 
such 'dual' labour markets rather than exploit the new legislative arsenal provided for 
them by the government (Rubery,l986:108; Ferner and Hyman,1992: pxxvii). 
Whether the starting point is with changes in the organisation of capitalist production 
or with the re-structuring of labour markets, strikingly similar conclusions are drawn 
regarding the political future for trade unions in late capitalist societies. For writers 
such as Goldthorpe (1984) and Cameron (1984), the segmentation of labour markets 
and the emergence of 'dualism' as a feature of capitalist economies are likely to spell 
the decline of corporatist political arrangements and with this, an end to trade union 
influence at the centre of government. This is because trade unions are no longer able 
to 'deliver' workers in the growing and largely unorganised secondary sectors whilst 
the state may seek to loosen their grip upon organised workers in the primary sector. 
Although employing rather different theoretical frameworks, Offe (1985: eh 6) and 
Lash and Urry (1987), for example, draw very similar conclusions concerning the 
collapse of corporatism but are tempted to extrapolate further than 'dualist theory' in 
relation to patterns of culture, consumption and associated political movements . Given 
the complexity of the ways in which a 'disorganised capitalism' draws upon sections of 
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labour, Offe argues that it is no longer possible for trade unions to represent a 'unified' 
working class in their dealings with the state. The interests of' core' workers enjoying 
relatively affluent, consumer orientated lifestyles associated with well rewarded 
positions in primary labour markets, may be quite distinct from casualised workers in 
other secondary labour markets, who may only enjoy a tenuous grip upon formal 
employment. Similarly, Lash and Urry identify 'a decline in the collective identity of 
the working class' (1987:234) as a result of growing differences between private and 
public sector labour markets, the feminisation of occupations and increasing diversity in 
consumption patterns. As unemployment rises there may be increasingly sharp conflicts 
between groups of workers, as 'core' employees defend their interests against those in 
weaker positions (migrant workers, younger workers, and older workers, women in 
non-unionised sectors, etc). 
Offe envisages several dangers for trade unions at this point. Certainly, corporatist 
politics are no longer viable if unions are no longer able to represent to the state the 
'universal' interests of an organised working class. But further to this, there is a danger 
that unions will find themselves defending the interests of privileged 'core' workers 
against the marginalised (1985:160). In turn, given the high rates of unemployment and 
the casualised, sporadic experience of work for many sections of the labour force, a 
more fundamental problem arises, Offe argues, because wage labour grows less and 
less important in shaping the values and lifestyles of potential union recruits. For Offe, 
unions must both adjust their own agendas to reflect these broader concerns (quality of 
life issues, environmental politics and the problems of industrialism) and devise 
strategies which will offer ways of re-integrating marginal groups into the core 
(campaigns over the quality of work, campaigns for flexible and job sharing 
arrangements, etc) (Offe, 1985:162-169). As we shall see, there are some indications 
that these issues are beginning to emerge in the concerns of trade union journals. Offe' s 
attempt to trace the implications of his analysis into the spheres of culture, identity and 
lifestyle find a parallel, of course, in the writings of the proponents of the 'New 
Times' perspective (Hall and Jacques,1989; and also Laclau and Mouffe,1985), where 
it is assumed that movements towards 'decentralisation' in the organisation of work, 
decline in large scale Fordist mass production and the consequent differentiation of 
social classes will produce a decline in traditional class based politics and a new 
preoccupation with a diverse politics of identity and lifestyle. Again, there is some 
limited evidence that some unions are developing an awareness of these issues in the 
content of their journals and this is briefly discussed further in the next chapter. 
However, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the empirical breadth and 
theoretical significance of the changes described above and the durability of the abstract 
models which have been constructed to describe them. The value of 'dualist' models in 
describing political and industrial change in Britain has been questioned by Longstreth 
(1988), while the 'post-Fordistldisorganised capitalism' account has been challenged 
from several quarters (Rustin,1989; Hirst,l989;Sayer,1989; Hyman,199l; Crompton, 
1993). A common theme to be found in the critiques of both the dualist and 
disorganised capitalism theses is a questioning of the extent to which the structural 
changes described can provide the basis either for a generalised analysis of the present 
or for an extrapolation of future trends. Longstreth, for example, argues that while 
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there is compelling evidence for a 'dualization of the workforce', it remains unclear 
whether these patterns are the product of a long term, permanent structural process 
characteristic of late capitalist economies, as suggested by dualist theory, or simply the 
conjuncturally specific product of a particular government's policy and pragmatic 
adaptation by employers in certain but not every employment sector (Longstreth, 1988: 
430-431). 
Similar objections are levelled against the more ambitious claims of Offe, Lash and 
Urry and the proponents of the 'New Times' account. There are dangers in over-stating 
the case in two senses. Sayer (1989) and Hyman (1991) question the extent to which a 
shift towards post-Fordist production relations has really occurred throughout the main 
sectors of the British economy; they take the view that the movement towards post-
Fordism is uneven and that there are good reasons why capital may retain traditional 
forms of production and employment patterns in particular areas. Secondly, there are 
enormous dangers in over-simplifying the historical account. The reluctance of the 
British working class to mobilise in mass political action has long been the subject of 
debate during 'old times', let alone new. There is plenty of evidence to confirm a 
working class preoccupation with 'pleasure', 'lifestyle' and 'consumption' in late 
Victorian, as well as late twentieth century Britain (Crompton,l993:88). The 'post-
Fordist/ disorganised capitalism' account, then, too frequently rests upon a stark 
polarisation between two 'ideal types' and, implicitly, a rather mechanistic model of 
the relationship between the sphere of production and the polity and civil society 
(Ferner and Hyman,1992:pxix). After all, it is possible for a society such as Japan to 
combine a high degree advancement towards post-Fordist production arrangements in a 
number of economic sectors, with extremely conservative patterns in the spheres of 
family life and cultural identity (Hirst, 1989: 325). 
For critics such as Rustin and Hyman, it is important to recognise the diversity in 
forms of capitalist production and in related political arrangements. Post-Fordist 
production relations should be regarded as one variant but even within one society 
there may co-exist a variety of forms of production, depending upon the formulation of 
particular accumulation strategies on the part of capital and the nature of the 'balance of 
forces' at a local level (Rustin,l989:308-9). 
A similar point can be made in relation to the development of political structures. 
According to the 'post-Fordist/disorganised capitalism' account, corporate political 
structures are strongly associated with the era of capitalist mass production and 
Keynesian economic management. Accordingly, corporate state structures wither as 
capitalism develops new 'post-Fordist' forms of production. Even critics such as 
Longstreth and Crouch (1986) concur with the view that one of the distinctive features 
of the recent decade has been the level of sustained political pressure exerted by the 
central state against corporatist arrangements and the legitimacy of trade unions in both 
political and industrial arenas. However, a 'de-corporatised' state is not necessarily a 
weak or de-centralised state, as the Thatcher years in Britain have illustrated. Once 
again, for Ruskin and Hyman, one of the sets of considerations central to an 
understanding of political-economic developments are the strategies and interests of 
capital. There is no necessary contradiction between a growing centralisation of many 
state powers and a decentralisation of particular processes in production and 
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consumption (Rustin, 1989:309). There is a danger, then, in underestimating the 
importance of political strategy in the response of capital to the crises of accumulation 
which characterised the experience of advanced capitalism in the first three decades 
after the war and in stressing, to too greater a degree, the impact of structural change in 
production relations. Hyman (1986), for example, argues that it is the crisis of 
accumulation and the consequent fiscal crisis of the state in late capitalist societies 
which renders the concessions to labour secured through corporate 'post-war 
settlements' no longer sustainable. This kind of analysis places more emphasis upon the 
factors which prompt capital to politically confront organised labour, rather than the 
longer term structural processes which may fragment and undermine working class 
organisation. Viewed in this light, it is possible to point to an important continuity in 
the underlying economic and political rhythms of capitalism. 
Three conclusions can be drawn at this stage. Firstly, there is a general agreement 
that unions must now undertake the development of a political strategy which does not 
assume a return to the politics of coporatism in the near future and there are signs in 
the content of the journals discussed in the next chapter that this is occurring, although 
there is also evidence of a continuing preoccupation with the politics of the centralised 
state, too. Secondly, while there may well be quite an advanced movement towards the 
de-centralisation of industrial relations and enforced labour 'flexibility' in certain 
sectors of the British economy (Ferner and Hyman,l992:xx) , this movement is uneven 
and there remain very sizeable sectors based around traditional patterns of production 
and employment. 
Thirdly, and following from this, it is likely that while some unions may display, in 
their journals and in their wider recruitment and communication strategies a recognition 
of these changes and an attempt to articulate new forms of politics and new patterns of 
consumption, this is unlikely to be a universal feature of trade union responses to the 
events of the post-1979 era. In terms of political strategy, for example, on the basis of 
experience in organising and representing particular employment sectors, unions may 
be more or less sympathetic to the interpretation which stresses political intervention, 
rather than change in class structure and sources of class identification. A great deal 
depends upon the positioning of particular unions in terms of industries, labour markets 
and exposure to the effects of government policy. 
As Ferner and Hyman note, the changes British trade unions have experienced in 
recent years are likely to be partly conjunctural in nature, the product of recession and 
particularly hostile government policy, but there are, also, more fundamental structural 
processes at work, stimulated by international competition and the globalisation of 
large-scale capital (Ferner and Hyman,1992:xxiii). The dramatic decline in 
manufacturing, a drop from eight million jobs to five million between 1971 and 1988 
and the growth in service sector employment from 11.6 million to 15.2 million in the 
corresponding period (Crompton,l993:82) has had a significant impact upon union 
membership and the landscape of the labour movement. Three positions can be 
identified which appear to imply continuing, long term difficulties for British trade 
unions. There are those writers, including Offe (1985) and Lash and Urry (1987), who 
emphasise structural change in the class structure and the composition of segmented 
labour, concluding that the traditional basis for collectivist organisation is being eroded. 
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Although employing a distinct theoretical framework, Goldthorpe (1984) can be 
included here. There are those arguments, specific to the British experience, which 
assume that Thatcherism has been successful in securing a permanent purchase upon 
employees, fostering a more individualised workplace outlook (Hall and 
Jacques,1983;Ha11,1988) and those who remain sceptical of the view that a new form 
of capitalism is emerging but who, nonetheless, believe that there are good reasons why 
capital should mount a sustained attempt to claw back the ground lost to labour through 
the 'post-war settlement' (Hyman,l991; Coates,1989;Hyman and Elgar,1981). 
However, it is by no means certain that structural or 'compositional' changes 
(changes in the nature of the class structure and/or changes in the ideological 
orientation of employees) will 'inevitably' produce a decline in the vitality of trade 
unionism. There are good grounds for treating the 'compositional' analysis with some 
caution (Kelly,l990). A number of the socio-economic changes identified by theorists 
such as Offe, Scott and Lash, and Hall (1988) pre-date Thatcherism and can be found 
in periods of union growth as well as decline; while many late capitalist societies 
display the structural features and patterns of change identified in the compositional 
argument, there is enormous variation in the ways in which trade union movements 
have responded (some with significant success), empirical attitudinal survey data fails 
to support the argument for permanent ideological change, and even within the 
economic sectors most likely to display features of new 'post-Fordist', non-unionised 
workplace relations, such as electronics, there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
it is the 'business cycle' and the accompanying political climate rather than deeper, 
permanent structural change which has brought a harsher climate for unions 
(Kelly, 1990:33-34). 
One of the most acute problems for the labour movement as a whole is to distinguish 
between the permanent feature and the conjuncturally specific. As discussed below, the 
debate between those stressing structural or compositional change and those suggesting 
that a decline in unionism is a less permanent product of the business cycle, is of vital 
significance for unions in considering questions such as the effectivity of recruitment 
drives (Mason and Bain, 1993) and of course, political and communication strategies. 
Practical implications: the concrete experience of unions since 1979, 
Though Thatcherism may have left collective bargaining structures relatively unscathed 
at a local level, nonetheless, its impact upon the national political environment for 
trade unions has been both visible and dramatic. It has been suggested that trade 
unions' own conservatism ( a theme which also emerges from the review of union 
journal content in the next chapter); their reluctance to demand a system of industrial 
relations based upon rights, as in other European countries, rather than immunities 
(Mcllroy,1989), rendered them vulnerable to the legislative onslaught of the 1980s. 
This has been compounded by the inclination of the judiciary to interpret existing 
legislation in a variety of ways mostly unfavourable to trade unions (Coates and 
Topham,1988:ch 10). However, using a step by step strategy rather than an unwieldy 
Industrial Relations Act, successive Conservative administrations have introduced a 
series of pieces of legislation which place very significant restraints upon the 
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mechanisms used traditionally by trade unions to defend their members' interests. 
Secondary action and closed shops have, in effect, been banished; individual members 
rights of employment protection severely weakened, and long-standing immunities 
protecting industrial action withdrawn (Mcllroy,l989). In addition, legislation now 
overrides the union rule book in a manner not comparable to any other institutions in 
civil society, so that all senior positions and the executive committees of all unions 
have to be filled by compulsory secret ballot (Edwards et al,l992:14-15). 
As a number of commentators have remarked, many of these measures were not 
entirely new in their own right. What was new in the last decade was the combination 
of civil and criminal law (Hyslop,l988:78) in conjunction with a cheerful toleration of 
mass unemployment, an extensive programme of privatisation, other measures designed 
to 'free up' the labour market (abolition of wages councils, training schemes designed 
to depress wage rates for the young, abandonment of the Fair Wage doctrine in the 
public sector), a dismantling of tripartite corparatism, and the sheer political will 
behind the whole process (McLroy, 1989: 103;Rubery, 1986: 108;Longstreth, 1988:415). 
The sequestration of union funds, effectively paralysing the NUM and NGA during 
disputes and successfully cowing the NUS, seemed in the mid Eighties to symbolise the 
triumph of the government in taming trade unions but, as Mcllroy (1989: 102) points 
out, the defeat of the miners was secured by encouraging 'working miners' to employ 
existing common law, rather than the new legislative arsenal. 
Doubts regarding the impact of the new legislative framework were expressed 
during the mid and late 1980s. Rubery (1986), Macinnes (1987 a and b), Mitchell 
(1987) and Longstreth (1988) all pointed to evidence of continuity , as well as some 
change, in industrial relations at a local level. Once local collective bargaining 
structures are established, it is difficult to eradicate them (Rubery, 1986: 83) and the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (cited in Rubery and Longstreth), conducted 
during the early 1980s, suggested that unions were generally being successful in 
preserving local recognition agreements. Indeed, according to the W.I.R.S., the 
gradual extension of formal, local agreements in the workplace continued into the first 
half of the 1980s (Longstreth, 1988:420), with the number of establishments drawing up 
agreements at least covering pay and conditions, discipline and dismissal, increasing 
from 85% to 94% between 1980 and 1984. For these writers, the pace of change at a 
local level was much slower than might be suggested by the government's legislative 
project and the rhetoric of ministers. 
However, in the first half of the new decade a rather different picture emerges. It 
remains the case that employers have often been reluctant to exploit the full potential of 
the new legislative framework to confront unions in the workplace. Relatively few have 
simply terminated existing agreements, preferring instead to marginalise their influence 
through more subtle 'partial exclusion policies' (Smith and Morton,l993:97) including, 
for example, greater emphasis upon direct communication with employees, by-passing 
union channels of communication, fragmentation of bargaining and the introduction of 
performance related pay (Smith and Morton,1993). Nevertheless, there is evidence of a 
. growing rate of de-recognition (2). The most significant impact is in the case of 
'greenfield' sites and new enterprises where employers appear now to be much more 
willing to resist unionisation in the first place and exploit the greater discretionary 
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power afforded by the new legislative framework (Smith and Mason,l993). Given the 
decline in traditional, usually organised, manufacturing and the growing dominance of 
the new service sector activity, this is a particularly sharp problem for unions seeking 
to bolster membership levels through recruitment in new areas. 
The evidence does not all point in one direction. Unions have enjoyed some success 
in securing new recognition agreements. One hundred and three new agreements were 
signed between 1988 and 1993, covering 60,000 employees (3). Nevertheless, 
according to the Department of Employment, the proportion of workers covered by 
collective pay agreements has dropped from 55% of all full-time employees in 1975 to 
just 34% in 1993 (4). Similarly, there has been a decline in the number of members 
organised in closed shops, from 5.2 million in 1978 to 2.6 million in 1989 (Edwards et 
al,1992:15). Overall, the pattern seems to be that while employee rights have clearly 
been weakened in significant but specific ways, 'the basic system of individual 
employment rights [has been] left largely intact', and indeed, in some ways has been 
strengthened, through the application of European community law and the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice (Edwards et a!, 1992: 15). Even rising rates of 
unemployment do not, in themselves, necessarily imply a weakening of trade unions. 
Given increasing labour market segmentation, union organisation in 'core' skilled 
markets may remain relatively strong despite very high levels of unemployment in 
other segments (Ferner and Hyman,l992:xxvii). 
The 'law of unintended consequences' has also, to an extent, worked in favour of 
trade unionism. If the government implicitly assumed that the 1984 Trade Union Act 
would deny trade union funds to the Labour Party and effectively impede most trade 
unions' own political campaigning, the consequences of the Act in practice have been 
quite different. In being compelled to actively campaign amongst their memberships to 
secure a vote in favour of a political fund, unions have been spurred to devise new 
internal communication techniques, compile accurate centralised membership lists, 
consider sometimes for the first time the nature of the target audiences within their 
memberships, and think through the relation between communication strategies and 
political objectives (5). Perhaps, most important was the evidence which suggested 
clearly to union leaderships that communication was a crucial factor. Opinion poll data 
demonstrated that a majority of unions would have failed to secure a 'yes' vote from 
their memberships if ballots had been held before each campaign got underway 
(Blackwell and Terry,l987:639). While one view is sceptical regarding the more 
extravagant claims of union leaderships in relation to the mass participation of ordinary 
members in these campaigns (Blackwell and Terry, 1987:640), there is no doubt that the 
success of every union, including even those which had never previously considered the 
option, in securing support for the establishment of political funds, was a tremendous 
success which pushed communication work much higher up each union agenda. Very 
much the same effect has been produced by the 1988 Employment Act. If the hidden 
agenda behind this Act, which requires unions to hold postal ballots for all senior posts 
and national executive committees, was to alter the political balance within union 
leaderships in favour of 'moderation', once again, the consequences were quite 
different. In almost every case, on turn-outs significantly lower than for comparable 
workplace elections, the union status quo has prevailed. However, the 1988 Act has 
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also acted as an important spur to unions in the development of internal communication 
and campaigning work (6). 
A great deal depends upon the orientation of management. There is evidence that not 
only unions but managements are frequently uncertain as to how best to adapt to a new 
environment in which unions are weaker and the labour market more de-regulated 
(Streeck,l987). There is certainly evidence of a greater insistence on the part of 
managers upon 'flexibility' and 'flexibile specialisation' (Hirst 1989) in the labour 
process (the application of specialised skills but without the demarcations which 
afforded skilled workers considerable control over their experience of work in earlier 
decades). Managements are more likely now to encourage a shift away from 
collectivised employee relations towards individualised arrangements in terms of pay 
and performance but there is little evidence that managements have sought to impose 
full-blown 'human resource management' techniques on a large scale (Edwards et a!, 
1992:27). Ironically, it has been in the public, rather the private sector where new 
'hawkish' management styles have provided the context for the more determined 
application of 'human resource management' approach. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the difference between the two sectors in this respect is clearly reflected in the 
tone and concerns of 'public' and 'private sector' union journals. 
At the same time, the various indicators of industrial conflict all suggest a decline in 
overt workplace resistance. The annual number of officially recorded strikes fell 
throughout the 1980s to just 354 in 1991 (compared to an annual average of 2,885 
between 1970 and 1974), and the number of days lost through strike activity fell from 
11,964 in 1980 to 759 in 1991 (Edwards et al,1992:55). The effect of recession and 
unemployment in dampening strike activity is difficult to untangle from the additional 
obstacles to strike action created through the legislation of the last decade and the 
'deterrent effect' of the high profile union defeats of the 1980s (Kelly, 1990). 
Nevertheless, while there are significantly fewer stoppages, unions have generally been 
successful in retaining the potential for strike action as a weapon in their armouries 
(7). In the 1970s, the tendency was for there to be a large number of short strikes, 
involving relatively few workers. While the total number of strikes dramatically 
declined in the 1980s, the number of long strikes involving greater numbers of 
workers, actually increased (8). 
Evidence on earnings also suggests that within the organised primary sector of the 
labour market, unions have had some degree of success in maintaining the strength of 
collective bargaining in a very hostile climate. Those workers in traditionally strong 
positions have often managed to consolidate their positions, though there has been some 
relative decline in two key areas, manufacturing and the public sector 
(Rubery, 1986:94). Of course, as Maclnnes stresses, the success of certain groups in 
preserving or improving their earnings has not been through sustained economic growth 
during the last decade but because the labour policies of the Government have allowed 
such groups to enhance their positions at the expense of weaker groups in secondary 
labour markets, unorganised industries, and the young, the old, and the unemployed 
(Maclnnes,l987: pxiv), -very much the danger anticipated by Offe (1985) and 
discussed above. Polarization between those in prosperous primary sector positions and 
the low paid, between the private and public sectors, between the prosperous regions 
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and the depressed, and between occupations within companies, is clearly increasing 
(Edwards, 1986:7; Longstreth, 1988: 420-422; Maclnnes, 1987: preface; 
Rubery,l986:94-95). The evidence suggests, then, an uneven picture with certain 
groups of workers insulated, to a degree, from the impact of labour market 
deregulation whilst others suffer a significant deterioration in their market positions. 
A similar situation exists regarding multi-skilling and job controls. There clearly has 
been widespread change in working practices and procedures for the use of new 
technologies in many occupations during the 1980s. Some theorists have interpreted 
these as part of an employers offensive to losen the control of unions over the labour 
process (Hyman and Elgar,l981). While many employers have probably sought to 
develop such strategies, evidence of their success is, once again, patchy. Changes in 
working practices have often been introduced within the framework of existing 
agreements rather than by abandoning them and unions have been quite successful in 
retaining controls and safeguards over the pace of work (Rubery,1986: 96-98). Often 
management try to introduce changes to working practices as part of a pragmatic and 
piecemeal response to changes in market conditions rather than as part of a 'grand 
strategy' (Edwards,1992:60). On the other hand, many of the industries in which 
unions were sufficiently organised to secure job controls are now declining and new 
areas of employment are developing without any tradition of agreement over working 
practices or the nature of jobs. In introducing computerised technology, employers 
have often side-stepped the craft unions by recruiting white collar staff (Rubery 
1986:97-98; Longstreth 1988:425). Once again, the evidence suggests an uneven 
picture in which some groups of workers successfully employ strategies to preserve 
gains they have made over the years or to accomodate change within acceptable 
frameworks while other groups are more fully exposed to the impact of political and 
economic macro trends. Attempts by management to secure higher levels of 
productivity from workers through changes to shift arrangements, new working 
practices and the utilisation of new technologies are not necessarily opposed by union 
members but neither are they welcomed, as one might expect if employees were fully 
embracing a new ideology of individualised industrial relations. Rather, it seems that 
the response of workers is characterised by a fatalistic and grudging acceptance of their 
'inevitablity' (Kelly,1990). 
The Union Response 
One point to emerge immediately is that given the uneven and complex nature of the 
impacts of the political economic environment upon unions in recent decades, unions 
are unlikely to produce a common response. Rather, particular unions will respond in 
distinct ways, according to their perceptions of their positions in relation to certain 
segments of the labour market, the extent to which they can shield themselves from the 
more severe consequences of the new legislative climate and each union's own 
traditions and organisational culture. 
Overshadowing the strategic thinking of every union is the aggregate decline in 
union membership. From the historic peak of 13.3 million affiliated members in 1979, 
membership of the TUC had dropped to little more than 10 million in 1988 (Bird et 
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a!, 1989) and continued to fall towards 7 million by 1993 (Mason and Bain, 1993; 
Hutton,l993). Perhaps more worrying for unions is the evidence regarding union 
density. On all the various measures of density, the data suggests a declining union 
profile but the accelerating decline in the proportion of union members to those in full-
time employment in the late 1980s, indicates that unions were failing to make 
significant in-roads into the new employment sectors which began to expand 
(Edwards, 1992:32). According to Mason and Bain (1993), opportunities do exist for 
unions to increase recruitment amongst the estimated three to four million non-
unionised employees to be found in workplaces where recognition agreements remain 
intact and in 1989, they point out, 27 out of the 78 TUC affiliates did actually increase 
their membership totals. However, as described above, debate continues regarding the 
extent to which unions can exert influence over the fundamental forces shaping the ebb 
and flow of unionisation, with some academics, the 'structural determinists', taking the 
view that 'exogeneous' factors (the business cycle, government policy and employer 
strategy) are decisive, whilst others, the 'union interventionists', more recently taking 
the view that union leadership, strategy and organisation have an effectivity,- they can 
'make a difference' in assisting unions to expand in hostile environments (Mason and 
Bain, 1993). In particular, Kelly (1990:41) argues that there are good grounds for 
believing that under-investment in recruitment campaigns and the provision of services 
for members is partly responsible for declining membership. 
In practice, the exogeneous 'structural' environment is likely to provide the context 
within which the effectivity of union strategy and leadership is tested; appropriate 
union intervention 'making a difference' but within the limitations and constraints 
imposed by labour market conditions, the practice of employers and the orientation of 
the state. The example of the effectiveness of the recruitment strategies of white collar 
unions, such as ASTMS in the 1960s and 1970s, and white collar union leaders, such 
as Clive Jenkins, are often cited by supporters of the 'interventionist' account but, of 
course, the particular structural conditions of many white collar and professional 
employees, particularly in the public sector, have clearly also favoured unionisation. 
The complex position now regarding the success of unions in mounting recruitment 
strategies reflects the segmentation of labour markets and the uneven impact of 
'exogenous' factors described above. For example, decline in overall union density 
masks some areas of considerable strength and union success, although these are hardly 
the examples one might have anticipated during the 1960s and 1970s. Manual workers 
are still more likely to be in unions than white collar workers, as a whole, but 
according to the 1991 Labour Force Survey union density was highest amongst 
professional occupations (52%), accounted for largely by the very high rates of 
unionisation in teaching, lecturing and other 'public sector' professions (9). More 
recent evidence confirms this pattern (Central Statistical Office, 1995:74). Kelly 
identifies 23 unions successful in increasing their membership levels between 1979 and 
1988; 17 of these are wholly or mainly public sector or organising within sectors only 
very recently privatised (Kelly,l990:32). The employment areas which provided fertile 
ground for recruitment during the 1980s are very much removed from the heavy 
industrial manual heartlands. While the unions organising in traditional manual sectors 
have suffered membership decline, it is sectors including media and entertainment, 
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telecommunication, education, banking, health and other public sector work, where 
unions have actually expanded (Kelly,l990:32). 
Contrary to some views, it is 'de-professionalisation' which triggers unionisation, 
rather than vice-versa (Raelin, 1989). The public sector in Britain, as in many European 
countries (Ferner and Hyman,l992:pxxviii), has seen sustained state pressure to 
depress pay and secure increased productivity through a combination of cut backs in 
staffing and pressure to agree new 'flexible' working conditions. However, in Britain 
this has also been accompanied by reforms and re-organisaton designed to introduce 
market disciplines to the delivery of public services and new market oriented 
management perspectives. The combination of growing job insecurity, deteriorating 
rewards, and in the case of public sector professional occupations, decreasing 
professional autonomy, has created a fertile climate for the public sector unions. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, the experience of the last decade is vividly reflected in the 
journals of public sector unions but it has encouraged strikingly different responses, 
some unions assuming that the traditional imagery and vocabulary of unonism will have 
a new resonance for public sector employees, other unions constructing an appeal 
through the development of a professional agenda for employees experiencing de-
professionalisation. 
But there are other areas of opportunity for unions. Although union density is, 
historically, much lower amongst part-time employees, it has remained stable and, 
indeed, has actually slightly increased while full-time union density has declined (10). 
As almost a quarter of the workforce is now part-time this is of some significance. 
Similarly, there are some indications that unionisation amongst female employees has 
remained more buoyant while male rates of union density have continued to decline 
(11). A large number of part-time jobs are now taken by schoolleavers and young 
workers. In the past unions have invested little time targeting 'young people' as 
potential recruits; the complacent assumption that union values will somehow be 
automatically transmitted to the next generation can no longer be made, given the 
destruction of the apprentice system and the concentration of young people in part-time, 
casualised and 'super-exploited' segments of labour markets (Kossof,1988 B). The 
process of segmentation not only reflects patterns of gender and age differentiation but, 
of course, race as well (Ohri and Faruqi,l988). It is clear that some of the largest 
unions which traditionally recruited in largely masculine manual employment sectors 
are now turning to these other segments of the labour market. The T and G and the 
GMB, for example, have begun to recruit significantly more young people, part-time 
female workers, and temporary workers (Haque, 1990) though the T and G lost almost 
forty percent of its membership between 1979 and 1990 (12). 
A fundamental challenge, then, for unions in the present decade is to respond to the 
increasing segmentation of labour markets with appropriate recruitment strategies. As 
many of these segments consist of 'unorganised' employees with little previous 
experience of unions and little daily contact with union activists, a central element in 
such strategies must be communication. However, this process must involve more than 
just finding an appropriate symbolic formula with which to communicate union values; 
it is likely that structural and organisational reform of existing union power structures 
will be a prerequisite for really effective work in these unorganised or under-organised 
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segments. Often the reasons for particular social groups not joining unions in large 
numbers are complex, not merely that the union message has so far failed to reach 
them. This issue has grown sharper as the feminisation of important segments of labour 
markets has accelerated and the traditional patriarchal nature of many union structures, 
thrown into sharp relief (Briskin and McDermot, 1993). Even in the late 1980s, the 
higher echelons of most unions remained in male hands, although a minority of female 
salaried officials were making some progress (13). 
Some unions have recognised the need to respond to the changing nature of labour 
markets through reform of their organisational structures as well as their approaches to 
communication. As we shall see in the next chapter, there is evidence in the 
communication materials of both NALGO and COHSE of an attempt to find a new 
vocabulary and imagery with which to express union messages, free from the 
traditional masculine symbolism which used to characterise much union communication 
(the example of pictures of rows of male delegates in shirt sleeves at conference is 
often cited). UNISON, the product of a merger between NALGO, COHSE and NUPE, 
has attempted to extend the process of reform beyond communicative work and has 
created a constitution which formally requires the establishment of organisational 
structures reflecting the dimensions of race, gender and disability (Collinson,l994). 
Other unions have not moved so far as to build a recognition of new potential 
membership profiles into their consititutions but there is a growing awareness of the 
need to make union membership more attractive and more meaningful for groups 
traditionally neglected by unions but which are likley to become increasingly important 
union constituencies as labour market segmentation progresses. Thus, a number of 
unions, including the CPSA, USDAW, and MSF, are seeking new ways of 'reaching' 
young workers (Kossof,l988 A; Labour Research,September 1990A). The CPSA has 
recently adopted a 'Charter for Youth'. Other unions are adopting strategies designed 
to weaken existing mechanisms of male control, particularly at branch level, where 
'progressive' strategies supported by female activists and, often, salaried officials are 
sometimes resisted by male members (Cunnison and Stageman, 1993). 
However, pressures for change do not inevitably produce evolutionary refinement. 
As discussed further below, the TUC has sought to defme a new strategic role for itself 
as a recruitment agency for the labour movement as a whole. In response to the 
dramatic decline in union membership through the 1980s, a TUC Special Review 
Group was established in 1987 to draw up a plan for union survival. One product of 
this review was the suggestion that the TUC should take responsibility for recruitment 
drives targeted at 'greenfield sites' and employment sectors with low union densities. In 
1990 the TUC targeted Trafford Industrial Park in Manchester and Docklands in 
London, both areas with new industrial and commercial enterprises; jobs in services, 
white collar work and information technology, and a significant amount of associated 
part-time and casual employment. However, in both cases the results were 
unimpressive and the costs in terms of publicity materials and advertising high 
(Harper,l990). The reasons for the failure of these initiatives are complex but one of 
the factors undermining the projects was the half-hearted support of the largest unions, 
still conscious of the competitive nature of union recruitment, particularly around 
unorganised and greenfield sites in an era of single union deals. In fact, there is 
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evidence to suggest that some unions, including the largest, are inclined to seek the 
'line of least resistance' by competing for a larger share of existing organised 
memberships, rather than undertaking the fundamentally more difficult task of 
recruiting in new unorganised sectors (Willman, 1989). 
Similarly, another defensive response to membership decline is merger and the late 
1980s saw a wave of merger activity. By 1990 twenty of the major TUC affiliates were 
engaged in merger discussions of some kind (14). Thus, the three public sector unions, 
NUPE,NALGO and COHSE have merged to form UNISON, now the largest TUC 
afftliate; the two biggest unions for skilled engineering workers, the EETPU and the 
AUE, have merged to form the AUEE; two major technical and white collar unions, 
APEX and the ASTMS have combined to extend their activities throughout the 
professional service and financial sector in the form of MSF; and the G and M has 
expanded through a series of effective 'take-overs'. Only four from the original panel 
of eleven unions selected for the present research have not been affected by merger or 
take-over in the last six years. As discussed below, merger activity is likely to have 
important implications for communication work because potential union suitors will 
seek to construct appropriate public images. 
Some writers believe, however, that an even more fundamental re-orientation is 
occurring arising from the pressure to sustain memberships and the new cultural ethos 
of the 1980s. For example, Basset! and Cave (1993),Field (1988),Wickens (1987:ch 
9),Bassett (1986), Sherman (1986), all share the view that to survive unions must re-
fashion their primary purpose, place far less emphasis upon the protection of collective 
rights, spend more time in exploring the ways in which they can assist individual 
employees in negotiating with employers and develop the range of services they supply 
to members as individual 'consumers'. For Basset!, the series of 'strike free' and 
'single union' deals negotiated from the early 1980s onwards at plants, such as Sanyo, 
Nissan, Hitachi, Toshiba and Silentnight, signal the way forward. Such deals are the 
necessary price unions must pay for recognition in the new sectors of economic growth 
which do not have the traditions of manual unionisation and collective representation 
(Basset!, 1986:chs 8 and 9) . In these circumstances, unions must find new ways of 
meeting the needs of their members through the provision of services customised more 
fmely to suit the requirements of individual employees. This may involve the 
development of fmancial services (Wickens, 1987), welfare provision (Field, 1988), 'off 
the peg' contract clauses to facilitate individualised employee bargaining (Basset! and 
Cave, 1993) or a rolling programme of market research and improved internal 
communication (Sherman,1986). No longer will unions be able to recruit simply on the 
basis of the collective protection they afford through the possession of industrial 
muscle. 
A number of these writers, including Basset! and Cave, Sherman and Foster and 
Wolfson (1989) are inclined to regard the rise of 'business unionism', as these 
developments are sometimes described, in the practice of unions such as the AEU and 
the EETPU, as the first indications of a more general pattern which is emerging as a 
consequence of the changes in the class structure, the shift in production towards post-
Fordist arrangements, and the hegemonic effect of Thatcherism. In this sense, such 
union initiatives are 'read' as structurally determined responses and are regarded in 
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some way as 'inevitable'. However, there are some who question the extent to which 
such evidence does provide an indication of a more generalised pattern yet to emerge. 
Maclnnes (1987: 151) and Edwards (1992:28) point out that 'new style' agreements 
relating to industrial behaviour, pendulum arbitration, flexible working, and other 
concessions made through 'business unionism', still only involve a small proportion of 
workers. In fact, only one union has shown a consistent appetite for single union deals. 
Between 1988 and 1993, eighty-one such deals have been negotiated and the fifty -three 
have involved the AEEU (15). It is entirely possible, then, to read the concessions 
made by some unions towards 'business unionism' in recent years as examples of 
pragmatic responses to a hostile environment, rather than a permanent and structurally 
inspired re-orientation. 
Nevertheless, it is true that unions have had to review and, in some cases, re-think 
the basis of the relationships they have constructed with their memberships. Whether or 
not particular unions are seeking to organise in sectors directly affected by 
technological innovation, or new management techniques, or changes in the 
composition of the working class, as we have seen, all unions have had to fight harder 
to retain members and find new ones. This has led to a steady growth in the provision 
of financial, legal, leisure and other services by unions for members (16) and greater 
effort being invested in market research techniques and communication work. Heery 
and Kelly (1994) believe that the 'servicing relationship' between trade unions and their 
members can be understood as having passed through three phases in post-war Britain. 
While they concede that by no means all unions have conformed to this typological 
history, they argue that immediately after the war many unions were characterised by 
'professionalism unionism' through which 'a cadre of professional representatives' 
negotiated on behalf of 'a largely passive membership' (1994:3). This type of servicing 
relationship was undermined in the late 1960s and 1970s as full time union officials had 
to accommodate new claims for greater power and involvement at shop floor level with 
the growing influence of shop stewards in many industries. This period is described by 
Heery and Kelly as a period of 'participative unionism' but this, in turn, has been 
broken up by 'the sharp decline in aggregate union membership since 1979 which 'has 
prompted the emergence of a new servicing relationship' (1994:7). This third form of 
'servicing relationship' is characterised by Heery and Kelly as 'managerial unionism' 
and is based upon a new perception of union members as 'discerning and calculating 
consumers who must be deliberately attracted into the union fold' (1994:7). Hence, the 
increased investment of time and resources in researching and monitoring employee 
needs, and in designing and promoting union services in ways calculated to appeal to 
particular sections of the labour market. In short, union membership is regarded as a 
product to be marketed. 
There are important implications for union communication work in these 
developments. By no means all unions have fully embraced a new understanding of 
'servicing relationships' but there is evidence in both union journals (to be discussed in 
the following chapter) and in the work of union press officers that a number of unions 
now attach more importance to communication work because they can no longer 
assume that the workplace environment will continue to offer up a continuous flow of 
membership applications. If unions do seek to present themselves to employees in new 
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ways, this has to be communicated and, given the increasing inclination of employers 
to seek ways of 'directly communicating ' with employees themselves, it is ever more 
important for unions that their communication strategies are effective. 
Summary 
Union communication work has to be understood in the context of a changing political 
and economic environment. It remains unclear at this stage how far reaching or 
permanent the changes discussed above actually are. As Ferner and Hyman (1992) 
suggest it is quite possible that capital will seek to organise labour through a variety of 
. new and traditional production relations depending upon its particular needs in different 
sectors of the economy. And yet it is possible that the advantages of 'flexibility' and 
'efficiency' in the new forms of production represent a compelling logic which 
employers will seek to apply and extend. On balance, while much of the new industrial 
landscape may be more permanent than the supporters of the 'business cycle' model 
assume, it seems probable that union intervention in terms of recruitment strategy, 
political campaigning and communication work does 'make a difference'. 
Union leaderships certainly assume this to be case and have responded to the 
changes in the political-economic environment in a number of ways. The exclusion of 
the union elite from the centre of government in the period since 1979 has compelled 
trade union leaderships to think more about the nature of political communication. Only 
'insider groups' can afford the luxury of ignoring media and political communication 
work. Beyond this, the new harsher legislative environment has forced unions to re-
consider the importance of communication and public relations in the industrial context. 
The collapse in the traditional membership bases in manual and manufacturing 
industry, combined with the increasingly complex segmentation of labour markets, has 
necessitated a more sophisticated targeting of existing and potential members, 
particularly part-time and casualised employees, women working in un-organised 
sectors, young workers, black and Asian workers. The distinct experience of employees 
in the public and private sectors and the pressure towards de-professionalisation in the 
caring occupations has generated a number of politically important agendas which 
unions have had to address in their communication work. Just as Offe (1985: eh 6) 
recommends, some unions have sought to attract new members in the public sector 
caring occupations through re-asserting the professional status of such work but, at the 
same time, other public sector unions have interpreted the new assault on public sector 
pay and conditions as an opportunity to re-assert traditional collective union values. As 
we shall see, both themes are reflected in both the journal content of public sector 
unions and the media work of their press officers. 
Before focusing upon the media work of the unions selected for this study a brief 
account of the general development of communication strategies and accommodative 
media work within the labour movement is provided. 
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Union Communication Strategies: a la carte. 
Before tracing the slow development of trade union communication work it is 
important to consider the range of possibilities from which British trade unions have 
selected their strategies. Clearly, as with all aspects of political strategy, choice and 
decision making regarding communication work are bounded by the constraints and 
circumstances of the period. Nevertheless, even though in earlier periods 
communication technology was both cruder and relatively more expensive, there were 
choices to be made. Comparison with the experience of trade unions in the USA 
illustrates this point, though it also suggests that trade unions are likely to confront a 
set of common obstacles to effective communication work, whether they organise in 
Britain or the USA (there is little substantial comparative material on trade union 
communication work in Europe). A great deal depends upon the assumptions which are 
made regarding the possibilities of working 'within' or 'without' the organisations of 
news production and agencies of communication. 
(i) Radical critique and structural reform. 
There are those, of course, within the labour movement who hold a view of politics 
and of the structural position of the mass media which leads to a scepticism regarding, 
not only public relations techniques but any communications strategy which does not 
address the need for fundamental structural reform. In other words, the problem has to 
be addressed from without, through the application of measures external to the news 
media and communication systems. In relation to newspaper publishing, for example, 
it has been frequently argued by trade unionists and others (Basnett and 
Goodman, I 977) that the tendency towards concentration of ownership in the hands of 
powerful proprietors and companies hostile to the objectives of the labour movement, 
makes the task of presenting a diverse range of political perspectives, including a trade 
union agenda extremely problematic. Only an elaborate regulatory framework or 
interventionist mechanism, enforced through state legislation, will begin to open up 
opportunities for trade unions to develop a coherent news agenda. Those who question 
the neutrality of the state doubt whether even this approach will succeed given the 
advantages which wealth and the possession of resources confer upon those resorting to 
law (Foot,1984). 
A great deal depends upon the model which is used to describe and analyse the news 
media and communication agencies. Albert Zack, director of public relations for the 
AFL-CIO in the U.S. (1958-1980), insisted that anti-union bias in news coverage was a 
product of reporter ignorance rather than a reflection of dominant political and 
economic structures. The remedy, therefore, lay in ever greater 'accommodative' 
efforts to brief journalists and provide them with appropriate news materials amongst 
other conventional public relations techniques. However, this approach was attacked by 
several different unions, particularly during the 1970s, who argued that strategies were 
required which did address the problem of the structural positioning of the news media, 
including media education for trade unionists (in order to give them the critical skills to 
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decode ideological content) and campaigns to publicly highlight the inter-locking 
corporate media structure of American capitalism (Douglas, 1986:46-48 and 239-256). 
Only, perhaps, during the period in which News International became the focus of 
public attention during the 1987 Wapping dispute, have British unions adopted a similar 
strategy of corporate 'outing'. However, some British trade unions have supported 
campaigns for structural reform and state intervention in news publishing. The TUC 
and some individual unions submitted evidence to the last Royal Commission on the 
Press (MacGregor) during the mid-1970s and, more recently, several unions have 
helped to fund the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, which campaigns 
for a number of regulatory reforms to increase diversity of political perspective within 
the news media. The TUC has also taken an active role in submitting evidence and 
proposals to the government during the preparation of the 1988 Broadcasting White 
Paper and 1990 Act. 
The underlying logic of the analysis here suggests that while institutional and 
structural forces may shape the nature of news and cultural production in ways which 
disadvantage subordinate groups like ordinary workers and trade unionists, nonetheless, 
it is possible to employ the power of the state, as an external pressure, to modify these 
patterns of representation and open up opportunities for the expression of subordinate 
perspectives. The obvious difficulty with these strategies in Britain is the absence, in 
the last sixteen years or longer, of a political administration likely to seriously consider 
such proposals. The record of progress of privately sponsored 'right of reply' proposals 
in the House of Commons is not encouraging. 
(ii) Advertising and the utilisation of independent channels of 
communication. 
As in Britain, at the root of the communication problem for unions in the USA has 
been a suspicion of the daily national newspapers which have a history of hostile 
labour coverage (Douglas 1986:18). Just as in Britain, the structure of the newspaper 
market has worked against the survival of newspapers sympathetic to the goals of the 
labour movement but unions in the USA moved much earlier towards developing 
comprehensive independent communication strategies. For American unions too, then, 
the communication dilemma has been to choose whether to work through the 
dominant communication and media systems with all the difficulties which arise from 
the political and economic structures which underpin them, or to seek to develop 
alternative and independent channels of communication which afford greater control 
over the nature of the message constructed but which have major implications in terms 
of resources and access to capital. 
Attempts were made to develop union supported alternative daily papers in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century but as these floundered American unions turned to 
explore the possibilities of pioneering of trade union radio. The first AFL funded 
sialion began broadcasting in Chicago in 1926 and individual unions also established 
local FM stations in the 1940s (Douglas,l986:chs 2 and 3). As the costs of FM 
broadcasting mounted in the post war period unions made greater use of free public 
service slots on radio and on a more limited scale television, too (Pomper, 1959). 
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However, with gradual de-regulation, the 'public sphere' supported by the public 
service slots also began to shrink and in order to avoid dependence upon newspapers as 
the main channel of communication with existing members or the general public a 
number of unions in the US have turned to advertising despite the costs. 
Given the high costs involved, advertising is only likely to become a more attractive 
option as the political and ideological environments grow harsher. American unions 
turned to advertising in the 1950s as the costs of running FM radio grew prohibitive; 
the public service slots on networked broadcasting began to shrink and public opinion 
grew alarmed at the prospect of the merger of the CIO and AFL in 1955 
(Pomper,l959:483). In the 1960s, American unions turned to advertising in response to 
the perception that the hostility of newspaper coverage was growing more intense 
(Douglas,l986:38). Most recently, unions in the US have resorted to advertising in 
recognition of the weakening of their industrial muscle and the toughening of corporate 
management attitudes during disputes (Riley, 1993). Of course, advertising is not free 
from institutional, political and economic constraints but it does allow even union 
clients greater control over the construction of the message than attempts to disseminate 
information through mainstream news organisations. 
Larger memberships, greater incomes and a more diverse media environment have 
encouraged American unions to be more ambitious than their British counterparts. 
However, their communication goals have been characterised by a similar 
defensiveness and commitment to a 'labourist agenda'. Perhaps reflecting the 
experience of organising during the McCarthy years, a common theme in much 
communication work has been the part American organised labour contributes to the 
'American way of life'. American manufacturing unions in textiles and car production, 
for example, have regularly organised 'label' campaigns aiming to persuade consumers 
to buy goods produced by American organised labour. They have chosen not to develop 
more radical themes which place issues of workplace power and control on the political 
agenda, except in one respect. American unions have pioneered in the last decade a 
technique termed 'corporate campaigning' in which the public image of particular 
companies is highlighted and attacked in order to weaken their bargaining posiliun, 
using a variety of media opportunities from advertising to briefing journalists, with a 
focus upon the poor records of such companies in terms of the treatment of employees, 
their environmental record, and even the inter locking directorships of the management 
teams (Riley 1993; Douglas 1986:239-256). 
The institutional and regulatory arrangements for broadcasting in Britain have not 
provided British unions with either opportunities to establish their own broadcasting 
institutions or regular public access slots on mainstream broadcasting channels, 
although the TUC is now planning to utilise the BBC television's night time education 
schedule. British unions have also been much slower to consider the possibilities of 
advertising through mainstream media though white collar unions have occasionally 
invested in advertising since the 1960s for the purposes of recruitment or more recently 
in campaigns against public expenditure cuts and the privatisation of public utilities. 
Though advertising affords greater client control over the nature of the message 
constructed, the costs involved combined with the labour movement's historic 
suspicion of commercial advertising and, perhaps, a scepticism regarding its 
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effectiveness, have caused unions to distance themselves from the world of professional 
advertising until the 1980s. Related to this is a view of the cultural and the industrial 
as quite distinct spheres of social activity, which was shared by much of the British 
labour movement until relatively recently. Unlike many European labour movements 
and even the USA, where unions have sponsored and even participated in plays, films 
and broadway musicals (Douglas, 1986:ch3), British unions have been reluctant to 
stray too far into the sphere of cultural production. Once again, it is only in the recent 
past and through the initiatives of mainly white collar unions, that a labour movement 
perspective has been presented in terms of union sponsored drama and Jilm. 
(iii) Media Pressure Politics. 
While unions may lack the material and symbolic resources to develop alternative 
~.:hannels of communication or advertising, given certain pre-requisites, considerable 
political energy can be harnessed through a lobbying and complaints strategy direclt:u ai 
the news media. This involves the identification of the media as a target for lobbying in 
much the same way as conventional pressure group politics positions the state. The 
underlying assumption here is that there exist within the news media, institutional 
forces which act as a barrier to the encoding of a union perspective. The Glasgow 
University Media Group argue that so entrenched are the 'inferential structures' or 
taken for granted assumptions of news journalists that use of public relations techni4ut:s 
or communication strategies are unlikely to alter the 'culturally skewed' nature of news 
reporting. According to their own sample of television news, the more energeli~.: 
gt:neration of 'publicity inputs' by white collar unions in the 1970s failed to achieve 
very significant 'improvements' in the quality of coverage, even if interventionist 
mroia strategies sometimes increased the quantity of media coverage (1976:235-243). 
· The familiar news values which might, for example, prioritise the personality uf an 
established 'high profile' union leader over coverage of a wider union agenda were 
resistant to union interventions. 
The logic of this analysis led the Glasgow team to favour a complaints strategy over 
the investment of more resources in conventional public relations (Philo et al, 1977). A 
strategy of complaint concerning particular examples of coverage, suppurlt:u by 
evidence derived from content research would have the merit of focusing upon 'the 
overall framework within which industrial activities are reported' (1977: 136). In other 
words. the aim would be to expose in the public arena the inferential frameworks 
shaping mainstream news coverage through documented examples and research. Tht: 
Glasgow team commend the work of the ACTT in producing the pioneering 'One 
Week' report on television coverage in 1971 and the work of unions like NALGO in 
gathering evidence to submit to the 1975 Royal Commission on the Press and the 
Annan Committee on broadcasting. 
A complaints strategy is one way of exerting pressure upon news organisations to 
rt:vit:w ami modify editorial policy. By the 1990s we have become much more familiar 
with 'media pressure politics' (Manning, 1991 ), from the establishment of a 'mt:uia 
monitoring unit' at Conservative Central Office, under the chairmanship of Norman 
Tebbit, to the demonstrations outside Thames Television by the disablt:u in prult:si 
50 
against the passive images of disability conjured by 'telephon' charity events, and the 
invasion of Fleet Street newsrooms by activists from the women's movement. Any 
attempt to raise public awareness of issues of selection and news values in the 
organisation of media production can be regarded as part of the process of 'media 
pressure politics' and could include anything from organising a day conference to the 
more spectacular examples above. 
The work of the ACIT and NALGO in gathering evidence on patterns of news 
coverage was followed by the TUC's own analysis of the coverage of the 1979 'Winter 
of Discontent' (TUC, 1979A) and the union supported work of the Campaign for Press 
and Broadcasting Freedom in producing an early critical discussion of news media 
coverage of the 1984-85 Coal Strike (Jones et a!, 1985). In the USA, as in Britain, 
monitoring and complaints strategies rose to the top of the union agenda as immediate 
responses to particularly hostile dispute coverage, where political and industrial conflict 
had intensified but where there remained a strong ideological commitment to a labour 
movement agenda. It was in these conditions, for example, that the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers published the first union sponsored 
research on television images of trade unionism in 1980 (Parenti, 1986: ch5) in the USA 
and the same pressures led to the eventual creation of'the Labour Institute for Public 
Affairs, funded by the AFL-CIO in 1982 (Douglas,1986:ch 2), with a brief to develop 
comprehensive communication strategies for unions, including monitoring research. 
The strategies discussed so far have all involved the positioning of unions as 
external to the news media and main agencies of communication. The final strategy 
involves the attempt to work with and within the news media. In the cases above, 
unions seek to modify the communicative practice of media and communications 
agencies, by pressure exerted through the state and legislature or self initiated 
'pressure politics'. Alternatively, unions may seek to exert control over the message 
communicated, by buying the agency of communication (a radio station) or buying 
access to the channel of communication (an advertisement or a union funded public 
access programme). The final strategy, however, requires trade unions to expend 
resources in the modification of their own organisational arrangements and to modify 
tlu::ir cultural practice in order to accommodate the 'needs' of the news media. 
(iv) Accommodation: public relations and 'modern' communication 
strategies. 
For the reasons outlined above, through the 1980s a number of leading trade unions 
have attached more importance to exploring the ways in which they can accommodate 
their communication goals within the parameters determined by the routine workings of 
news organisations. In a sense, there has been a movement towards strategies which 
allt:mpl lo work within the existing 'system' of news gathering and production, rather 
than exert pressure from the outside. In a preliminary survey of trade union 
communication arrangements in preparation for this study, conducted in 1988, only 
seven unions with memberships over 45,000 employed one or more full time press 
officers (see appendix one). The remaining 31 TUC affiliates allocated the duties of a 
press officer to a member of staff with other administrative responsibilities and 
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frequently without experience as a journalist. Partly as a result of the wave of mergers 
which created a smaller number of much larger organisations, it has become the norm 
rather than the exception for unions to employ at least one member of staff with a full 
time commitment to press and news media work. 
This is one feature of a broader process in which a number of unions have invested 
significant resources in developing organisational structures geared to internal and 
external communication work. A movement towards 'working with' news 
organisations; attaching more importance to making information available to 
journalists, providing other types of assistance to the news media, and anticipating tht: 
work of journalists by 'pre framing' information in terms of mainstream news values, 
implies a rather different model of the news media to those which underpin tht: 
strategies outlined above. 
Implicit in this strategy is the view that news production is not wholly shaped by the 
structural position of news organisations or by the levers of instrumental power 
available to the enemies of trade unionism. It implies that the 'inferential frameworks' 
shaping iht: approaches of journalists still allow some opportunities and possibilities for 
union press and media work to be effective. A criticism often levelled at the work of 
the Glasgow University Media Group, for example, is that they paid insufficient 
attention to studying the process of news production in the field 
(Elliott,1981;Cottle,l993:9). A theme to be developed in this study is that, not 
withstanding the political and structural context within which news production ocl:urs, 
ilu: poliiil:s of ~::ngagement between union officials and journalists cannot be ignored if 
we are to fully understand the process of encoding labour and industrial news. In the 
wurse of uealing with industrial and labour correspondents, the skills of an effective 
union press officer and a thoughtful approach to news agendas can 'make a difft:rent:t:', 
albeit wiiltin pammeters determined by the logic of national daily news production. 
Amongst trade unionists suspicions of the dangers which a hostile prt:ss may prt:st:nt 
havo:: nul uisappeared. Many within the labour movement, including those at a senior 
trade union level, retain an analysis of media organisations which places them in lite 
l:ontext of the class and power relations of capitalism. Nonetheless, 'accommodative 
strategies' are now more common; more senior officials appear to believe that 
resources can be invested to exploit what communication opportunities may arise and 
insure damage limitation exercises are conducted with expertist:. Smut: union 
lt:au~::rships are more optimistic and have committed their unions to 'proactive' and 
highly interventionist strategies. Nevertheless, British unions haw bt:t:n notably slowt:r 
tu embrdl:t: strategies of accommodation and the politics of news media work associated 
with them, than their American counterparts. 
In the USA, it was a crisis in the coverage of labour relations in mainstream news 
media, following a wave of strikes (Douglas,1986:25) immediatdy after WorlU War 
Two, whil:h prompted a public relations firm to be hired jointly by the AFL and CIO 
in 1948 (prior to the merger of the two organisations in 1955). The aim was tu tadlt: 
ihe problem of apparent declining public esteem after years of growing popularity in 
the pre-war period. Since then 'in-house' public relations departments havt: bt:l:ome a 
common feature of most large American unions and a number of the smaller ones 
(Douglas,1986: 111). 
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Larger memberships, greater incomes and a more diverse media environment have 
encouraged American unions to be more ambitious than their British counterparts in 
terms of all communication strategies. The Labor Institute for Public Affairs (LIP A) 
was established with funding from the AFL-CIO and individual unions in 1982. 
LIP A's primary aim has been to develop comprehensive communication strategies in 
the USA and to explore the ways in which new communication technologies can be 
exploited including video and cable television (Douglas,1986:38-43). This may mean 
that in the future American unions will begin to place less emphasis upon 
accommodative work with news journalists but at present such work remains a central 
part of many union communication strategies in the United States. 
American union communication goals, then, have often been characterised by a 
similar defensiveness and commitment to a 'labourist' agenda - with the exception of 
'corpomte campaigning'- to their British counterparts. The absence of a sustained 
discussion of workplace relations and issues of power is a notable feature of British 
union journals as well, as we shall see in chapter three. The greater the tendency to rely 
upon accommodative strategies, the more likely it is that union agendas will reflect the 
caution of labourism and articulate even quite conservative themes because of the need 
to mobilise dominant media news values. 
The slow emergence of trade union communication strategies 
For some writers, 1979 marks the point at which trade unions begin to take 
communication issues seriously (Seaton,l982; Verzuh,1990). It is in 1979 that the 
unions suddenly find themselves dramatically cast out from their 'insider' relations with 
government, with the arrival of Mrs Thatcher in office, and according to conventional 
pressure group theory organisations enjoying only 'outsider' status quickly come to see 
media work as the main weapon in their armouries (Grant, 1990). And, of course, it is 
from 1979 onwards that, for the multiplicity of reasons discussed above, the need for 
effective communication work grows ever more pressing. However, this view is an 
over-simplification in both theoretical and empirical terms. To begin with, as argued 
in the first chaoter. the conventional insider/outsider model is state-centric and 
underestimates the importance of the news media as foci for lobbying activity on the 
part of both 'insider' and 'outsider' groups. Secondly, in terms of the historical record, 
it is clear that some unions, particularly but not only white collar unions, have 
priorilised communication work for considerably longer and that the issue of news 
media representation of trade unionism was a matter of sharp concern shared by trade 
unionists at various intervals throughout the history of the labour movement but 
especially during the decade before, as well as after, 1979. 
A labour and industrial beat for newspaper correspondents emerged in the 1930s 
(Evans, 1953) and this will be discussed at length in chapters six and seven. However, 
in the period before the Second World War, while journalists attended a large number 
of union conferences and developed informal contacts with many union officials, very 
ti:'w union:; assigned spedfic press and publicity duties to particular staff. The TUC 
'='·'>ii!l:>lish<:'.<:l " press bure"'' during 1he 1930.s l:>nt the official view of 1he i!ppropri~te 
fm;o~t1nn nf ih~;,; dt>:n~rtm~nt w:.:~s. inform:-tt1on tli~~min::~l'ion rathP:r th:.m :-t morP. nro:-tc.tlvP-
. -. - - ... "'"I".. . - - --- - --- - ·- ... ... • . .. - . .. .. - - I" - ..•. -. 
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role (Tracey,l953). During the war, Waiter Citrine, TUC General Secretary (1926-
1946) showed an interest in the possibilities of radio broadcasting as an educative tool 
for trade unionists and discussed his ideas with the BBC but in the main, trade union 
attitudes towards news media coverage were characterised by a 'fatalistic attitude' 
(Seaton, 1982:273). While the view of radio and newspaper coverage might have been 
critical, there were few sustained discussions amongst trade union leaders as to what 
could be done about it and, indeed, not all trade unionists regarded the mass media as 
their enemy. The NUR executive actually passed a motion thanking the press for its 
coverage after one dispute in the late 1950s (Wigham, 1961: 169). 
Only some white collar unions and staff associations, presumably because they 
lacked the certainty of recruitment afforded by the closed shop agreements common in 
manual industries, demonstrated a willingness to invest resources in the appointment of 
press officers or the development of publicity campaigns. By the beginning of the post 
war period the civil service unions, USDA W and NALGO employed staff with these 
specific responsibilities (Wigham,l961:166) and the NUT appointed a full time press 
officer in 1956 (Gerbner,l969:219) but as Wigham points out, the customary salaries 
of union officials in this period were unlikely to attract staff with experience in 
journalism and, in any case, union etiquette implied that union members rather than the 
general public should be the first to hear of significant developments in union affairs. 
On the whole, blue collar unions ignored the potential of communication technology 
and expertise although the NUTGW , in one of the more bizarre union communication 
initiatives, released a promotional gramophone record in the late 1950s 
(Wigham,l961: 180). 
In its submission to the Donovan Commission, the TUC indicated that it saw little 
need for an expensive public relations campaign (Seaton 1982: 273). And yet as Eric 
Wigham, the Times labour correspondent during the 1950s and 1960s, argued this 
indifference regarding news media coverage flew in the face of evidence of a sinking 
public standing and a continuing failure to communicate the essential arguments to 
support the organisation of workers in the workplace (196l:ch 9). This was in marked 
contrast to trade unions in the United States where ambitious projects to support first 
newspapers and later radio programmes and even whole radio stations were devised in 
both the pre and post war periods (Douglas,l986). In the United States, of course, 
most large employers already used a range of sophisticated public relations techniques, 
sometimes directed against labour. In Britain, during the 1950s, although some political 
communication and public relations work was undertaken by large companies, such as 
ICI, and trade associations including, for example the Iron and Steel Federation and the 
Road Haulage Association, in response to the threat of nationalisation 
(Finer,l966:ch7), frequently companies matched trade unions in their reluctance to 
exploit communication techniques (Wigham, 196l:ch 10). In this sense, there was little 
incentive for unions to invest in media work. 
A decade later, Wigham still considered that most trade unions had made little 
progress in developing appropriate responses to 'the fierce newspaper campaigns' 
frequently directed against them (1969: 172). Several well publicised incidents of ballot 
rigging and the application of draconian disciplinary measures had provided hostile 
sections of the press with plenty of ammunition and yet a majority of blue collar unions 
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continued to deplore their portrayal in much news media coverage whilst continuing to 
regard it as part and parcel of the industrial environment (Philo and Hewitt,1976). 
However, by the late 1960s Clive Jenkins, general secretary of the newly formed 
ASTMS, had started to integrate recruitment and publicity campaigns within one 
systematic strategy. ASTMS planned to recruit in previously unorganised white collar 
employment sectors and the mass media offered an initial channel of communication 
between union and potential recruits. Jenkins expended considerable effort in 
developing a network of contacts, not only with journalists on the labour beat but also 
science, technology and even education correspondents (17). It was ASTMS who had 
the audacity to first take out a newspaper advertisement in the 'top people's paper', The 
Times, in 1968 and also began to invest in the development of a large publicity and 
communications department (Jenkins and Sherman, 1979:55). It seems that a number of 
white collar unions began to explore the possibilities of more elaborate communication 
strategies by the end of the 1960s but blue collar unions, in the main, insulated by their 
relative strength in terms of recognition agreements and union density, remained more 
passive in their external communication (Philo and Hewitt, 1976) and unimaginative in 
their development of internal communications (Selvin, 1963). 
Union communication work in the 1970s: the unions look outwards. 
Certainly, as Seaton (1982) and Verzuh (1990) suggest, the news media coverage of the 
1979 Winter of Discontent was generally hostile and did further encourage unions to 
attach more importance to media and communication work. However, this is better 
understood as the culmination of a process which had its origins in the growing 
political and industrial polarisation which began in the late 1960s and quickened in pace 
throughout the 1970s. There is considerable documentary evidence to confirm that 
much earlier in the decade an anxiety about the damage hostile news media coverage 
might do was widespread throughout the union and labour movement. By October 1975 
64% of the general public and even 56% of trade unionists in a MORI poll agreed 
with the proposition that 'most trade unions are controlled by extremists and militants' 
and 75% of the public and 65% of trade unionists sampled believed that 'trade unions 
have too much power' (18). In this decade, though, union membership continued to 
grow and the size and influence of the TUC continued to expand. Union confidence 
was high and political prospects appeared fair. Against this background there was less 
pressure to consider issues of internal communication with memberships and, with 
some exceptions, trade unions defined the problem of communication as an external 
one, concerning the representation of trade unions by broadcasting organisations and 
the press. Rather than accommodate the 'needs' of the news media, encouraged by the 
political confidence of the left and the radicalism of the shop stewards movement, 
many trade unionists looked outwards, developing a critique of the work of the news 
media, themselves. Consideration of how union practice and organisation might be best 
reformed to accommodate the rhythms of news organisations only began to emerge as 
an issue towards the end of the decade. 
As early as 1971, the ACTT conducted a limited content analysis of television 
content in an attempt to demonstrate 'bias' in coverage (19). By 1977, concern 
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regarding media treatment, expressed particularly forcefully through a series of 
resolutions to successive TUC annual conferences, had prompted the TUC to organise a 
one-day conference on 'Trade Unions and the Media' (20) and establish the TUC 
Media Working Group. Other union officials and activists were already developing 
substantial critiques of news media coverage several years before 1979 and beginning 
to contemplate what communication policies might be necessary to address the 
problems identified (21). 
If the TUC's approach, as set out in its submission to the Donovan Commission, 
betrayed a certain complacency in the 1970s, this position had to be abandoned as 
pressure within the labour movement grew. A two-pronged TUC approach emerged 
which combined a monitoring and complaints strategy with a later recognition that 
some development of 'accommodative skills' was necessary. In combination with 
several individual unions, such as NALGO, the TUC submitted critical evidence on 
news media coverage of industrial relations both to the MacGregor Royal Commission 
on the Press (1974-77) and the Annan Committee on broadcasting (1977-79). The TUC 
Media Working Group also began towards the end of this period to produce a series of 
practical guides, some of which were intended to encourage the acquisition of 
'accommodative skills' on the part of union activists and grass roots members. In 1979 
'How to Handle the Media: a guide for trade unionists' (TUC 1979B) was published 
with a description of the routine processes of news production and advice on how best 
to write and distribute press releases, hold press conferences and handle inquiries. This 
was followed by a more specialised briefing on the use of local radio (TUC Campaign 
Bulletin,1980) and detailed advice on making formal complaints (TUC,1983). 
There are several reasons why the TUC and individual unions began to adopt more 
active and critical approaches. Firstly, the shop stewards movement of the early 1970s, 
which both responded to and encouraged a devolution of negotiating power from the 
national forum to the level of the plant, had a radicalising effect as more rank and file 
union members found that daily union politics touched their working lives (Heery and 
Kelly,1994). It is likely that in gaining more first hand experience of industrial 
relations processes, a number of ordinary employees were provided with a more 
substantial 'benchmark' with which to assess news media representations of industrial 
relations. Secondly, in a number of ways the political and cultural circumstances of this 
period encouraged a more radical and critical perspective to be applied to 
'establishment' institutions including television and daily newspaper organisations. 
Opposition to the Heath government's 1971 Industrial Relations Act, the coal strikes of 
1972 and 1974 which culminated in the collapse of the government, the growing 
industrial and political opposition to the Social Contract and the imposition of 'IMF' 
cuts in 1976 by a Labour government, all helped to foster a radical and critical 
perspective amongst a number of trade unionists making them more sensitive to the 
ideological contours of news coverage. Resolutions denouncing news media coverage 
of trade unions and industrial relations were submitted by local union branches almost 
every year to the Annual Trade Union Congress during this period,- a pattern which 
significantly tails off in the 1980s (22). 
Thirdly, the influence of academic interventions should not be underestimated at this 
point either. As discussed further in chapter nine, a number of British academics had 
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begun the task of describing and analysing the nature of the ways in which trade unions 
were represented through the news media and this work added an additional authority 
to the critical perspectives already developed by trade unionists (Ha11,1973; Hartmann, 
1975; Morely,1976; Glasgow University Media Group,1976 and 1980; Edwards, 1979; 
Downing,1980). Much of this work was funded by organisational sources with 
significant public legitimacy including Unesco and the Leverhulme Trust which lent 
further weight to the critique being developed from within the labour movement. In 
turn, once the MacGregor Royal Commission of the Press was established, it became 
clear that it, too, would seek to gather evidence on the subject of press coverage of 
industrial relations (McQuail,l977) which signalled the state's endorsement, at least of 
the legitimacy of the question as to whether or not industrial relations coverage was 
'biased'. This, incidentally, may partly explain the ferocity of the response from the 
broadcasting organisations and some other journalists to the publication of the Glasgow 
work (Skirrow,1980). Some trade unions including the ASTMS entered into a dialogue 
with academic researchers (Sapper,1977 and 1983) and others, such as NALGO, began 
to make use of academic expertise in designing media training programmes for 
members (Philo and Hewitt, 1976; Philo,Beharrell and Hewitt, 1977). 
If part of the trade union complaint was that, too often, there was a failure in the 
news media to recognise the rationale for particular union policies or strategies, this 
was in part a reflection of the decline in the labour and left daily press, a process with 
roots in a history which stretched back long before the 1970s (Curran and 
Seaton, 1985). Not only were there, by the late 1970s, far fewer newspapers with even 
a lukewarm sympathy for the labour movement, there was also a gradual and almost 
imperceptible erosion of the space within all popular newspapers devoted to serious 
political commentary. This shrinking of the public sphere provided by popular 
newspapers was a feature of the process of tabloidisation as competition in Fleet Street 
intensified. Competition at the popular end of the newspaper market had always been 
fierce but by the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of critics began to voice fears 
about the erosion of formal political content in popular daily papers. For Ron Todd of 
the T and G, this amounted to the disenfranchisement of working people; popular 
newspapers no longer supplied ordinary trade unionists with the information necessary 
to make informed choices or participate in a meaningful way in democratic decision 
making (Sparks,1992) (23). For some unions, this too was an additional spur to 
consider more seriously communication policies and alternatives to the popular press 
for the purposes both of presenting a public case and in terms of internal 
communication with their own members. Beginning in the 1970s, the process of 
tabloidisation rapidly gained momentum in the 1980s and was exacerbated, from the 
labour movement's point of view, by the unqualified enthusiasm for the new 
Conservative government which characterised the right wing popular papers in the 
early 1980s. 
Finally, not only labour but sections of capital began to explore more systematically 
the possibilities of communication work and this, even in the mid to late 1970s, placed 
more pressure upon trade unions. As noted above, British employers, in contrast to 
their American counterparts, had been slow to utilise public relations techniques in the 
first two decades after the Second World War and had been content, in the main, to 
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allow workplace trade union structures to function as the main means of internal 
communication between management and employees (Cayford,1985:1; 
Jones,1986:ch2). However, in the late 1970s aggressive new management styles were 
already emerging in companies including British Leyland under Michae1 Edwards, 
United Biscuits, IBM(UK), Cadbury Ltd, Talbot Motor Co., Continental, and Kellogs 
(UK) (Cayford,1985; Wickens,1987:140-142). It was clear that there was a new 
determination on the part of some managements to by-pass the traditional lines of 
company union communication and appeal directly to employees over the heads of shop 
stewards and union officials. Trade unions were compelled to begin to consider more 
seriously their own internal communication strategies. Some white collar unions had 
long records of substantial resource investment in internal communications but by the 
late 1970s, some blue collar unions began to move in similar directions. Sid Weighell 
became general secretary of the NUR, for example, in 1975 and immediately 
introduced a programme to develop the NUR' s communication systems with a re-
launched union journal, a series of newsletters to members and a new 'open' policy 
with industrial correspondents (Weighell, 1983: 106-107). 
At the end of the 1970s, then, the issue of media coverage and the representation of 
unions was already widely perceived as an important political issue within the labour 
movement. A number of unions had already invested time and resources in sharpening 
their critical understanding of news media processes and coverage; some, mainly but 
not exclusively white collar unions, had taken steps to re-structure their internal 
communication systems, and some of the now familiar 'do-it-yourself guides for 
dealing with the news media were already being produced both by the TUC and 
individual unions (24). What happened in the following decade was that the pressures 
producing these responses grew in intensity but were also exacerbated by the changes 
in the political and economic environment discussed earlier in the chapter. The latter 
compelled many more unions to develop more comprehensive approaches not only to 
external communication work and the issue of media representation but to the battle for 
effective internal communication work, as well. 
The 1980s: the rise of the comprehensive. accommodative communication strategy. 
If it is an over-simplification to suggest that it was the events 1979 which prompted 
unions to think seriously about media work, nonetheless, it is true that intensity of the 
hostility of sections of the press during the 'Winter of Discontent' in 1979 shocked 
many union officials, a mood reflected in the TUC's pamphlet, 'A Cause for Concern' 
(TUC 1979), published just after the election of Mrs Thatcher. 
The period following 1979 is best understood as one in which developing but 
underlying structural changes intermesh with the conjuncturally specific, to force both 
internal and external communication work to the top of the labour movement agenda. 
These are the political-economic changes discussed at length earlier in the chapter. If, 
in the 1970s, the security of the unions' membership bases encouraged unions to 
become preoccupied with the external political context of communication,- the issues of 
'bias' and 'balance' in the news- the structural forces of change, reinforced by the 
policies of the incoming Conservative administration in 1979, provided powerful 
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stimuli for unions to develop more comprehensive internal and external communication 
strategies in the 1980s. The emergence of new forms of production, new employer 
strategies for organising labour and new patterns of segmentation in the labour market 
represent the backdrop to contemporary union communication policy. 
As we have seen, the collapse of the manufacturing base, the rapid decline of heavy 
industry in both public and private ownership and the privatisation of the public utilities 
all contributed to the dramatic decline in union membership levels. Half way through 
the 1980s, it was clear to many unions that there was a desperate need to respond to the 
growing complexity and segmentation of labour markets in order to find ways of 
compensating for the loss of members in traditional sectors. This required a sustained 
review of communication work, both internal and external and an attempt to fmd new 
forms of discourse, new vocabularies and symbolic systems with which to express 
union values and appeal to the new target groups, amongst young workers, the 
growing feminised and unorganised work forces, black and Asian workers, the part-
time and the casualised (Kossof,l988 (a) and (b); Cunnison and Stageman,l993; Heery 
and Kelly,l994) (25). As we have seen, unions did not consistently take up the 
challenge of attempting to organise in virgin territory and frequently mergers with other 
unions or intensified competition within already organised sectors (26) appeared more 
attractive options but each of these also implied the need to develop more fully 
elaborated communication strategies. In developing merger plans, for example, unions 
found that it might be advantageous not only to invest in the production of appropriate 
communication materials such as, promotional literature, videos, and union journal 
articles but also to engage in news media work. The more frequent the appearance of a 
union on the inside pages of the quality newspapers taken by senior union officials and 
the labour movement elite, particularly in the context of stories about modernisation or 
innovation, the stronger the position of a trade union as a merger suitor. 
As described above, the impact of the increasingly severe political and legislative 
environment was also double-edged. If it seemed as if the series of employment 
measures and trade union reforms enacted by the government throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s aimed implicitly to legislate the emasculation of the labour movement, the 
unintended consequence was to provide unions with an additional spur to develop 
effective communication strategies as a response and the ' success' of the campaigns to 
secure membership support for political funds confirmed that investment in 
communications work could be justified in terms of concrete results. The imposition of 
compulsory secret ballots for industrial action and the requirement to run postal 
elections for senior posts had similar consequences, compelling unions to develop 
more adequate infrastructures to support internal communication, computerised 
membership lists with home addresses, mail shot software and the appropriate 
organisation of staff at head offices. In short, while the legislation was unwelcome, it 
did have the effect of forcing many unions to significantly improve their 
communication systems. 
If the tougher managements had already begun to develop aggressive communication 
strategies in the 1970s, the trend spread as the impact of the government's legislation 
and the change in political climate began to tip the balance of power within the 
workplace against organised labour. Techniques first tried at British Leyland were 
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applied at British Steel to 'soften up' the workforce in anticipation of the large scale 
redundancy programme (Cayford,l985) of the early 1980s. British Rail applied the 
'new' communication techniques in the dispute with the NUR in 1983 over flexible 
rostering, employing a direct mail shot to the homes of employees and a 'personal' 
letter from the chairman; a telephone call line and a series of advertisements 
(Jones,1986ch 2; Parker,1989 eh 10). In the fmancial year 1983-84, British Rail spent 
£19 million on corporate communication and £0.5 million simply on corporate 
advertising aimed at 'opinion formers' (Parker 1989:268). At the same time, despite 
Sid Weighell's determination to introduce an innovatory approach to union 
communication, the NUR executive suffered a humiliating defeat when the 
membership refused to back industrial action in a postal ballot and this appeared to 
underline the success of BR management in communicating 'over the heads' of union 
officials. Three years later the strategy of the NUM during the 1984/85 Coal Strike was 
criticised for a failure to invest in sustained communication work to match that of the 
Coal Board and government (Jones, 1986; Adeney and Lloyd, 1986). This is discussed 
further in chapter five. Management use of 'new' communication technology then, as 
part of a strategy to side-line trade unions and foster individual employee 
identification with corporate goals, rather than collective union ambitions (Smith and 
Morton,l993), provided an additional pressure upon unions in the 1980s to 'fight fire 
with fire'. In an era in which an increasing number of professional organisations and, 
indeed, even the government itself (Jones,1986; Golding,l992), were beginning to 
invest significant resources in communication and public relations work, unions would 
ignore communication issues at their peril. The expansion of the symbolic environment 
( though not necessarily the public sphere) through the growth in local broadcasting and 
day time national television only reinforced this point. 
If unions were compelled by the new political and legislative environments of the 
1980s to think in more imaginative ways about communication issues, the lowering 
cost of communication technology began to make more ambitious plans realistic. By the 
mid 1980s many unions, including the CPSA, UCW, T and G, NALGO, NUPE, 
EETPU, were either producing in house or commissioning their own recruitment or 
training videos (Cayford,1985; Peers and Richards,l986). Even relatively small unions 
like the Tailors and Garment Workers chose to invest in a recruitment video. A few 
began to exploit video technology in developing more sharply focused political 
campaigns over issues like the political funds (Peers and Richards,1986). By the end of 
the decade a small number of unions developed much more ambitious projects such as 
the in house television production studio built by the AEU and named 'Hamlet 
Television' after president Bill Jordan's fondness for Shakespeare (27). 
At the same time, a new willingness could be detected within sections of the labour 
movement to consider the opportunities provided by communication technology 
(Landry et al, 1985). The example of the success of the GLC anti abolition campaign 
which had apparently won a notable success in terms of public opinion if not a 
political victory, appeared to suggest that well targeted communication strategies could 
succeed in popularising a left agenda. Under Neil Kinnock, the 'shadow 
communication agency' and other 'modernisers' within the Labour Party gained 
increasing influence in calling for the left to place communication and presentation at 
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the centre of political strategy. As Ken Livingstone said, 'It's a TV age ... Three 
minutes on the box with Janet Street Porter is worth hundreds of public meetings' 
(28). The suspicion with which much of the labour movement traditionally viewed the 
institutions of mass communication had not disappeared. However, a new interest in 
the opportunities presented by communication systems found an influential intellectual 
support amongst the advocates of the 'New Times' perspective (Hall and Jacques,l989) 
where a new politics of consumption, identity and lifestyle appeared to imply that the 
left should engage in a project of 'niche' campaigning to reach an increasingly 
divergent and segmented set of constituencies. 
Indeed, according to Heery and Kelly (1994), the organisational culture within 
trade unions was not immune to change. In the next chapter, the survey of union 
journal content will describe a strong emphasis in a number of union journals, upon the 
services which unions can provide for 'individual' members, with articles and news 
items outlining, legal and financial services, support for the negotiation of 'customised' 
or individual employee contracts and union provision in the spheres of health, leisure 
and tourism. Several union press officers interviewed for this study indicated that one 
of their objectives was to raise the proftle of union work in these areas. This is 
consistent with Heery and Kelly's view that the 'servicing relationship' between unions 
and their members has passed through three phases in the post war period. In the 
immediate period after the war, 'the servicing relationship' between unions and 
members could be typified as 'professional', where full-time salaried union officials 
played the major role in representing the interests of members to employers and in 
securing collective agreements. In the late 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of the shop 
stewards movement and more radical shop floor politics, a new pattern characterised 
by 'participative unionism' emerged, reflecting a suspicion of the familiarity of 
relations between full time officials and managements, and based upon the principle of 
'self activity' whereby ordinary members exercised greater influence in collective 
negotiations (1994:5). However, recently Heery and Kelly suggest, a third 'servicing 
relationship' has emerged, characterised as 'managerial unionism' based upon ' ... a 
perception of union members as discerning and calculating consumers', 'primarily 
instrumental in their orientation' who 'must be deliberately attracted into the union 
fold' (1994:7). As a consequence union bureaucracy must become more managerial in 
its functioning, researching and monitoring employee needs, designing and promoting 
union services to match and planning the organisation, training and deployment of its 
own human resources to support service delivery (Heery and Kelly, 1994:7). 
So pressure to develop communication work and formulate more coherent 
communications strategies came from both without and within during the period after 
1979. Once union members began to be constituted as 'consumers' or 'market 
segments' to be serviced, the identification of particular 'target audiences' and work on 
improving and widening the range of communication techniques was bound to follow 
Communications. the TUC and the wider labour movememt in the 1980s. 
It is 1985 which marks the more fundamental departure in which accommodative work 
is given the highest priority.The TUC Media Working Group, established in 1977 in 
61 
response to growing rank and file and elite concern about media coverage, had a brief 
to develop strategies which could be recommended to individual TUC affiliates and to 
take a lead in encouraging the labour movement to develop communication work, so its 
publications can be regarded as examples of officially endorsed best practice and as 
indications of the political assumptions underpinning the communication strategy of the 
union elite. The work of monitoring news media output, started by scholars and 
individual unions, was continued and broadened to include the general representation of 
women in the media. The TUC Media Working Group published a series of pamphlets 
concerning the dominant themes and imagery of the media (TUC 1979A; TUC 1980; 
TUC 1985) and sought to extend the lobbying and complaints strategy by involving 
rank and file union members, at a local level (TUC 1981; TUC 1983). The critique of 
media coverage continued to reflect the legacy of the sharper, more radical politics of 
the labour movement in the 1970s. In terms of the options set out above, the emphasis 
was upon exerting pressure from without or by establishing independent means of 
communication rather than working 'within' the news gathering system through 
accommodative news work. The use of the legislative force of the state to establish 
mechanisms to redress the balance in union and political coverage was first formally 
endorsed by the TUC Media Working Group in 1983 (TUC 1983) and, at first, as TUC 
policy began to evolve and consider new possibilities, attention turned to the strategies 
which afforded the most control over the construction of the message including 
advertising (TUC 1985), independent video production (1986A) and the commissioning 
of market research (1986B). 
As we have seen, some individual unions had already begun to invest in 
accommodative media work before the start of the 1980s but this was hardly common 
practice. The TUC Media Working Group did not dismiss accommodative work and 
the TUC published its own 'do-it yourselr manuals (TUC 1977;TUC 1979 (b);TUC 
1980) on dealing with journalists and the news media but up to the mid-1980s, there 
was little consideration of substantial investment or fundamental organisational reform 
with regard to accommodative work. 
It is at this point that the TUC's orientation towards communication issues appears 
to shift. For one thing, the routine supply of angry resolutions to conference 
condemning news media coverage began to dwindle. Coverage of the 1984- 85 Coal 
Strike briefly revived the old debates but by the end of the decade reports of annual 
conference contain little evidence of the deep-seated antagonism towards the news 
media characteristic of conferences in the 1970s (29). A thorough examination of the 
reasons for this is beyond the brief of this investigation but is likely to be, in part, a 
reflection of the influence of the 'soft left' and 'modernisers' within both unions and 
the Labour Party and also the product of a feeling that the complaint and critique 
strategy had somehow been exhausted. 'Bias', 'distortion' and 'cultural skew' had been 
documented dozens of times and yet few clear gains appeared to have been secured. 
The changes in the orientation of unions towards their members- 'the servicing 
relationship' described by Heery and Kelly (1994) - was already prompting a re-
consideration of the role of communication work and encouraging unions to focus more 
upon the symbolism and language through which they could represent themselves, 
rather than the dominant 'frames' imposed by the news media. And, of course, 
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following the defeat of the miners, the crushing 1983 general election defeat of the 
Labour Party, and the other set backs experienced by the labour movement in the first 
half of the 1980s, the political confidence which had underpinned the left-critique of 
the 1970s had all but disappeared. 
This is the background to an important shift in the TUC's own approach to media 
and communication work.. In 1984, the TUC began to consider more fundamental 
questions concerning the organisation of union structures in relation to communication 
and this marks the development of a more sustained attempt to accommodate the 
imperatives of news organisations, as part of a broader re-orientation towards the mass 
media in general. The mass media began to be regarded less as hostile sources of 
ideological conflict. Rather, accommodative media work was to be treated with 
sufficient priority to warrant significant additional allocations of resources and even 
structural re-organisation. In March 1984, the TUC General Council produced a 
consultative document on strategy for the coming decade which included a long section 
on communications (30). 
It provides a good example of the ambivalence which was to characterise many 
union approaches as they embraced accommodative media strategies during the next 
few years. On the one hand, the document rehearsed the familiar criticisms of 'anti 
union bias' in the news media and yet also noted that, 
"The opportunities and demands for unions to put across their 
points of view through the media will increase and this in turn 
will place more pressure on unions to deal with the media in 
a professional way in order to ensure that the best use is made 
of the opportunities. • (31) 
The document reviewed the work of the TUC Media Working Group, noting the 
publication of practical guides and the forthcoming advice on use of advertising, video 
and market research. However, it moved beyond these by placing in the context of 
communication work, a need for organisational reform, the role of full time officers, 
and union training programmes. Following the circulation of this consultative document 
amongst TUC Regional Councils and County Associations, the TUC Standing 
Conference of Principal Union Officers held a conference to review responses in 
January 1985. The document produced for consideration at this conference set the tone: 
'Trade unions cannot ignore the message of June 1983- that 
even after four years of economic failure, public service 
cutbacks, public asset stripping, and the scandal of rampant 
unemployment, so many trade unionists and others were uncon-
vinced by our presentation of the alternative.' (32) 
The first section of the document reviewed the internal communication systems which 
unions employed to reach their own memberships and dwelt mainly upon the 
development of union journals which is discussed in the next chapter of this study. The 
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second section reviewed the external communication systems employed by unions and 
considered: 
'the scope for enhancing the use made by unions of printed 
and broadcasting avenues of communication which, for all 
the justifiable suspicion of them which exists, remain the 
most immediate link between working men and women and the 
organisations which represent them.' (33) 
Once again, the ambivalence of trade unions towards mainstream news media surfaced. 
One the hand, the political analysis developed by many trade unionists and the 
assumptions regarding structures of power and control suggested that the news media 
were always likely to prove hostile territory and yet, on the other hand, their 
importance in the lives of most ordinary trade unionists, and the public at large, 
pointed to the political imperative to acknowledge and anticipate their work in 
'producing news'. 
The document explicitly notes a number of the changes in the political and economic 
environment noted above,- the appeal of Thatcherism even amongst trade unionists, the 
threat of recent legislation and the proposed compulsory ballots for political funds, the 
use by employers of new communication techniques (34), and the expansion of the 
news media environment in the early 1980s (35). The efforts of unions in working with 
local broadcasting media were acknowledged but "union communication experts 
generally recognised that British unions do not do as much to initiate publicity and 
influence opinion as, for instance, unions in France and Sweden where 
'communications' attract a far greater share of resources" (36). The paper summarised 
the results of a survey of the union arrangements to support media work undertaken in 
preparation for the conference. Significantly, although the conference paper rapidly 
passes over this point without elaboration, very few unions employed full time press 
officers at this stage. Most either relied upon the media skills of their general 
secretaries or employed staff to combine the role of press officer with other duties such 
as research or producing union publications (37). 
The provision for media training also appeared very uneven with some unions 
investing very little time or resources in developing appropriate skills for staff and even 
the TUC, itself, only at the stage of piloting new 'Communication Skills' courses at its 
national education centre. The main theme to be explored in this study is the centrality 
of the relationship between union elites and industrial correspondents in the production 
of industrial news and, given the constraints imposed by structures of power and 
production, the possible effectivity of the politics of source-correspondent interaction. 
The important position of industrial correspondents as points of contact for most unions 
was acknowledged in the document and yet curiously, in the light of the reservations 
regarding the 'anti-union bias' of the news media expressed in the introduction, the 
discussion moved on without any consideration of the politics of union-journalist 
interaction or the techniques which might advantage union press officers within these 
politics. Instead, there was some limited discussion of the new terrain where unions had 
found some opportunities for developing media work including local radio and the 
64 
specialist press and a call was made for greater attention to be paid to the ethnic 
minority press (38). 
The document signalled an important shift in the thinking of the TUC towards 
accommodative media work. In reviewing the staffing and resourcing of media work 
within trade unions and in calling for further survey work to be undertaken, the 
document pointed to the possibility of institutional re-organisation and significant 
investment in media work orientated towards news organisations for the first time. Of 
course, other communication strategies were not simply abandoned and the document 
noted the enthusiasm a number of unions expressed for the advertising campaigns 
particular unions had employed in their opposition to the privatisation of British 
Telecom and the water industry. Nevertheless, the document was notable for the 
absence of any discussion of the more combative strategies, such as monitoring and 
complaint or structural intervention. Of course, there remained plenty of support for 
such strategies within the labour movement but they were no longer being placed in the 
foreground in the official policy discussions of the TUC. 
One practical outcome of the January 1985 conference was the establishment of an 
ad hoc group of Union Communication Officers to meet regularly. The brief of this 
group was to review further the use of communication technology, marketing and 
advertising services; consider the role of the TUC in terms of union communication 
strategy, and provide a way of pooling expertise and appropriate resources for dealing 
with the news media. In the following year, the ad hoc group met four times and 
helped to draw up the TUC guidelines on use of advertising and video, in conjunction 
with the TUC Media Working Group (39). Given that the latter was comprised mainly 
of general secretaries and senior officials from the print, media and other relevant 
unions but without the knowledge of media practice to be found amongst the union 
press and communication officers in the ad hoc group, it is likely that the ad hoc group 
was able to exert considerable influence in terms of practical policy. This was all the 
more likely because the Media Working Group became preoccupied with the dangers 
implicit in the government's review of broadcasting policy through the establishment of 
the Peacock Committee and the later green and white papers on the future of 
broadcasting ( 40). 
The ad hoc group continued to meet sporadically over the next two years. It 
reviewed the work of trade union press officers, the role of trade union journals, and 
collated information on a variety of specialist media services, including even the repair 
of union banners ( 41). Its main significance was, perhaps, as an opportunity lost. For 
the first time a forum existed in which union press officers could meet and discuss 
common problems but which also offered the possibility of more structured co-
ordination of union press and media work, along the lines of the arrangements 
established by the media and press officers of the various environmental pressure 
groups (Anderson,1993:61). In addition, representatives from the Labor Institute of 
Public affairs (LIPA) had been invited by the Media Working Group to brief the TUC 
on the ways in which a variety of media techniques could be integrated within one 
strategy (42). However, these opportunities were not seized and the ad hoc group 
ceased to meet regularly in 1988. This was partly a consequence of the unambitious 
brief given to the ad hoc group in the first place but it was also because the work of the 
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group was overtaken by events. Firstly, the policy of the state towards broadcasting 
and the dissemination of information had been thrown into sharp relief by the crisis of 
the Spycatcher case, the treatment of union members at G.C.H.Q. Cheltenham, plans 
to reform the Official Secrets Act, new restrictions placed upon access to information 
generated by the former public utilities, and the broadcasting white paper. Secondly, 
the TUC had become increasingly alarmed by the steady haemorrhaging of union 
members through the decade and the dramatic fall in revenue, to the point at which it 
was decided in 1987 to establish a Special Review Body to examine the whole future 
strategy and direction of the TUC, itself (43). 
Inevitably, the issue of communication work was subsumed within this broader 
review, in an atmosphere of perceived crisis, as the impact of the developments in the 
political and economic environment discussed above, became sharper and ever more 
visible. The Special Review Group drew up, amongst other things, plans for the TUC 
co-ordinated recruitment drives (the 'Union -Yes' campaign) to reach under-organised 
and green field employment sectors, which were pioneered at Trafford Park, 
Manchester and Docklands in 1990 (44). As the TUC lost profile and presence in so 
many employment sectors, so the importance of communication opportunities, for 
projects such as 'Union-Yes', continued to be underlined. Yet, as Annual Congress 
noted with alarm, policies of media de-regulation, the growing centralised control of 
the state over information and increasing concentration of ownership in media markets 
all meant that the 'public sphere' which afforded such opportunities was actually 
shrinking (45). For example, the Media Working Group expended considerable energy 
in trying to persuade, with only limited success, both BBC and ITV not to drastically 
cut back staff and broadcasting time allocated to labour and industrial affairs ( 46) in 
response to a new political and commercial climate, hostile to traditional public service 
broadcasting values. 
By the late 1980s, it is possible to detect a further re-focusing in TUC 
communication strategy. In fact, the focus widens, once again, to take account of the 
generalised threat presented by these changes in the communications environment. The 
importance of accommodative media work had been 'flagged up' by the ad hoc group 
but this now became part of a more generalised concern about the nature of the 
symbolic environment and communicative activity. However, in very different 
political circumstances to the 1970s, in the wake of the ravages of the 1980s and 
without the buoyancy afforded by the shop floor radicalism of the 1970s, the tone of 
debate was both more defensive and less ambitious. There is no return to the combative 
'monitoring and complaints strategy' of the mid-1970s, though continuity can be 
detected in some elements of policy. The 1988 Annual Congress passed resolutions on 
the dangers of concentration in press ownership, calling for legal obligations to be 
placed upon wholesalers to distribute a diverse range of newspapers and a statutory of 
right of reply (47). The Media Working Group were given the task of formulating a 
general policy statement on the mass media and a conference, 'The Role of the Media 
in a Democracy' was held in March 1988 with speakers including representatives from 
the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom and industrial corespondent, Philip 
Bassett, closely associated with the politics of 'new realism' (48). A 'shopping list' of 
desirable legislative reforms emerged which expanded the resolutions of Congress and 
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included repeal of the Official Secrets Act, a freedom of information act, and the 
establishment of one regulatory 'Communications Council' to embrace all media 
sectors (49). In practical terms, it was agreed to continue the fight to preserve public 
service broadcasting, partly through co-operation with European unions facing similar 
threats (50). 
The 1980s can be characterised, then, as a decade in which the deteriorating political 
and economic environment forced the TUC and the labour movement on to the 
defensive. Paradoxically, one consequence of this was the development of a more 
comprehensive communications policy which involved a period in the mid-80s in 
which the issue of the necessary infrastructure for accommodative media work was 
placed in the foreground by the TUC. By the late 1980s, the changes in the 
communications environment, the threat posed to the 'public sphere' and the growing 
profile of the state in both controlling and sponsoring information flows (51), had 
prompted a more generalised concern about communication policy at the macro level. 
Nevertheless, an awareness of the issues and necessary investments involved in micro 
communication work had emerged and was now to be found in the policy of individual 
unions, as well as the TUC. The irony is that the TUC moved to a position where it 
could formulate a comprehensive strategy for communications, including both 
accommodative work and approaches offering more autonomy, just at the moment 
when it became increasingly difficult to resource and sustain such work. By the early 
1990s, crisis of funding through declining membership had reached a point at which 
severe retrenchment had to occur. In 1990, all the work of the various TUC 
committees was suspended as the full implications of the financial deficit were revealed 
(Harper,l990). The TUC announced a re-organisation and 'modernisation' of its press 
and publicity departments in 1992 (52) with the rationale that the TUC had to find a 
new role as a research and lobbying organisation but the evidence of drastic cutbacks in 
other departments suggested that the motive was as much to do with cost as reform. 
Inevitably, there are now severe limits on what communications initiatives, the TUC 
can undertake. The 'TUC Bulletin', the TUC's own newspaper for union members, 
launched in 1986, was axed in 1991 as a cost cutting measure (53). New promotional 
campaigns, such as 'Towards 2,000', launched in 1991, are less ambitious than 
'Unions Yes' and involve less resourcing in terms of advertising and staffing. Against 
this background the TUC Media Working Group was wound down and finally 
subsumed by the Finance and General Purposes Committee, also in 1991 (54). 
Some media initiatives continue. The 1992 conference, 'Making the Most of Local 
Radio', which included presentations by Geoffrey Goodman (former Daily Mirror 
industrial editor and LBC industrial correspondent) and Nicholas Jones (formerly BBC 
radio industrial correspondent) represented an attempt by the TUC to encourage more 
flexible media work by individual unions in areas where it was perceived that there 
were possibilities to articulate a reasoned union case (55) but the flow of pamphlets and 
guides on communication work has ceased and there is little discussion of the 
exploitation of new communication technologies by the TUC, itself. Chapter seven 
discusses the recent decline in the number of labour correspondents and changes in the 
geography of the labour beat. The TUC is no longer, as it was for almost forty years, a 
part of the daily round for labour correspondents and indeed, even the press 
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conferences which follow the monthly meetings of the TUC council are no longer well 
attended by journalists. There is less momentum in the TUC's communication work 
and fewer opportunities for its development. 
This is not the case, however, with individual unions. A view of accommodative 
media work as offering significant potential and more than just exercises in 'damage 
limitation' began to gain ground amongst individual unions, as well as the TUC itself, 
in the second half of the 1980s. Several reasons can be suggested. As we have seen, a 
number of unions, had already begun to consider accommodative techniques and had 
published guides or 'DIY manuals' to foster better 'media handling' at branch level 
(56). The factors which pushed unions to develop these approaches to the point where it 
was considered necessary to invest centrally in accommodative work probably included 
both 'positive' and 'negative' impulses. In the case of the former, the influence of 
'modernisers' within the Labour Party and the labour movement was already strong by 
the mid-1980s. In the light of the example of the Greater London Council, where a 
hostile press had been 'turned around' by a policy of selective media engagement, and 
the advice provided by the Labour Party's 'shadow communication team' (a group of 
advertising and media practitioners close to the Labour Party leadership), there was 
much more support for the view that the media generated a symbolic environment 
which had to be acknowledged in political terms. 
A number of unions, particularly those who saw themselves as politically close to 
the Labour Party leadership, began to travel in the same 'modernising' direction. 
Hence, the decision of the General Municipal and Boilermakers' Union to embrace the 
world of design consultants and 'corporate imaging' in re-launching itself as the 
'GMB', complete with new logo and a new 'high-tech', 'post-modem' headquarters in 
Wimbledon (57). As Heery and Kelly (1994) suggest, there was a general movement to 
be found in a number unions to re-fashion the 'servicing relationship' between union 
and membership in the 1980s and this involved placing much more emphasis upon 
communication with individual members, rather than collectively with branches. 
However, as the 1985 TUC survey of communications noted, union journals and 
publications normally worked to a monthly cycle (58). If unions wished to 
communicate more speedily with individual members the daily press and broadcasting 
channels offered the only route. Given the pressures to reach new potential members in 
more diverse segments of the labour market and consolidate the support of existing 
ones, this became increasingly important. 
In terms of negative impulses, the collapse of the 'News on Sunday' project ended 
the hopes of some unions that it would prove possible to sustain a commercially viable 
newspaper of the labour movement to replace the old Daily Herald. A number of 
unions had invested in this project and its collapse in 1987 meant the end of attempts to 
establish an independent channel of news communication (59). This reinforced the trade 
unions' dependence upon the mainstream news media. Towards the end of the 1980s a 
number of unions took steps to re-organise and invest in accommodative media work, 
often as part of more comprehensive communication strategies. The survey conducted 
by the TUC for the Conference of Standing Officers Conference on communications in 
1985 found that 'only a few of the largest unions have one or more staff whose time is 
spent exclusively on media relations' (60). The preparatory work for this study 
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revealed that out of the thirty-seven trade unions with membership levels above 45,000 
in December 1987 only, seven employed a press officer with a full-time commitment 
to press and media work. Twenty-three unions employed staff who combined press 
work with other duties including, for example, research or editing the union journal 
(61). The remaining unions left press work to the general secretary or an equivalent 
senior official. 
Today, the picture is quite different. Partly arising from the recent series of large 
mergers which have allowed unions to pool resources to produce economies of scale, it 
is now the norm for large unions to employ at least one full-time press and media 
officer. Accommodative media work receives a significantly greater investment and is 
often supported by organisational structures designed to improve communication work. 
In the case of the 1988/89 Ambulance Dispute, the unions involved took a conscious 
decision to integrate industrial and communications strategy, so that the requirements 
for effective accommodative media work largely determined the pattern of industrial 
action adopted by the union leadership. The role of those primarily involved in 
accommodative union work is explored in further depth in chapters four and five and 
the example of the Ambulance Dispute is examined in chapter nine. The possibilities, 
constraints and dangers of accommodative media work for trade unions is the main 
focus of this study. 
Summary 
As the balance of power between unions and employers shifted in the period after 
1979, unions experienced changes not only in their external ideological orientation to 
the outside world but also· in terms of the values and commitments which formed the 
internal ideological framework for the labour movement. This is hardly surprising. If 
unions are positioned in a crucial way to express and transmit conflicts between the 
powerful and the subordinate in workplace relations, then tensions will appear through 
the mobilisation of symbolic as well as material resources. The survey of union journal 
content in the next chapter reflects these ideological tensions and changes. Several 
journals, for example, reveal attempts to reconstruct the imagery and language of trade 
unionism in response to the ideological legacy of the 1979 'Winter of Discontent' and 
the 'pool' of negative imagery deposited by the news media over several decades (see 
the chapter nine on the 'representation of labour'). 
On the other hand, the crisis brought about by structural change and political assault 
inevitably triggered conflicts within the labour movement, too. These, also, are bound 
to be expressed in symbolic as well as material form. The EETPU journal 'Contact' 
offered, for example, a particular way of 'representing' the conflicts within the labour 
movement during the late 1980s over the union's aggressive recruitment practices and 
the union's final expulsion from the TUC ( in itself a theatrical piece of stage 
management for the news media with the general secretary and delegates striding from 
the TUC conference hall). In the same period, the GMB sought to underline its political 
interventions through accommodative media work, seeking to highlight its distinctive 
political position as both a 'modernising force' but also an opponent of 'new realism', 
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through the 'proactive' briefing of selected correspondents working for the key 
newspapers read by the labour movement elite. 
All forms of political and industrial communication can be understood as both 
expressions of conflict and means for the articulation of conflict. Each of the 
possibilities for media and communication work discussed above implies particular 
positions in terms of degrees of combativeness or defensiveness. The 'proactive' 
targeting of particular news media and briefing of correspondents is often understood as 
quite an aggressive, interventionist pattern of communicative work. However, as an 
accommodative strategy it involves embracing or, at the very least, making 
compromises with the dominant news values and criteria of mainstream news 
journalism. In this respect, it is actually a defensive strategy, often requiring 
concessions to be made and with the danger of 'incorporation' a possibility. The extent 
to which union staff and press officers, in particular, are required to make concessions 
in their accommodative media work and the extent to which they can engage in a 
politics of symbolic representation and source activity to secure advantage is a major 
concern of this study. 
We have seen, then, that union communication strategy is shaped without and 
within. The changes in the structural positioning of unions with regard to labour 
markets , in their relationship to the state, and in their role in the relations of 
domination and subordination between capital and labour have all prompted changes in 
the ways in which they seek to exercise control in the processes of communication and 
symbolic representation. At the same time, though, decisions about communication 
strategy and media work are not merely responses to external pressure but also reflect 
the nature and internal politics of particular unions, as organisations. Chapter four of 
the present study, for example, discusses the crucial importance of the relationship 
between media workers and union leadership in supporting effective accommodative 
work. The case of the NUM during the 1984/85 strike casts a shadow across the whole 
study. As we shall see, not only many journalists but a number of union press officers 
were critical of the uncompromising stand taken by the union with regard to 
communication. There were few concessions made by the NUM to the needs of 
accommodative work with the news media. Arguably, the ambulance unions achieved 
more in terms of news coverage through a strategy which required not only union 
organisation but industrial strategy to be geared to media work. And yet, as chapter 
nine describes, there are costs and dangers here , too. 
Having established the political and economic context for union communication 
work, the next step is to examine accommodative work in more depth but in order to 
do this, it is necessary to consider the preferred agenda which unions might seek to 
present to the news media. One possible measure for these purposes is the content of 
union journals. 
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Chapter Three 
What the Union Papers Say 
Chapter two has described the forces at work which have driven trade unions to invest more 
readily in communication work. Union memberships can no longer be taken for granted, 
new segments of the labour market have to be reached and the attempts by some employers 
to outflank trade unions using direct communication techniques have to be matched. The 
increasingly severe political and economic environment of the last two decades has 
encouraged unions to turn to a politics of communication. Inevitably, this has meant an 
increased importance being attached to union newspapers and journals (1). 
This chapter considers what a sample of trade unions have chosen to communicate through 
their journals and newspapers, in order to establish one measure of a trade union agenda and 
to illustrate one set of communicative responses to the changing political and economic 
environment detailed in the preceding chapter. Subsequent chapters will consider additional 
ictures of the trade union agenda based upon interviews with union press officers and 
taff, before exploring the difficulties and degrees of success experienced in presenting 
ese ideas to the national press. A content analysis has been conducted sampling eleven 
ade union journals during the period January 1989 to December 1989 (2). This represents 
e largest quantitative study of British trade union journals so far conducted including 116 
ifferent issues (3). Full details of sampling and coding are included in appendix two. 
As with many other aspects of union communication work, for much of this century the 
roduction of union journals was often characterised by an inverse relationship between the 
egree of optimism reflected in the assumption that ordinary members would find the 
inutiae of union business of interest, and technical proficiency in the design of 
ommunication materials. Eric Wigham, industrial correspondent on the Times complained, 
n 1961, that too many journals contained an undiluted diet of district reports and financial 
tatements; "were slipshod, dull and uninformative, produced by a general secretary or other 
fficial in odd moments, with little money at his disposal and less journalistic experience, 
elying .. .largely on 'handouts' from the TUC or 'fill-ups' from the Daily Herald" 
igham,1961 :177). Few contained up to date information on negotiations or significant 
evelopments, fewer still even published a letters page to allow two-way communication 
etween leadership and rank and file. A contemporary academic analysis concluded that 'for 
e most part ... journals are not edited but pasted together' (Selvin,1963:80). So dire and 
evoid of creative flair in design were most union papers that Selvin constructed a 'grey 
ale' with which to quantify the effect of graphics and lay out. Few union journals achieved 
position even half way up the scale (1963:81). Not only the content but the systems of 
· stribution were in need of reform. According to one study conducted in the early 1950s, 
ly two out of ten TGWU members read the 'T and G Record' and half the membership 
d not even heard of it (4). 
Twenty three years later, according to one assessment of the future for trade unionism, 
ings had not appreciably improved (Sherman, 1986: 124-125), despite the efforts of some 
ominent union leaders to revamp their union papers (Jones,J. 1986:220; Weighell, 
83: 106-7). According to Sherman, few ordinary union members bothered to read journals 
and union distribution systems were so haphazard that it was impossible to be sure whether 
or not most members even received a copy. Unions, according to Sherman, would be best 
advised to cut their losses, abandon journal publication for ordinary members and rely more 
upon effective media work with press and television (1986: 125). Similar anxieties had 
ready been expressed from within the labour movement. There was a recognition that the 
ureaucratic and procedural language of unionism and the preoccupation with internal affairs 
ften made union papers inaccessible and unappealing at a time when it was increasingly 
· mportant to strengthen relations between leaderships and ordinary members 
Howard,l984). 
The TUC responded to such anxieties by establishing a major review of communication 
ork which confirmed the critical picture painted by Sherman but drew very different 
nclusions. Union journals did often fail to reach up to half the target audience and were 
tually read by far fewer members (5). Rather than abandoning journal publication the 
C strategy paper recommended that more resources should be invested in union papers to 
ake them both more proficient in terms of criteria of effective communication and 
essible to ordinary members; that better use be made of desk-top publishing to allow the 
roduction of local and regional publications as well as those produced by head office, and 
hat professional market research techniques might be deployed to identify segments of the 
abour force which might be 'targeted' with particular papers or 'wrap around' sections. In 
963, the only evidence of niche or segment targeting came from one journal editor who 
gued for the inclusion of knitting patterns on the grounds that they appealed to young 
emale workers who were particularly difficult to organise (Selvin, 1963:90). 
The TUC strategy document acknowledges one of the central dilemmas for union 
urnals, the question of editorial independence, but skirts around the question of how best 
resolve it. As the TUC document notes, 
'The maintenance of overall responsibility in the hands of the general secretary, who is 
himself accountable to his executive and his conference, satisfies the need for clear 
lines of direction for the journal but this has to be carefully balanced against the 
desirability of producing an attractive, entertaining and informative journal which will 
not end up, and in bulk, unread in the factory skip or propping up the shop steward's 
filing cabinet' (6) 
s we shall also see when considering the practice of union press officers, questions of 
mmunication and representation in union work are inextricably bound up with issues of 
wer and political control. The dire quality of so many union journals in the past was not 
mply a product of a Jack of imagination or expertise; it was as much a function of the 
ntralised structures of control which union leaderships assumed were 'naturally' 
propriate. Even today, unions are often tempted to appoint journal editors from within 
eir bureaucracies rather than from journalism but even where journal editors regard 
em selves as journalists, rather than union officers, there often remains a tension between 
perceived communication objectives of the leadership and the editorial criteria 
termined by the need to 'reach' ordinary members. How this tension is resolved is 
portant in determining the character and, perhaps, the success of a journal and often the 
oader media strategy, too. 
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There is considerable evidence to suggest that unions have responded to the problems 
identified in the mid-1980s. Labour Research recently reported a significant improvement in 
lthe quality and professionalism of journals, which the TUC attributed to the consequences of 
he introduction of the TUC journal competition (7). A broader explanation is provided if 
eery and Kelly (1994) are correct in identifying a shift towards 'managerial' relationships 
tween unions and their members, based upon the provision of services and a new 
nderstanding of members as 'consumers'. If this is the case, then the journal is likely to be 
garded as an important 'marketing tool'. Along with the more frequent use of video, 
dvertising, and marketing techniques; the re-design of logos and shortening of names, 
eery and Kelly note the re-vamping and re-launching of a number of union journals in the 
ate 1980s (1994:9). 
Certainly, there has been a movement from newspaper to a glossier magazine format; 
ore unions are prepared to direct mail journals to home addresses, having been compelled 
o compile up to date computer records of members in order to comply with legislation on 
allots and elections, and more unions now produce distinct publications dedicated to certain 
mployment sectors or particular social groups (for example, young members) (8). Five out 
f the original panel of eleven unions selected for this study now direct mail their journals, 
nly two followed this practice at the beginning of the research (see appendix one). A 
umber of unions now undertake market surveys of their memberships to inform editorial 
licy (9) which further underlines the view that union leaderships are less likely now to 
egard their journals purely as vehicles for disseminating a 'union line'. Four unions in the 
resent panel have commissioned external market research of their memberships, partly with 
e intention of revising editorial policy. A re-fashioning of the union-member relationship 
pon the basis of service provision and consumption has important implications for the 
tructure of authority within the union organisation, including editorial policy. In the early 
960s, one survey found that out of 18 unions sampled, only four employed a member of 
taff to edit a journal full-time. Most combined this function with a number of other 
dministrative or research functions. Even fewer had any previous experience in journalism 
elvin,l963:80). A second survey, conducted in the early 1980s, found that 27% of editors 
ported possessing no previous experience in journalism and over half identified 
emselves, first and foremost as 'full time workers of the union', rather than journalists. 
nly 13.5% claimed 'total editorial independence' (Grace,l985:236). In the present study, 
nly two out of eleven journals sampled, were not edited by staff with previous experience 
mainstream journalism and it was unusual not to find staff describing themselves as 
fessional journalists, although all those interviewed in this study believed that editorial 
licy had to be informed by the broad policy and objectives of the union (10). 
This, too, then suggests a quite rapid 'professionalisation' in journal production, although 
appears that union leaderships will continue to expect an editorial line which is 
mpatible with the official politics and policy of the union. However, it is the case that if 
urnals are to be more finely tuned to the interests and preoccupations of ordinary 
embers, then journal editors will require more 'operational autonomy' on a day to day 
sis. 
Such changes are well illustrated in the case of the AEU (now merged with the EETPU). 
race, in a case study of four union journals and their editors, found the AEU journal editor 
ubling up as union press officer as well, and very much under the thumb of the union 
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president, Sir John Boyd (Grace, 1985:249). Although keen to innovate in ways designed to 
make the journal more popular, such proposals were not approved by a leadership 
committed to a didactic vision of its function. The present author can confirm that amongst 
experienced labour correspondents, the general impression was that the AEU' s media and 
communication work during this period was ineffective and moribund. However, in the late 
1980s, the AEU leadership split the functions of journal editor and press officer. A trained 
journalist was appointed to edit the journal and Charlie Whelan was recruited from the 
union's divisional office at the Ford Plant, Dagenham, to take over press and media work, 
on the basis of his performance in dealing with the presentation of disputes. These changes 
are regarded as having working well; the journal recently won the TUC journal competition 
and Whelan was widely regarded amongst labour correspondents as one of the most 
effective union press officers . However, the present AEU leadership has had to concede an 
'operational independence' to both the journal editor and the press officer, though both, in 
turn, have to ensure that their work is informed by the broader policies and objectives of the 
union (11). 
A further measure of the importance unions attach to internal communication is budget 
location. Depending upon the print run, the costs of production of a union journal can 
ary from £20,000 to £60,000 per issue, but usually represent around 2% to 3% of a 
nion's annual income, though in some cases this figure may rise to around 5% (12). Detail 
f the costs of journal production for unions in this study are set out in appendix four. On 
he basis of these figures, the costs of one print run can often amount to as much as the 
ntire annual budget for a union press office, if staff salaries are excluded. Precise figures 
or the costs of each element of union communication and media work are extremely 
ifficult to produce (13). Nevertheless, in terms both of the re-structuring of lines of 
ommand and in terms of the investment of resources, a significant number of unions in the 
riod between 1987 and 1992 have demonstrated a strong commitment to journal 
ublication, consistent with the interpretation that unions now regard their journals as 
rforming a vital set of functions. 
ere are limitations in the use of the union journal as a channel of communication. Some 
nion press officers will rely upon the national news media, particularly the press, if they 
ant to communicate a message quickly to their memberships (for example, the results of a 
allot or the ending of a dispute). The monthly or bi-monthly journal has obvious 
isadvantages in terms of speed of communication. Nevertheless, the journal allows the 
nion to remain in control of the process through which themes are articulated right up to 
e point of publication. In the journal a union can set its own agenda and present it as it 
ishes. 
The interviews conducted with union press officers and journal editors for the present 
dy confirm that there are significant differences in definition of target audiences for 
urnals. Some unions, such as NALGO, 'editionalised' (including sector dedicated sections 
rapped around' the main paper) their papers to meet the needs of particular groups of 
orkers in, for example, the areas of health, local government and gas. The GMB produced 
separate newspaper 'targeted' at 'young' union members. Some unions chose not to 
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distinguish between the messages they wished to communicate to the general public through 
the news media and those aimed at members through the journal. For Charlotte Atkins of 
COHSE, the message the union sought to communicate to the public about the National 
Health Service was precisely the same as that aimed at COHSE members through the 
COHSE Journal. Similarly, the message of 'The Miner' reflected the public face of the 
NUM. Nell Myers, NUM press officer, occasional journal editor and assistant to the senior 
officials: 
'Well, The Miner speaks for the national union so it will reflect the 
policies of the national union and an honest reflection of those policies 
and why they have been formulated is really all one would ask of the 
media.' 
However, some unions drew sharper distinctions between the general public and the union 
membership. Charles Harvey, editor of the IPMS Bulletin, perhaps reasonably, assumed 
at the main fodder of the Bulletin, news and discussion of the highly complicated Civil 
ervice pay and grading structures, would be unlikely to capture the interest of the public. 
n the case of the IPMS, press and media work with national newspapers and broadcasting 
rganisations was regarded as the most appropriate channel for 'reaching' the general public 
r union members if an urgent message had to be communicated. 
Some of the larger unions made further distinctions in terms of target audience. Both the 
MB and the EETPU, for example, regard their journals as elements in wider marketing 
trategies. According to John Lloyd, Head of Communications at the EETPU, the union 
ournal 'Contact' was directed at two target audiences. The primary audience was, of 
urse, the membership but the union is also very sensitive to the reactions of employers in 
reen field or unorganised employment sectors. During the second half of the 1980s the 
EPTU developed a strategy for growth based upon recruitment in occupational sectors 
'thout a history of EETPU organisation. Prospective employers' perceptions of the union 
ere, therefore, an important factor to be taken into account in the union's communication 
trategy including the journal. The GMB has grown in the last few years by pursuing a 
uccessful merger policy with smaller unions in employment sectors like clothing and 
xtiles, catering and security, to compensate for the decline in its traditional membership 
ase in manual and municipal sectors. According to Adrian Long, until recently Media 
fficer at the GMB, one important aim of the union's communication strategies, including 
e production of several different journals, was to 'soften up' potential recruitment sectors. 
Improvements in the quality and distribution of journals have gone hand in hand with a 
ore sophisticated and sharply delineated understanding of target audiences. Journals may 
e aimed at existing members or particular sections of membership but they may also be 
esigned to appeal to potential members, merger partners, significant employers and, 
metimes labour and industrial journalists. These patterns have to be placed in the context 
the changing political and economic environment for unions and their responses to these 
anges. The combination of longer term structural changes in production and the 
ganisation of labour markets, with the unfolding political project of the Conservative 
ministration unleashed a set of forces whose cumulative impact grew ever sharper towards 
e end of the decade (whether or not unions retrieve some of the lost ground, if and when 
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the 'business cycle' picks up, remains to be seen). Chapter two discussed the evidence 
which confirms that unions have been compelled to seek out new memberships and work 
harder to make their role more meaningful for social groups, frequently neglected by unions 
in the past (Offe, 1985; Kossof,1988; Cunnison and Stageman,1993). The more 
sophisticated and finely delineated targeting of journals is one aspect of these broader 
tterns. 
By 1989, then, the period of the content sample, trade unions were experiencing the 
ffect of rapid political and economic changes at, perhaps, their sharpest. The main planks 
f the Government's legislative framework were in piace; employers had enjoyed a decade 
n which to seize the initiative within the workplace, the long term implications of the 
lobalisation of market relations and production were apparent. As one indication of the 
egree of flux in the union environment during this period, six out of the eleven unions in 
he panel were already contemplating subsequent mergers when the present study 
ommenced. The sample of content, then, should capture union agendas produced in a 
riod of rapid and threatening change, in which unions had been compelled to re-organise 
d re-think many of their traditional strategies. 
The Content Analysis 
!even trade union journals, sampled across the twelve months of 1989 (14) generated 1743 
terns, coded as one theme per item (see appendix one for full details of sample selection and 
ategory definition). 
able 1 summarises the distribution of items across twenty one categories employed in the 
oding of data. 'Main items' represent the most prominent items (usually either being the 
gestor the item to appear at the top of the page). 'Sub-items' refer to the next three most 
rominent items on each of the sampled pages. 
The most frequent type of item to appear related to 'Services provided by unions' and 
ould range from short news items announcing a change in the administration of a 
articular membership facility to lengthy feature articles promoting financial and legal 
ackages or, perhaps, the opening of a new holiday and leisure centre. Union work in 
roviding or sponsoring training and education was also included in this category. 
mediately, one of the limitations of content analysis is made apparent. A preoccupation 
ith the range of services provided for individual members in union journals is consistent 
"th the view that unions are now seeking to re-fashion their relationships with members 
ong the lines described by Heery and Kelly (1994). If these authors are correct in 
ggesting that the 'managerial servicing relationship' emerged in the 1980s, as unions 
sponded to the sharp decline in membership by devising new strategies based on a picture 
members, as 'discerning and calculating consumers' (1994:7), then the fmding that 
.4% of journal items in the sample dealt with the provision of union services is 
mediately explicable. The problem, of course, is that content analysis produces a static 
cture of one moment in time. 
Field (1988) has recently noted the historic role of trade unions in terms of welfare and 
ucation provision, originally providing an alternative to the market for working class trade 
ionists, in the absence of the state. A possible flaw in Heery and Kelly' s argument relates 
ecisely to this point. We cannot be sure that the emphasis upon the provision of services 
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for members is a new phenomenon of the 1980s; there are good grounds for supposing that 
unions have always secured support, partly through individual provision, as well as the 
romise of collective protection. Moran, for example, in a study of Post Office workers in 
e early 1970s, reports the motivation for union membership being 'calculative' or 
· strumental in the majority of cases (Moran,1974:ch 4). Given the wealth of evidence on 
he instrumental orientation of workers (Goldthorpe et al,1968; Hill,1976, etc), it would be 
little surprising if trade unions had not responded to these patterns before the onset of the 
1980s. It may be the case, then, that union journals have always reflected an emphasis upon 
hat unions can do for each, individual member. Moran certainly found the Post Office 
orkers' union journal strongly promoting a variety of services, including legal advice and 
nsurance in the early 1970s (1974:25). 
What is required is a time series of content measures to track changes in the distribution 
f items over the decades. Unfortunately, this is not available and beyond the scope of the 
resent study. As discussed above, only two published studies of British trade union content 
xist and there are significant difficulties in seeking to employ either for the purposes of 
irect comparison (15). Selvin (1963) examined one issue each of journals published by 18 
e unions in September 1961. 
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measuring column square inches, he found almost half the space in these journals was 
voted to 'union affairs' which may have included the provision of services but, 
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unfortunately, also included internal politics, wage claims, obituaries, 'social notes', and 
routine business (1963:87). Given its 'catch all' nature , it is hardly surprising that almost 
half of the sampled material fell within this category. Grace (1985) sampled four union 
journals over the period of one year but, once again, did not include a category which 
allowed the differentiation of union services from 'routine union affairs' (1985:242). 
The historical perspective is, therefore, frustratingly inconclusive. One is left simply with 
circumstantial evidence. We know that unions have considerably expanded the range of legal 
services provided to members (Newell, 1989: 1234-5) and that these have represented a 
significant success in terms of appeal to recruits (16). We also know that the range of 
financial services available has also been expanded in recent years, although evidence 
suggests these are less powerful in attracting members than other aspects of unionism 
(Sapper,l991). Indeed, the whole 'marketing' operation within many trade unions has been 
revised and expanded during the late 1980s, albeit not always as professional marketing 
people might recommend (Chee and Brown, 1990). If we place the 'professionalisation' and 
re-launching of union journals (17) in this context, it seems very likely that there has been a 
significant shift in the way unions understand the purpose and function of their publications, 
and that this is consistent with Heery and Kelly' s account of post-war developments. 
However, conclusive evidence is simply not available. What can be said is that this aspect 
of the union agenda does provide a sharp contrast with the 'bad news' concerns of the 
ational news media as detailed in the extensive research literature (18). 
To find that items dealing with 'Union news' are third most frequent is predictable and 
onforms to the patterns identified by Selvin and Grace. All items dealing with internal 
nion politics, elections, appointments, retirements, and social events were included here. It 
as rare for items in the journals to deal at length with matters of sharp internal political 
ontroversy even though the sample period coincided with the emergence of a number of 
roblematic issues (for example, the re-organisation ofNATFHE into two 'detached' sectors 
or further and higher education, the proposals for the merger of COHSE and NUPE, and 
e left-ward shift in the composition of the executive of the NUCPS). Items in this category 
ere much more likely to detail the award of long service medals or the appointment of a 
ew regional official. Grace distinguished between union journals he classified as 
agitators' and those he regarded as 'conformers' (19). The former allowed more 'upward 
ommunication' with rank and file criticism of the union leadership being reflected in 
etters and the occasional article (1985:237). The latter appeared to be more concerned to 
resent an image of unity with broad support for the leadership and much less rank and file 
riticism. 
Few of the items in this sample would justify the term agitational in the context of 
race's distinction. The letters pages of the Civil Service union journals (particularly the 
CPS Journal) sometimes reflected the frustration of members over the failure of the 
nions to prevent the erosion of pay and conditions. However, in the main, the position of 
ach union leadership was either explicitly supported or implicitly supported through the 
bsence of critical content. Even the expulsion of the EETPU from the TUC generated little 
omment other than strong support for the stand taken by General Secretary Eric Hammond 
the EETPU paper 'Contact'. Given the crucial importance of this issue for the trade union 
ovement as a whole the coding schedule included two separate categories, 'Conflict with 
ther unions' and 'Conflict with the TUC' to capture specific material concerning this 
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controversy. However, each category only generated fifteen and sixteen items apiece (0.9% 
each) despite the dramatic EETPU walkout from the TUC Conference occurring during the 
sample period. Once again, it is tempting to 'read' this as a reflection of the shift from what 
Heery and Kelly describe as 'participative unionism' (greater emphasis upon rank and file 
opinion, characteristic of the late 1960s and 1970s), towards the service based 'managerial 
unionism' of the 1980s (Heery and Kelly,1994). 
For the smaller unions, the emphasis in journal content upon internal news is likely to be 
part of an editorial strategy designed to reach members through the appeal of a local 
newspaper. While the inclusion of numerous minor items on appointments, retirements and 
local events may not appeal to the detached reader, the value of recognition and local 
context are believed by small union journal editors to interest ordinary members. The 
Assistant General Secretary of NUHKW, for example, sought to produce a 'mix' of local 
news and political analysis in the hope that recognition of a local face or event would 
encourage a more sustained interest in the items discussing political and industrial issues 
(20). The availability of cheaper printing technology allowed for the inclusion of even more 
colour pictures of 'ordinary members' in a variety of contexts (social events, unusual 
hobbies, charity fund raising, etc). The NUHKW had a relatively small membership 
concentrated mainly in the textile factories of the East Midlands and parts of Manchester. 
This enabled the journal to address its readership as a local community (copies are 
distributed free to every branch or factory canteen on the basis of one per three members). 
The journals of the very large unions like the Transport and General Workers or the 
GMB cannot reach members in the same way. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the large 
volume of uncontentious internal union news is likely to be included for its value in 
nhancing the message that trade unionism involves 'ordinary people' and relates to their 
xperience. For several large and small unions, this has involved some important editorial 
!icy initiatives. Attempts have been made to re-cast the conventional images of union 
articipation. Pictures of shirt-sleeved male delegates, attending union conferences or 
eetings, are much less likely to appear now, as journal editors seek to highlight the 
nvolvement of women in the union movement. The GMB, for example, targeted precisely 
ose employment sectors with high proportions of female workers for recruitment 
ampaigns. The editorial policy of the NUHKW Journal was to include as many feature 
"cles and pictures concerning the involvement of women and ethnic minority members as 
ssible. Seventy per cent of the NUHKW membership is female. Similarly, at the GMB, 
OHSE, and NALGO, staff confirmed that a deliberate strategy to place female activism in 
he foreground and minimise the number of images of traditional masculine unionism, 
haped editorial policy (21). Once again, this reflects the extent to which unions have sought 
o respond to structural change and labour market segmentation, through communicative 
ctivity. In each case, journal content is intended to relate to the changing composition of 
nion memberships. 
In view of these editorial policies it is surprising, perhaps, that items dealing with 'equal 
portunities' did not represent more than the ninth most frequent category. Included, here, 
ere issues relating to equal opportunity, inequalities of race or gender, and the question of 
omens' participation in the labour movement. However, this may be a further illustration 
f the limitations of quantitative content analysis. A brief discussion of the qualitative 
imension of journal content below will illustrate the ways in which some journals have 
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· ed to construct a new symbolism (reflected in design, format, language and choice of 
hotographs), which departs from the traditional masculine framework, even if in numerical 
erms, these patterns are not reflected in the editorial selection of items. Editorial decisions 
along both quantitative and qualitative dimensions; it is possible that union journal 
itors have been more concerned with making the fOrm of their publications more 
ccessible for women, whilst paying less attention to content. 
'Routine union work' referred to 'bread and butter' conditions of service issues which 
ere not discussed in the context of declared industrial conflict. This category would 
nclude, for example, news and discussion of pay offers, settlements, negotiations, 
· scussions regarding working arrangements and speculation regarding the plans of 
mployers concerning such issues. In total, then, 42.8% of the journal content (services, 
nion news and routine work) was introspective in nature, focusing upon life within the 
pheres of union organised employment sectors. The inward looking nature of much journal 
ntent is, perhaps, not surprising and conforms to patterns identified by Selvin (1963) and 
race (1985). 
e World Outsid 
What of the external environment? The first notable feature of the distribution of items is 
e dominating influence of the Government over the nature of content. This is made all the 
ore striking if a comparison is made with coverage of the other main political parties (in 
ractice almost exclusively the Labour Party). While items dealing with Government policy 
ounted to 267 items or 15.3% of the total items, the corresponding figure for the other 
ain parties was a mere 47 or 2.7%. Clearly, it was the Government that dominated the 
litical agenda of the journals in this study. Six of the unions were affiliated to the Labour 
arty and the Labour Party's major Policy Review exercise was moving towards completion 
the sample period. Nevertheless, the parameters of political discussion in the journals 
ere largely shaped by the Government's policy agenda and the direction of debate through 
e sample period was primarily determined by the unfolding of Government initiatives. 
able Two. Distribution of 'Government' and 'Other Parties' Items as Proportion of 
Union Journal Content(%) 
Government Other Parties 
blic Service' (NALGO) 28.6 0.9 
A TFHE Journal' 19.7 
17.0 4.2 
UCPS Journal' 15.9 1.0 
e Miner' (NUM) 15.4 3.1 
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able two continued Government Other Parties 
Contact' (EETPU) 15.3 2.7 
AEU Journal' 15.1 9.7 
Hosiery and Knitwear News' 14.8 1.4 
NUHKW) 
COHSE Journal' 10.7 2.3 
Garment worker' (NUTGW) 10.5 1.4 
IPMS Bulletin' 4.3 1.0 
Unions with a significant interest in the public sector were likely to reflect this pattern 
ore sharply, as indicated in table two (with the notable exception of the IPMS Bulletin 
22)), but all union journals carried far more items concerning what the Government was 
oing or planning rather than the alternatives offered by other political parties. These figures 
artly reflect the threat that particular government policies represented to the position of 
hese unions and their members. 'Public Service' (NALGO), for example, devoted over a 
uarter of all items to aspects of government policy such as the privatisation of the gas and 
ater industries, and the plans for the reorganisation of local government. The NA TFHE 
ournal was preoccupied with the impact of the Goverment reforms in further and higher 
ucation and the 'COHSE Journal' with the parallel reforms in the National Health 
ervice. For the 'NUCPS Journal', much of the coverage was devoted to the dangers of the 
ext Steps initiative (the semi-privatisation of certain Civil Service Departments re-
ashioning them into more market oriented agencies). The part played by Government in 
e deterioration of the market position of members, of course, was also a frequent theme 
ere. The difficulty of discussing the state of the public sector or prospects for the future 
· thout contemplating the central role of the Government is underlined by the infrequency 
f items distributed in the separate 'Public Sector' category (only 31 or 1.8% see Table 1). 
However, the presence of the Government at the centre of the political stage was a 
ature of the journals produced by very nearly all the unions, not only those with sizeable 
ublic sector memberships. Much of the general political discussion focused upon the 
ostility of the Government towards the labour movement and the impact of particular 
licies, including the Employment Acts and the G. C. H. Q. sackings. The 'poll tax' was 
so the subject of frequent items. A great many were highly critical, of course, and this 
ritical perspective extended beyond the boundary of feature articles into many of the news 
ems as well. Nonetheless, one is struck by the degree to which the political agenda of the 
urnals in this sample was reactive and shaped by the energy of Government rather than 
e will of the labour movement. Evidence of a substantial alternative political agenda was 
otable by its absence. This underlines, perhaps, the dominance of the state in so many 
tors of public life or, at least, the apparent impossibility of describing much of the 
onomic and political environment without confronting the looming presence of central 
vernment. But part of the explanation may also lie in the extent to which both journal 
itors and union press officers work with and take for granted conventional, mainstream 
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news values, - a tendency reinforced by the appointment of more journal editors from 
ainstream journalism. In mainstream news journalism, the thoughts and policies of 
pposition parties may often be of interest but the intentions and acts of governments are 
ways newsworthy (Hartmann,1976:(2)-42). This is a theme of some importance, to which 
· s chapter shall return. 
As with the low frequency of 'public sector' items, so the relatively low frequency of 
terns dealing with 'the economy' or even 'own industry' (designed to capture news or 
iscussion of developments in particular markets, technology or innovations, etc), in 
ractice, was a consequence not so much of the neglect of such themes but of the tendency 
o raise them in the context of government. 
e familiar criticism of content analysis is that it is too often employed with the assumption 
at frequency equals significance. Content analysis often does fail to capture important 
uances in coverage. However, it is an extremely helpful technique in highlighting the 
ignificance of absences. In the present group of journals, a common feature was the 
elatively low frequency of items dealing with 'action'. This category was designed to 
pture any item dealing with issues arising from industrial action of any kind, from full 
!own strikes to disputes leading to small scale over-time bans or working to rule. Reports 
f imminent action, the completion of action, employers behaviour during action, the use of 
e courts, negotiation following action, or analysis of the causes of industrial action would 
fall into this category. Contrary to the old familiar news media images, there was very 
· ttle evidence of industrial militancy in the pages of these journals. Almost twice as many 
ems were likely to concern union services to members or central government, and almost 
· ce as many were devoted to internal union news or details of routine work of trade 
'ons. Only 150 (8.6%) of the items dealt with industrial action of any kind (see table 
ne). 
This was surprising because the sample year coincided with the development of some 
ighly significant national disputes. During this period members of NALGO and COHSE 
ere involved in the end of the 1988 Nurses Dispute and the start of the 1989 Ambulance 
ispute; the engineering unions began their campaign for a 35 hour week with selected 
tion, and the T and G mounted a brief but bitter fight against the abolition of the Dock 
bour Scheme. Even at the end of the 1980s, disputes, albeit frequently of a minor nature, 
ere a common feature of most trade unions' experience. Despite these developments, in 
e main, the union journals studied here did not place industrial action or conflict at the top 
f their news agendas. Though unions with significant public sector memberships were more 
kely to carry items dealing with conflict (see table three) most journals were much more 
eoccupied with the 'menace' of government, the promotion of services, or routine 'in-
use' events. Undoubtedly, part of the explanation for these notable omissions lies in the 
onthly cycle of journal distribution. Events often unfold very rapidly during the course of 
· sputes and journals are unable to keep pace; unions seeking to keep their members in 
uch with developments frequently have to rely upon either branch circulars or the 
ainstream news media. However, the whole explanation cannot be found in the 
mbersome internal communications of many unions. After all, a number of these disputes 
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were protracted, lasting weeks and months, rather than days. It remains surprising not to 
find more discussion of the strategic position in disputes, if not news of the day to day ebb 
d flow as disputes progress. 
able Three Distribution of 'Action' Items by Union Journal(%) 
'Public Service' (NALGO) 15.1 
'T and G Record' 14.1 
'NATFHE Journal' 11.7 
NUCPS Journal' 11.6 
COHSE Journal' 9.6 
The Miner' (NUM) 6.8 
IPMS Bulletin' 4.8 
AEU Journal' 4.3 
Hosiery and Knitwear News' (NUHKW) 3.5 
Contact' (EETPU) 0.9 
The Garment Worker' (NUTGW) Nil 
The coding schedule was designed to capture any evidence of a radical political or 
ndustrial agenda. In the 1970s the debate over the Bullock Report generated considerable 
· scussion concerning worker participation in industrial decision making ( Coates and 
opham,l980:284). A category was included in this coding schedule to capture any 
vidence that such debates were reflected in contemporary union journals, ('Need for 
orker participation'). Similarly, in the 1970s, an important feature of the radical critique 
as the focus upon company investment decisions and the failure to direct significant capital 
nto the modernisation of the industrial sector (Glasgow University Media Group,1976:ch 
). The 'Failure to invest/ need for new technology' category was included to capture any 
vidence of that debate continuing in these union journals. The distribution of items in table 
ne reveals a virtual absence of stories or articles questioning investment decisions, or 
iscussing more democratic forms of industrial control. There is very little evidence of an 
ppetite for industrial militancy or for an agenda which questions the existing framework of 
usiness organisation and decision making. Almost without exception, the union journals in 
is sample accepted the industrial status quo by default. 
Even where journals included reports of industrial action, the framework for discussion 
ontinued to remain within the boundaries of labourism, rather than radicalism. The 150 
ems dealing with 'action' were also coded for the identification of 'causes' and 'effects', as 
ummarised in tables 3 and 4 (appendix two provides detail of coding categories). The 
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· ntention was to explore how far the trade union journals moved away from the industrial 
onflict agenda identified in much industrial news reporting by researchers, including the 
lasgow University Media Group (1975, 1980), Morley (1974), Hartmann (1976), Edwards 
(1979), Downing (1980), Cumberbatch (1986), Hutt (1987), and Walsh (1988). Although 
iffering significantly in other respects, all these researchers point to an absence of detailed 
iscussion of the underlying causes of industrial conflict in much of the national news media 
verage. By implication or sometimes explicitly in truncated discussion of causes, the 
esponsibility for industrial conflict was often placed exclusively with the trade unions. 
It might be assumed that trade union publications would reject these news frames, in 
avour of those rooted in alternative, more critical accounts of the workplace and the 
lationship between capital and labour. The coding schedule was designed to capture 
vidence of these and other possible explanations. It was anticipated that unions might wish 
o provide qnite complex explanations and analyses. Accordingly, unlike the main coding 
hedule, a system of 'multi-coding' was applied, so that each of the 150 original 'action' 
terns, might generate up to three 'causes'. 
Distribution of 'Causes' oflndustrial Action 
Total(%) 
. Management obstinacy or 29 (18.2%) 
ruthlessness 
• Conditions 27 (17.0%) 
. Wages claims bonuses 26 (16.4%) 
Protest against Govt. policy 24 (15.1 %) 
Threatened or actual 20 (12.6%) 
redundancies 
Employer attempts to worsen 12(7.5%) 
conditions of service 
. Wages relative to other 5 (3.1 %) 
groups 
. Tactic to force negotiations 4 (2.5%) 
. Wages relative to company 3(1.9%) 
profits 
0. Support I sympathy for other 3 (1.9%) 
workers 
I. Employers worsening health 3(1.9%) 
and safety 
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able four continued. 
2. Cuts in public expenditure 1 (0.6%) 
3. Bad/incompetent management 1 (0.6%) 
4. Work of militants/agitators (nil) 
= 159 (causes identified in 103 items). 
7 items concerning 'action' did not specify any causes. 
s table four demonstrates, the journals in this sample were content to lay the blame for 
isputes at the door of 'obstinate' or 'ruthless' management. In this respect, and in the 
bsence of the 'militant/agitator' model, there is a marked difference between these accounts 
d those one might expect in the mainstream news media. And yet, the explanatory 
ramework revealed in this sample can hardly be described as radical. Management might be 
escribed as 'obstinate' in negotiation but it was rare for the general competence or expertise 
f managements to be identified as a 'cause' (0.6%). Explanations for action and disruption 
ntred around traditional 'bread and butter' labourist concerns,- rewards, working 
nditions, and threats to jobs. Just as journalists frequently appear to assume that a 
ufficient explanation for industrial conflict is provided if readers are informed that a 
ispute is about 'pay', without any contextual or historical detail, so a similar process could 
e found repeated in the journals. It was extremely rare for journals to begin to place . 
ndustrial conflict in the context of a broader critique of the relationship between capital and 
abour. Only 3 items drew comparisons between workers' wages and company profits as a 
use of conflict. It was certainly not the case, then , that the journals in this sample 
ffered a sustained critique of labour relations under capitalism or explanations of conflict 
hich moved beyond the traditional explanatory framework of pay, conditions and jobs. 
'Action' items were also 'multi-coded' for their discussion of the effects of industrial 
ction. The extensive research literature on news media coverage of industrial relations, 
uggests that news reports are likely to dwell upon the negative consequences of action; the 
nomic damage done to companies or the national economy, inconvenience to the general 
ublic, the threat to employment prospects, and so on. It is not surprising that the union 
ournals in the sample hardly touched upon these aspects of disputes. It is interesting to note, 
owever, that the most frequent 'effect' to be noted was the success of action in 
emonstrating solidarity and collective loyalty, often underscored through the inclusion of 
hotographs of well attended rallies and marches. This suggests, perhaps, that trade unions 
ave not wholly abandoned a traditional understanding of the relationship between union and 
embers based upon the balance of rights and obligations bound up in the principle of 
ollective mutual protection. Many unions may now regard their members as 'discerning 
d calculating consumers' (Heery and Kelly,l994:7) but this does not preclude the 
esurrection of symbolic frameworks and vocabularies which appeal to collectivist values, in 
articular circumstances. Clearly, trade union journals have a brief to present 'up-beat' 
eports of the effectivity of 'action', though the danger, of course, is that to dwell upon the 
ffectivity of action is to re-introduce the dominant news frames employed by the 
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ainstream news media. One 'solution' which emerges from this sample is to place in the 
oreground the consequences for employers ('loss of production/inconvenience to 
mployer') and the publicity value of action ('drawn public attention to the issue') but to 
well far less upon the 'inconvenience to the public', or more profound economic 
nsequences ('reduction in profits', 'reduction in jobs', or 'reduced competitiveness') 
tentially associated with industrial action. 
able Five Distribution of 'effects' of Industrial Action, 
. Loss of production 18(16.5%) 
inconvenience to 
employer . 
. Demonstration of 38(34.9%) 
solidarity and 
support. 
. Drawn public attention 
to the issue. 
. Sent signal to Govt. 
. Sent signal to employers. 
. Brought employers to 
negotiating table. 
. Successful conclusion 
to dispute. 
. Reduction in company 
profits. 
. Loss of jobs. 
. Inconvenience to 
public. 
. Reduction in competitive-
ness . 
. Danger of wage inflation. 
. Violence I disturbances. 
24(22%) 
5 (4.6%) 
1 (0.9%) 
4 (3.7%) 
13 (11.9%) 
1 (0.9%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (0.9%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
2(1.8%) 
. Other. 2 (1.8%) 
= 109 (effects identified in 98 i terns) 
items concerning 'action' did not specify any effects. 
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Returning to the main coding schedule, set out in table one, the relatively few number of 
terns dealing with 'equal opportunities', noted above, could be understood as further 
eflecting a pattern of political caution in the selection of themes. We have seen that a 
umber of unions regarded the recruitment of more women and members of ethnic 
inorities as an important part of their strategies to bolster membership; that several journal 
ditors and press officers confirmed that these strategies informed the editorial policies of 
ournals, and that the form, if not the numerical content, of some journals reflected these 
pproaches. Yet, relatively few items explicitly dealt with the question of equal 
portunities and absolutely no items presented the participation of women in trade unions 
s a central theme for discussion. If union journals were promoting such themes, it was by 
tealth rather than through a bold strategy which openly demonstrated a commitment to a 
dical agenda for race and gender politics. The gender and ethnic composition of 
hotographs might be monitored; more items dealing with routine union news might feature 
omen or black members but very few items dealt explicitly with the issues of opportunity 
d participation 'head on'. Once again, this suggests a convergence between the editorial 
licies of the journals and mainstream news values. It is quite possible that the hostility 
wards the politics of anti-racism and sexism, characteristic of much news coverage in the 
"d-1980s (Van Dijk,l991; Curran,l987; Goldsmith's College Media Research 
roup, 1987) encouraged a climate of caution amongst journal editors. It is also, of course, 
uite likely that a number of journal editors assumed that too 'strident' a tone in coverage of 
ese issues would jar with more conservative minded union members. Given the 
ifications or 'pictures' of memberships constructed by several editors, this is a plausible 
xplanation, although a majority of the media staff interviewed during the course of the field 
ork were reluctant to generalise about their readers. 
e editorial policy of most of the journals appears to be a cautious one; to concentrate for 
uch of the time upon the routine and uncontentious. Moreover, the perspective of many of 
e journals is frequently directed inwards, towards the internal business of each union. 
ence, the relatively low frequencies of items dealing with such matters as 'the economy', 
ternational issues' or 'the wider role of the trade union movement' (see table one). Where 
e perspective is directed outwards it remains narrow in focus. The shadow of the 
overnment looms large through the pages of these journals. The lack of attention directed 
wards the opposition parties and the frequency of items concerned with the policies of the 
atcher government, suggests a mainly reactive political agenda. While much of the 
ntent of these journals was critical in tone, nonetheless it was the policies and 
rformance of central government rather than the discussion of political alternatives which 
ominated content. 
In the absence of a reliable historical series, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions 
garding the extent to which these patterns depart from the past. Selvin (1963) certainly 
und a preoccupation with internal affairs and routine union business in his sample of 
urnals. He also found a significantly larger amount of space devoted to coverage of the 
vernment, rather the Labour Party which surprised him because the sample month, 
eptember, preceded the Labour Party conference (1963:89). However, Selvin's coding 
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~schedule precludes any judgements regarding the presence or absence of a 'radical agenda' 
(23). Grace's study of only four journals sought to distinguish between the 'agitational' and 
the 'conformist' but even in the case of the two 'agitational' journals, 'routine union affairs' 
far outnumbered items dealing with industrial conflict. The proportion of 'exhortatory 
messages in agitationallanguage', in relation to other material, was notably low (24) 
(1985:241). It seems likely that the absence of a 'radical agenda' in the journals of the late 
1980s was not a new phenomenon; nor a further symptom of the crushing of the union spirit 
y the Conservative administration. If Grace's data is taken at face value, then coverage of 
industrial conflict was as sparse at the beginning of the decade as at the end. 
How should the absence of radical and conflict perspectives in the present sample, and 
pparently in the earlier studies, be explained? The answer is probably two-fold in nature. 
irstly, the forces described in the previous chapter which have compelled unions to 
espond in new ways to the changes in their political and economic environments, are 
nlikely to encourage a more pronounced radicalism. As we have seen, unions have been 
ushed onto the back foot; forced to address a 'defensive agenda' with recruitment, the 
roblem of dwindling income and the preservation of the existing membership bases as the 
ain items. Secondly, however, as suggested above, there is little evidence to lead us to 
elieve that many union journals ever articulated, in a consistent way, the demands of a 
dical, left agenda. On the contrary, in some important respects the union journals in this 
ple appear to share elements of the news frameworks which underpin the mainstream 
ews media; there is an appetite for 'human interest' news, stories of the achievements and 
xperiences of union members; the shadow of the government looms large across the picture 
f the external world presented in the pages of the journals and discussion of evidence 
inting to the fundamental sources of social conflict in society is often muted. The 
· storical and astructural nature of much news reporting has been documented in numerous 
cademic accounts (25); in all but a few union journals, readers are provided with glimpses 
f the historical context and structural forces shaping their lives but rarely in a consistent, 
ustained analysis. In the perennial debate concerning the balance between popular news 
alues and academic explanatory frameworks, journal editors tend to favour the former. 
· s is not a new phenomenon and not one confined to Britain. As one review of the 
merican union press commented, over a decade ago: 
'There is brilliance and passion in labor journalism, but not enough. 
The US economy is in flux. Capital is more fickle and more impatient 
than ever. Technology is shaping an uncertain future ... Factories are 
closing. Millions are unemployed. The wages and work rules of American 
unions are under unrelenting public relations attack. Yet to read some 
labor papers this might all be happening on Venus. ' (Hoyt, 1983: 34) 
here are two sets of constraints which may always have blunted the radical cutting edge of 
ome union journals. Firstly, trade unions have always been highly politicised organisations, 
ontaining within them both factional divisions and individual rivalries. In subsequent 
hapters, the study explores the implications of this for the relationship between union press 
fficers and journalists. Several press or media officers and editors, in conversation with 
he author, commented upon the need to be sensitive to internal political currents. As the 
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official' voice of the union, the journal has a particularly high profile. Editors may need to 
read warily. As one said (working for a union with a divided national executive), 'one can't 
e seen to be favouring one side in our union against the other'. 
A cautious approach to internal political issues may also extend to the wider political 
nvironment if a union national executive has polarised along conventional lines between the 
eft and right of the labour movement. In addition, the journal may be regarded as a political 
ool for aspiring or established 'figures' within a union. Most of the officers interviewed 
!aimed that they enjoyed the confidence and trust of their general secretaries, but it was 
so the case that a number of general secretaries were inclined to intervene in the editorial 
ecision making process. Indeed, a number of general secretaries retained the official 
sition of 'editor in chief or similar. Senior figures may seek to exert influence over the 
itorial policy of a journal according to criteria determined by their political perspectives 
Grace, 1985:249) or their personal objectives (Hoyt, 1983:36). One journal editor 
ommented wryly to the author that he always anticipated an increase in copy submitted by 
nion officers and a fresh spirit of co-operation when union elections were on the horizon. 
ccasionally, union leaderships may intervene directly to remove items (Hoyt,1983:34) but 
t is more likely that the most successful journal editors quickly acquire an understanding of 
he political context in which they are working and adjust their editorial policies 
cordingly. This may not always imply a muted radicalism,- the example of the NUM is 
ne exception,- but often it does. 
A further factor checking the possible radical inclinations of union papers is the editor's 
rception of the disposition of the membership. It was notable during the course of the 
teld work how few union officials referred to 'typical' or stereotype models of their 
ders. However, some did make generalisations in the context of explaining editorial 
!icy. Charles Harvey, for example, believed that the IPMS membership divided between 
ore militant branches organising in the museums and galleries and those of a much more 
onservative inclination in the technical and scientific divisions. The latter dominated 
umerically and Charles Harvey assumed that these members would be 'highly resistant' to 
more explicit ideological message in the union journal (26). He, therefore, sought to 
mphasise the union's expertise in negotiation and knowledge of the complex Civil Service 
greements because it was these elements which made the IPMS attractive to such 
embers. In a similar way, John Lloyd characterised EETPU members as 'members of the 
wkward squad' unwilling to swallow 'a political line' from local branch officials or the 
nion journal (27). 
Coverage of industrial action throws up a particularly sharp dilemma for editors. In the 
ast, it was often assumed that evidence of a trade union's willingness to defend the interests 
fits members was likely to be popular amongst existing members and might be helpful in 
ttracting new ones (Bain and Elsheikh,l976). However, some evidence suggests that there 
an inverse relationship between the popularity of unions amongst the general public, as 
easured by opinion polls, and levels of strike activity (Edwards and Bain 1988, Roiser and 
ittle 1986). Edwards and Bain suggest that it was the decline of strike activity and low 
rice inflation rather than growing public opposition to Thatcherism which produced an 
pswing in union popularity, as the 1980s moved on. The field work for this project has 
reduced evidence which suggests that some trade unions are very concerned about public 
rceptions of unionism and the damage done to their public standing during periods, such 
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s the 1979-80 'Winter of Discontent'. Several union officers in interviews and 
nversations conducted for this research stressed the importance of dissolving traditional 
mages of unionism associated with the exercise of industrial muscle (28). This has 
mportant implications for the editorial policies of union journals. Just as the conventional 
ictures of rows upon rows of male delegates attending conferences are beginning to 
isappear, so too are the pictures of pickets assembled outside the factory gates. This is not 
e case for all trade unions but is likely to be the pattern for unions seeking to recruit in 
ew, unorganised sectors or sectors without a tradition of mass collective action. In these 
ectors , in the absence of concrete examples of routine union work, workers are likely to 
e most strongly influenced by the ideological representation of trade union practice 
onstructed through media images and 'the opinion of the general public'. Adrian Long 
Media Officer at the GMB), for example, believed that unions had to find a new 
ocabulary and a new set images in order to reach these potential members in the 
norganised employment sectors targeted by the GMB (29). The GMB journals are one part 
f this marketing strategy. 
We can see, then, the way in which the traditional restraints upon the articulation of 
dical agendas now intersect with pressures which have accumulated through the 1980s. A 
urther dimension to this process becomes clear when we consider that union journals may 
ave several distinct 'target audiences'. Competition for the right to organise 'greenfield' 
ctories, for example, is intensifying and placing pressure upon some unions to act as 
uitors, seeking to woo companies through the fostering of 'progressive' and 'constructive' 
ages. Protracted industrial conflict or, indeed, the promotion of a broader radical 
dustrial agenda are hardly compatible with these aims. There is some evidence to suggest 
at in such circumstances unions may seek to dampen down or even suppress industrial 
ilitancy at a grassroots level (Foster and Woolfson,1989). A similar approach may be 
pplied to some union journals. Certainly, the journal editor of one high profile union in this 
dy indicated that while, in practice, the union was involved quite regularly in disputes 
'almost every week'), it was the policy of the union's communication department not to 
ublicise these except in exceptional circumstances. The union assumed that its journal 
ould be read by the senior managers of just the companies it was targeting for recognition 
greements. 
Diffidence in the discussion of industrial conflict is not the hard and fast rule. Much 
epends upon particular circumstances and the nature of the strategy a union may formulate 
r coping with a harsher environment. At certain times it may suit the interests of even 
nions closely associated with the politics of 'new realism' to be seen having the courage to 
tand up' to a major employer. For example, the AEU press officer noted that a public 
nfrontation with Ford UK cast the union in the role of David against the multi-national 
oliath. This kind of dispute would be highlighted by the union through work with the 
ational news media and the union journal, although the content analysis for this research 
roject reveals a low proportion of 'action' items in the AEU Journal from month to month. 
imilarly, recent evidence suggests that the quite frequent involvement of white collar, 
ublic sector unions in industrial action during the last decade has not acted as a deterrent to 
sing rates of public sector professional unionisation (30). The journals of unions organising 
eh groups appear to respond in different ways with NALGO' s 'Public Service' including 
91 
most twice as many items dealing with 'industrial action', as the COHSE Journal (see 
ble three). 
Table Six A Percentaee of items falling in selected cateeories by 
union journal. 
Public Sector Unions. 
ategory NUCPS NALGO COHSE NUM NATFHE IPMS 
(IPCS) 
207 218 178 162 137 187 
14.2 19.7 13.0 5.1 12.3 8.2 
ovem- 15.9 28.6 10.7 15.4 19.7 4.3 
ent 
14.5 11.9 11.2 13.0 15.3 19.3 
ews 
outine 17.4 5.5 16.3 16.1 19.7 28.9 
ction 11.6 15.1 9.6 6.8 11.7 4.8 
5.3 2.3 7.9 5.1 6.6 4.3 
4.6 5.0 1.9 3.6 4.3 6.3 
ovement 
lema- 2.6 6.4 2.8 3.7 3.7 Nil 
onal 
qual 4.3 2.3 6.7 Nil 3.7 1.1 
pportuni 
ies 
0.9 2.3 3.1 Nil Nil 1.0 
4.6 4.0 3.8 Nil 8.0 0.5 
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able six NUCPS 
ontinued 
NALGO COHSE NUM 
5.3 
0.5 
0.5 
Nil 
2.4 
Nil 
0.5 
0.5 
eed for Nil 
orker 
articipat-
ther 1.0 
2.3 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
1.4 
able six b over page. 
2.3 Nil 
5.6 Nil 
0.6 Nil 
5.0 Nil 
Nil 0.6 
1.2 0.7 
Nil 2.1 
Nil Nil 
Nil Nil 
1.7 5.0 
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NATFHE IPMS 
0.7 5.3 
4.8 2.9 
Nil Nil 
Nil Nil 
Nil Nil 
1.6 Nil 
Nil Nil 
Nil Nil 
Nil Nil 
7.2 1.1 
Table 6B ,erivat~ Sector Unions 
I Category TandG NUTGW NUKHW EETPU AEU 
Union 13.7 21.1 24.3 10.8 25.4 
Services 
ovemment 16.9 10.5 14.8 15.3 15.1 
25.3 21.1 14.4 5.4 6.1 
7.0 2.1 9.15 16.2 5.4 
14.1 Nil 3.5 0.9 4.3 
0.9 15.8 6.3 2.7 4.3 
6.3 9.9 Nil 10.8 2.8 
ternational 2.3 1.4 2.8 0.9 4.3 
1.9 8.4 1.4 0.9 6.5 
6.3 1.4 2.7 9.7 4.2 
arties 
eneral Nil 1.4 0.9 Nil 0.9 
ound 
p 
0.4 Nil 0.7 Nil Nil 
Table liB 
contd. 
ealth and 
afety edu-
ation 
eed for 
orker 
ther 
TandG 
1.1 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
15.5 
NUTGW NUHKW EETPU AEU 
1.4 0.9 Nil Nil 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 
3.2 4.2 0.9 17.2 
mploying the same coding categories as in previous tables, three out of the four journals 
'th the most frequent appearance of' Action' items recruited mainly in the public sector. 
s noted above, 'Action' items produced only the fifth most frequent theme in the survey 
sa whole with 8_6% of all items. Nevertheless, NALGO (15.1 %), NATFHE (11.7%), 
CPS (11.6%) and COHSE (9.6%), all public sector unions, included significantly 
igher proportions of 'Action' themes. Only the Transport and General Worker's 'Record', 
rganising in both public and private sectors, revealed a higher proportion of 'Action' 
ems (16.8% ). At the other end, the lowest proportions of' Action' items were to be found 
the journals of the NUTGW (nil), the EETPU (0.9% ), the NUHKW (3.5%) and the AEU 
4.3% ), all unions organising mainly in the private sector. In contrast, private sector unions 
laced 'union services' in the foreground of their coverage with three unions, the T and G, 
e EETPU and the NUHKW, devoting more than twenty percent of their items to such 
atters. Four out of the five unions with the lowest proportions (NATFHE, NUCPS, IPMS 
d the NUM) were public sector, though it should be emphasised that this was a significant 
erne for all unions. 
The almost relentless worsening of conditions in the public sector during the last ten 
ears or more; ever tightening resource limitations; an informal but stringent public sector 
comes policy; 'marketisation' and the contracting out of services, and major, apparently 
reatening, legislative changes affecting many groups of public sector workers, have all 
mbined to produce conditions in which the case for trade unionism has been more easily 
efended. As a result, public sector white collar unions have been surprisingly successful in 
reserving their membership bases, even in conditions when industrial action has been a 
curring feature of the working environment (31). The higher frequency of 'action' themes 
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may have reflected the editorial view that conditions in the white collar and professional 
ublic sector, during the 1980s, had not produced a disillusionment with the traditional 
ea pons of trade unionism. However, not all public sector unions responded to these 
onditions in the same way. The relatively low number of 'action' items in the IPMS 
ulletin, probably reflected the editorial desire not to antagonise the more 'moderate' 
ections of the union in Civil Service engineering and technical departments. The 'COHSE 
ournal', also, contained slightly fewer 'action' items than other public sector union 
ournals. This may have been related to qualitative evidence which suggested that COHSE, 
ditionally a union which organised the lower grades within the NHS, was seeking to 
ffer its members and potential recruits, a new vocabulary and symbolic stock with which to 
onstruct images of occupational self-identity, based on concepts of professionalism and 
ublic service. Images of traditional unionism do not sit easily alongside a new professional 
iscourse within the journal. The ways in which this journal sought to reconcile these two 
ompeting discourses will be explored further below. Low 'action' figures for the NUM's 
Miner' simply reflects the emasculation of the union, following the Coal Strike of 
984/85. 
In contrast, the private sector has become not only a harsher environment for union 
rganisation (due both to recession and Government legislation) but also a much more 
mpetitive environment for unions. Declining absolute numbers of manual and engineering 
orkers have made recruitment both more vital and more difficult. This combined with the 
radual spread of 'single union' agreements and the 'Japanese' practice of inviting union 
bids' for recognition or 'beauty contests' (Wickens,l987:ch.9), have tended to pitch union 
gainst union. The 'enterprise unionism' of the EETPU which eventually led to its expulsion 
rom the TUC was by no means an isolated example of 'vigorous' market combativeness 
ickens,l987; Foster and Woolfson,l989). As discussed above, unions in these 
ircumstances are likely to attach particular importance to the image projected through their 
urnals, not only in relation to prospective recruits but also possible merger partners and 
mployers targeted for recognition agreements. These are powerful reasons why unions 
ight wish to highlight the range and quality of services provided in their journals, all 
elping to underline the 'go-ahead' nature of modern unionism and, perhaps, why journal 
itors might chose to make less of any involvement in industrial action. Hence, the absence 
f traditional union imagery of conflict and disruption. Heery and Kelly (1994), of course, 
rovide one theoretical context for these shifts but it should be noted that the response of 
nions, faced with the difficulties of the 1980s, has frequently been to compete for existing 
emberships, rather than fmd new ones (Willman, 1989). It may be that unions are shifting 
wards 'managerialism', as described by Heery and Kelly, but it may also be partly that 
nions, particularly those organising in the private sector, have settled for an old fashioned 
og fight. These are not mutually exclusive explanations. 
It would be a mistake to attach too much importance to differences between public and 
rivate sector journals. The differences are of degree and emphasis. They are to be found in 
rtain important themes and may reflect differences in the experience of public and private 
ions.but they are not found in all the themes identified in the survey. Private sector union 
urnals contained few 'Public sector' items but even large public sector unions such as the 
MS (7.9%) and NALGO (5.5%) contained relatively few. This is partly a product of the 
ing scheme and the inevitability of discussions concerning the public sector being placed 
96 
in the context of 'government'. News or discussion of threats to the public sector or 
strategies for it's defence were infrequent, though these issues were sometimes touched upon 
in the course of discussing government policy or, in the case of the public sector unions 
where the government also represented the employer, in 'Routine' or 'Action' items. Single 
theme coding meant that some items which touched upon the public sector in the course of 
discussing other dominant themes would not be coded under 'public sector'. 
For other themes, variations between union journals were not pronounced. Given the well 
publicised commitments a number of unions have made to 'progress' and 'innovation', it 
was surprising to find low proportions of 'own industry' items in the journals of, for 
example, the EETPU, the T and G, and the AEU but comparable figures were little 
higher in the public sector. The frequency of items dealing with issues of 'Equal 
Opportunity' revealed a grouping around a mean of 3.3%, with the 'The Garment Worker' 
(NUTGW), the COHSE Journal and the AEU Journal, containing the higher proportions. 
Undoubtedly, in the case of 'The Garment Worker' and the COHSE Journal, an editorial 
commitment to the issue of equal opportunities was likely to find sympathy with 
significantly 'feminised' workforces in the textile industry and lower tiers of the National 
Health Service. The absence of many 'international' items was reproduced in both public 
d private sector journals and the one notable exception, 'the Garment Worker', remained 
arochial in outlook, as many of the 'international' items, were actually preoccupied with 
he arguments for import controls. 
ualitative Dimension· two unions and alternative re resentations of a 'new trade 
substantial qualitative analysis of each union journal was undertaken as part of the 
esearch project. Limitations of space preclude a full discussion of this. However, a brief 
nsideration of two journals permits a contrast to be drawn in the way two unions sought to 
epresent their attempts to re-construct and re-work traditional trade union values, in the 
ight of the changes in the political and economic environment discussed in chapter two. The 
wo journals selected, 'The COHSE Journal' and EETPU's 'Contact', are not typical of 
he sample but they do provide significant points of contrast which are, in themselves, 
lluminating. They underline the point that the difficulties unions experienced in the 1980s 
id not produce uniform responses, even amongst 'modernising' unions. 
Although, the frequency of 'action', let alone 'agitational, items was low, several other 
nion journals in this sample were committed more strongly to a traditional union agenda 
hich was sometimes 'agitational'. In sharp contrast to 'the COHSE Journal', NALGO's 
blic Service' was consistently 'agitational', in Grace's terms (1985), employing a 
ewspaper format with large type, exhortatory headlines and frequent use of imagery 
ormally associated with 'action' (photographs of pickets lines and rallies). 
'WHERE IT HURTS- IN THE COFFERS' 
'Councils were hit where it hurts,- in the coffers- by 
NALGO's 15,000 strong army from 325 branches who voted 
to go out on indefinite strike.' 
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(Public Service front page, September 1989) 
Traditional values of collective strength and loyalty are made quite explicit in these 
examples. The NUM's 'Miner' was similar in tone, though, there were far fewer items of 
'action' to report. In the private sector, the 'T and G Record' retained a traditional 
newspaper format and a similar 'up-beat' tone with a relatively high proportion of 'action' 
items. The 'NUCPS Journal' carried slightly fewer 'action' items but employed a striking 
and 'radical' approach to lay-out and design reminiscent of the 'underground press' of the 
late sixties . In tone and format, then, the two journals selected for detailed qualitative 
discussion are atypical rather than representative but they do illustrate the tensions which 
arise in the symbolic representation of versions of trade unionism, which depart from the 
traditional. 
The COHSE Journal and Professionalism 
The content of the COHSE Journal suggested a union in transition. Indeed, the very 
format of the journal was re-vamped, complete with a change of title from 'Health Services 
News' to 'The COHSE Journal', underlining the new emphasis upon professionalism. The 
re-launch, however, involved more than just a change in title. COHSE transformed the 
journal from a conventional monthly trade union newspaper to a rather glossy full-colour 
front page bi-monthly magazine (first issue May 1989). The front pages of the old 
newspaper format 'Health Services' employed traditional bold type, large headlines, and 
black and white layout to convey customarily up-beat, often 'agitational' messages. 
'HOSPITALS FOR SALE' (September 1988) 
'DON'T TAKE US FOR GRANTED' (July 1988) 
'LOW PAY IS DRIVING NHS WORKERS OUT' (February 1989) 
'CHRISTMAS BAH HUMBUG!' (December 1988) 
e impact of these kinds of headlines was reinforced with opening paragraphs immediately 
· ntroducing themes of action and the unfolding of events. For example, the by-line 'Work to 
rade Nurses Win Appeal' was supported by the opening sentence, 
"Hundreds of COHSE nurses have proved that working to grade, 
or even just the thought of it, can force health authorities 
to back down. • (December 1988) 
e December 1988 issue carried a front page cartoon of a 'Santa Kenneth Clarke' (at that 
·me Minister for Health) bouncing a nurse on his knee with the caption 'What I want for 
hristmas is justice!' (illustration one). 
In contrast, the new magazine format brought a clearly more sobre, less agitational 
pproach with the implication of measured and considered analysis. The very first magazine 
ormat front cover featured a a colour photograph of a female lecturer with health service 
tudents taking notes. Three headings summarised the contents of the most important feature 
· cles in the issue: 
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Work-to-grade nurses win appeals 
or COHSE nurses have proved that wOJ'Idni shire. IDIIIIIIi .. • have agJ'88C1 
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~-
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..<! 
AH HUMBUG 
man who p.romised nunes they would 
their wage rise by Christmas has now 
authorities to take money OUT of 
on. 
Says COHSE General Sec-
retuy Hect<r MIC.Kenzle: 
'The threau or pey cutos end 
legal aWO!l romirla out of the 
!Hpartment of Health are 
aim<!<! more at managen 
thon at nunes. 
'Clarke iJ terrified ol a 
widescale revolt amoog the 
peopla b rel!es cm to do the 
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sugsested publicly that DO 
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Black COHSE 
members In 
conference 
'TEACHING TOMORROW'S ODAs A new profession in the making.' 
'NHS CHILD CARE More than just a perk.' 
'KENTUCKY FRIED NURSES The advertisers move in.' 
'PLUS PROFESSIONAL COVERAGE and News and views.' 
The cover invited the reader and COHSE member to approach the journal in a very different 
way. The magazine headings offered the prospect to the reader of serious debate and 
considered analysis in contrast to the former front page news stories which hastily 
summarised news events. The tone was 'professional'. The 'lead' feature article inside (May 
1989:20) supported this invitation with a three page article on Operating Department 
Assistants, 'the new health professionals' , and a black and white photograph of a bearded 
operating theatre nurse. The front cover of the next issue (June 1989) featured an attractive 
Asian 'nurse' or 'model' with baseball boots and sports socks as accessories to an NHS 
uniform (illustration two) . The nurse/model introduced the 'COHSE Comforts Summer 
Catalogue'. While the picture and caption invited the reader to enter into a relationship with 
COHSE as a consumer, three headings highlighted different themes to be developed in 
feature articles: 
·AN A TO Z OF NEGLECT Robin cook on the Government's record' 
' PROFESSIONAL FOCUS What will NCVQ mean?' 
'THUNDERBIRDS ARE GO Sport with a difference the American way.' 
Thus, the photograph and caption suggested that COHSE membership could embrace the 
olitics of consumption (the cover was very similar to the designer socialist leisure wear 
talogues produced by CND, Marxism Today, etc, during this period). Yet, at the same 
·me, the theme of professional development was once more raised through the National 
ertificate of Vocational Qualification but combined with the familiar political critique of 
overnment under-funding. However, the third heading invited the reader to approach the 
ournal almost as a weekly magazine signalling a 'human interest' feature which actually 
urned out to be about a nurse who plays American football. The cover, then, appealed to 
he reader in a variety of potentially contradictory roles, as professional , as consumer, as 
ade unionist and as weekly magazine reader. 
It is no coincidence that professionalism, as an organising motif began to appear, 
o11owing the re-launch of the journal. COHSE appointed its first 'professional officer' in 
uly 1988, with responsibility for dealing with the int·erests of members in professional 
cupations. In an attempt to preserve and expand its membership base, the union was 
arching for new ways in which to reach beyond its traditional recruitment territory in the 
ower tiers of the NHS, to the professional grades. It sought to do this by developing in the 
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journal, and elsewhere, an agenda which placed the quality of the experience of work in the 
foreground, as well as the traditional concerns of rewards and conditions. In this, we can 
find reflected some of Offe' s suggestions for a new unionism appropriate for an age of 
segmented labour markets and de-collectivised values (1985). 'Professional Focus' was 
introduced as a regular slot in the magazine; articles such as 'Physiological Measurement 
Technicians,- More Than Just ECG Girls' (Sept-Oct 1989) or 'Teaching Tomorrow's ODAs 
-A New Profession in the Making' (May-June 1989) began to highlight 'professionalism' as 
a recurring issue but other articles also implicitly engaged the reader 'as a professional' 
with technical discussions of policy or practice, like 'The Truth About NCVQ' in the 
'Professional Focus' slot (July-August 1989) , 'Medical Photographers,- the Job Behind the 
Camera' (Ju1y-August 1989), or 'Comprorrusing a Principle, the Downfall of 
Supernumerary Status' in 'Professional Focus' (November- December 1989). Many 
articles were footnoted with references reinforcing the image of a professional journal 
rather than trade union paper. The January - February 1990 issue included a special reduced 
subscription negotiated with the union for the journal 'The Professional Nurse'. 
One of the difficulties in Heery and Kelly' s account (1994) of changing relationships 
between unions and their memberships is an absence of much discussion of how unions 
might engineer change. It is assumed that change is driven by more fundamental changes in 
social structure, ideology and the composition of workforces. However, this may 
underestimate the active role which unions may play in reconstructing and re-working these 
relationships, through the re-deployment of resources and symbolic work. Certainly, it is 
possible to find in the 'COHSE Journal' an attempt to rework and reconcile the values of 
trade unionism and professionalism. The values of traditional professionalism and 
traditional unionism are not immediately compatible; the former enshrining the principle of 
individual expertise, the latter embodying the value of collective organisation. However, 
November I December 1989 issue, an article written by a local branch activist sought to 
define a 'new kind of professionalism developing inside the National Health Service'. 
'Professionalism articulates this concern with the quality of 
work being done. It is the way in which people participate 
together in exercising control over their work within society'. 
(COHSE Journal November/December 1989:29) 
In this way, trade union and professional values are harnessed through the development of 
themes concerning control over the organisation of work and measures of quality or 
standards within the NHS. The ideological 'join' is not perfect; two customary elements of 
rofessionalism,- exclusivity and restricted entry - have to be rejected as defining 
haracteristics. 'Meaningful professionalism applies to all groups of workers', the article 
nsisted. 
'Other aspects of professionalism are secondary ... Exercising 
control over the quality of work being done may 
produce as a by-product a body of research based knowledge. 
It may result in the right to undertake 
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certain tasks being reserved to specified groups. It may 
result in limited entry to a defined group. None of these, 
however, is essential to professionalism' (32) 
Whereas, professionalism used to mean 'exclusivity' , it should now be understood as 'an 
expression of us as a disciplined self-ordered body of people'(33). This is a rather skilful 
argument which seeks to preserve the space for COHSE to maintain its role as a trade union 
based upon collective strength (after all, for many COHSE members the value of the union 
would continue to lie in its ability to extract more from management through collective 
pressure than might otherwise be achieved through individual negotiation) whilst offering an 
ideological framework which can draw in new professional members and adjust to likely 
changes in the Health Service occupational structure. But for many COHSE members, 
particularly those in the lowest paid occupational sectors, the fundamental appeal of COHSE 
continued to be the security and protection afforded through collective organisation. This 
point, perhaps, marked the limit of the distance available for the Journal to travel 
ideologically. 
Professionalism and the symbolic representation of action 
Despite the 'harnessing' of trade union and professional values, the COHSE Journal , in 
contrast to NALGO'S 'Public Service' , carried relatively few 'action' items (9.5%), and 
contained very few traditional images of action or militancy (picket lines, rallies, etc). There 
may be two intertwined explanations. On the one hand, a predominance of such traditional 
imagery would introduce a dissonant note, given the 'professional focus'. Secondly, the 
COHSE membership base was significantly feminised (hence the relatively high frequency 
of 'equal opportunity' items) and, unlike NALGO's 'Public Service' , there was interesting 
evidence in the journal of a re-working of the traditional 'masculine' symbolic vocabularies 
normally employed to represent union members engaged in 'action'. Whilst needing to 
acknowledge the 'essential' activity of trade unionism, for the reasons discussed above, the 
'COHSE Journal' displayed numerous examples of industrial action being represented 
through a 'feminised ' symbolism. In one of the last 'newspaper' editions (September 1988) , 
a picket line is represented on the front page, not through the customary photograph of 
'massed ranks' signifying 'collective strength and support' but a single female nurse, facial 
expression and body language hardly connoting the 'menace' of traditional picket lines. One 
can even detect a hint of self-mockery (i llustration three). 
A further example comes from the only magazine issue to highlight the long running 
ambulance dispute on the cover. Rather than the familiar pictures of large mass meetings or 
pickets often used by the national press and, indeed, some trade union papers (NALGO's 
' Public Service' and the 'T and G Record' , for example), the January/February 1990 issue 
pictures one female ambulance worker in uniform, a strike sticker contrasting sharply with 
the insignia of Hertfordshire Ambulance Service on her fluorescent jacket (illustration four). 
ne simple headline posed the question: 
'LOCKED OUT Where now for the ambulance crews?' 
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of the NHS review 
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ar from agitation or exhortation the tone is almost one of detached analysis. Although the 
· cle inside was more upbeat, stressing the success of the action so far and the extent of 
ublic sympathy, it was remarkable how little use was made of the journal for agitational 
urposes during the dispute which was of national significance, lasted six months and 
i ved a great deal of news media coverage (discussed further in chapter nine). 
Every photograph of 'action' included in the sample period, featured women and usually 
ramed as 'individuals', rather than as members of 'threatening' collective groups. In this 
ay a potential contradiction was resolved between the reality of womans' involvement in 
dustrial action and popular news values in which notions of traditional femininity were 
mbedded. The arena for industrial action was retained but the 'masculine role' of picket 
as rejected. Industrial action became 'feminised'. 
There were regular items in both the newspaper and magazine issues focusing upon equal 
pportunity in general and, with surprising frankness, upon persisting inequalities within the 
nion itself, though the latter were usually related to union initiatives to act positively. The 
eptember 1988 issue focused upon the TUC's new Equal Rights Department while 
ovember 1988 featured a COHSE Conference for Black Members, and the December 
988 issue devoted extensive coverage to its proceedings. However, while COHSE did 
arry more items of this kind than other union papers what does not emerge from the 
ontent analysis but is, nonetheless, particularly striking is the commitment throughout the 
urnal to promoting positive images of white and black women actively involved in union 
ork. With the introduction of the magazine, every single cover featured a woman either in 
active union role or involved in a professional health care occupation of some kind. This 
attern was reproduced throughout the journal. Photographs of women outnumbered those 
f men quite clearly. Women appeared in theatre gowns with clipboards, obviously 'in 
ge' (February 1989), supervising O.D.A. training (May I June 1989), or checking drips 
ith 'obvious authority' (September I October 1989). The Journal seemed intent on make a 
nk between femininity and trade union activity. The platform at the 1989 union conference 
as dominated by two giant size posters of female COHSE members at either side and this 
as highlighted in the photographs of the proceedings included in the magazine (July-
ugust 1989). 
In the construction of the new format COHSE Journal, then, it is possible to fmd 
ements which we might read in terms of Heery and Kelly's framework for describing 
anging relationships between unions and their members (1994) and, in offering an agenda 
hich places the quality and control of work, and workplace gender politics, in the 
ground, it is possible to see an approximation to the programme Offe (1985) sketches 
t.for a trade unionism relevant the segmented labour markets and de-collectivised work 
rces of 'disorganised capitalism'. And yet, for the reasons discussed above, there are 
mits to the extent to which the COHSE Journal can abandon the traditional concerns of 
ade unionism. 
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Unlike the 'COHSE Journal', the reconstruction of trade union values in EETPU's 
Contact' was not announced through a switch to a re-vamped, glossy magazine format. On 
e contrary, 'Contact' along with the T and G 'Record' represented two examples of the 
ost traditional formats in trade union journalism. Both retained conventional newspaper 
ayouts with bold headlines dominating dense columns of small print with limited use of 
hotographs, mainly of 'heads and shoulders'. In 'Contact' there were a number of regular 
eature articles but layout and print size were rarely altered. Only one issue of 'Contact' 
sed colour printing,- a 'one-ofr souvenir issue for the EETPU's centenary conference. The 
!icy towards content remained as conservative as the layout design with much space being 
evoted to 'traditional' union items; lengthy and detailed reports of conference speeches, 
onthly articles by General Secretary Eric Hammond always appearing on the third page, 
tters from members at the back, retirements and deaths on page two, and news of union 
utings and local branch events liberally sprinkled throughout. 
The inclusion of a large number of stories on retirements, union outings or events, and 
tories of events in the lives of ordinary members (for example, 'Frank lands Buxted's 
iggest', about the landing of an 8lb rainbow trout at the union's leisure centre or Division 
's day trip to Boulougne, February 1989, 'Burnley's Break' for retired Burnley EETPU 
embers at the union's Esher College, December 1988 ), combined with the frequent use of 
sed 'holiday snap' photographs gave 'Contact' a 'folksy' flavour reminiscent of the 'Old 
odgers' column in the Daily Mirror. Although the experience of the labour process for 
y EETPU members was changing rapidly the union paper still sought to engage them, at 
ne level, through the elaboration of traditional working class values towards leisure and the 
ily. The 'day out' for work mates and their wives appeared as a frequent item implicitly 
ggesting a traditional connection between male member and 'his' union. 
And yet, the EETPU was at the vanguard of the new 'business unionism' and it, perhaps 
ore than any other union, articulated a new individualism in its outlook and approximated 
ost closely to the 'managerial unionism', identified by Heery and Kelly. Traditionalism 
d the EETPU's brand of 'radicalism' were reconciled in the pages of 'Contact' through 
e device of representing each departure from traditional unionism in terms of pragmatic 
lain common-sense' and political moderation. Frequently, this was expressed through the 
rsona of the union's general secretary, Eric Hammond, who regularly featured throughout 
e paper. Hammond's populist defence of the EETPU's business unionism attempted to 
·m traditional trade union labourist values for the EETPU and to contrast these with the 
Jinkered political extremism' of his union critics. In this light, the traditional flavour of 
ontact' was quite compatible with Eric Hammond's 'no nonsense stance' on union 
oderation. 
Eric Hammond, in his regular feature articles, sought to relate the expulsion of the 
TPU from the TUC to two themes not uncommon in the national news media coverage of 
dustrial relations; the dangers of 'political extremism' and the question of modernisation 
d progress. Thus, under the heading, 'Sustain the Voice of Reason', he wrote in the 
ecember 1988 issue: 
'Our union has adopted ... a more realistic approach. We have 
consistently rejected the pseudo-revolutionary ranting of 
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extremists and those who allow themselves to be dragged along on a 
sea of empty rhetoric. ' 
n the same article he continued, 
'Should we fail in our mission then the cause of reason, hope, 
progress, and partnership in industry will suffer a grave, 
perhaps irreparable, set back. ' 
eaders were presented with two stark choices bound together in a dichotomised world of 
dustrial relations; accept the realism of the EETPU or the pitfalls of extremism, the 
pportunity to modernise and progress in partnership with capital or be left behind in an 
bsolete world inhabited by the critics of the union. A year later Eric Hammond continued 
insist upon a division of the world between the EETPU , the modem and the progressive, 
n the one hand, and 'the tired old time servers at Congress' (November 1989 page three), 
n the other. As the conflict with the TUC over single union deals, which eventually led to 
e expulsion of the EETPU, intensified, news items and articles critical of the TUC 
ppeared regularly throughout the sample period ('Choose the Future' Oct 1988 page 6, 
redictable Absurdity' Feb 1989 page 4, 'The fight to preserve the union's independence 
om external diktat' June 1989 page 4, and so on). A preoccupation with inter-union rivalry 
d open conflict with the TUC was a recurring theme running throughout the sample 
riod as indicated by the content analysis (18.9% of all 'Contact' items). Such conflicts 
ere invariably explained as the result of 'insidious' work by, for example, 'MSF and its 
ard-left supporters' (August 1988). 
The inferential structure underpinning much of this material, the dichotomy between 
oderation and extremism, progress and stagnation, was common in much national news 
edia coverage of industrial relations. 'Contact', perhaps more than any other journal in the 
pie, appeared to share both interpretative and evaluative frameworks (Deacon and 
olding,l994:l9) with Fleet Street. The selection and treatment of themes in other journals 
ften suggested the influence of traditional news values and a journalistic training but in 
ontact' there was a basic congruence in ideological outlook which produced a common 
roach to classifying and understanding the industrial world. Contact and much of the 
ws media shared something of a common industrial relations agenda. 
dividualism and Pr essivism 
e tone of the front page of the 'Contact' which announced the result of the EETPU ballot 
dorsing the leaderships' position on competitive recruitment and thus, making expulsion 
om the TUC a likelihood, conveys not only a note of defiance but also associates this with 
'spirit of independence' which, in turn, echoes the emphasis upon individualism which 
as at the heart of the EETPU message. 
'Its "Yes" by a mile ... 
INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION 
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Split from TUC after "no surrender" vote 
(August 1988 front-page). 
e heroic tone of the item sought to associate likely expulsion with the values of freedom, 
ndependence, modem thinking and political moderation. Thus, for example, Eric 
ammond makes the linkage between 'individual choice' and modem trade unionism 
xplicit in the same item: 'the Bridlington rules procedures failed to allow people to choose 
eir unions and were "out of tune with the times" '. Hammond distinguished between 
rdinary local trade unionists whom he expected to continue to work with the EETPU and 
ose 'politicos at a national level who sought to cause trouble' and 'could not command an 
y in real life' (front page August 1988). The juxtaposition of militant minority against 
oderate majority is a theme familiar to most students of national news media content of the 
960s and 1970s (Cohen and Young 1981, Morely 1976,Hall1971). The same message and 
e same underlying values are repeatedly announced in successive front page headlines 
ollowing the August 1988 issue: 
'FREE TO CHOOSE' (October 1988) 
'IT'S INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM' (October 1988) 
'OVERWHELMINGLY LOYAL 
Stewards slap down for outside mischief makers' 
(December 1988) 
'STRONGER THAN EVER 
Jersey conference Sure to Chart Encouraging Gains' 
(Apri11989) 
'HUGE VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE' 
(inside pages June 1989) 
e moral legitimacy of the EETPU position and the emphasis upon the individual choice 
ffered to trade unionists by its action is affirmed in each of these examples. 
However, 'individualism' and 'choice' surface again and again throughout the journal, 
t merely in the rhetoric directed at the TUC. The December 1989 'Contact' carried an 
· cle by Hammond, affirming his 'determination to enhance the rights of the individual 
ember' (page three) and it is these rights which, for example, provide the rationale for the 
form of union rules which, once again according to Eric Hammond, 'are a hangover from 
e past that impede choice and the freedom of the individual' (June 1989 page 6). It was 
ammond, in a conference speech reported verbatim across two densely typed pages, who 
gued: 
'Our growing insistence upon the individual his votes ... her rights 
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... their desires ... could only lead in one way or another to the 
TUC of last year and our expulsion' 
(June 1989 page 2) 
e logic of the EETPU approach leads to an emphasis upon individual, rather than 
ollective rights within the workplace and this was frequently acknowledged in 'Contact'. 
eve raJ articles detailed the support provided by the union for individuals who wished to 
ain further training, qualifications or enhanced marketability in other ways. 'Multi-skilling' 
greements were presented as an opportunity for the individual employee. For example, an 
'cle entitled , 'We'll Help You Get the Right Deal', concluded: 
"Whatever happens, we must continue to create every opportunity 
for all our members to develop the New Technology skills 
appropriate for the 1990s and beyond ... the Union's Productivity 
and Technical Services Department can assist in ensuring that 
your agreement is a good one." (August 1988 page four). 
Once again, the emphasis is upon the work of the EETPU as a 'no nonsense', progressive 
rganisation opening up opportunities for individuals to adopt individual strategies for 
proving their market positions. 
The reconstruction of trade union values in this way, inevitably leads to a concentration 
pon the range of services which the union can provide for individual 'consumer/members'. 
is was reflected throughout Contact as confirmed in the quantitative analysis (24. 3% of 
I EETPU Contact items dealt in some way with the services the union offered to 
embers). The union's financial, legal, training and leisure services were all heavily 
romoted in specific articles. The union's showpiece leisure and holiday centre for 
embers, Buxted Park in Sussex, was featured in a number of items (June 1989, April 
989, December 1988). 'Only the best at Buxted Park' emphasised the type of 'market 
a!' the union was trying to achieve and, of course, the EETPU regarded itself as 
rating in a competitive market for new members. Hence, the departure from the TUC 
ridlington rules. The April 1989 issue contained a four page pull-out special on the range 
f services available to members including solicitors, distance learning packages, the union's 
technical college, RAC membership, financial services and holiday insurance, all 
troduced by Eric Hammond. The August 1989 issue carried the front page story 'CO-OP 
oup! ', thus simultaneously announcing a banking link up for members and emphasising 
e point that the EETPU got there first. Every issue of Contact contained a feature, 
ashpoint', concerning financial advice and written by the union's finance officer. An 
vertisement for the RAC, a picture of a stranded motoring family with the caption 'It's at 
es like this when you know its really worth being a member of the EETPU', underlined 
e Union's aggressive marketing strategy. 
Limits of In ividualism 
en the EETPU was reluctant to follow the logic of its brand of 'new unionism' to its 
gical end-point. There was little discussion, for example, of performance related or 
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'personalised pay'. In just one item, tucked away on an inside page in a small report, such 
rewards systems were described as 'potentially very damaging' ... 'unfair, divisive, and 
demoralising'. It would only be accepted 'pragmatically' with 'safeguards to 
lessen ... negative effects' imposed by the union (page 7). The EETPU, then, was reluctant to 
abandon all elements of traditional unionism. As with COHSE, the limit to the ideological 
·ourney undertaken by the EETPU was determined by the fact that, ultimately, trade unions 
can draw strength from only one source,- the collective organisation of their memberships. 
Performance related pay represented a fundamental threat to this foundation stone of trade 
unionism, even for the EETPU. 
The 'fact' of industrial action provided an equally problematic issue for the political and 
ideological framework underpinning 'Contact'. Although the 'Campaign for a thirty five 
hour week', launched by all the engineering unions, was underway and included over-time 
bans in key sectors, during the sample period, 'action' stories amounted to only 0.9% of 
'Contact' items. Contact 'resolved' the problem of reconciling collective action with the 
ETPU's agenda by simply not mentioning it. Whereas 'the COHSE Journal' sought to 
construct and 'individualise' the imagery of industrial action, in 'Contact' it was simply 
'disappeared'. There were no photographs of pickets or rallies, no shots of officials 
dressing meetings and no stories. 
Another tension between the old and new was resolved in a similar way. One might 
ticipate a trade unionism of 'individual freedom' to embrace issues of equality of 
portunity. And yet, the traditions of the EETPU were patriarchal and the flavour of 
Contact' strongly reflected this. Despite appointing a 'National Officer for Equal 
pportunities' in August 1988, the union paper described a masculine world of work and 
nionism. This was in sharp contrast to 'the COHSE Journal'. The quantitative content 
alysis had shown that in the sample period only 0.9% of 'Contact' items dealt with 
issues of equal opportunity'. Two items in the sample period discussed training 
pportunities for women in skilled work but there was an absence of any discussion of how 
omen might participate more within the union. Contact was male dominated not only in 
he sense that very few stories or articles concerning women were included but also in the 
ge of pictures and images of trade unionism it contained. The June 1989 Special 
entenary Conference issue was a good example (illustration five). The front page projected 
large photograph of row upon row of shirt sleeved male delegates listening to the 
roceedings. On the inside pages short reports were included summarising debates with 
ccompanying pictures of more shirt sleeved male speakers involved in the proceedings. Not 
ne cover in the sample period featured women. 
e earlier studies of union journals conducted by Selvin (1963) and Grace (1985) suggested 
w positioned themselves to the left of the mainstream in labour movement politics. The 
bsence of a radical left agenda is unlikely to be a new phenomenon and, as we have seen, 
ere are powerful forces working against the articulation of a more robust radicalism in 
e 1990s. If there is a radicalism, it is to be found in the way some union journals express 
sponses to the changing political and economic environment; the growing segmentation of 
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abour markets, the changing composition of workforces and the symbolic vocabularies 
hich are employed to reach them. 
What is noticeable are the points of convergence in symbolism and communication 
etween the union agenda and mainstream news values. This is found, firstly, in the frames 
r angles which are employed to organise stories. For example, 'human interest' angles 
ere applied not merely to the 'routine' of union affairs, as in 'Contact', but with the more 
litically salient item, as well. Thus, for example, the 'COHSE Journal' hung news items 
n low wages around the 'personal story' of a NHS domestic, supplementing her income by 
orking in a pub. Quite hard hitting political messages about funding systems were 
resented via stories of personal difficulty, as in 'Shock for Victim of Private Health 
ystem' about a COHSE member facing a bill for £7,000 and grim personal experiences of 
dimentary public health care in the USA (November 1988). Similarly, other journals 
pped elements of their union agendas around dramatic events and personal experiences. 
e 'T and G Record' highlighted recent transport disasters at Kings Cross station, the 
ebruge ferry sinking, the Clapham rail crash, together with a picture of the drowned 
aptain of the Marchionesse Thames barge, to develop a critical perspective on de-regulation 
ont page, September,l988). NALGO's 'Public Service' was fond of presenting 'the 
rsonal stories' oflocal authority employees caught in the poverty trap (August,l989). In 
ach case, the assumption underpinning the item was that information had to be organised 
ough a set of news values common to the journalism of both union papers and Fleet 
treet. 
Secondly, the 'inferential frameworks' underpinning items sometimes revealed common 
lements shared with the mainstream news media. Hence, for example, the use made by 
ontact' of the 'majority I militant- minority paradigm' (Morley, 1976) in organising 
ories about the opposition to the EETPU's 'business unionism'. The desire to move 
eyond the mainstream media images of the 1979 Winter of Discontent', as illustrated in 
OHSE's 'individualised' representation of the 1989 Ambulance Dispute further underlines 
is point. Whilst not accepting the legitimacy of the Fleet Street interpretation of the 1979 
inter of Discontent', implicitly it is this which informs the organisation of the material 
d compels the 'COHSE Journal' to seek an alternative way of framing events, which 
voids the ideological connotations associated with the symbolism of that period. And, 
irdly, following from this, the boundaries which circumscribe the world of 'legitimate' 
litical activity within the mainstream news media, so also tend to limit the political 
rspectives to be found within the union papers. Hoyt (1983) in his review of the labour 
ress in the US, asks whether union papers continue to 'empower' readers. Are readers 
pplied with information which can inform workplace union strategies or permit informed 
oices for union members to be made? In the sample of union journals collected for the 
resent study, an answer to Hoyt's question must be two-fold. As individual members many 
nion journal readers are probably better informed than ever before. As consumers they are 
mpowered', given the volume of material contained in many journals on union services, 
nion advice and the benefits of membership. In the journals of unions organising 
rofessional and technical workers, readers are also often 'empowered' as individual 
lleagues, with information and discussion of occupational issues and career development 
or example, 'Professional Focus' in the 'COHSE Journal'). However, there is little 
· dence of a collective empowerment. Little information is provided which prompts 
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uestions concerning the structures of power and authority in the workplace. Debates over 
e nature of industrial democracy appear to have been long forgotten. Few journals 
upplied information or research data which would allow an informed critique of the 
ractice and strategy of the major employers in particular employment sectors to be 
eveloped, despite the work and accessibility of Labour Research. Employers might be 
riticised but usually on the grounds of their 'obstinacy' or 'short sightedness' in 
egotiation, rarely in terms of questioning the legitimacy of corporate management 
tructures or their lack of accountability. 
Given Selvin' s depressing description of union journals three decades ago, there has been 
enormous improvement in the quality of the communicative work undertaken in 
ontemporary union publications. Nevertheless, for complex reasons, involving both 
xternal pressures and intemal strategic thinking, it remains ironically the case that during a 
riod of fundamental change in the organisation of production and workplace relations 
etween capital and labour, union journals remain reluctant to pose the fundamental 
uestions. 
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Chapter Four 
Briefing for the Union: the practice of trade union press officers and 
the internal union environment. 
We now know that there are many reasons why trade unions are likely to attach a 
growing importance to communications and symbolic work (chapter two) and we know 
something of the agendas which unions may wish to communicate (chapter three), 
although it is acknowledged that some unions may distinguish between agendas which 
inform communicative work with members, as expressed through the content of 
journals, and those constructed for a wider public (chapter five is partly concerned 
with providing a further account of union agendas through the perspectives of union 
press officers). This chapter considers the work of union press officers in the context of 
the theoretical themes set out in chapter one. If communication and symbolic work 
express the central relations of domination and subordination in society, and given the 
position of trade unions within those relations, how best can unions organise their 
media and symbolic work in ways which acknowledge the structures of material and 
ideological power? 
This chapter focuses upon the central organisation of the trade union; upon the 
question of access to the decision making process and upon the allocation of resources 
for media work. In short, the union press officer's internal environment. In the 
following chapter, the external environment is considered through the relationships 
press officers develop with journalists and the range of external factors which constrain 
their work. 
Responsibilities and working conditions. 
The working conditions for the trade union officers visited in this study varied 
enormously and not only in accordance with the size of the union that employed them. 
Frequently the officers working for the smaller unions in the study inhabited small, 
sometimes dingy offices, with cramped conditions and papers piled high over desks and 
filing cabinets. However, it was notable that conditions were not much better for 
officers representing some of the largest unions in the country. Only the GMB had 
appeared to have embraced the modem world of corporate office design with a new 
purpose built headquarters reflecting the union's emphasis upon 'corporate branding',-
building up an association in the public's mind between the GMB and modem, 
progressive trade unionism. A brand new post-modem architecture, the GMB logo 
mounted on the public face of the building; bright; open plan offices, bristling with 
information technology and coded security zoning requiring employees to tap in their 
'PIN's to move from one section to another, all provided a sharp contrast with other 
union environments. The 'Communications Directorate' for the GMB occupies one 
entire floor of open plan, modem office furniture and television monitors. NALGO, 
too, allocated an entire floor to its Publicity Department. Indeed, it was so large that a 
map of the seventh floor was helpfully provided for visitors when they alighted in the 
lift. 
So working conditions vary widely. More detailed descriptions of the resources 
allocated to each press officer will be provided in a section comparing union by union 
below. The duties and responsibilities of press officers also vary widely. Here, the size 
of union is a better guide to circumstances. The bigger trade unions were all able to 
allocate at least one officer to press and media work. more or less full time. Sometimes 
these officers would take on additional tasks but this was out of choice, to facilitate 
their press and media work or to enrich their jobs. For example, Charlotte Atkins of 
COHSE acted as a 'Political Officer', engaging in lobbying work at Westminster and 
some background research but this was not at the expense of press and media work. It 
arose from the coincidence of her background and interests, on the one hand, and the 
strategy of the union, on the other, in moving away from public rallies towards 
'quieter' forms of political communication, at Westminster. The variety of duties is 
reflected in the range of official titles for posts. Adrian Long acted as Media Officer in 
the Communications Directorate at the GMB, John Lloyd was Head of 
Communications at the EETPU, Ken Jones of the NUCPS was officially Head of the 
Research Department, while Mr Lomans was Assistant to the General Secretary at 
NUHKW. Few of those interviewed were known simply as press officers. 
The Position Within Each Union 
As we shall see, staffing or 'time' as a resource is often an important point of 
differentiation between large and small unions and is likely to determine the degree of 
proactivity in media work. In addition, the degree of access media or press officers 
have to the higher levels of decision making within the union (the national executive 
committee or equivalent) is likely to be important, for reasons discussed further below, 
and the level of resourcing in terms of budget and facilities ('the technology of media 
work'). Precise information on levels of funding, specifically allocated to press or 
media work, is extremely difficult to obtain. At the time the research was conducted 
very few unions cost-centred such work with a specified budget. Usually, the cost of 
media and press work was subsumed within broader budget headings ('publicity', 
'administration', even 'education') and to make matters even more complicated, 
campaigning work which might include press and media activity was often supported 
from the legally distinct political fund, as well as the main budget lines. Information 
derived from the accounts registered with the Certification Officer is included in 
appendix four, though only one union, the NUCPS, included a specific figure for 
'press and media work'. Most press officers could only provide estimates of the figures 
involved in specifically supporting press and media work, as distinct from broader 
publicity functions and journal production. Would, for example, the costs involved in 
entertaining journalists, be funded from an administrative budget line or the political 
fund or both? (1) As Charlie Whelan (formerly AEU press officer) asked, 'what is 
press work?' (2). For many press officers, the distinction in practice was artificial. 
Proactive campaigns might be funded jointly by Publicity, Industrial, Publications or 
even Education departments (3). 
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This makes it very difficult to isolate specific figures for the resources involved in 
supporting specifically press and media work, but where press officers were able to 
supply a detailed breakdown of their costs and budget allocation these have been 
included in the following discussion of resources. 
Set out below is a set of brief summaries of the conditions for press and media work 
within each union. Details of union budgets and membership levels for the year 1992 
are set out in appendix four. 
Larger Unions 
1. AEU 
One officer (Charlie Whelan) worked exclusively upon press and media work, with 
access to typing and administrative support from a pool. He had a position on the 
editorial board of the union journal but was not involved in day to day editorial 
decisions. Involvement in editorial work was limited to the planning of a small number 
of campaigns developed through the journal, media work and publicity materials. 
Though running a relatively small department and without any formal experience in 
journalism, Charlie Whelan had an extremely high reputation amongst journalists and 
other press officers. He proved the 'exception to the rule' in that he did not have 
formal access to the national executive committee of the AEU, an important advantage 
in helping to acquire the kind of inside information valued by journalists, but he did 
have a very close working relationship with the general secretary, to whom he was 
formally responsible, and it was this which was valued by journalists. He has 
subsequently joined the staff of the present Labour Party leader with responsibility for 
communication work. 
In 1992/93, the total AEU budget for publicity, including the publication of the 
'AEU Journal', was £835,000, a figure which placed the AEU above the media 
oriented GMB in the spending league but still significantly below NALGO's budget of 
over £2 million. Little of this money appeared to be invested in the press office, the 
only obvious items of expenditure being a primitive personal computer, a FAX 
machine and the P.A. (Press Association) link, which Charlie Whelan used 'sparingly' 
once each mid-morning to monitor emerging news stories. 
2. COHSE 
One officer (Charlotte Atkins) worked exclusively upon press and media work, though 
she was developing her role in political communication and lobbying activity. She had 
the 'luxury', however, of being able to devote her time fully to media work whenever 
necessary. In contrast to the AEU, as press officer Charlotte Atkins worked closely 
with the team of three involved in producing the journal and could call upon their help 
for additional support for her press work when required. In the past, press work and 
journal production had not been co-ordinated, being located in separate buildings,- 'it 
was a crazy situation, we might be working on the same story but in separate 
buildings'(4). However, COHSE moved all communication staff into one office, in 
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order to integrate the work and now all staff worked as one 'team'. Charlotte Atkins 
enjoyed card carrying status as a full member of the union, rather than merely an 
employee, and on this basis was allowed to attend national executive meetings. 
An annual income £11,117,874 in 1992 made COHSE one of the richer unions in 
the study and around 78% of this was spent on administration, including publicity (the 
journal alone cost £60,000 per issue to produce). In contrast to the AEU, where 
Charlie Whelan battled against the imposition of strict budget lines, the COHSE budget 
was, according to Charlotte Atkins, one of the most tightly controlled amongst large 
unions. A video camera, for example, could only be purchased by viring money from a 
media monitoring account. Approximately £20,000 was allocated to media and press 
work each year, excluding salaries (5), although additional support was provided from 
the publicity department (the production of leaflets, etc) and the journal budget. The 
press and media budget paid for, amongst other things, a P.A. link to receive news up 
dates and circulate copy, and a subscription to the '2/1 0 U ni versa! News Service' 
(UNS) which allowed the circulation of a fixed number of press releases each year. The 
budget also included a press clippings service and a contract with 'Telemonitors', a 
company which provided transcripts of television output. In common with a number of 
press officers, Charlotte Atkins was beginning to question the value of media 
monitoring and 'Universal News Services', at the time of the study, a theme to be 
explored further below. 
Following the merger of COHSE, NUPE and NALGO, Charlotte Atkins has 
become a full-time political officer. 
3. EETPU 
John Lloyd as Head of Communication was the only officer of the larger unions in the 
sample to combine press and media work with editing the union journal. The 
Communication Department was responsible for all media, press, and publicity 
functions. John Lloyd had a full time assistant with design and layout skills, acquired 
through working in magazine journalism, to support journal production and could call 
upon further clerical and administrative support from other sections. However, in 
comparison to the large publicity or communication departments at unions such as 
NALGO or the GMB, the EETPU' s was relatively small. Even COHSE, with a 
membership half the size of the EETPU, supported a larger publicity department. 
However, as appendix four indicates, despite a lower membership, COHSE enjoyed an 
annual income more than twice that of the EETPU. Although staffmg levels were 
relatively low, there was a considerable investment in communication technology. The 
department used Apple PC's with sophisticated desk top publishing and printing 
facilities, - 'the best in-house business communication system in South East England' 
(6),- to produce all its own communication materials, including leaflets, newsletters, 
and press releases. The journal was edited on the same system but printed externally. 
Rather than subscribe to UNS, or the P.A., John Lloyd used an 'intelligent' FAX 
machine to distribute press releases to key journalists. 
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Although without a formal training in journalism, John Lloyd recognised the 
importance of 'speaking with authority', in the eyes of journalists, and was given full 
access to EETPU Executive Council meetings. 
4. GMB 
Next to NALGO, the GMB probably had the biggest communications department, 
amongst British unions. Adrian Long had the official title of Media Officer in the 
Communications Directorate. He worked under the Director of Communication, 
Nicholas Woolas, a former current affairs television journalist. Two staff, including 
Adrian Long, worked full-time on 'media related activity', out of a total staff of nine 
within the department. Nicholas Woolas lent additional support in meeting and briefmg 
journalists but Adrian was able to devote himself 'almost totally' to press and media 
work. All media and communication work, including journal production and press 
work, was integrated through an annual strategic plan produced by the Communications 
Directorate. This plan was, in turn, informed by the broader strategic thinking of the 
union leadership and the senior staff within the Communications Directorate, including 
Adrian Long, had access to all national executive meetings. 
With an annual income of £39,136,000 in 1992, the GMB was the third most 
prosperous union in the sample and £726,000 was spent upon 'publicity'. Adrian Long 
estimated that direct costs (staffing, facilities, PA and UNS services, mobile phones, 
and media monitoring) for media and press work amounted to approximately £55,000 
and indirect costs (PR stunts, commissioning of external research, etc) a further 
£30,000 (7). A total of approximately £85,000 in 1992/93 would have made the press 
and media work of the GMB some of the most well resourced in union circles, matched 
only by NALGO. 
5. NALGO 
NALGO's Publicity Department, occupying an entire floor of the union's headquarters, 
was the biggest developed by any union at the time of the study. The Press Office was 
located within this department with a staff of three full-timers, headed by Mary 
McGuire. She worked closely with the editor of the NALGO journal, 'Public Service' 
but was not involved in day to day editorial work, though particular campaigns were 
developed through both the journal and media work. Once again, Mary McGuire had 
full access to national executive and senior political circles within the union, a policy 
pioneered by NALGO many years before other unions recognised the importance of 
allowing those who spoke publicly on their behalf a full understanding of the political 
context in which they worked. 
NALGO's income in 1992 was the highest of the unions in this study and the 
Publicity Department enjoyed, what was in union terms, a huge budget of over £2 
million, excluding staffing costs (see appendix four). The bulk of this was spent upon 
the production of the union journals and other publicity materials. During the research 
period over £300,000 was invested in a new desk top publishing system (compared to 
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£20,000 spent by IPMS). However, in 1992/93 NALGO allocated £103,200 to the 
Press Office, which was spent on staff salaries, media monitoring (£14,600), 
'campaigns' (£5,000) and newspapers/magazines (£3,700). NALGO had recently 
terminated its UNS contract. 
6. TheTGWU. 
Although the largest union, at the time this research was undertaken, with the second 
highest income (see appendix four), unlike other large unions in the study, the TGWU 
operated with a straight forward press office, without the ramifications of publicity or 
broader communications functions. The journal, 'T and G Record', was produced quite 
independently, the only link being the inclusion of the journal editor on the mailing list 
for press office press releases. The head of the press office, Eddie Barrett and his 
'number two', Andrew Murray were both professional journalists with experience on 
national newspapers. Despite the size and resources of the T and G, the press office 
provided a sharp contrast to the relative 'media opulence' of the GMB and NALGO. 
Without a specific budget, Andrew Murray said it was impossible to calculate the cost 
of press work, 'too many imponderables'(8), but major items of expenditure had to be 
approved by the national executive. Other than two PC's and a FAX machine, the 
press office displayed none of the investment in media technology which confronted the 
visitor to, for example, the GMB headquarters. 
Unlike NALGO, COHSE and several other large unions, the tradition and 
organisational culture of the TGWU did not permit its press officers routine access to 
the highest levels of decision making. In contrast to Charlotte Atkins (COHSE), Eddie 
Barrett and Andrew Murray were not TGWU members; they retained their NUJ 
memberships and saw themselves as employees and 'professional journalists'. They 
were not given access to the national executive, although they did enjoy a close 
relationship with the general secretary, to whom they were directly responsible. 
Nevertheless, while many journalists gave a positive assessment of the TGWU press 
office, others and a number of union press officers, referred to the 'secretive' culture 
of the union. 
Smaller Unions 
7. IPMS 
A team of two media officers with three support staff handled all press and media work 
but also produced the union journal and publicity materials. The Head of the 
Communications Department (Charles Harvey) devoted most of his time to editing the 
journal, leaving press and media work to Sarah Goodall, his assistant. However, the 
degree of inter-changeability in terms of staff and functions was probably greater at 
IPMS and NATFHE than_in the other unions in this study. At the time of the field 
work, IPMS had just invested £20,000 in a new Desk Top Publishing system which 
was eventually going to permit the integration of all media work, including the journal 
and press work. Although a relatively small union in terms of membership, IPMS still 
"' ,,_., ' 
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generated an income seven times greater than that of the NUM in 1992. The total 
budget for the Publicity Department was £459,000 in 1993, a sum equivalent to other 
unions of a similar size, such as NATFHE and the NUR. However, despite this budget 
allocation, IPMS had not invested in either a PA link or UNS and this, according to 
Charles Harvey, was as much a matter of policy as resource limitation. A sceptical 
view of UNS was common amongst press officers and will be discussed further below. 
As in the case of the TGWU, the staff within the IPMS publicity department 
regarded themselves as employees, rather than union members. Formerly, the 
department was accountable to the general secretary and staff did not enjoy routine 
access to the IPMS General Council, although this met only infrequently anyway. 
8. NATFHE 
Two officers within a Communications Department, Paula Lanning and Midge Purcell, 
took responsibility for press and media work and combined this with editing two union 
journals (a magazine and a tabloid), and responsibility for the production of all 
publicity materials. Both officers provided in-house media training courses. Thus, 
NATFHE tried to do with two staff what IPMS achieved with five, the GMB with nine 
and NALGO with a staff, perhaps, six times larger. From an annual income of around 
£5.5 million each year, NATFHE allocated £400,800 in 1993 for all publicity work. 
Although, 'exceptionally' (9), £56,000 had recently been spent upon re-launching the 
union, including £6000 on the design of a new logo, in the main the resourcing of 
NATFHE' s media work was modest. £1,700 was spent upon a press cuttings service; 
£2,700 set aside for a '2/10 Communications' (UNS) contract, though less than half of 
that was eventually spent and Midge Purcell estimated that, perhaps, a further £500 
was spent specifically upon press and media work (10). Both Paula Lanning and 
Midge Purcell had the opportunity to attend national executive meetings and they had 
'pretty good access to the general secretary' ( 11). 
9. NUCPS 
At the time the field work was conducted, Ken Jones acted as press officer almost by 
default. Press work was directed to his office by virtue of his role as Head of the 
Research Department. In this sense, NUCPS provided an example of how unions used 
to organise their media work before the recent prioritisation of communications. Since 
the field work for the present study was completed, a full-time press officer has been 
appointed. Ken Jones had no role in the editing of the journal,- 'quite a different style 
of writing' (12), though he did provide background research for articles on occasions. 
Six research officers worked under Ken Jones and he often referred press enquiries to 
the appropriate research officer or, indeed, to staff in other departments. An annual 
income in 1992 of £10,548,029 made the NUCPS fifth most prosperous union in the 
study, with a very large proportion being spent upon 'administration' (almost 97%) and 
according to the accounts, £19,384 being spent upon 'press and media work'. This, of 
course, appears a relatively small sum compared to NALGO or the GMB but is 
probably comparable to other unions of an equivalent size. One difference may lie in 
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how that budget was spent. At the time of the field work, the NUCPS spent 
significantly more on their UNS account than other unions,- 'four to five thousand 
pounds'(l3), compared to less than one thousand at NATFHE and less at NALGO. The 
higher expenditure on UNS was, in fact, a substitute for a more proactive press and 
media strategy. 
Ken Jones had access to national executive committee meetings and regular meetings 
with the general secretary but necessarily as a press officer, rather than as Head of 
Research. 
10. NUM 
Nell Myers was appointed as an Assistant to the President and General Secretary. In 
this role she combined the work of the NUM'S press officer with a number of other 
duties, including some media training. She had recently edited 'The Miner' in the 
absence of Mervyn I ones, the paper's editor, though there was not a formal integration 
of journal and media functions. Like the NUCPS, the NUM did not possess a press or 
publicity department and indeed, Nell Myers conducted much of her work from her 
home in East London, while the union's headquarters was based in Sheffield. Although 
the union recorded a membership of 93,684 in 1992, its income was lower even than 
that of the NUKFA (NUHKW), at only £1,331,943. The accounts give little indication 
of how resources were allocated to publicity or campaigning work, although £65,758 
was spent during the 'Campaign Against Pit Closures', a modest sum given the 
importance of the issues at stake. Overall, it appears that press and media work was 
relatively under resourced, Nell Myers having at her disposal one PC and a FAX 
machine. 
Nell Myers was able to 'sit in' on national executive meetings but it was clear that 
she regarded herself as 'someone first and foremost who works for the President' (14). 
As we shall see later, this very sharply defmed understanding of line management had 
important consequences for the pattern of relations between the NUM and labour 
correspondents. The position was made more complicated by the federal structure of 
the union which meant that 'constitutionally' Nell Myers was unable to speak for each 
NUM Area. A common complaint amongst journalists was that it was very difficult to 
get either an 'on' or 'off record' comment from the union. 
11. NUHKW 
In his post as Assistant General Secretary, Mr Lomans combined press and media work 
( a surprisingly high volume for a small union rooted mainly in the East Midlands) with 
the formal role of journal editor. In practice, although he supplied many of the ideas, 
much of the day to day work for the journal was farmed out to a local free-lance 
journalist. Similarly, many press and media enquiries were referred to shop stewards 
and local officers who might be directly involved in disputes or closures. Mr Lomans 
also took formal responsibility for the production of publicity materials with free-lance 
support A total administrative budget of only £2,980,816 placed severe limitations 
upon the resourcing of media work (even press releases were posted rather than 
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FAXed), though factory closures and the 'sweatshop' image of the textile industry 
generated regular media interest. Investment in media work amounted to little more 
than an annual advertisement in the Leicester Mercury, to contribute to the 'hosiery and 
knitwear special edition', hospitality for local journalists at the annual conference and 
occasional coach trips to Westminster for the purposes of lobbying local MPs and 
briefing journalists, en route. 
There is considerable variation, then, in terms of the resourcing of media work, the 
organisational arrangements through which press and media work is related to the 
decision making process within each union, and the extent to which media work is 
integrated within a broader communications strategy. Regarding the latter point, it was 
clear that the unions which did not regularly synchronise their journal publication with 
media work (TGWU, NUCPS, NUM and AEU), were also unions with less 
commitment to the general concepts of communication strategy and proactive 
campaigning. Press and media work were more narrowly defined as simply that,-
working with the news media, rather than contributing to broader communications 
campaigns. This, in turn, often reflected the organisational culture within particular 
unions, - there remained a widespread suspicion of journalists and 'media folk' in many 
unions,- and, sometimes, a professional scepticism on the part of union press officers 
regarding 'proactiveness'. It was often the case that in these unions the membership and 
general public were defined as quite distinct 'target audiences' and the point made 
frequently was that journal publication worked to a monthly cycle which made it an 
unsuitable vehicle for immediate communication purposes. The question of resources 
for media work and the crucial question of how news media work was related to the 
organisational hierarchy within unions are now discussed in further detail below. 
The Press Officer and the Chains of Command. 
Trade unions retain essentially bureaucratic structures. Each official has a precise set of 
duties and must relate in quite specific ways to other officials and departments. In 
addition, most trade unions are typically organised on a principle of democratic 
accountability. Each officer or official is made accountable to the membership of the 
union through the role of the General Secretary. Officers are subordinate to the 
General Secretary, the General Secretary supervises their work and, in turn, is 
answerable to the national membership for the performance of the overall organisation. 
A few trade unions such as the NUM are organised on more de-centralised federal 
lines. 
Trade union press officers face a potential problem because these structures are not 
tuned to the rhythms and demands of the national news media. Media enquiries seek to 
solicit almost instant responses from spokespersons and press officers because of the 
value placed upon 'immediacy' in the selection of news (Chibnall,1977:23), the 
pressure of news deadlines (Eiliott and Golding,l978:ch 5; Schlesinger,1978: eh 4; 
Cottle, 1993:ch 2) and competition not only between rival news organisations but 
between journalists within particular organisations. Industrial correspondents were by 
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no means assured of getting their copy into print, particularly by the late 1980s (the 
'decline' of labour and industrial journalism is discussed further in subsequent 
chapters). The formal structures of many trade unions are cumbersome and inflexible 
when viewed from the perspective of journalism. If every media enquiry had to be 
referred upwards to the General Secretary trade union press officers would face an 
impossible task in trying to cater for the needs of correspondents. 
In the majority of unions in this study it was clear that a normative framework has 
evolved to circumvent this problem without undermining the formal principles of 
accountability. Firstly, many press officers indicated that it was essential to develop a 
set of ground rules to structure the relationship between press officer and general 
secretary. These ground rules had to include a large measure of trust on the part of the 
general secretary to allow press officers sufficient independence to respond to 'routine' 
media enquiries without continually referring upwards. In return, press officers had to 
accept certain boundaries. Most press officers emphasised that their work was 
delimited by the agreed policies of their union; making policy on the hoof as they 
responded to journalists was a real danger. This means that it is essential to have a 
thorough working knowledge of the policies of the union as agreed by the union 
conference and national executive. Secondly, a number acknowledged that there were 
certain issues of particular political sensitivity which had to be handled with greater 
care and caution. Here, referral upwards might be required by general secretaries and 
senior officers. This was likely to occur most frequently in those unions experiencing 
sharp internal political conflicts or with those closely associated with the politics of the 
Labour Party. However, all trade union press officers had to exercise considerable 
political judgement in assessing the nature and implications of news stories and media 
enquiries. 
If a set of ground rules can be agreed between press officer and general secretary, 
then a system of what might be called 'delegated quotation' can be employed. When 
speed of response was essential trade union press officers often constructed a comment 
or statement themselves, hastily had it 'agreed' by the general secretary and then 
issued it. In certain circumstances the quote might have been simply constructed, 
issued to the press with the general secretary being told what he or she had officially 
said later on. Of course, this required considerable faith in the judgement of the press 
officer but the possession of such 'authority' was regarded as an important attribute by 
journalists. 
'Mostly I will be doing the instigating and then I'll say, "Look 
I need a quote for this" or something ... but sometimes if I'm 
desperate I'll make something up like on the Royal Ordnance 
story , if it has to go out quickly'. (15) 
In some circumstances the principle of 'delegated quotation' can be dramatically 
extended. When I visited one large union, the Head of Communications, had just 
fmished constructing an entire interview with the General Secretary, to be published as 
a preview to the union conference on the front page of the journal. The opening 
paragraph began: 
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'This is the conference that decides the direction of the Union's 
main policy commitment for the next two years. So [name of journal] went 
along to [general secretary's name] office at [location], the union's H.Q. 
to talk to the General Secretary. The day we were there, [ ... ] was 
joined by the Conference Chairman, [ ........ ],President of 
the Union. We were in luck. We could get both of them to let us 
know what they were expecting from conference. "What," we asked 
"are the key industrial issues for the [name of union] in Blackpool this 
year?" 
There then followed an extensive interview in which the journal quizzed an absent 
General secretary and President about their views on conference issues. 'Delegated 
quotation' on such an elaborate scale is, perhaps, rare but use of the device allows 
press officers much greater flexibility in making media interventions speedily. 
There are clearly differences in practice between unions. The degree of rigidity in the 
union organisational structure and the nature of the relationship between General 
Secretary and press officer are likely to be important factors. For some press officers, 
like Charlie Whelan of the AEU, his licence to employ delegated quotation varied 
depending upon the issue. For some, like John Lloyd of the EEPTU (above) 'delegated 
quotation' could be used in good measure but in certain unions press officers enjoyed 
far less freedom to exploit the flexibility and speed of response offered by the device. 
Ken Jones of the NUCPS did have the authority 'according to custom and practice' to 
issue press statements independently but only did so in 'exceptional circumstances'(l6). 
Normally, all press releases were produced after consultation upwards. At NATFHE, 
the General Secretary 'likes to have pretty much of a hands-on approach to press and 
publicity materials', according to Midge Purcell (one of NATFHE's two press and 
publicity officers) which, again, must limit scope for 'delegated quotation' (17). 
The Union Organisation and the 'Inside Track' 
Most press officers will say that they enjoy a cordial working relationship with their 
general secretaries but there clearly are differences in the degree of access to the 
I hi!~hest levels of decision making enjoyed by different press officers, and differences in 
smoothness of the relationships they enjoy with their senior officials. As noted 
au~•vc:, considerable political judgement has to be exercised by press officers in 
an1:ici1patiing the political implications of particular issues or enquiries from the news 
mt:<Jia. They are likely to be much more confident in making such judgements if they 
fully briefed about policy making, the strategic thinking of the national executive 
the internal politics of the union. As described above, not all press officers, for 
exatmiile, are given access to national executive committee meetings. Eight of the trade 
uni<ons in this study did give access but in three cases (the T and G, IPMS, and the 
press officers had to work without being privy to formal national executive 
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Diagram One. The Position of the Press and Media Officer within the Union 
Organisation: two contrasting ideal types. 
le~=~=] I Press Office 
Publicity In-boose PR 
TYPE A 
TRADmONAL UNION 
National 
Executive 
I General 
Secretary 
Administration 
and Finance 
I Research 
TYPEB 
MODERNISING UNION 
General National 
Secretary Executive 
Industrial Finance and 
Relations Administration 
~ Annual Communication Strategy ~ 
I Research 
The diagram (diagram one) sets out two 'ideal type' union structures. The 'type A' 
structure reflects the 'civil service' organisational culture within some unions. A rigid 
distinction is drawn between elected officers and salaried employees; the former 
exercising the formal task of decision making, the latter undertaking the administrative 
of implementation. The press office is formally accountable to the general 
i sec:retrry; the role for staff within being defined as the execution of union policy as 
deternrim~ hierarchically by the executive committee and directed by the general 
secretrry. In organisational terms, the press office might be isolated both from the 
121 
political process at executive level and the day to day practice of other departments 
within the union, including publicity and journal publication. The 'type B' structure 
suggests a higher degree of integration with a 'press office' being located within a 
broader communications department and formal access to executive meetings being 
granted to communications staff. It is tempting to predict that journalists would indicate 
greater satisfaction with the performance of press and media officers working for 'type 
B' unions. However, the informal relationships and culture within a union also have to 
be taken into account. At the AEU, for example, Charlie Whelan compensated for a 
lack of formal access to executive meetings by developing valuable informal, 'corridor 
contacts', in addition to regular informal access to the general secretary. In a union 
with a divided and 'leaky' executive, it was still possible to gather 'intelligence', 
despite the more closed and less integrated formal structure. 
Enjoying the confidence of senior officials and access to the higher formal arenas of 
decision making are not only important in allowing press officers to meet journalists' 
requirements in terms of speed of response. As we shall see in chapter six, the ability 
to provide 'intelligence' is valued, perhaps, above all other qualities by labour 
correspondents. A good union press officer, in the eyes of these joumalists, is one who 
has the ear of his or her general secretary and can provide accurate briefings on likely 
developments within unions; or can indicate how the political balance of an executive 
might determine future policy, or whether or not an executive is likely to accept an 
employers final offer. And a good union press officer will exploit this appetite for 
intelligence by granting particular journalists a position 'on the inside track'. 
Achieving access to the decision making process within organisations, characterised 
by highly sensitive political cultures, is by no means a problem pertinent only to union 
press officers (Franklin,1986; Walder,1991). None of the press officers I interviewed 
indicated that lack of access or a poor relationship with their general secretary actually 
impeded their work. At the same time, several press officers believed that access to the 
highest decision making forums in a union was essential for effective media 
performance. Mary MacGuire of NALGO, for example, believed that press and media 
officers must have access to all key committees , 'so that they know the ins and outs of 
union policy'. John Lloyd of the EEPTU agreed that was essential to be 'on the inside 
track' (18). At the GMB, the Media Officer, Adrian Long, and the Head of the 
Communications Directorate, Nicholas Woolas, developed the annual strategic plan for 
communications work jointly with the General Secretary (John Edmunds) and worked 
'very closely' with the General Secretary and senior officials on a daily basis. 
'That's not only because we expect it but because in our General 
Secretary you have someone who thinks the union's public face 
is a very important part in fulfilling his project which is to 
make the GMB the biggest union in Britain.' (19) 
Although few press officers would acknowledge the point in public, some remain on 
nearer the outside than the inside and this is related to the structure and 
culture of different trade unions. As noted above, a common perception 
the TGWU, shared by many but not all journalists, was that the organisational 
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culture of the union was an impediment to the work of its press officers, sometimes 
placing them in a position in which journalists appeared better informed about 
developments than they. The interviews conducted for this study at both the NUCPS 
and IPMS suggested that officers worked within similar cultures. Charles Harvey, 
Head of Communications at IPMS, sometimes had to 'use his common-sense' because 
IPMS General Council met infrequently and the General Secretary was sometimes 
unavailable but he regarded his job as strictly that of implementing IPMS policy. He 
had no desire or brief to 'push a political line' and was not normally involved in 
strategic decision making (20). A similar situation existed at the NUCPS. Ken Jones, 
Head of the Research Department was given access to executive committee meetings 
and enjoyed 'a close relationship with senior officers' but he added: 
' ... having said that, I do perceive myself as a civil servant. I 
don't get involved in politics or political currents. I tend to 
shelter behind the scenes. I let them get on with it.' (21) 
While none of the press officers in this study believed that it was appropriate for them 
to be actively involved in the political process, an organisational culture which strictly 
reinforces the 'civil service model' may inhibit the ability of press officers to gather the 
contextual political information which confers their position on 'the inside track'. 
Certainly, journalists regarded with more credibility those press officers who they 
believed 'spoke with authority'. 
In some unions the distinction between officers and salaried officials is not so sharply 
drawn. Indeed, Charlotte Atkins, press officer at COHSE, was a card carrying 
member of COHSE with full officer status (in her previous jobs at UCAIT and TASS 
as a salaried employee she held only an NUJ membership card). This meant that, if 
necessary, she had the authority to give an interview and be quoted in her own name as 
a senior officer of the union. Although, 'normally' she attributed a comment or a 
statement to the general secretary, 'if it's only local radio, I'll do it in my own name'. 
There were differences of opinion between press officers about the advisability of 
raising one's own profile. Some believed that press officers should never be quoted as 
representatives of their union but the advantage of Charlotte Atkins' position at COHSE 
was that it permitted a rapid response to media enquiries but also ensured that she 
played a full part in the development of the union's policy and strategy which, in turn, 
placed her in a position of confidence in explaining the detail of union views to the 
news media. At NALGO and the GMB those representing each union to the media had 
a greater role in actively shaping union strategy than the 'civil servant model' might 
perm~i 't.• Mary MaGuire at NALGO was formally accountable to the Publicity 
Comn~li 'tt '€~e but in practice the Committee usually went 'along with my 
on budget and strategy. It's rare for the Committee to order me to do 
something different.' (22). As noted above, Mary MacGuire had access to all the key 
~·· and decision making forums at NALGO, while at the GMB 
~ · · · was a central element in the overall political strategy of the union, 
' · ' · ~ · ·' by the General Secretary, senior officers and the Communications 
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The Press Officer and the General Secretary. 
While the formal structure and the organisational culture of a trade union are important 
factors in the working environment of a press officer, the personal relationship between 
press officer and general secretary must also be taken into account. Some senior union 
officers relish a high media profile while others have to be bullied into developing 
relationships with the media. Some take considerable interest in media work while 
others still have to be persuaded that press and media work is worth more than cursory 
consideration. 
There is no doubt that a telegenic General Secretary is a considerable asset to a trade 
union press officer. The media performance of Jimmy Knapp, gruff 'plain speaking' 
general secretary of the NUR was identified as a crucial element in the success of the 
NUR's public relations work during the 1989 rail dispute by Laurie Harris, the NUR's 
press officer. Roger Poole, a NUPE senior official, became the very effective public 
face of the health unions during the 1990 ambulance dispute, discussed further in 
chapter nine. A similar strategy was used by NALGO which targeted 'Question Time' 
and similar television shows as platforms for its general secretary. 
By no means are all general secretaries 'telegenic' or eager for a high media profile. 
Some remain media shy and others continue to discount the value of media work. The 
EETPU always had difficulty in persuading Eric Hammond to contribute, particularly 
to the prestigious Radio Four 'Today' programme because it involved getting up too 
early in the morning. Other general secretaries only acquire a taste for media work 
after being thrust into the media spotlight during high profile disputes. Officers face a 
difficulty here. Enthusiasm is to be encouraged but there is a danger that an over-
developed appetite can create difficulties for the press officer. Some senior officers 
may have such an enthusiastic 'hands on' approach that the work of the press officer is 
actually impeded. And Mr Lomans of the NUHKW noted wryly that the interest of 
officers in media work and particularly in appearances in the union journal always 
seemed to intensify in periods leading up to union elections. Press officers also have to 
tread wearily. One aspect of the normative framework which regulates their 
relationship with senior officials dictates that the latter be afforded, at least, 'first 
choice' of media opportunities. Mary MaGuire, at NALGO, 'has been very tempted' to 
do national television interviews when opportunities arise but the General Secretary is 
not immediately available. However, on each occasion she has resisted the temptation. 
Mr Lomans of the NUHKW recognised that 'most General Secretaries and Presidents 
will feel a bit peeved' if television opportunities are not passed up to them. Charlotte 
Atkins (COHSE) confirmed that national, as distinct from local, broadcasting media 
had to be reserved for the senior officers. 
In damage limitation or 'fire fighting' situations, the union press officer will face a 
dilemma which may involve reconciling the interest of the organisation in limiting the 
flow of information to external agencies, with the need to preserve credibility in the 
eyes of journalists,- particularly as silence is often interpreted as an indication that the 
union has 'something to hide'. At best, a set of informal rules can be agreed on how to 
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deal with such awkward situations which incorporate some kind of compromise 
between the interests of the union, on the one hand, and the need to nurture 
relationships with journalists, on the other. Eddie Barrett, of the T and G, commented: 
'We have a rare but useful understanding with the General 
Secretary (at that time Ron Todd). We don't tell anyone 
lies. Nobody asks us to say anything that isn't true because 
if that happens your whole credibility is blown ... but there 
may be times when we say nothing ... so journalists know what 
they do get from us is reliable.' (23). 
Press Officers. Resources. and Technology 
One central question for any study of media and press work concerns the impact of 
resources and the 'technology of news work'. Is it the case that a higher level of 
communication resources advantages the wealthy and powerful? This has certainly been 
the assumption in much of the 'classic' writing in the field of pressure group theory 
(Finer,l966) and more recently, in some of the accounts of the eventual 'triumph' of 
the Coal Board over the NUM, in 1985 (Adeney and Lloyd,l986; Winterton and 
Winterton,1989). However, the evidence from the present study strongly suggests that 
while it is the case that the possession of wealth and resources can be translated into 
public relations power, a great deal depends upon the kind of resources employed, -
human or technical,- and how they are exploited organisationally. 
Even in the relatively short duration of this study, the technology of media work has 
changed significantly. When I first began making enquiries about media resourcing 
only a minority of the unions in the original sample used FAX machines (24). The 
arrival of cheap FAX machines has produced an 'equalising effect' between unions 
because they can be used as a cheap, and probably more effective alternative to UNS. 
'Two-Ten Communications', owners of the UNS newswire, offered several different 
types of contracts dependent upon the number of news rooms clients wished their press 
releases to reach, using the Press Association lines. For a press release to reach 170 
news rooms, 'Two-Ten Communications' would charge £215 per three hundred words 
(25). Not only was this prohibitively expensive for many unions but rather like a 
'buckshot' approach to media work, it distributed press releases to too wide a range of 
targets. Except in exceptional circumstances (during for example, national disputes) 
most press officers might wish to target a far smaller number of correspondents, 
working for perhaps twenty national news organisations. Unions with UNS accounts 
tended to allocate between one and two thousand pounds per year, although NUCPS 
spent between four and five thousand pounds (26). Many unions simply could not 
afford to allocate what amounted to, for the smaller unions, up to approximately ten 
per cent of their press budgets. Not only was the FAX machine a cheaper alternative 
but combined with an 'intelligent' dialling system, it offered an equally efficient and 
more finely honed mechanism, delivering press releases not simply to the news room 
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but to particular news desks or even individual correspondents within news 
organisations. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the value of UNS was being increasingly 
questioned by trade union press officers but this was not only because of the arrival of 
FAX. There was considerable scepticism about the value of press releases in the first 
place. While all trade union officers dealing with the news media issued press releases, 
few believed that this was sufficient. Almost all those interviewed said that if a story 
was important they would attempt to make personal contact with key journalists by 
telephone. The general view was that technology was no substitute for the development 
of personal relationships with journalists. An unselective issuing of press releases was 
likely to do more harm than good as busy journalists, overwhelmed by the sheer 
volume of pieces of paper arriving on their desks, were inclined to 'bin' most and 
resent those they read, unless they were also briefed about their significance. The UNS 
account represented about a quarter of the COHSE press and media budget and on the 
basis that 'it was rarely used', following a review, the contract was not renewed. 
Similarly, even at NALGO, the union with probably the most generous allocation of 
resources to media work, UNS was eventually dropped. Mary MaGuire renewed the 
UNS subscription when she had just taken over as Head of Press and Publicity but: 
'I think I have used it about five times. Frankly if a story 
holds up it will be used by the P.A. (Press Association) 
and the nationals. If it doesn't it's a waste of time ... 
Journalists don't look at it (UNS copy). I've been looking 
at the content,- it's all company news but it costs a third 
of a press officer. ' (27). 
Eddie Barrett of the T and G dismissed UNS as 'a waste of time'. On the other hand, 
there may be other reasons for subscribing. The NUCPS, one of the smaller unions in 
the study, spent far more than any other union on UNS during the study (four to five 
thousand pounds per year). One officer justified the expense on the grounds that while 
journalists regarded UNS as a public relations vehicle, 
' ... it is a very easy mechanism if you haven't a lot of time 
to phone up journalists. You don't necessarily get them 
interested in the story but you do make sure that every 
journalist has a copy of the information. It's like using a 
FAX, it saves individual F AXes ... 
If you're short of time and you just want to satisfy your 
bosses that you've put out the information on people's desks, 
it's useful.' (28) 
There is the suggestion here that technology was being used precisely as a substitute for 
effective personal contact. 
Though also expensive and beyond the means of most small unions, a P.A. [Press 
Association] link allows press officers to monitor the development of national news 
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stories. In this study the AEU, COHSE, NALGO, and the GMB all used this P.A. 
service. It not only allows press officers to keep up with the daily national news agenda 
but also to intervene in the news encoding process when an appropriate story breaks . 
This opportunistic strategy implies a willingness to commit a significant amount of 
time and energy to watching and waiting. For example, Charlie Whelan of the AEU 
always checked the P.A. copy at around 11.30 am each day. Even the AEU could not 
afford to use the P.A. service continuously throughout the day. However, by mid-
morning most of the stories to be used by the broadcasting media, evening papers and 
following day's nationals were developing. 
' ... you can see what's on the news and something might come up 
that everyone else is doing and you think "Puck ... we've got no 
quote from the union on that." So I ring up and I say, "there's 
a quote from Gavin Laird on that story and nine times out of ten 
they'll add it in.' (29) 
This illustrates, again, the importance of having the authority to use the practice of 
'delegated quotation' when necessary. In contrast to the AEU's sparing use of the P.A. 
link, Adrian Long at the GMB, with the luxury of probably the second largest union 
budget for media work, did have a P.A. monitor working over his desk almost 
continuously through the working day and a modem system which allowed the union's 
communication directorate to be connected to the Press Association and Profile, a 
media data base, via electronic mail. Charlie Whelan believed press officers suffered 
'a serious handicap' without the P.A. service. However, even here the importance of 
the human dimension is underlined. Charlie Whelan made the P.A. service effective 
because he used it as part of a considered strategy of intervention. In contrast, the 
NUCPS spent significantly more on UNS for probably less effect because the 
investment in technology was not matched by a comparable investment of time, 
combined with tactical thinking. 
Media monitoring services were used by some unions. NATFHE still employed a 
press cuttings service; the GMB invested in the 'high tech' Profile system but COHSE 
decided to cancel its contract with 'Telemonitors', during the course of the field work. 
None of the press officers in this study regarded media monitoring as an essential tool, 
despite the blandishments of the commercial companies. 
Desk top publishing was becoming much more common though. Of the larger 
unions, the GMB, NALGO, and the EEPTU all invested in expensive DTP systems 
which allowed them to produce glossy, professional quality materials in-house. Of the 
smaller unions, only the IPMS bought a DTP system which was used, at that time, only 
for the production of the union journal but had the capacity to handle publicity and 
media materials as well. The problem of DTP for the less well resourced unions is that 
such systems tend to generate work rather than save labour costs. As word gets around 
within an organisation about what a DTP system can do, more departments develop 
new projects to exploit its potential. And DTP systems usually require at least one 
member of staff to be allocated more or less full time to their operation. It is unlikely 
that a DTP finished press release had any more chance of being read by journalists than 
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a conventionally typed one. However, press officers sometimes need to produce more 
elaborate briefing materials for journalists and here the speed and quality of DTP 
systems may be of significant value. Once again, it was not the technology in itself but 
the way in which it was combined with 'staff time' as a resource which was most 
important. 
Another significant use of resources available more to the larger unions than the 
smaller ones was to, in effect, buy news worthiness through the practice of 
commissioning surveys of public attitudes or economic trends. In other words, to supply 
'information subsidies'(Gandy,1982). An important theme prioritised by the union can 
then be wrapped around the publication of the results of the survey, at a time likely to 
maximise media interest. The AEU used this technique very successfully on a regular 
basis, through the publication of survey data on unemployment prospects in 
manufacturing industry released to coincide with the monthly publication of official 
government economic statistics and the health unions have began to exploit it. It will 
be discussed further in the sections below dealing with inequalities between unions. 
However, professionally conducted surveys are expensive and cannot be used on a 
regular basis by the smaller unions. 
Time as the Most Important Resource of All 
Generally, the larger unions have more of the 'technology of media work' at their 
disposal, though as the case of the NUCPS illustrates, smaller unions may be willing to 
spend considerable amounts of money on technology as a substitute for human labour. 
However, what emerged as an important theme in the field work for this study was the 
importance of time as a resource, in itself. A very common comment amongst press 
officers working for the smaller unions was that they simply did not have enough time 
to move towards proactive rather than reactive media work. A proactive strategy 
requires time in planning and preparation, time invested in targeting key journalists and 
time in actually working with those journalists. Given the limited staffing and range of 
duties from journal editing to research, publicity and administration, undertaken by 
some press officers in smaller unions, it is sometimes difficult for them to move off the 
backfoot. A long term media strategy requires careful discussion, planning, an element 
of additional 'creativity' or 'flair' and the necessary time invested in targeting 
particular journalists or media outlets. Midge Purcell of NA TFHE, for example, would 
have liked to reach a wider broadcasting arena beyond news and current affairs. With 
the necessary research and planning, NATFHE views concerning women and 
education or training could have been presented through radio programmes like 
'Womans Hour' or the consumer programme 'Punters' on Radio Four: 
"There's a lot more that we could do if we had the time. We could 
think creatively about how to get issues across. It does take time 
and a certain amount of creativity. If we targeted Woman's Hour 
we would have to think what angle they might be interested in, 
what is topical but hasn't been done before ... " (30). 
128 
What made this situation even more frustrating was that a former senior officer at 
NATFHE had just moved across to the Education Department at the BBC. Midge 
Purcell, therefore, had a ready made contact but was unable to invest the time required 
to exploit the opportunity. To move off the backfoot; to become 'proactive', trade 
union press officers must construct agendas or messages which combine appropriate 
thematic elements, or news values, with mechanisms which exploit the symbolic 
resources, political capital, or just straight forward 'newsworthyness' which unions 
may possess. 
Not all union press officer concurred with the view that staffing and associated 
allocations of 'time' was a significant factor. Charles Harvey, for example, believed 
that the smallness of the IPMS Communications Department was an advantage, 
allowing a cohesive and more flexible response in comparison to their main 
'opponents' , Ci vi! Service press officers locked into 'a slow and cumbersome 
bureaucracy' (31). Similarly, Laurie Harris believed that as he was the only press 
officer at the NUR, he could move more rapidly to 'outflank' the unwieldy public 
relations department at British Rail (32). However, neither Charles Harvey nor Laurie 
Harris approached press and media work with such elaborate strategic thinking as, for 
example, the GMB Communication Directorate; each being a little sceptical of the 
more extravagant claims made by some supporters of 'proactivity'. With horizons more 
limited to the day to day skirmishes of media work, the issue of staffing and time was, 
perhaps, felt less acutely. 
Nevertheless, it is time which largely determines the quality of the social 
relationships developed by press officers with journalists and it is time which allows a 
press officer to apply the skills of his or her craft in exploiting both material and 
symbolic resources: 
'Our job would be more difficult without some of the new technology 
but it wouldn't be impossible. If you've got a good story and you 
know how to present it and how to handle the story then it doesn't 
matter whether you've got two or three FAX machines ... A FAX machine 
cannot put a spin on a story ... it can't give you nuances, the 
political or industrial feel of a story.' (34) 
Of course, this view can be read as an example of a professional ideology at work, 
legitimating the skills of a particular occupation, and on one level that is precisely what 
it is. However, it is the case that the most fundamental inequalities between 
organisations seeking access to the news media are not those related to the distribution 
of communication technology. The distribution of advantage and disadvantage in the 
struggle to achieve access to news media is shaped by forces largely beyond the 
capacity of the press officer to influence, a point to be discussed further in the next 
chapter, but in terms of the factors controlled within their internal environment, staff 
time and the skills involved in mobilising both symbolic and material resources are of 
most importance. As illustrated in the case of the NUCPS at the time of the field work, 
investment in communication technology is no substitute for time invested in 
·developing contacts with journalists and assessing the symbolic and material resources 
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to be deployed. UNS distributed press releases were likely to be ignored; a measured 
and judicious use of the telephone, as practised by, for example, Char lie Whelan was 
likely to be more effective. 
Inevitably, then, we are forced to consider what is meant by 'effective press and 
media work'. Discussions with journalists and labour correspondents confirmed that 
Charlie Whelan was almost universally regarded as one of the best union press officers. 
'Quick', 'sharp', 'professional', 'an eye for a good story' were some of the phrases 
invoked by both journalists and other press officers in support of this view. Jim 
Fookes, a press officer at NALGO, believed that Charlie Whelan was being groomed 
(34) and, indeed, he has subsequently joined the Labour Party leaderships' 
communications team. It is notable, then, how the professional perspectives of many 
press officers coincided with those of journalism. Both journalists and press officers 
stressed the importance of being able to spi>t 'a good story' and the importance of 
'getting the right angle'. Both cited 'professionalism' as the criterion upon which to 
assess performance and some press officers referred to the 'obligation of objectivity' 
in much the same way as some journalists. Although frequently critical of the nature of 
the news media as a whole, particularly tabloid newspapers, a majority of the press 
officers in the study shared a common modus operandi with journalists; to be 
'effective' they had to acknowledge the news values of daily national journalism and its 
rhythms and routines. Hence, the need for chains of command within unions which 
allowed press officers to respond quickly to inquiries and have a 'delegated quote' from 
the general secretary to hand; hence the commitment to embed union communication in 
the news values of national journalism and the elevation of 'professional skills' above 
the power of the technology of news communication. 
Press Officers: Background. Career and Professional Style. 
Most press officers arrive in their positions through one of two routes; professional 
journalism or trade union administration. Of the press officers in this study, only Eddie 
Barrett and Andrew Murray at the TGWU had worked extensively on national 
newspapers. However, Charles Harvey, at the IPMS, had worked for regional 
newspapers in the Midlands and developed an interest in trade union communication 
through experience as an NUJ activist. His assistant at IPMS, Sarah Goodall, had 
worked in the trade press. Midge Purcell, at NATFHE, held an American degree in 
journalism, but had also worked for a number of community and campaign groups in 
the USA before coming to Britain. In contrast five of the press officers in this study 
had arrived in their current positions through promotion within trade union 
administration. John Lloyd almost fell into his position as Head of Communications at 
the EEPTU. After joining the EEPTU as a research officer in the early 1970s he got to 
know most of the industrial correspondents through his work in supporting EEPTU 
negotiating sessions. 'I used to make the tea for the industrial correspondents'. 
However, in the mid 1980s he was asked to write the official history of the 
union, 'Light and Power', and his appointment was made on the strength of that book's 
light and entertaining style. Charlotte Atkins first started as a political and research 
officer at TASS before moving into a post at UCATT which 'grew' into press and 
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media work. She took up her post at COHSE on the basis of the media experience 
acquired there. Charlie Whelan was 'spotted' whilst working as a local AEU organiser 
at Fords, Dagenham, whilst Ken Jones at NUCPS had been involved in trade union 
research throughout his career. 
The one exception to this pattern was Adrian Long at the GMB who first made his 
mark as President of the National Union of Students, then moved to a small 
communications consultancy, 'Gould Mattinson Associates' and worked closely with 
the 'shadow communications team', supporting the Labour Party's new media 
strategies. His particular brief was to support the British Labour Group in Europe 
before the European Parliamentary elections. 
Table 7. Backgrounds of Union Press Officers in the Study 
Journalism 
Eddie Barrett(T 
and G) 
Charles Harvey 
(IPMS) 
Mary Maguire 
(NALGO) 
Midge Purcell 
(NATFHE) 
Union 
Administration 
John Lloyd 
(EEPTU) 
Ken Jones 
(NUCPS) 
Charlie Whelen 
(AEU) 
Charlotte Atkins 
(COHSE) 
MrLomans 
(NUHKW) 
Adrian 
Long(GMB) 
Nell Myers (NUM) 
The difference in background and experience produced differences in emphasis and 
priority but it was notable that most of the press officers without formal training in 
journalism still shared a common modus operandi with labour correspondents. Eddie 
Barrett argued that his twenty six years experience in journalism meant that: 
'We understand what national journalists want because that's 
our background and we're in a position to angle our material 
for them Gournalists).' (35) 
Similarly, Charles Harvey (IPMS) talked of the importance of a sense for news values 
and the skills involved in writing a good news story while Mary Maguire (NALGO) 
emphasised the need for 'a professional approach', - an awareness of which stories 
'will stand up' . 
'I don'tjust release any old story because somebody wants me 
to. I will judge what is the story that's going to be used, if 
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its going to be used we go ... and ninety nine times out of one 
hundred I'm right.' (36) 
Those press officers from non-journalistic backgrounds might expand or qualify the list 
of essential attributes but not reject the common framework of shared assumptions. 
According to Adrian Long (GMB), for example, a political awareness was vitally 
important, particularly in a trade union with a national political presence close to the 
Labour Party and a significant 'political responsibility' inside the TUC. 
'It would be virtually impossible for a journalist, no matter 
how well trained, to come in and understand some of the political 
subtleties of what we're trying to do, unless they had a 
background in politics as well.' (37) 
Yet, at the same time, he added, a combination of trade union political experience and 
the 'approach and feel' of professional communicators was required ... 
' ... to cut through the way trade unions sometimes speak. Trade union 
speak is a language all of it's own, and part of our job is to make 
sure its turned into a language people understand when they're eating 
their tea in front of the telly. Some of us don't have the twenty 
years experience but what we do have are the skills to make that 
twenty years mean something'. (38) 
Not all union press officers were convinced by these sorts of arguments. Charlie 
Whelan, for example, nine months into the job, took a more irreverent view but, 
nonetheless, still embraced the dominance of mainstream news values: 
'Its easy. My old granny could do it ! I just write pieces 
as I would like to read them in the newspaper! '(39) 
There were differences in temperament and style between press officers, ranging from 
the up beat 'corporate professionalism' of Adrian Long, the iconoclastic but energetic 
and opportunistic 'shop floor' or 'union corridor wisdom' of Charlie Whelan, the 
rather dogged professionalism of Eddie Barrett, Andrew Murray and Mary McGuire, to 
the more fatalistic outlook of Ken Jones and Nell Myers. Ken Jones (NUCPS) and 
Adrian Long (GMB) provided marked contrasts in terms of time and thought invested 
in the preparation of media work. Adrian Long belonged very much to the new breed 
of union officer, drawing concepts and vocabulary from the world of commercial 
marketing and corporate communications. He identified three target audiences for 
media work,- existing GMB members, potential GMB members, and 'opinion 
formers'(political and media elites). Distinct strategies were devised to reach each of 
these groups, through particular media (one politician may be known to read a 
particular paper, for example) and all this was done in accordance with the 
communications plan drawn up on an annual basis. In contrast: 
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Interviewer: 'Are there any tricks of the trade which can be applied ?' 
Ken Jones (NUCPS): ' .... (long silence) ... not really ... other than the 
professional points ... get releases out early, don't 
issue releases on a Friday. We do all the normal 
things but we don't do the proactive bit. .. digging up 
stories which can be packaged for the press. We don't 
have much contact with the press. Normally, its just 
statements and summaries of negotiations.' ( 40) 
Ken Jones was pessimistic regarding opportunities for much more than 'damage 
limitation work' with most papers, other than, perhaps one or two of the more 
sympathetic broadsheets. He identified low pay as the key issue the NUCPS would like 
to insert into a preferred news media agenda but he added ... 
'Getting that across to the media is a thankless task. Middle 
grade civil servants are not high up most people's league tables 
of deserving causes. ' ( 41) 
While broadsheet papers might carry something, with the rest of the papers, 'you might 
as well forget it'. Too often papers simply reinforced a stereotyped image of civil 
servants as 'a privileged, parasitic group'. 
For rather different reasons, Nell Myers, of the NUM, was equally pessimistic. She 
could see no evidence of 'the public relations way of dealing with media', prevalent in 
a number of unions, 'actually protecting the interests of members, winning disputes, or 
building the strength of those unions in areas of massive exploitation'. For her, 'the 
aims, intentions, and purposes of the media are not only completely different to those 
of the NUM but often in utter contradiction and completely hostile'(42). 
Other press officers in the study recognised the political role of the news media but 
drew finer distinctions between types of media and the interests of particular groups of 
journalists. It was common to fmd union press officers apportioning blame for hostile 
coverage, not to individual correspondents but to proprietorial influence or editorial 
decision making at a higher level within news organisations. Most still believed that it 
was possible to secure successes, at least with broadcasting media and broadsheet 
papers. As one union press officer argued: 
'You haven't asked me how important public opinion is. Presumably, 
its crucial. I mean if Scargill wasn't such a crackpot the Miner's 
wouldn't have lost. Look at the ambulance workers ... public opinion 
was crucial there ... absolutely crucial ... when you've got no clout, 
its all you've got. '(43) 
Other press officers were also able to offer anecdotal evidence for the effectivity of 
media work. At the T and G, for example, Eddie Barrett recalled a dispute over the 
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sacking of a British Airways cabin crew for alleged stealing. The 'key themes',- the 
high handedness of management, the innocence of the crew, inconvenience to the 
pubic -, were identified in terms of popular news criteria and the strategy worked quite 
effectively. A large amount of publicity was generated, the crew was reinstated and 
eventually the newly appointed B. A. Director of Human Resources was sacked. Here, 
then, is an example of the way in which mainstream news values can be harnessed to 
communicate trade union themes. Only Nell Myers (NUM) appeared to take an 
uncompromising line on the issue of news criteria and union agendas. The other press 
officers in the study were all more or less engaged in a common enterprise to identify 
mainstream news pegs around which to hang themes drawn from unions' agendas or to 
defensively invoke mainstream news values in the presentation of their unions' 
positions, a technique known as 'fire fighting' and discussed further in the following 
chapter. 
Summazy 
This chapter has looked within the union organisation at the press officer's internal 
environment. It has considered the ways in which the inevitably bureaucratic nature of 
organisations which acknowledge a formal accountability to mass memberships, 
constrains the nature of press and media work, and at the techniques which press 
officers can employ to overcome such problems. Surfacing again and again throughout 
this chapter is evidence, too, of the tensions inherent in the role of trade union press 
officer. Whether they are recruited from within the ranks of the union or whether they 
are appointed on the strength of their experience in professional journalism, trade union 
press officers must 'speak for the union'; their primary function is to represent the 
perspectives and interests of their union to the outside world. There are frequent 
occasions when this function is not easily reconciled with the interests and needs of 
professional news journalists. And yet, at the same time, a majority of union press 
officers in this study acknowledged the importance of 'professionalism' and the need to 
accommodate the requirements of professional journalists. In this context, union press 
officers are required to act both as trade unionists or 'advocates' of clearly defined 
political interests and as more dispassionate 'professionals' involved in the assessment 
and dissemination of information. The tensions inherent in the role of trade union press 
officer will be explored further in the following chapter. 
The chapter has also considered the extent to which an unequal distribution of 
material resources disadvantages those 'resource poor' trade unions seeking access to 
the news media. Goldenberg's study of the attempts by 'resource poor' community 
groups to secure favourable news coverage in Boston offers a comparable approach 
(1975). Inequalities of wealth and political power do, indeed, skew the distribution of 
access to the news media but, as Goldenberg concluded, 'resource poor' groups may 
still secure some successes in the struggle to win favourable news coverage, providing 
they can mobilise particular kinds of material and symbolic resources (1975:47). 
'Contactability', according to Goldenberg, was valued by journalists and this has 
implications in terms of staffing. Credibility, too, in terms of the provision of 
information or research data in a digestible form, which journalists could rely upon and 
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'process' was also important. Above all else, the quality of relationships established 
with journalists and the extent to which these were informed by a common 
understanding of news values and the beat system, allowed such groups to make some 
headway (1975: 140-141). 
In the same way, those unions in which press officers enjoyed sufficient authority to 
respond quickly and in ways regarded as credible by journalists, were more likely to 
report successes in securing favourable coverage. Press officers who possessed 
sufficient expertise in particular areas, or who could quickly supply answers to 
inquiries by drawing upon the expertise of other departments in the union (industrial, 
research, etc), were highly valued by journalists. The absence of the 'technology of 
communication' was not, in itself, a disadvantage. What counted was the ability to 
mobilise symbolic and material resources to maximum effect and this depended more 
upon the capacity of press officers to construct their preferred themes using the 
vocabulary and symbolism of dominant news values. 
The danger of this discussion is to lose sight of the structural constraints within 
which press officers work,- political and ideological, as well as economic,- and to 
produce an account which describes the action of press officers in naively volunteristic 
terms. The following chapter begins to anticipate this danger by considering the union 
press officers' external environment and includes a section which examines the ways in 
which the best laid proactive plans may be blown off course. Subsequent chapters add 
to the description of the external environment; they describe the 'exchange' 
relationships between press officers and labour correspondents and the ways in which 
structural developments impact upon the opportunities and constraints for the actors 
involved in the production of labour and industrial news. In focusing upon the ways in 
which actors negotiate organisational impediments and develop patterns of stable 
interaction, there is always a danger that one loses sight of the 'big picture'. After all, 
as Laurie Harris of the NUR commented, good publicity has hardly improved the pay 
of nurses. Even Charlotte Atkins of COHSE conceded that while the health unions won 
the publicity battle during the ambulance dispute, the war ended in stalemate. For the 
moment, however, whilst noting the importance of the structural context, the focus will 
remain upon the activity of the actors involved in forming some of the social 
relationships which underpin news encoding. 
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Chapter Five 
Press Officers, Correspondents and the Inside Track 
The study now turns to examine the nature of the relationships which pattern the 
interaction between union press officers and their external environment. Chapter four 
suggested that it was not the possession of material resources as such, but the ways in 
which those resources could be invested to support and direct interaction between the 
representatives of source organisations and journalists which was of particular 
significance in the practice of press and media work. This chapter explores the 
relationship between union press officer and journalist in greater depth; it describes the 
nature of the 'bargain' through which many union press officers and correspondents 
direct their relations, but also begins to consider the intrusion of 'external' forces 
which disrupt and re-order such relations. 
Changing Relationships 
As chapter six describes in more detail, there was some truth in the old picture of 
labour correspondents. There certainly used to be a common pub conveniently sited 
around the corner from most leading union headquarters (perhaps two, if the union 
executive was politically split as in the case of the AEU) where labour correspondents 
and union officers would meet, drink and forge a beverage inspired esprit de corps. 
However, whatever the importance of the pub as an arena for social contact in the 
past, relationships between press officers and journalists rarely follow the pattern of 
Private Eye's Lunchtime O'Booze, today. Only Eddie Barrett of the T and G and John 
Lloyd of the EETPU appeared to invest much time in the traditional form of 
intercourse between sources and journalists. John Lloyd, only recently appointed Head 
of Communications, spent four months meeting journalists socially in order to establish 
a framework of connections. 'Only the other week', he had spent the afternoon in the 
pub with the chair of the Industrial Correspondents' Group, 'gossiping about unions 
and football'. As a former journalist Eddie Barrett still mixed socially with journalists 
and the location of the TGWU, at Smith Square, in the centre of London, allowed 
regular meetings 'around the watering holes of Westminster'. He met journalists 
'frequently socially': 
' .. .if someone calls us and asks us if anything's happening 
... we'll suggest popping around for a drink and a chat to see how 
things are going. It's not dishonest but its a way of making people 
think they are on the inside track' (1). 
The importance of making contacts think they are on 'the inside track' was one of the 
tricks of the trade employed by a number of press officers. It recognised the labour 
correspondents' appetite for 'intelligence', or information which allowed 'informed 
judgements' to be made about future developments and likely scenarios, and it 
depended upon the cultivation of a 'shared intimacy', through which off-record 
material and snippets of information could be exchanged. The nature of such 
'exchanges' and the importance of the inside track will be developed below. In the 
past, such relationships may have been cultivated around the pubs of Fleet Street and 
Westminster, or seaside hotel bars during 'conference season' . The cash registers in 
such venues may still ring with deposits made by some labour correspondents and their 
contacts within unions but much less frequently. The era of such frequent personal 
contacts has gone; in its place a new pattern of 'telephonic interaction' is now the 
norm. The irony is that as unions in recent years have taken steps to make themselves 
more accessible to journalists, through the appointment of full-time press officers, so 
changes in the nature and organisation of daily news journalism have compelled 
journalists to retreat from the networks of personal contacts which used to sustain their 
'intelligence' gathering. Of course, these patterns,- the re-location and rationalisation of 
national newspaper journalism, the increasing use of electronic information gathering, 
the changing geography correspondent's beats and the decline of particular news 
specialisms,- are not unrelated or isolated developments but more visible manifestations 
of a process of fundamental change through which commercial news organisations have 
sought to exploit new technologies and organisational structures to respond to ever 
fiercer competition in news markets. 
The history of industrial journalism; the recent decline in the fortunes of the 
Labour and Industrial Correspondents Group and recent changes in the nature of the 
labour beat are described more fully in chapters six and seven. Briefly, both media 
organisations and many trade union headquarters have re-located away from the centre 
of London. Further to this, the nature of work for national news journalists has 
changed as news organisations have sought to rationalise and improve productivity. 
Few journalists now have the time to indulge in the extended lunch breaks of previous 
decades. The result of these trends is a change in nature of relationships between 
journalists and union officers and a decline in the frequency of their face to face 
contact. Many of the most significant exchanges now take place by telephone between 
the suburbs of London and various points along the south bank of the Thames; 
between, for example, Banstead in Surrey and Battersea or Bromley in Kent and 
Blackfriars. According to Charlotte Atkins of COHSE, 'the boozy image of journalists 
is less and less true' (2). Adrian Long (GMB) argued that there had been a 
generational shift in journalistic culture; younger journalists having neither the time nor 
inclination to spend much of their working lives propping up bars (3). Both Adrian 
Long and Phi! Woolas (Head of the Communication Directorate at GMB) engaged in 
regular wining and dining of targeted journalists but this remained a highly structured 
strategy focused upon a specific goal (for example, a briefing upon a key theme) rather 
than the development of casual, unfocused pub culture. Most press officers, as Charles 
Harvey (IPMS) observed , will spend very little time in face to face contact with 
journalists. For most, the typical day to day contact will be by telephone and Fax 
machine with much less regular personal contacts at, perhaps, the union annual 
conference or a special press event to launch a campaign. For Charlie Whelan (AEU), 
it was a point of professional pride never to have to buy a journalist a drink. 
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'They have to make the effort to see you. I've never taken a 
journalist out anywhere. I'd feel slighted ifl had to go and 
buy them a drink! " ( 4). 
The diminishing numbers of industrial correspondents has accelerated the decline in 
regular personal contact. There are fewer specialists around to develop working 
relationships with. As described further in chapter eight, some newspapers, including 
Today, the Daily Star and the Sun now only have an intermittent commitment to a 
labour desk; all other papers have reduced the number of labour and industrial 
specialists. And yet, most union press officers remained quite sanguine about the long 
term prospects. Many believed decline was cyclical: 
'Interest has fallen off with the perception that unions generate 
less news but all daily papers with the exception of the Daily Star 
have at least one or two industrial correspondents. We try to play 
our part in sustaining them with stories of strikes that are 
happening and so on.' (5) 
Of course, it is in the interests of union press officers to sustain the work of industrial 
correspondents because as Charlie Whelan (AEU) says, 'there's nothing worse than 
dealing with someone who doesn't know what you're talking about'(6). The value of a 
shared frame of reference goes beyond a common knowledge of names and 
organisations. As discussed below, a mutual interest in the comings and goings in the 
world of industrial relations allows a kind of rapport to develop which helps to foster a 
mutually beneficial normative regulation. Non-specialist journalists are much less likely 
to recognise the 'rules of the game' which can regulate the relationship between union 
press officer and industrial correspondent. Union press officers have grown accustomed 
to the most hostile 'hatchet jobs' being written by non-specialist general reporters or 
feature writers (Seaton,l982:280). Journalists outside this normative framework are not 
bound by a personal and career investment in relationships with union staff. 
Which Newspapers ? 
Ericson found that the Canadian police, as news sources, distinguished between tabloid 
and broadsheet correspondents, favouring the former, but frequently excluding the 
latter from an 'inner circle' (1989B:3-4). Most trade union press officers in this study 
were more likely to be wary of admitting tabloid journalists to their 'inner circle' or 
'inside track'. Nevertheless, the approach of many was to regard the disposition of the 
right wing tabloids, almost as part of the 'natural' condition of the political-media 
environment. Journalists on these papers were, ... 
' ... just doing their job. If they're working for a right wing 
newspaper they don't want a load of left wing polemics. So if 
you' re working for the Morning Star you don't write in the same 
way as if you' re working for the Sun'. 
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(Charlie Whelan AEU)(7). 
Nevertheless, a number of press officers distinguished between papers in the way 
they dealt with enquiries whilst professing sympathy and respect for journalists in 
general. One union press office distinguished between its 'A' and 'B' service: 
'We have an A service and aB service ... the B service is what 
the Sun get. They don't contact us to confirm a story, they only 
contact us to get some kind of quote that will land the uuion in 
the shit. They're never looking for positive stories, so we 
deal with them honestly and give them anything they want, we 
send them the normal F AXes, press releases etc, but we don't 
give them anything else. I mean we don't phone the Sun industrial 
editor and say "check that - you might find something in that" '. (8) 
A number of interesting points are illustrated here. To begin with, apart form the 
differentiation between the Sun and other papers, there is the suggestion that a 
normative framework can regulate relationships between journalists and press officers. 
The Sun cannot be trusted to play by the rules of the game; quotes may be used simply 
to confirm a pre-established angle rather than to illustrate the union's perspective. The 
response to Sun enquiries, therefore, is to provide basic 'factual' information, the 
bare bones of a story (this is a 'fire-fighting technique' employed by a number of press 
officers) but not involve Sun journalists in more elaborate exchange relationships. The 
nature of such exchange relationships will be discussed below and 'fire fighting 
techniques' are analysed in a subsequent section. 
There was by no means complete unanimity amongst the press officers in this study 
regarding the trustworthiness of particular journalists or media organisations. Fairly 
widespread misgivings were expressed regarding relationships with the Sun. One press 
officer commented that she felt she always needed a witness in the room when dealing 
with Sun inquiries because of the danger of 'having words put in your mouth. '(9) And 
yet, the same press officer felt more comfortable with the tabloid Daily Mirror, where 
she believed Mirror journalists were 'on our side'. Indeed, Mirror journalists would 
make helpful suggestions about how best to construct the union perspective in tabloid 
discourse. Given this kind of collaborative atmosphere she felt comfortable in allowing 
Mirror journalists to take draughts away to be re-worked before going to press. 
Suspicion of the Sun was not universal. John Lloyd (EEPTU) said he could not 
remember 'being betrayed' by any journalists (another indication of a normative 
framework structuring relationships). All journalists respected the distinction between 
on and off record briefings, for example. Indeed, the Sun, perhaps because of the 
political position of the EETPU, gave the union more coverage than the Mirror. John 
Lloyd regarded the Mirror as a 'priority' for further work. In the Sun, by contrast, the 
EEPTU General Secretary, Eric Hammond, was presented as 'Hambo', crusading 
against left extremism.(IO) 
On the other hand, Ken Jones (NUCPS) despaired of all tabloid papers. As far as the 
Sun, Star, Mail, and Express went, 'you may as well forget it', while Today had just 
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produced five paragraphs on civil servants as privileged and parasitic, with index linked 
pensions and more holidays than anyone else. Only the F. T., Guardian, Daily 
Telegraph, and Independent ('sometimes') could be relied upon to cany a reasonable 
story without attempting to 'editorialise'(ll). Nell Myers of the NUM was reluctant to 
distinguish even between tabloid and broadsheet journalists. 
Interviewer: 'It sounds as if you don't distinguish much between media, 
types of paper, t.v. etc, ?' 
Nell Myers: 'Very little ... hardly at all. I do distinguish between some 
of the journalism of the labour movement and the capitalist 
media. I have a different feeling for Socialist Worker, 
Newsline, Worker's Press, Morning Star, those in 
particular, than I do for anybody in the capitalist media, 
press and radio ... ' .(12) 
There is a certain ambivalence in the approach of Nell Myers. On the one hand, many 
of her views suggest a model of society in which structured inequalities of wealth and 
power might be expected to very significantly constrain what a trade union press officer 
might hope to achieve. On the other hand, she was reluctant to dismiss mainstream 
journalists entirely. 
'There are certain journalists that I have come to have a certain 
regard for and a certain amount of trust in and a feeling that 
they are not going to "do" you and are going to be reasonably 
fair ... but conversely there are those for whom its just a waste 
of time speaking to; that if you get a message on the answer phone 
saying • call back" you don't bother because its just a waste of 
time ... although I try not to get into that trap because you never 
know what the query might be.' (13) 
Not surprisingly, those press officers in the study with the most pessimistic views about 
the prospects of generating 'fair' or 'positive' coverage were the ones least likely to 
recognise the value of fostering 'exchange relationships' with correspondents. 
Exchange Relationships: bargains. 'intelligence' and the Inside Track 
The suggestion that journalistic culture is based upon a set of binding consensual norms 
has been challenged in recent fieldwork (Ericson et al1987:349-50). The point has 
been made that while rules may exist, journalists frequently and routinely bend them or 
manipulate them to their advantage in the course of their relationships with news 
managerst editors, and external contacts. Similarly, the suggestion, here, is not that a 
rigid consensual system structures all relationships between press officers and 
journalists in stable and predictable ways. On the contrary, the relationships described 
by the union press officers in this study were much less structured. The normative 
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framework operated for some officers in their dealings with some journalists. 
Goldenberg, in his study of the attempts by 'resource poor groups' to secure access to 
the news media, found that only a minority of potential source-correspondent 
interactions crystallised into stable, on-going relations. Nevertheless, he describes those 
that did as centering around an implicit 'bargain' (Goldenberg, 1975: 136). Sources 
provided accurate information, exclusive material and privileged interviews and 'in 
return', journalists tried to ensure that their copy contained a faithful representation of 
source views and perspectives. If sources had opportunities to shape patterns of news 
coverage, such opportunities were generated through the capacity of news sources to 
provide 'information subsidies' (Gandy,1982). 
A similar process could be detected in much of the interaction between 
correspondents and union press officers. Accurate information, advance 'intelligence' 
or a position on the 'inside track', and access to senior officials, were the 'bargaining 
chips' which experienced press officers tried to employ in their 'exchange relations' 
with correspondents. As discussed further in the following chapters dealing with labour 
corespondents, a prominent goal for such journalists is the acquisition of information or 
'intelligence' which puts them 'ahead of the game', or provides a contextual 
understanding which permits an informed reading of events. The subcultural values and 
practices of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents Group reinforced this 
orientation; status being awarded to those journalists with a reputation for shrewd 
judgements and inside information; the 'Golden Bollock' trophy being awarded 
annually for the published copy most wildly inaccurate in its assessment of future 
developments. In return, for a position on the 'inside track', union press officers 
hoped to secure a 'fair' representation of union perspectives in the news copy 
produced. The rules regulating such exchange relationships were not explicit and rested 
upon a fragile shared intimacy which could rapidly evaporate as circumstances 
changed. At best, such rules structured the union source-journalist relationship only so 
long as it suited both parties in the relationship for interaction to be patterned in this 
way. 
However, the union press officers in this study, identified a number of expectations 
which had to be acknowledged in order to foster effective 'exchange relations'. Firstly, 
most stressed the importance of investing time in dealing with journalists. It was widely 
believed that journalists discriminated between those press officers seen as helpful, 
usually available; those willing to put effort in responding to enquiries, and those who 
appeared less willing to pull out all the stops or who were often difficult to contact. In 
this sense, it was believed that journalists related to union officers as individuals, in 
terms of personal characteristics, rather than according to their status as representatives 
of particular organisations (Chibnal1,1977:ch 6; Ericson et al,l987:350-351). 
As Midge Purcell of NATFHE expressed the point: 'You have to make sure that you 
.are as useful to them as you want them to be useful to you'(l4). This meant taking the 
trouble in Midge's case to either research the answer to a query herself or find someone 
in the NA TFHE Research Department who could. With an enormous quantity of recent 
government legislation affecting further and higher education, enquiries, particularly 
from education correspondents, could be extremely complicated and time consuming. 
In other cases, making the effort may mean making one's home number available to 
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journalists and being prepared to accept enquiries at virtually any time. Industrial 
correspondents usually avoided abusing this arrangement but there was always the 
possibility, during national disputes, of a local radio journalist ringing at 5am in 
preparation for the breakfast news (15). 
Another obligation for press officers was to ensure that they were worth phoning. In 
other words, they had to ensure that journalists regarded them as authoritative and 
credible. They had to be seen as 'speaking for ' the union and had to be recognised as 
being sufficiently close to the centre of decision making within the organisation to be in 
possession of reliable, if not 'inside' information. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the nature of the internal culture of a union and the position of the press 
officer in relation to the senior officers and the national executive were of considerable 
importance here. Credibility had to be earnt. John Lloyd (EEPTU) spent three months, 
as we have seen, establishing his credentials with industrial correspondents, even 
though as a researcher he was already known to a number. Charlie Whelan, on the 
other hand, enjoyed an immediate credibility because he had worked for one of the 
senior figures in the AEU before assuming responsibility for media work. 'They 
[journalists] knew I knew what I was talking about' (16). 
If the framework for exchange relationships between union officers and journalists 
rests upon a fostering of individual contacts, then a great deal depends upon the nature 
of the approach employed by press officers. Most press officers in this study believed 
that it was important to avoid identifying journalists, even those working for right wing 
tabloids, as agents of hostile forces. 
'It takes an awful lot of hard work and not treating journalists 
like your enemies. Treat someone like your enemy and they'll be 
your enemy' (17). 
The union press officers in this study were inclined to believe that labour 
correspondents held a personal sympathy for trade unionism. Why else, Laurie Harris 
(NUR) asked, would they choose to specialise in industrial relations? If this was the 
case, the best strategy was 'to be willing to make yourself available, talk to them 
[journalists], be as open as you can,- I don't think we ever said "no comment" [during 
the 1989 rail dispute] (18). During the rail dispute, Laurie Harris worked 16 to 17 
hours each day in the office and took a further three or four calls at home during the 
evening and at night. The key was to ensure that the NUR always had a reputation for 
accessibility and a friendly response. 
There is a more explicit recognition of the normative framework in certain 
circumstances. The distinction between on and off the record briefings was 
acknowledged as one the rules of the game, generally accepted by both sides in the 
relationship. Similarly, most press officers respected the principle of 'exclusivity' and 
recognised the importance for journalists in protecting 'exclusives' before publication. 
For example, details of the spending cuts and job losses at Guys and Lewisham 
Hospital, were leaked to the Daily Mirror. The Mirror then contacted COHSE for 
confirmation and comment on what, in the light of the political controversy over the 
Government's NHS reforms, was a very important 'exclusive'. Although the 
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temptation was to circulate the information to other news organisations in order to 
maximise the political impact, Charlotte Atkins 'sat' on the story in recognition of the 
importance of 'exclusives' for news organisations in a very competitive sector. 
'I thought Mirror exclusive ... I won't break that exclusive 
... and then ten minutes later I was rung by the Telegraph. 
I thought, "Right, its not an exclusive" and then 
immediately put out a press release to the P.A. [Press 
Association] and rang Robin Cook's office. It was obviously 
a massively big story. '(24) 
This suggests that the norms governing 'exclusivity', at least, can exercise quite a 
powerful restraint. The Guy's story had tremendous propaganda value for COHSE and 
yet, Charlotte Atkins held back until she was 'honourably' released from her obligation 
to the Mirror, with evidence from the Telegraph that exclusivity had evaporated. 
Why should both press officers and journalists accept such a normative framework, 
however fragile, when it can act as an inconvenient impediment in situations which 
demand rapid responses? Presumably, because on balance the advantages out-weigh the 
inconvenience. Indeed, some press officers are in a position to exploit the principle of 
'exclusivity' in ways which allow them to insert particular themes in particular news 
media texts. At the heart of the 'bargain' between union press officer and 
correspondents is the idea of information or intelligence as a 'coin of exchange' which, 
in turn, implies the possibility of 'credit'. Press officers sometimes have in their 
possession information which is either not of direct relevance to the message the union 
is seeking to communicate or sometimes actually damaging to the image of the union. 
Assuming the information is not deeply discrediting, some press officers are in a 
position to make fine calculations about the 'value' of such information to journalists 
and the 'price' they can extract. The 'price', of course, is the inclusion in the 
journalist's report of other themes that the press officer has either targeted for a 
particular news text or wishes to publicise widely. Alternatively, the 'value' of such 
information may be 'banked' as 'credit' for use at a later date. For example, during my 
visit to one large union headquarters the union press officer offered a story concerning 
the number of resolutions from Scottish branches calling for the union to re-affiliate to 
the TUC, to The Scotsman. Evidence of quite significant dissent from the leadership's 
official line might be regarded as an embarrassment not to be highlighted by the 
union's own publicity machine. However, the press officer believed that in practice it 
would do little damage 'as everyone knows Scots branches are calling for re-
affiliation'. The story was 'a sweetener' which would help to consolidate his standing 
with some important journalists (25). 
It would be wrong to overstate the case. Some press officers engage in more or less 
explicit horse trading but others do not. Some have developed relationships with 
journalists which are based only upon a vaguer and more generalised sense of co-
operation and mutual obligation. Some press officers have not 'fine tuned' their media 
strategies to the point where they seek to target particular news outlets and, as we have 
seen, some hold much more pessimistic views about the value of media work and, 
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therefore, are much less likely to make proactive interventions of any kind. However, 
where press officers are encouraged to develop sophisticated media strategies, involving 
targeting and proactive intervention, the trading value of information is frequently 
exploited. Given the importance attached to media work at the GMB, it is not 
surprising that the union's officers responsible for communications are actively 
involved in such bargaining on a routine basis. 
Interviewer: 'Do you target particular information for particular 
journalists?' 
Adrian Long: 'Yes absolutely and all the time ... you actually get 
involved at times in a process of horse trading. I very 
desperately wanted a certain story placed in a certain 
newspaper about three weeks ago ... that is where it had 
to be, to be read by the people we wanted to influence. I 
mean it was a good story anyway so the paper would have 
taken it but I wanted to make sure that only that person 
[a certain journalist] got it, so in order to convince 
that person that they were getting something that was 
important to them, we provided additional information from 
other areas as well ... and we serviced that story very, 
very thoroughly. Now the unwritten rule is that that 
person will help me with other stories as well.' (26) 
The GMB may be an exception. No other union in this study had developed such 
finely tuned targeting with distinct strategies for reaching members, potential members 
or 'opinion leaders' amongst political elite groups. However, this example does 
illustrate the potential advantages of such normatively regulated, exchange 
relationships. Of course, practical difficulties sometimes intrude. Charles Harvey 
(IPMS), for example, obtained 'leaked' information concerning the closure of the naval 
dockyard at Davenport with a significant loss of jobs. As with the item about spending 
cuts at Guy's Hospital, this information was of considerable political significance and 
likely to generate widespread interest amongst the national papers. However, Charles 
Harvey decided to offer an 'exclusive' to a contact on the Financial Times because this 
would help to consolidate a particularly valuable relationship. The F.T. was one of the 
few national papers likely to take a consistent interest in IPMS issues. As the union 
annual conference was under way, the journalist from the F. T. was invited to spend a 
day at the union's hotel and a special room was booked with lunch and additional 
facilities. On the appointed day, however, Rolls Royce announced that it was sacking 
and re-hiring, on inferior terms, its entire workforce and every industrial correspondent 
in the country was diverted to Derby (27). This illustrates an important theme to be 
developed below,- the vulnerability of the efforts of union press officers to the impact 
of counter forces, quite beyond their control. Nevertheless, it also confirms the point 
that exchange relationships were not the prerogative of the large unions alone. Even Mr 
Lomans of the NUHKW sometimes 'let certain journalists know that something was 
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about to happen', though being regionally based and almost permanently threatened by 
the contraction of the textile industry, there were limitations regarding the energy of the 
union's media work. 
Exchange Relationships and the Balance of Power 
The existence of a loosely structured normative framework, regulating interaction 
between press officers and correspondents does not, of course, imply equality between 
parties in the exchange. There are several reasons why journalists may be placed in a 
position of advantage but, nevertheless, while all sorts of factors may stack the cards 
against union officers, an exchange relationship implies at least some bargaining 
power, albeit on an unequal basis. Mary MaGuire (NALGO) recalls ringing to 
complain about an item to fmd the journalist concerned, equally annoyed that his story 
had been 'subbed' at the Sunday Times because ... 
'they're professionals and it damages their relationship with 
the unions. If their stories appear constantly distorted, they 
won't get anything else from the unions .. .It is a sanction I 
could use and its a sanction I would use if I thought a story 
was deliberately distorted by a journalist ... 
a story that was really bad. [ The ultimate deterrent?] Yeah ... ' (28) 
There is, then, a complex relationship in which each side has rights and obligations. 
Journalists are aware of the 'dangers' of producing overtly biased copy and, indeed, 
this would transgress their own professional norms (this may apply less to journalists 
working for some popular papers). Equally, press officers are 'expected' to recognise 
the needs of journalists; the news criteria for 'good copy', the rights of exclusivity, the 
routines of the news organisation, and so on. 
As discussed in chapter one, the picture of source-journalist relations, provided in 
academic accounts, has been modified slightly over recent years. Although Tunstall 
believed that correspondents in specialisms without immediate revenue or advertising 
goal implications, enjoyed greater opportunities to play one source contact off against 
another (1971), subsequent accounts rooted in a variety of perspectives over the last 
two decades have portrayed a picture of official source dominance, ranging from the 
model of primary definers (Hall et al, 1978), through accounts of explicit news 
management (Cockerell et al,1985) to analysis of the process of 'exchange, dependence 
and assimilation' ( Chibnall, 1977: 225). All these accounts suggest that on most 
occasions, official sources are able to exploit their control over information flows, the 
legitimacy and authority associated with institutional and state power, and the pressures 
of the various news beats, to secure the upper hand in their dealings with journalists. 
By implication, non-official and resource-poor sources are at a disadvantage in their 
dealings with journalists because they possess less legitimacy and are unlikely to be 
able to exercise control over information flows. However, as the focus has shifted 
towards non-official sources in recent years the picture has grown more complex 
(Goldenberg,1975; Schlesinger et al,1991; Anderson,1993). Anderson, for example, 
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shows that while non-official sources usually do face an up-hill battle against the 
scepticism of correspondents and the legitimacy of official sources, there are particular 
circumstances in which opportunities arise for non-official environmental sources to 
make the running (strong public opinion, a news vacuum caused by the slowness of 
official sources to react to events, etc.). Similar points have emerged from studies of 
the origins of the 'poverty lobby' (Whitely and Winyard, 1983; McCarthy, 1986). At the 
same time, recent work underlines the point that despite all the advantages official 
sources enjoy, in certain circumstances, they may be deflected from their media 
objectives, particularly if the messages of the powerful reflect discord at the top, or if 
non-official 'advocates' are mistaken for more dispassionate 'arbiters' by journalists 
(Deacon and Golding,l994). 
A complex picture is presented, then, in which the structural and institutional 
advantages of official sources, the inferential assumptions and organisational practices 
of journalists, and the resource weaknesses of non-official sources, are all likely to 
disadvantage the representatives of non-official organisations in their dealings with 
journalists and yet, these pressures are not wholly determinate. There are opportunities 
and 'spaces'; circumstances in which non-official sources can open up access. Seaton, 
in her account of the relationship between unions and the news media believed that 
unions had 'some real sanctions over journalists'; there was a 'similarity with political 
reporting' because unions could afford to refuse to talk to particular journalists, 'they 
can talk to his rivals' (Seaton,1982:278). Of course, Seaton made her observations in 
an era very different to the contemporary scene, a period in which labour journalism 
was riding high and there was a pronounced appetite within news organisations for 
labour and industrial copy. And yet, even then, as chapters seven and eight 
demonstrate, it is doubtful if the relationship between union officials and labour 
correspondents was comparable to the practice of the Westminster Lobby. Certainly, 
since then, the balance of power has shifted further away from union sources. 
In general, the determinants of the balance of power between union press officers 
and correspondents can be described in the following terms, whilst recognising that a 
great deal depends upon specific circumstances (the nature of the news story in 
question, the nature of union and its previous newsworthiness, etc): 
(a) Labour and industrial correspondents still need 'intelligence'. Their ability to assess 
developments and produce copy characterised by 'informed judgements'; their ability to 
acquire 'expertise' which is recognised within their organisations and which, therefore, 
strengthens their own security and organisational standing, depends partly upon what 
they can acquire from union sources. A 'good' union press officer will try to ensure 
that labour correspondents come to use them in these terms. The offer of a position on 
the 'inside track' is probably the best 'bargaining chip', a contemporary union press 
officer has. 
(b) However, two forces are likely to undermine and constrain the cashing in, even of 
this modest advantage. Firstly, most union organisations are characterised by 'porosity' 
(Ericson,1989:214); that is information 'leaks' from a variety of sources within the 
organisation (the national executive, senior officials with their own agendas, etc) and 
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this means that journalists, particularly the older and more experienced labour 
correspondents, have the opportunity to by-pass union press officers and employ 
alternative contacts to maintain information flows. This underlines the importance, 
from the union press officer's point of view, of securing their own position on the 
'inside track', with access to executive meetings and through being privy to the mind of 
the general secretary. 
(c) Secondly, the knowledge associated with each branch of journalism has a 'market 
value', determined by the current dominant editorial strategies of news organisations. 
As chapters six and seven describe, the fortunes of industrial and labour reporting are 
on the wane. All daily newspapers have cut back the number of staff assigned to the 
industrial desk; there is less space allocated to labour and industrial copy, and more 
former labour specialists now find themselves having to widen their briefs to include, 
for example, employment and personnel matters, the regulation of public utilities, or 
even matters wholly unrelated to labour relations. Union press officers now fmd that 
their 'bargaining chip' is worth less in the market place. Journalists may want to write 
about union stories but they are no longer routinely required to by their news 
organisations. 
Recognising these constraints, what techniques are available for union press officers 
when they seek to 'cash' in their bargaining chips? 
Tricks of the Trade 
Textbook accounts of public relations rehearse a number of familiar points about news 
deadlines, the writing of press releases and the organisation of press conferences 
(Macshane,1979; Jefkins,l988,etc). While these details of the mechanics of public 
relations are not to be dismissed, an adequate analysis has to recognise the importance 
of the social practices which sustain public relations work. The fieldwork in this study 
suggests that the quality of social relationships between press officers and journalists 
and the resources (particularly human) devoted by unions to media work are likely to 
be more decisive. Indeed, some 'street knowledge' of current developments in the 
relationship between media and unions and knowledge of the political context (inside 
and outside trade unions) is as important as a textbook understanding of press release 
design. Although some public relations consultancies like to measure 'output' in terms 
of press releases distributed, a parsimonious use of press releases is the mark of an 
experienced press officer. 
'Some of the other unions are sending out two or three 
press releases a day. I never send out more than one a week because 
I want them Uournalists] to think, "Ah this is the AEU, this 
will be important, we'll do something here." Charlie Whelan (29) 
Charles Harvey (IPMS) imposed a limit of two per week. Mary Maguire (NALGO) 
issued press releases only 'infrequently'. It was agreed amongst most union press 
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officers that the value of press releases was quickly eroded. However, they faced a 
dilemma. Unions operate in increasingly competitive environments. Given the 
importance of maintaining the 'value' of press releases, press officers sometimes chose 
to 'sit' on certain stories rather than release them. And yet, this ran the risk of allowing 
a competitor to break the story first and secure the publicity value for another trade 
union. Charles Harvey (IPMS) 'held back' on a story regarding job cuts at British 
Nuclear Fuels only to find 'the story breaking from under me' and aT and G official 
with a high media profile, appearing on television. 
Most of the union officers interviewed regarded personal contact with journalists as 
much more important than press releases alone. The important work was done over the 
telephone. NALGO, for example, never issued press releases to the fourteen hundred 
addresses on its mailing list for routine announcements (executive elections, a planned 
event, annual conferences, etc). For important issues, particularly if the union found 
itself having to react quickly to a story which had emerged from another source: 
' ... we may just phone them [journalists] up because we have a very 
good relationship with the Labour Group but even if we FAX we will 
phone them up as well and say it is on its way.' Mary McGuire (30) 
Follow a Fax release with a call, recommended John Lloyd (EETPU), " 'Did you see 
the press release today about such and such ... ?"(31). 
'The media have their own agenda,- a lot of the things we do are 
not automatically stories. You have to make them come alive and 
you just can't do that by Faxing someone a press release. You 
have to contact them by phone.' Adrian Long (32) 
The 1984/85 Coal Strike provides a striking illustration of the same point. Nell Myers 
(NUM) attempted to match the vastly superior resources at the command of the Coal 
Board (for example, a team of over twenty press officers) through sheer hard work: 
'NCB had far greater human resources but we put out far more 
press releases and press conferences than they did and it 
just never got the coverage.' (33) 
According to Nell Myers, there was a reluctance on the part of the news media 
generally to represent the NUM case in anything but a critical light. Referring to the 
evidence supplied in 'Media Hits the Pits' (Jones,D, 1986) she argued: 
'The received wisdom was always that of the NCB. The disputed argu-
ments were always those of the NUM' .(34) 
The inferential frameworks employed by journalists, the perspectives developed at a 
senior editorial level inside news organisations and, indeed, the exercise of political 
power through interconnections between the political elite and those controlling news 
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organisations, all played a part in shaping the nature of coverage during the Coal 
Strike. However, part of the explanation for the absence of a robust NUM perspective 
in much of the reporting may also lie in the nature of the social practices underpinning 
the relationship between the NUM and news organisations. Nell Myers lacked the 
human resources necessary to follow up the issuing of press releases with personal 
contacts. The frequent issuing of press releases alone was unlikely to help the union's 
cause, particularly as Nell Myers took an uncompromising position in relation to 
dominant news values and news media rhythms. Information was not organised in 
terms of 'news frames'. As described in chapter seven, tensions between the union and 
journalists, including labour correspondents, were exacerbated by the NUM' s 
reluctance to acknowledge the normative framework which loosely regulated much of 
the interaction between journalists and other union press officers. 
Of course, the 'big picture', the nature of control within news organisations and the 
relations which sensitised news organisations to promptings emanating from 
government and the political elite, cannot be ignored. Would a more pragmatic news 
media strategy, directed towards the national labour correspondents, rather than 
exclusively dependent upon the media skills of the President, have made any 
difference? One feature of the media experience of the strike was the frequency with 
which labour and industrial correspondents found their copy altered and sometimes 
transformed, after it was submitted (Jones,N, 1986). To weigh these factors, on the one 
hand, and the refusal of the NUM to acknowledge the 'exchange relationships' 
patterning union-correspondent interaction, on the other, is an impossible task. Put at 
its simplest, the goodwill which clearly did exist amongst a number of labour 
correspondents, was not utilised by the NUM and, it seems likely, that as a 
consequence of this at least some opportunities to present an NUM perspective were 
lost. 
The same conclusions can be drawn about the other elements which make up the 
formal mechanics of public relations. Just as union officers preferred telephonic or 
personal contact, to the press release, so few relied very heavily upon press 
conferences. The T and G Press Office held one formal briefing each week on the 
business of the Executive Council, but for most unions, press conferences were used 
sparingly. With the highly regarded Civil Service restaurant a floor above, the IPMS 
Communications Department sometimes used it as a venue for press briefings, in the 
confidence that these would be well attended; other unions, including NALGO, 
NATFHE and the EETPU sometimes used press conferences and drinks parties as 
forums to promote new initiatives and occasionally, new general secretaries. During the 
field work for this study, the TGWU Press Office invested a considerable amount of 
time in setting up a series of regional press conferences to launch the agricultural sector 
pay claill'i. On the whole, however, much of the work of union press officers was 
either reactive or opportunistic and in each case a swift initiative was likely to be most 
effective. Much of the most important work was simply done on the telephone through 
networks of 'telecommunal' contacts. When asked if he ever used press conferences, 
Charlie Whelan (AEU) simply answered emphatically 'No!'. The time and effort 
necessary to be invested in setting up a formal media conference was unlikely to yield a 
commensurate return in comparison to informal contacts. 
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The argument in this section has been to suggest that the textbook descriptions of 
the mechanics of public relations do not accurately capture the reality of the social 
practices which underpin the work of the press officers in this study. So what are the 
elements of such social practices and how do they relate to the circumstances of 
particular unions with specific resources and concerns? Many media interventions 
discussed by the press officers in this study were the result of a 'media street wisdom' 
and opportunism demonstrated by some officers but not all. The style of Charlie 
Whelan (AEU) loitering by the P.A. monitor, mid-morning when 'good stories usually 
break', ready to intervene to inject an AEU perspective, has already been noted. 
Several other press officers employed similar techniques designed to 'attach' a union 
message to already emerging stories. Charlotte Atkins (COHSE) gave the example of 
by-election coverage. There are usually possibilities to be exploited around the issue of 
local health services. Cuts made by the local area health authority were strongly 
highlighted during one recent by-election. At the Monmouth ( 1990) by-election, a 
simple FAX release to the Welsh regional papers triggered 'an instant response. . . as 
soon as the FAX machine sent it off, the phone started ringing, I thought, "goodness 
I'd forgotten what issuing a regional PR. was like" (35). Similarly, unions like the T 
and G and NALGO or even smaller unions like the NUCPS will try to ensure a union 
view is included in coverage of accidents, disasters and other sudden news events. 
Two important points are worth emphasising here. Firstly, 'effective' opportunistic 
press and media work is a product of the combination of particular material resources 
(i.e. a Press Association monitor) and sufficient human resources. Press officers need 
the time and space to think opportunistically. Secondly, an opportunistic strategy also 
implies an understanding of, even a sympathy with, mainstream news values and 
selection criteria. The art is to weave a union perspective within the structure of a story 
which stands the test of a critical news editor. 
Sometimes a news peg has to be found around which a union theme can be hung. 
This, in turn, may take considerable time and effort. Charlotte Atkins, for example, 
spent hours searching through coroners' reports in order to find a particular example to 
illustrate a general point concerning the dangers of low staffing levels in hospitals (36). 
Similarly, Mary Maguire knew that news journalists would only be interested in the 
issue of sick building syndrome if they were supplied with case studies of individuals 
to enhance the 'human interest' dimension, preferably linked to forthcoming events 
(tribunal hearings, etc). The deployment of resources can be of major importance here, 
too. Charlie Whelan at the AEU used the resources of a large union to, in effect, buy 
access to the news encoding process. The union would commission large monthly 
surveys of employment trends in the engineering sector. While the data was of value in 
its own ri'ght, the survey also provided a news peg around which an AEU perspective 
on unemployment was hung. Charlie Whelan released details of the monthly survey to 
coincide with the publication of the Department of Employment's own figures to ensure 
maximum news value. This tactic has worked well producing AEU coverage on radio 
and television, as well as in national newspapers. On a smaller scale the NUHKW 
employed the same approach in commissioning a survey of job losses in the East 
Midlands textile industry twice each year. Results were released to the local media and 
usually generated local television interest, as well as regional press coverage. A 
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similar, though much cheaper, tactic was used by other unions to open up news 
opportunities. Charles Harvey (IPMS), for example, released 'open letters', in the 
name of the general secretary, to the government as the employer of civil servants, 
which provided a news peg around which IPMS perspectives could be hung. The 
NUHKW organised regular visits to Parliament with invitations to local M.P.s to 
accompany the party. Local journalists were provided with all the necessary ingredients 
for a useful story,- a news event involving local personalities and the opportunity to 
talk to 'ordinary' union members for 'the human angle.' Money cannot always be used 
to 'buy' access to the news encoding process. One union press officer persuaded his 
executive to donate £5,000 to Russian miners suffering hardship, hoping that the 
contrast between the generosity of the members and the absence of any donation from 
Arthur Scargill or the NUM would interest journalists. Surprisingly, no paper accepted 
the bait, not even the Daily Mirror which had become 'obsessed' with the alleged 
financial irregularities of the NUM (37). 
Given the rich rewards of regional media work, COHSE shifted the emphasis away 
from traditional union campaigning towards regional events designed as much for the 
photo-opportunity as a means of fostering solidarity: 
'we want to go beyond picket lines, we want to go for visual 
events, balloons, children ... not the traditional image of 
trade unions ... double decker buses, jazz bands. In resource 
terms this is much more effective than a march in London 
where you need coaches, time off work. .. a major lobby of the 
House of Commons costs us money!' (38) 
The Importance of Being There 
'We know that the press may well go for us because of the 
image of our members as being town hall, tea swilling 
bureaucrats. Before we get to the stage of anything being 
written in the papers, we start the process ... We write 
articles in the specialist journals, encourage branches to 
write letters to the local papers, we draft a special press 
release with instructions on how to adapt it for local use 
and to make sure local branches have someone available 
for interview, we encourage them to contact their local M.P. 's. 
We start right from the beginning not in an aggressive way 
but in a proactive way but we try to make sure that we get 
our point of view across very quickly and it works ... it 
worked in the local government dispute last year and it 
worked in the ambulance dispute'. (Mary Maguire NALGO) (39) 
While there may be disagreements over the issue of proactivity, there was widespread 
agreement amongst the press officers in this study that the essential elements of good 
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practice were 'professionalism' and 'efficiency'. In short, being available for 
journalists to contact and having something to say right from the outset. Having a clear 
message and anticipating what 'snags' might arise in terms of the ways in which events 
may be presented follow from these: 
'So the key to it is professionalism and being there right at the 
beginning, knowing what you want to say and knowing what snags 
you may face ... what questions journalists may ask, the things the 
Sun may write about, etc.' (Mary Maguire) (40). 
Here, again, the importance of the position of the press officer within the union 
organisation is illustrated. Press officers need to know what is going on and have the 
authority to respond quickly. The ability to translate, often complex arguments, into 
'newspaper speak' (Charlotte Atkins) quickly was an essential skill. 
J oumalists were like! y to turn first to those they believed could be relied upon to 
have information or the raw materials of a story readily available. During the 1989 rail 
dispute Laurie Harris worked 16 to 17 hours each day and still made himself available 
for three or four media enquiries at home. The health unions found similar hours were 
necessary at the height of the ambulance and nursing disputes as well. By contrast, 
while not working to rigid office hours, Nell Myers was inevitably less available to 
journalists because she combined media work with many other duties as a personal 
assistant to the President and Secretary and because she had to commute between the 
re-located head office of the NUM in Sheffield and her own home in East London. The 
federal and de-centralised nature of the NUM compounded these difficulties because 
the NUM headquarters depended upon information being relayed from each NUM area. 
Fire fighting: techniques of damage limitation 
According to Eddie Barrett, 'fire fighting' as distinct from simply reactive media work, 
arises when there is simply nothing good, from a union perspective, in an emerging 
story (41). Perhaps the first rule of 'fire fighting' is, 'never say "no comment"'. 
Otherwise, said Mr Lomans of the NUHKW, 'you are letting your own members 
down'. 'No comment' simply shows 'you've got something to hide', remarked Adrian 
Long (GMB). Journalists regard as legitimate the expectation that they will be given 
'something'. Here, then, is another illustration of the importance of the normative 
framework regulating source journalist interaction. Just as 'being there' is an essential 
attribute, so having some kind of comment is equally fundamental to achieving a 
reputation as a 'good press officer', amongst correspondents. 
However, there is more to 'fire fighting' than this. Adrian Long (GMB) provided a 
detailed list of 'do's and don'ts'. Be sure of one's case and 'get on top of the facts', as 
quickly as possible. Once one has a full picture of the events involved in a story, 
'move swiftly' to deal with media enquiries. At the same time, never saying 'no 
comment' does not necessarily mean full disclosure: 
'Sometimes one needs not to ignore the national papers but 
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just give them the barest of facts ... ! mean give them every 
thing they need but not worry that you're not going to convince 
them. What we've often found is that you can by-pass the national 
media and go straight to the local or regional media. People 
often take their information about disputes from the locals.' 
Find one theme that makes common-sense, one common denominator 
and repeat it and repeat it and repeat it. You have worked 
out your line. No matter what attempts are made to deflect you, 
you just keep repeating it. Now some of that just comes down 
to personal motivation and stubbornness. You have to be consistent.' 
We prefer even in a difficult situation to try and strike back 
and if necessary try to change the agenda.' ( 42) 
During the course of the field work, a number of press officers referred to examples of 
fire fighting which provide interesting 'case studies'. How are the principles listed by 
Adrian Long applied in practice? Perhaps one of the most potentially damaging stories 
for a union's public standing to emerge in recent years was concerned with the 
evidence of ballot rigging during the election for a new general secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union in 1990. The evidence of ballot rigging was 
known to the Executive of the T and G two days before the result was due to be 
announced. This gave Eddie Barrett two days to plan with the general secretary a 
strategy for handling the news media. Rather than attempt to suppress the information, 
a probably impossible exercise given the 'porosity' of the TGWU, the first step was to 
give 'a selective press briefing' to about 15 journalists 'who felt they were on the inside 
track' (thus, implicitly, seeking to exploit the relationships of exchange between press 
officers and journalists). The 'line' stressed was that evidence had come to light but 
that the union intended to take every possible measure to deal with it rather than 
conceal it. According to Eddie Barrett, 'this held for about two weeks' (43). However, 
the 'porosity' of the TGWU, a union with distinct political factions, meant that the 
TGWU Press Office was unable to maintain effective control over the supply of 
information, flowing from inside the organisation. 
'Then you got all sorts of outsiders digging around and 
insiders trying to score political points [by leaking 
information]' (44). 
In other media contexts, the persona of Ron Todd, a gruff East Ender with a 
predilection for the bureaucratic discourse of traditional unionism and a lack of media 
fluency, might work to the disadvantage of the union. However, in a situation where 
the union presented itself as 'coming clean with the public', these personal qualities 
could be utilised in the construction of 'Honest Ron', unsophisticated but straight 
forward and trustworthy. 
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'The overall impression we gave was that "Honest Ron" oos 
in charge and that helped. "It's a terrible thing but we're going to 
sort it out" was the message. '(45). 
NALGO often found itself in the firing line because of the nature of the occupations it 
organised. Social workers, in particular, have been a 'target' for media concern 
(Franklin and Parton,1991). 
'Three years ago we had screaming headlines about social workers. 
Now we've had three court cases this year where I've held a press 
conference on the day the findings are announced, along with our 
Social Services Officer and I've taken the press conference, briefed 
the journalists and put out a press release emphasising the 
problems, the shortages of social workers, etc, and each time we've 
had very sympathetic coverage and the tables seem to be turning 
now but that process has taken a very long time and the tables are 
only just turning. Journalists from the nationals, even the Sun 
don't automatically say it's the social workers fault now but they 
phone up and ask what the problems may be. Which is an enormous 
battle but it's half way won now,- where people are prepared to phone 
up and discuss what the problems are.' (Mary Maguire) (46). 
Perhaps, an acid test for such strategies was provided when the Sun obtained a copy of 
a leaflet published by NALGO as part of its campaign for lesbian and gay rights at 
work The leaflet had a satirical tone with headings such as 'What to do if you meet a 
lesbian?' It might not be anticipated that coverage in the Sun would be sensitive to the 
use of subtle irony. Mary Magure confirmed 'with sinking heart' to a Sun reporter that 
it was true but: 
'The piece was quite good for the Sun! they didn't say "Loony left 
NALGO" .. .it wasn't bad ... three years ago it would have been awful. 
We have a lot of these damage limitation exercises. There was an 
example the other week, the Sun got hold of a story and we managed 
to keep NALGO's name out of it. '(47) 
Through sheer persistence, stressing key themes repeatedly, Mary McGuire was at least 
able to influence the inferential framework with which Sun journalists approached 
'NALGO' stories sufficiently, to produce a hesitation in the 'construction' of events,- a 
recognition that a union perspective might be worth investigating. The problem was to 
ensure that this kind of discipline was maintained at a local level: 
'It is absolutely vital that if someone wants a comment from NALGO 
NALGO is available. This is what I stress to our branches. Frequently 
they issue a press release but then there's no one there to 
comment.' ( 48) 
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The media work of the local branches is sometimes regarded by the national press 
officers as their Achilles heel. Mary Maguire recalled a damaging story about Croydon 
social workers appearing in the Sunday Times. The item drew the readers attention to 
the fact that NALGO had refused to speak to the newspaper. 
'The branch phoned me up saying they wanted to make a complaint to 
the Press Council and I said you haven't got a cat in hell's 
chance because you refused to speak to them and they refused to 
speak to them because it was a Murdock paper. O.K. that's very 
fine, very principled but you' re missing out on your chance to 
put your point of view ... so that's the key to it.' ( 49) 
A classic example of the dilemmas facing the ideologically marginalised; whether to 
remain in the wilderness without a voice or to compromise one's message for the 
chance to speak. This is a theme to which the chapter returns as the concept of 
incorporation is placed in the foreground. The response of the NUM when faced with 
the threat of a potentially discrediting story proves an interesting contrast. Five years 
after the Coal Strike ended, the Daily Mirror published a series of articles alleging the 
mis-appropriation of union funds by the senior officials, Arthur Scargill and Peter 
Heathfield: 
'Damage limitation doesn't come into it. All you can do is 
respond with the truth. It was something we had never 
experienced before, even during the strike .. .it was so awful 
for Arthur and Peter because it began with an allegation of 
personal corruption but it was the one thing guaranteed 
to shock them- anything else, money from Libya, money from 
the USSR,- you can count them and they have, indeed, dispelled 
all those stories, but the accusation of personal corruption, 
taking money meant for the union or for families facing hardship 
was something they didn't expect. It was the one thing they 
never expected and so there was nothing in our experience to 
help us deal with it.' (50) 
Rather like the T and G during the ballot rigging allegations, the first response of the 
NUM was to try to establish that the issue was being dealt with. It was for this reason 
that the NUM executive commissioned an external inquiry. However, with the 
publication of its findings the NUM, once again , was the subject of intense news 
media intere~t. At this point, the strategy adopted was in marked contrast to the 
TGWU Press Office. The NUM directed its communication campaign inwards: 
'Following the report Arthur and Peter had two choices. The first was 
to see if the whole thing blew itself out. The other was to go 
on the road and campaign within (my italics) the union 
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to tackle everything the report alleged and that is what between 
the end of July and September they did. They just went on the road 
going anywhere and wherever they were invited, speaking to anybody 
holding a meeting. '(51) 
(Nell Myers NUM) 
Given the nature of the relationship between much of the news media and the union, a 
strategy directed inwards to secure the continuing support of members rather than one 
directed outwards at external target audiences was understandable. It was characteristic 
of the union that the immediate response was a concern for the health of the 
relationship between leadership and rank and file, rather than its public standing as 
constructed through the news media. 
Presenting Industrial Action 
Press officers cannot always determine when disputes become the subject of media 
interest. The work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976; 1980) has 
demonstrated that the news media present a far from comprehensive account of 
industrial disputes. Certain occupational sectors with established news value receive 
disproportionate coverage while other areas are ignored entirely. Some press officers 
are quite happy to be ignored in this context. John Lloyd of the EEPTU, for example, 
cheerfully pointed out that the EEPTU was involved in anything up to twenty disputes 
at one time but these rarely received publicity and given the union's desire to woo new 
employers and unorganised sectors, he was quite content to leave it that way ( the 
content analysis of journal content revealed very few items concerning strikes or 
disputes in the EEPTU's 'Contact'). Only in certain sectors where it was advantageous, 
did the union seek to publicise disputes. In the electrical supply sector, for example, 
tradition and history made a little sabre rattling appropriate in order to encourage the 
employers to talk, and help recruitment ( the union being seen to back members). In 
other areas, however, news of disputes would reinforce stereotyped ideas about trade 
unions in the eyes of employers and employees that the union desired to 'reach' for 
marketing purposes (52). 
John Lloyd followed much the same principles as applied by other press officers. 
Never say 'no comment' and ensure a clear and brief short summary of the union case 
was available. In certain circumstances this simply involved fending off awkward 
questioning. For example, the EEPTU was put under intense media pressure to clarify 
what 'substantial' actually meant in its 1990/91 pay claim. John Lloyd had to convince 
officials that the union response had to be more than 'no comment', although the 
issuing of precise information was likely to severely weaken the union's bargaining 
position. The trick was to release a press statement which supplied sufficient 'working 
material' for journalists without a specific figure for the claim. 
On other occasions the press officer may be required to justify the use of industrial 
action and to deflect potential media criticism. According to Mary Maguire, the key is 
to anticipate the nature of the coverage and to plan ahead. Echoing Adrian Long's point 
regarding the importance of speed, she believed that the union press officer had to put 
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the union point of view across 'very quickly ... not in an aggressive way but in an 
proactive way.' Planning and anticipation of likely news media angles worked in both 
the local government and ambulance disputes of the late 1980s,- the latter being, 'a 
marvellous operation'. Charlie Whelan made a similar point regarding the AEU and 
industrial action. Though involved in few disputes, and even fewer likely to attract 
national media interest, he always tried to identify one or two key themes to stress in 
briefing journalists at the onset of industrial action. 
'I mean with Fords in advance we try and set the agenda. Firstly, 
they're foreign, secondly they manufacture in America. We can 
use this to make people think they're nasty and we're the good 
guys.' (53). 
Similarly, the IPMS sought to place the Civil Aviation Dispute in the context of public 
safety. Air traffic controllers had strong 'news value' and the dispute had direct 
implications for the public during the holiday period. However, Charles Harvey 
believed that the IPMS was quite successful in developing an agenda which made 
connections between pay and conditions, on the one hand, and the interest of the public 
in safe air traffic control, on the other. 
Of course, there is likely to be less need for fire fighting during disputes if a more 
favourable agenda is established at the beginning but this, in turn, is likely to depend 
upon planning and organisation. Charlotte Atkins says COHSE learnt a lot from the 
experience of the 1988 Nurses dispute in planning for the subsequent Ambulance 
dispute. In the Nurses dispute the three main health unions found it difficult to co-
ordinate media strategies and publicity. Local activists in each union exerted pressure 
for 'days of action' and demonstrations in rivalry with each other rather than in 
concert. However, during the Ambulance Dispute three unions were already close in 
negotiations over merger proposals and the smaller size of the ambulance service made 
co-ordination much easier. At the start of the Ambulance Dispute, the decision was 
taken to use one officer to represent the public face of all five unions (COHSE, NUPE, 
T and G, GMB and NALGO). Roger Poole, NUPE staff side secretary, became an 
over night media celebrity but as 'an unknown' avoided the possible problems that 
might have arisen if a more familiar union 'folk devil' (Rodney Bickerstaffe, of NUPE, 
for example) had been employed, conjuring up images of the 'powerful union barons' 
(Woolas, 1990). As Charlotte Atkins says: 
'Roger was very good and avoided ranting on television. People 
don't want ranting ... Roger's a new style of officer and he 
had done some T.V. before. He had the right kind ofimage and 
came over as a reasonable sort of bloke and Clarke [Secretary of 
State for Health] had this image of being a thug and Roger 
came across as a sweet natured trade union official.' (54) 
Organisation was based upon a division of labour involving the three main unions in the 
dispute with the agreement of the other two. All media enquiries were channelled 
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through NUPE's press office while COHSE dealt with political lobbying. This meant 
that although five unions were involved, one consistent, 'common line' was presented 
to journalists. Despite attempts by journalists to find them (Woolas, 1990), very few 
cracks appeared in the united front. 
'Any conflict was dealt with and thrashed out. The line was 
decided behind closed doors and we kept to it. It was a 
classic way of running a dispute .... I think people have 
learnt a hell of a lot about how to present a union case 
... there are still your Ron T odds and Arthur Scargills who 
still say "We have to refer this decision to our Executive" 
but that stuff has gone now mostly. Everyone is becoming more 
television oriented and if you become more television 
oriented then you become more popular press oriented 
as well.' (55). 
The relationship between television news agendas and those of the popular press is a 
complex one involving reciprocal stimulation,- what is defined as significant on 
television is likely to be picked up by the tabloid press and vice versa. Television 
coverage, then, is likely to not only provide direct access to millions of homes but an 
indirect route to the press as well. It is, therefore, an important channel of 
communication to two target audiences; the public as a whole and union members 
specifically. However, a greater dependence upon television brings problems as well as 
advantages. The greater the dependence, the more significant the difficulties when 
television interest begins to wane and, of course, given the nature of the medium, in 
protracted disputes this is very likely to happen. When it does, channels to both the 
public and members are restricted and an important mechanism for obtaining access to 
the tabloid agenda disappears. 
' ... in the ambulance dispute we were using television to 
communicate and when television stopped life became more 
difficult. .. we had to produce a bulletin ... we had internal 
problems and we had to fmd other ways of communicating 
with members. We went from a very high media profile at the 
beginning of the dispute to a lower one towards the end. How 
do you keep them [the media] going? It's very difficult to 
keep media interest alive.' (56) 
COHSE noted the lessons of the Nurses Dispute and ensured that there was effective 
central co-ordination of local activity during the Ambulance Dispute. In contrast, the 
federal structure of the NUM made this much more difficult. Each area effectively 
developed its own media strategy. Some appointed press officers for the duration of the 
dispute (for example, South Wales) but others placed liaison with the media at the 
bottom of the list of priorities. Information about what was happening at a local level 
was only fed through to the centre in a haphazard way and sometimes not at all. 
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Paradoxically, it was the structure of the NUM itself which contributed to the 
concentration upon 'personalities' rather than 'issues' in the media coverage. This was 
because much of the only information available for Nell Myers to discuss with 
journalists was about the activity of those at the centre, the President and the General 
Secretary: 
'In those circumstances I could grasp the frustrations of 
journalists who couldn't get at what was happening ... ! could 
only deal with what Scargill and Heathfield were doing and that 
was disappointing ... but then again what difference would it 
have made given the overall coverage? I' m not insensitive to 
the frustrations of industrial correspondents trying to cover 
industrial disputes ... I can imagine it ... I just think there's 
more to it than that.' (57) 
It is possible that more effective lines of communication between the NUM 
headquarters in Sheffield and the local area officials would have allowed Nell Myers to 
supply material which correspondents might have used to satisfy the criterion of 
'balance' in the construction of stories. Similarly, greater attention to issues of 
organisation and resourcing may have prevented the NCB from playing 'the numbers 
game' so effectively. Nell Myers argued that many journalists were well aware of the 
doubtful validity of much of the NCB evidence on numbers returning to the pits: 
'Journalists were saying to us, "the figures are all over 
the place", especially in early Autumn. They knew about the 
dummies in vans, etc. The Financial Times and Daily Telegraph 
correspondents were saying "nobody believes those figures". 
It's things like that make me think it's no good slagging 
off the NUM ... the information is there and it isn't up to us 
to get them to use it, it's down to their own character ... all 
they needed to do was point out the turmoil the Board was in. '(58) 
For Nell Myers the information was there and the onus was upon the journalist to use 
it. Other press officers with more proactive strategies would, undoubtedly, have sought 
to devise ways of encouraging the use of that information. The passivity of the NUM 
stance is the product of a more pessimistic analysis which points to the determinant role 
of the news media in capitalist societies. The danger in this analysis is to, too quickly, 
dismiss opportunities to intervene in the news encoding process. Not withstanding the 
political agenda of the Tory tabloids, it may have been possible to mount a more 
sustained challenge to the NCB figures, -an issue of central importance during the 
strike. 
News Criteria. News management and the External Environment 
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The danger of an approach which dwells, at length, upon the world of trade union press 
officers from their perspective, is that their place in the 'big picture', and all the 
constraints which follow from this, are obscured. 
What are the factors 'beyond the control' of union press officers? In the dealings of 
trade unions, particularly those representing civil servants and public sector workers, 
the power of the state looms large, even if its capacity to secure 'primary definitions' 
has sometimes been over-stated (Schlesinger,l990; Anderson 1993). The government 
through the machinery of the state has the capacity to exert a very significant degree of 
influence over the elements of the political news agenda and the pace at which it 
unfolds. When the government selects a topic as a 'headline issue' the union's involved 
have to react swiftly. The Further Education White Paper was 'talked up' by ministers 
and NATFHE found itself suddenly very busy dealing with requests for 'mainly short 
reaction pieces'. Midge Purcell (NATFHE) distinguished between this and 'intrinsic 
interest' (i.e. sustained). When political interest in the Government's selection of 
training as a central plank in its agenda waned, so the media enquiries dried up. 
Needless to say, the government through the machinery of the state can also do a great 
deal to either stimulate or dampen down media discussion of policy initiatives, reports 
and so on, by careful control of the embargo system, publication dates, and timing of 
press briefings. Trade union officials may sometimes find themselves in a position in 
which they are 'expected' to react to Government announcements without the benefit of 
more than a few hours notice. The journalists they are dealing with may have had the 
benefit of advance briefings. The actual pace of policy development is also largely 
determined by the government. Ken Jones (NUCPS) commented that one the biggest 
problems was simply keeping up with the pace of innovation, particularly in the case of 
the civil service unions where, at one time, very significant proposals for changes in 
the conditions of service of members were being launched, almost at monthly intervals 
(the Next Steps project, privatisation of public utilities and the issue of GCHQ 
Cheltenham). Even the larger trade unions lack the resources required to keep abreast 
of rapid policy launches across a number of state departments (59). 
If the state represents one large feature of the external environment for trade union 
press officers, the configuration of news values and ideological perspectives which 
govern the selection process in news production is another major consideration largely 
beyond the power of press officers to influence. Even a major national dispute 
involving the best news value ingredients, such as the Ambulance dispute of 1989, 
failed to retain news media interest throughout. COHSE found the interest of journalists 
declining after the first few months, something which is confirmed in the discussion of 
newspaper coverage of the dispute, in chapter nine. At first, the health unions were 
able to insert many of the key elements of their own agenda in press coverage. 
However, not only did interest decline but over the duration of the dispute, the news 
frames shifted away from the union agenda, as employers and government figures 
intervened more actively (60). 
'We went from a very high media profile at the beginning 
of the dispute to a lower one towards the end ... how do you keep 
them interested,- it is a problem ... I even led a whole group 
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people up Banstead High Street (COHSE headquarters) ... even stopped 
buses you know ... it's very difficult towards the end of a dispute 
to keep media interest alive.' (61) 
The vagaries of particular news organisations present difficulties, too. While the 
Guardian, for example, had always been receptive to further and higher education 
stories, the Independent had recently mounted a challenge to the Guardian's dominance 
in this corner of the market (a lucrative source of appointment advertising). However, 
the Independent defined 'education' as school and university rather than technical 
college and polytechnic, thus proving barren ground for NATFHE despite intensive 
work on the part of the two NA TFHE press officers. In some instances, the editorial 
inclinations of particular newspapers may lead to problems of presentation and 
interpretation rather than lack of interest. Despite the efforts of the NUHKW officers to 
insist upon the existence of sweatshops in the East Midlands as the problem, the 
Leicester Mercury continued to define the ethnicity of the proprietors as the central 
theme to be highlighted and was twice referred to the Press Council as a result. This 
meant that Mr Lomans 'thought twice' before providing evidence to the local media 
despite its abundance (62). 
The typology for initial selection of unions in the study recognised the probable 
importance of union size as a significant variable. In the eyes of news journalists size 
normally equates with news interest. Many of the press officers interviewed here 
concurred with this view. Eddie Barrett of the T and G cheerfully agreed that the size 
of the T and G as the biggest union in Britain (at the time the field work was 
conducted) was an enormous advantage. It meant that journalists were routinely in 
touch with Eddie Barrett most days of the week. It is not merely size but the 
dominance of the T and G and the fact that it organises clearly identifiable groups of 
workers that is important. This partly explains why the officers of the GMB, Britain's 
second largest union placed more emphasis upon active media work. 
'There is no doubt that Phil Woolas and Adrian Long have a problem 
at the GMB because they are not the biggest. I mean it is a big 
union but not the biggest and therefore, doesn't lend itself 
to the sort of opening paragraph, "Britain's biggest union 
today ... "'.(63) 
Indeed, Adrian Long recognised this himself: 
'We fmd it sometimes quite difficult to establish a distinctive 
identity for whatever we're saying within a wider industrial issue 
if we're only the second or third union ... that's why we have 
decided to develop the role of the GMB as a major union in the 
centre ground of the TUC and the Labour Party .. .' ( 64). 
While the GMB may be the biggest union in certain employment sectors, cleaning, 
security, hotels and catering, it has lost members in the occupations forming its 
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traditional base, heavy industry and municipal manual work. While the T and G also 
needs to diversify, it has managed to retain a distinct identity with particular 
occupations. In the public mind, the T and G organises dockers and bus drivers. The 
GMB has felt the need to work harder to forge an alternative public identity and this 
partly explained why it has positioned itself so prominently in the mainstream of 
Labour Party politics. 
No matter how sophisticated the media strategy, or dominant the union, there are 
certain random events which may destroy the best laid public relations plans: 
'It just depends what else is happening in the world. If there's 
a Gulf War then you don't get many calls because every industrial 
correspondent is fighting for about the one page that's left in 
paper. Of course, if there's a dock strike it works the other 
way. '(65) 
Charlotte Atkins of COHSE reported precisely the same experience. The Gulf War 
obliterated media interest in health issues. COHSE suffered a larger share of random 
bad luck in preparing media campaigns than most unions. The day COHSE picked, 
months in advance, for the launch of the ancillary nurses pay campaign happened to be 
the day Mrs Thatcher resigned. Similarly, Charles Harvey of IPMS went to elaborate 
lengths to feed an 'exclusive' on the Davenport Dockyard closure to the Financial 
Times only to find that on the day in question Rolls Royce attempted to sack and re-
hire, on inferior terms, its entire workforce. Every industrial correspondent in the 
country was diverted to Derby (66). 
On the other hand, news stories trade unions would prefer to delay sometimes 
emerge prematurely because unions rarely enjoy sufficiently centralised organisational 
structures to guarantee perfect synchronisation between head office and local branch. 
News of 300 redundancies emerged, while those affected were still on holiday, despite 
the determined efforts of the NUHKW to prevent the story breaking. From a local 
source, the story eventually appeared on national television. Similarly, the health 
unions found during the 1988-89 nurses pay campaign that it became increasingly 
difficult to effectively project a common media message, as local COHSE ,NUPE and 
NALGO branches all organised independent and uncoordinated publicity exercises and 
'days of action'. The later 1989 Ambulance Dispute saw much more determined 
control exerted from the centre. As noted above, unions are normally characterised by 
a high degree of 'porosity'; it is extremely difficult for press officers to exercise control 
over the number of potential information flows which journalists may exploit. 
Some elements in the union press officer's working environment; the size and 
historic profile of their unions, the power of the government to exploit the state 
apparatus to its advantage, and the workings of local union branches, all help to define 
the material and symbolic environment each press officer inherits and which may only 
be amenable to modification in minor ways. The final section of this chapter returns to 
a consideration of the structural features in the external environment which impinge 
upon and constrain the practice of trade union press officers. 
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Competition Between News Sources: politics power and strategy 
There are three groups of 'key players' in the arena constituted by labour and industrial 
news reporting; employers and employers' associations, trade unions and the state. In 
certain circumstances, the 1984-85 Coal Strike for example , the state and an employer 
organisation may work closely together (Jones,N, 1986; MacGregor, 
1986).Governments through the apparatus of the civil service and the substantial 
resourcing of official information services, have at their disposal a powerful range of 
mechanisms for shaping the news encoding process. The rise of 'the public relations 
state' (Deacon and Golding,l994:5-7) has involved more than a doubling of 
expenditure on public relations and news management work since the beginning of the 
1980s. Information and reports can be published or suppressed, at least temporarily; 
the timing of press briefings and the amount of advance information released can be 
regulated to ensure that journalists have the maximum opportunity to write about an 
issue in detail or the minimum. The blurring of the distinction between civil servant 
and political advisor in the case of government information officers (Hennessy 1985, 
Cockerall et all984) strengthens this capacity. It was revealed at its sharpest during the 
Coal Strike but can threaten even the smaller unions. 
One example illustrates the point. The 1990 White Paper on Further and Higher 
Education proposed major changes to the education system, including the removal of 
further education from local authority control and the abolition of the binary divide in 
higher education. In contrast to some journalists, NATFHE was only able to obtain a 
copy of the document at 5.00pm on the day of the official announcement, at the very 
beginning of the Department of Education's press launch. The union was placed at a 
distinct disadvantage, unable to brief education correspondents with confidence or 
supply an alternative, detailed analysis. NATFHE was not only forced onto the back 
foot but actually wrong footed, issuing a statement indicating cautious approval, only to 
be followed the next day by a much more critical response once the implications of the 
new policy initiative had been digested by the research department. By then, of course, 
the damage had been done and only the weekly education press carried the revised 
position ( 67). 
Employers and Power 
As discussed in chapter two, employers have increasingly turned to communications 
work in recent years to secure a variety of objectives from raising their public profile 
('corporate branding') or combating hostile take-overs, to by-passing trade union 
organisations and exerting new patterns of workplace control (Wickens, 1987; 
Jones, N., 1986; Cayford, 1985; Newman, 1984). However, unlike the apparatus of the 
state, employers do not always possess a capacity to translate economic power into 
media influence. Despite the size of Fords UK, for example, one prominent union press 
officer bluntly dismissed their public relations department as 'total crap'. Many large 
companies supplement in-house P.R. with outside consultants but the latter are likely to 
have very little knowledge of the company in terms of the circumstances at plant or 
shop floor level. This, according to Charlie Whelan , could give trade unions an 
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advantage in the communications battle. Public relations problems could be as 
inhibiting to management as union. 
'What you've got to remember is that you can't have a company 
like Fords going round slagging off its workers because those 
workers have got to go back into the factory to make "quality" 
cars. So you can't say anything ... you can't say nothing really.' 
(Charlie Whelan) (68) 
Similarly, local employers are often inexperienced in dealing with the media and 
reluctant to make any kind of statement. This gave, for example, the NUHKW a 
number of opportunities to fill the news vacuum (69). Laurie Harris recalled that 
during the 1989 rail dispute, British Rail sought to exploit its advantageous command 
over resources by employing ten additional public relations officers to work with 
journalists and yet, 'British Rail were so inept they played into our hands' (70). B.R. 
management even allowed the annual accounts revealing large profits to be published 
in the week that Laurie Harris had been stressing to journalists the theme that profit 
was being put before safety. Measures of public opinion indicated considerable 
sympathy for the rail workers even during the period of maximum disruption to 
services. 
Employers are not infallible and command over superior material resources does not 
guarantee success. Much depends upon the social relations through which material 
resources are deployed. As we have seen, the ability to invest in the most elaborate 
electronic networked news distribution and monitoring systems may not count for 
much. Nevertheless, over time superior resourcing can be made to tell. In the 1984-85 
Coal Strike, despite some notorious public relations gaffs in the early phase of the 
strike (Jones,N,l986), in the end the ability of the Coal Board to deploy over twenty 
press officers to ensure that a Coal Board spokesperson was always available, usually 
with 'the latest figures on numbers returning to work' readily to hand, did make a 
difference. Wealth, of course, can also be converted into judicial authority. In the 
present study, one media officer representing one of the larger unions was the subject 
of an injunction issued by Lord Hanson, following the union's involvement in media 
coverage of the controversy surrounding the possible take-over of I. C. I. by the Hanson 
Trust and the danger of asset stripping. The power afforded by the possession of wealth 
and superior resourcing can be used to intimidate and quieten opposing voices. The 
union officer in question was 'very aware' of the resources deployed by Hanson, 
including not only a team of lawyers but five times as many press officers. 
Interestingly, there was developing co-operation between the union involved and I.C.I. 
to mount a public relations campaign against the hostile bid (71). 
Employer power can also be used to silence one of the main sources of union 
information, employees themselves. COHSE found that NHS employees, particularly 
in the Trust Hospitals were being disciplined for making unauthorised comments to the 
news media. In addition, 'patient confidentiality clauses' in new NHS Trust contracts 
were being used by managements as 'gagging' devices. NATFHE has recently 
established a 'whistle blowers hotline' for academic staff, bound by new 'gagging 
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clauses' in their contracts. During the 1989 rail strike, many NUR members were 
reluctant to 'go on record' and Laurie Harris had to find a variety of elaborate 'ruses' 
to allow journalists to talk to railway workers. 
Rival trade unions represent a third potential source of competition. Chapter two 
described the pressures trade unions now face, arising from declining memberships and 
the increasingly hostile economic and political environments. This chapter also traced 
the ways in which this pressure and the conflicts engendered by it find expression 
through communication and media work. This is as true of inter-union rivalry as it is of 
union - employer conflict, particularly where unions compete for new 'unorganised' 
markets or where several unions compete for one tightly defined market (e.g. primary 
and secondary teaching unions, unions organising lower grade civil servants, etc). 
Thus, IPMS and the TGWU have found themselves competing to develop higher news 
media profiles with a view to targeting technicians in the Civil Service; both CPSA and 
NUCPS have sought to highlight the IPMS 'capitulation' during the 1987 Civil Service 
grading dispute and, perhaps, most notoriously, the EETPU waged a high profile 
publicity campaigning against rival unions in defence of its 'aggressive' recruitment 
strategies. 
A contrast is provided in the health and public service sector, where the three main 
unions co-operated in two recent major disputes and eventually merged to form one 
'super' union. Similarly, the AEU and the EEPTU merged to form one dominant 
presence in the engineering sector. Again, during the course of this research, the GMB 
absorbed the Tailor and Garment Workers. In each of these cases, the management of 
potential conflict was partly achieved through careful communication and media work. 
Summary: the dilemma of incorporation 
The problem with the overly mechanical textbook accounts of public relations is that 
while they may provide detailed descriptions of the techniques involved in writing press 
releases or organising news conferences, they ignore two fundamental features of press 
and media work. Press and media work involves not merely techniques but social 
practices; relationships and patterns of exchange between press officers and journalists 
which crystallise over time, and yet remain quite fragile, easily fractured by the 
intrusion of external forces. And this points to a second weakness. There is an absence 
in the textbooks of any discussion of the material or symbolic environment in which 
press and media work occurs; the political and economic context, the structures of 
power which shape and constrain, or the reservoir of symbolism located in the public 
domain from which the ideological representation of events may be fashioned. 
What emerges from this study of the practice of trade union press officers is the 
extent to which such practice is rooted in social relationships, both within each union 
and, externally, with journalists. Trade union press officers depend upon particular 
kinds of relationships with their own senior officials and executive committees, in order 
to establish 'exchange relationships' with journalists. Tentative, implicit 'bargains' 
(Goldenberg,1975:136) only emerge between union press officers and labour 
correspondents, if press officers can establish that they can offer journalists a place on 
the 'inside track'; access to the kind of 'intelligence' which permits 'informed 
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judgements' and accurate assessments of future scenarios. These 'exchange 
relationships' are never equitable; journalists are likely to hold most of the cards, most 
of the time. To secure their own positions within their news organisations and in the 
eyes of their peers, they need access to such 'intelligence', but given the 'porosity' of 
most unions, experienced labour correspondents are rarely dependent upon press 
officers, alone. Unlike, other non-official source organisations, such as the Child 
Poverty Action Group or Greenpeace, the highly factionalised nature of many unions, 
makes centralised control of information flows nearly impossible. To further tip the 
scales against union press officers, the 'market value' of labour and industrial 
information has been declining as news organisations attach less importance to union 
and industrial relations issues, and correspondents find they have to accept broader 
beats with less specialisation. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has pointed to a number of examples where 'effective' 
press work has 'made a difference'; a union perspective has been included in the 
construction of a news item through the intervention of the press officer, or a damaging 
news frame has been modified on the basis of a union briefing. This will be examined 
further in chapter nine which explores how the health unions ran a 'successful' media 
campaign during the 1989 Ambulance dispute. For the moment, what is of interest is 
the price which is paid for the development of the 'exchange relationships' , upon which 
such press and media work depends. The price can usefully be described using the 
concept of incorporation. Union press officers recognise that, as Mary McGuire says, 
'in order for journalists to be of use to you, you have to be of use to them' (72). This 
means acknowledging the importance of news deadlines and the organisational rhythms 
which dominate a news journalists' day, and prioritising access and availability over 
other considerations to answer media enquiries. But it means more than this. It requires 
union press officers to largely define their agendas in terms of mainstream news values; 
to formulate their material through the eyes of news journalists. Whether or not union 
press officers possess formal training in journalism, the 'logic' which organises the 
exchange relationships between union press officers and journalists is likely to lead to 
the adoption of this kind of approach. As Charlie Whelan, (a union press officer 
lacking any formal training or experience but, nonetheless, rated as the best by many of 
the correspondents interviewed for this study) commented, it was 'easy', he just wrote 
'it' as he would like to read it in the papers (73). 
Tension and Symbiosis 
The role of union press officer, then, involves two dimensions of inherent and 
irresolvable tension. Firstly, as discussed in chapter four, union press officers must try 
to accommodate both the political demands associated with their positions within trade 
union organisations and their function as 'advocates', and yet, at the same time, they 
must acknowledge and are frequently committed to the objectives of 'professionalism', 
as defined by news journalists. It is this underlying tension which produces the 
oscillation between the contradictory and mutually competing goals of promoting a 
union perspective, on the one hand, and applying the criteria of 'news interest' and 
'journalistic detachment' in the selection of information, on the other. 
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If this is the first dimension of tension, following the discussion in this chapter, we 
can identify a second but related dimension which describes the practice of union press 
officers, as distinct from their goals or objectives. Just as union press officers oscillate 
between competing goals, so also in their routine practice, they oscillate rather like 
moths simultaneously attracted to and repelled by an electric light, between attempting 
to 'distance' themselves from the culture of labour journalism, and embracing the 
symbiotic relationship which they share with correspondents. Thus, on the one hand, as 
we have seen, union press officers are likely to explicitly recognise the distinct political 
interests which separate trade unions both from other suppliers of information or 
'knowledge brokers' (Gamham, 1986:44) in the public sphere and from journalists. On 
the other hand, they will acknowledge the importance of accommodating the needs of 
journalists, understanding the imperatives of news production, and the necessity of 
admitting correspondents to the 'inside track'. 
Incorporation and the Union Press Officer's Agenda 
This process of incorporation went beyond simply acknowledging the importance of 
mainstream news values. 'Successful' union media work, particularly of a proactive 
kind, meant embracing the underlying assumptions or 'inferential structures' which 
informed the ways in which journalists organised their material. Chapter three 
described the rather cautious and conservative nature of the agenda unions presented m 
their journals. There was an absence of discussion of issues which might prompt a 
questioning of the fundamental relations of power and control in the workplace. Even 
discussion ofindustrial conflict was muted and rarely related to issues of structure, or 
control of the labour process. Similarly, the press officers in this study, with the 
exception of Nell Myers (NUM), were inclined to take the workplace status quo as a 
'given'; none in the study proposed to present themes to the news media which would 
elaborate a radical analysis of power or relations between captital and labour. 
Even in the case of industrial action, while some press officers had the task of 
representing their unions in disputes, little attention was paid to the fundamental causes 
of workplace conflict. Rather, attention revolved around the 'bread and butter' 
concerns of a labourist agenda, pay comparisons and relativities, the rationale behind a 
particular claim, the status of conditions of service and so on. In some cases, where 
unions were seeking to market themselves to employers or groups of unorganised 
workers, there was an inclination to suppress news of industrial action. 
This is not to suggest that union press officers are without radical sentiments; a 
majority displayed a very strong commitment to the values of the labour movement and 
a deep dislike of the present Conservative government. Nonetheless, they would regard 
any suggestion that a more radical politics might form the basis of their press and 
media work as naive. The possibilities but also the constraints which are implied by 
mainstream news values and the inferential structures of journalists were simply 
regarded as 'inevitable'. Again, as Charlie Whelan said, 'you don't want a load of left 
wing polemics if you're writing for the Sun'. In short, to establish oneself as a 'good' 
union press officer, amongst correspondents, one must embrace both the working 
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practices and the working assumptions of news journalism. One must, at least in terms 
of daily working routines, become 'incorporated' . 
This has important consequences for what can and cannot be presented to the news 
media and the particular symbolic constructions employed. For example, the tendency 
of the news media to 'individualise' what are essentially collective problems (Cottle, 
1993:79) is sometimes encouraged by union press officers who recognise that, in 
difficult and ideologically hostile conditions, one of the few ways of encoding a union 
perspective is to 'harness' it to individual case studies, rich in 'human interest'. Thus, 
for example, the health unions during the Ambulance Strike provided journalists with 
opportunities to interview 'individual ambulance crews', rather than over-emphasise the 
widespread, collective problems of low pay and under-resourcing, with empirical data. 
Similarly, the NUHKW had some success in interesting local reporters, and sometimes 
current affairs journalists, in individual cases of super-exploitation and sweat shop 
conditions in textile factories, but in doing this, another perspective is obscured. The 
view that such examples are not 'isolated or extreme instances' but manifestations of a 
persistent, collective problem of low pay, structurally rooted in the conditions of textile 
production in England, was assumed not to be compatible with a news format. 
Similarly, the GMB gathered material on individual cases of work related illness but 
rarely sought to place these in a broader structural context for journalists. 
In summary, union press officers usually work with an agenda delimited by the 
'possible'; themes which do not threaten the inferential structures of journalists and 
which can be elaborated using the conventional news values of journalism. Typically, 
the agenda will involve three broad elements. Firstly, a union press officer may 
formulate a series of themes which allow the prominence of a union to be raised and 
the constructive contribution it may make to workplace life emphasised. This, in turn, 
may be related to the marketing work which a number of unions now direct towards 
prospective members, merger suitors, or targeted employers. Secondly, an important 
set of themes common to the press and media work of many unions will involve 
resource demands of one kind or another. Charlotte Atkins, at COHSE, looked for 
ways of promoting stories of under-resourcing in the NHS; the NATFHE publicity 
department sought to interest correspondents in the case for better training and more 
resources in the post-16 education sector; all union press officers would, usually 
annually, present a case for improved renumeration packages for their members. And 
thirdly, a union press officer's agenda might involve defensive work. Strikes or 
industrial action of another kind, might have to be explained and publicly defended. 
Alternatively, the reputation of members might need to be 'repaired', following 
stigmatisation. Thus, Mary McGuire (NALGO), accepted as a long term project, the 
task of improving the public standing of social workers. The Civil Service unions had 
similar problems with the public perception of their memberships. None of these three 
broad elements of a union agenda for media work, provoke fundamental questions 
about the industrial status quo or prompt discussion of the issue of control over the 
nature of production and the experience of work; all three can be elaborated and 
presented to journalists using conventional news values and without threatening the 
inferential structures routinely employed in reporting the workplace. 
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This is not to suggest that the media work of trade union press officers is without 
value or is counter productive from the union point of view. Undoubtedly, in a difficult 
political climate with waning news media interest in union affairs, a number of union 
press officers have made an important contribution in maintaining a union profile in the 
public domain and in helping to ensure that union perspectives do surface in the news 
media representation of events. The alternative to this process of incorporation is bleak; 
to remain on the outside of the news encoding process, with little influence over the 
way in which the representation of a union's affairs is constmcted, or perhaps worse, to 
be simply ignored and consigned to the ideological margins. The difficulties Nell 
Myers experienced in trying to present a coherent NUM case in the form of the union's 
'Plan for Coal' during the 1984/85 dispute, without making the concessions necessary 
to foster 'exchange relationships' (Jones,l986; Adeney and Lloyd,l986), illustrate the 
point. 
To remain on the outside is to risk marginalisation; to move inside is to accept, at 
least, partial incorporation into the mainstream news production system. And yet, even 
'inside', the work of union press officer is constrained and delimited by external 
forces; the presence of the state, the power of employers, the worsening political and 
economic conditions for unions and, of course, changes in the ways in which news 
production is, itself, organised. The next three chapters turn the focus more sharply 
upon this latter aspect, by first tracing the ways in which the emergence of labour and 
industrial journalism has been shaped by the historical development of the state, trade 
unions and employers organisations, and then finally, examining the contemporary 
practice of journalists. 
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Chapter Six 
The Rise of Labour and Industrial Journalism 
The next two chapters concern the history of labour and industrial journalism and the 
role of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents Group. In doing so, as indicated in 
the introduction, a start is made in tracing some of the ways in which changes in the 
broader political-economic environment impact upon the day to day practice of 
journalists and, in turn, union press officers . As the history of this journalistic 
specialism unfolds four aspects of the political-economic environment appear to play a 
prominent part: 
- the importance of the state as one of the main influences in shaping the nature of the 
labour beat and in helping to order the hierarchy of journalistic specialisms, through the 
political orientation of particular governments and their control over information flows 
from the political centre, 
- the wider political-economic dimension in which changes in both economy and polity 
influence the landscape of industrial and labour journalism so that, for example, trade 
unions appear to be a waning political force by the second half of the 1980s, as result 
both of government policy and more fundamental economic structural change, 
- changes in the political economy and social organisation of newspaper production, 
involving changes in the daily rhythms and routines of journalists, the physical re-
location of newspaper offices away from Fleet Street and changes in the way 
newspapers utilise the labour of journalists. 
- recent developments in the vitality of alternative specialisms within journalism, 
including 'direct rivals', such as financial, personnel and business journalism. 
Of course, each of these four aspects of the political-economic environment is inter-
linked. The rationalisation and re-organisation of newspaper production, for example, 
being stimulated by the weakening of print and media unions and the new labour 
relations climate fostered by the Thatcher administration. For some journalists, the 
recent decline in the fortunes of labour journalism and the standing of the Labour and 
Industrial Correspondents' Group should be regarded as simply a 'down turn' in a 
cyclical process. However, a 'reading' of the political economy of labour journalism 
suggests that actually more profound changes are occurring through each of these four 
aspects. This chapter presents a brief chronological account of the rise of this 
journalistic specialism to its peak in the period between 1965 and 1979 whilst the next · 
chapter describes its decline since 1979 and considers what relevance such a history has 
for the understanding of contemporary patterns of 'news work' involving union 
officials and journalists. 
A Chronological Account. 
The history of daily labour journalism is, in large part, a history of the Labour and 
Industrial Correspondents' Group . Three different types of material have been 
gathered to produce this account, the memoirs of leading trade unionists, journalists 
and politicians; interviews conducted with journalists who worked as labour 
correspondents during the last four decades (1), and the official papers of the Labour 
and Industrial Correspondents' Group dating from 1980 to the present (2). It is a great 
pity that the Group has not retained a record of its affairs since its beginnings in 1937 
and this has meant that in the absence of any other source of continuous evidence, the· 
historical account must remain a sketch rather than a complete history. Nevertheless, 
for the purposes of throwing light upon some important theoretical and empirical 
concerns of the present research sufficient material is available. 
During the 1920s a number newspapers carried reports by 'industrial 
correspondents' (Negrine 1993) but it is unclear whether these journalists were really 
specialists or little more than general reporters. However, by the late 1930s a small 
group of such correspondents had emerged and, contrary to one academic account 
which dates the beginning of the Labour and Industrial Group to 1965 (3), a formal 
grouping of labour specialists emerged in 1937. Clearly, then, the salience of labour 
news could not alone account for the emergence of a specialist organisation such as the 
Labour and Industrial Group. However, a press liaison officer was attached to the 
Prime Minister's staff in 1932, a public relations department established within the Post 
Office in 1933 and by the mid-thirties all the ministries 'in daily contact with the mass 
of the public' had formed 'information divisions', including the Ministry of Labour 
(Ogilvy Webb 1965:54). The role of each 'information division' was at first defensive; 
to liaise with the press and deal with journalists' enquiries - in effect, to shield the 
ministers and senior officials. Later their role evolved towards a more proactive stance 
which involved planning publicity campaigns and direct communication with the 
public. 
Trade unions were much slower to begin to allocate formal responsibilities for the 
dissemination of information although some of the public sector unions, including 
organisations representing local and central government workers, began to appoint 
press officers at the same time as the Ministries. Nevertheless, on a less formal basis 
regularised and routine channels of communication between unions and journalists also 
developed in this decade. The fortunes of labour and industrial journalism, then, are 
inextricably bound up with the two main sources of labour and industrial information, 
trade unions and particular departments of state. The history of the Labour and 
Industrial Group demonstrates the ways in which the state can both open up and shut 
down information flows, and the capacity of the State to foster particular ideological 
climates which either stimulate or dampen the demand for labour and industrial news. 
For these reasons, this discussion of the history of labour and industrial journalism 
will be organised around the identification of three distinct historical phases, 
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characterised not by the strength of appetite for labour news demonstrated by news 
editors but by the changes in the political and economic environment of labour 
journalism . Given this theoretical approach, the following framework can be 
constructed: 
1937 to 1965. 
In this period the first labour and industrial correspondents, appointed during the 
thirties by a small number of national newspapers, cohere as a more or less formal 
group. This is because a 'labour beat' emerges based upon the relevant departments of 
state, the national headquarters of some trade unions and the union conference season. 
The state plays an important role in fostering a fertile climate for the growth of a 
culture of labour journalism. This is in part because the bureaucratic structure of the 
state begins to regularise and routinise the flow of relevant information for labour 
journalists. However, it is also because the state during the Second World War and in 
subsequent decades seeks to reach an accommodation with organised labour. As the 
state tentatively embraces organised labour, so the status of labour journalism rises and 
the power of labour correspondents within news organisations increases. 
1964 to 1979. 
This period can be characterised as 'the golden age' for the Group. The movement 
towards an accommodation between government and organised labour quickens in pace 
and it is in this period that the state employs a strategy which more closely 
approximates to a 'corporate style' than at any other time. Relationships between 
government, organised labour and industry extend through a number of new forums 
created by the in-coming Labour administration (1964- 1970) and this widens the 
'labour beat' for journalists. Of course, this does not mean that such relationships are 
cordial or free from tension but such tensions and conflicts provide valuable copy for 
journalists on the beat. 
This period is also marked by important interpersonal connections between members 
of the Labour and Industrial Group and the Government. Friendships between Labour 
Party politicians and labour correspondents grow in importance as those politicians 
become Cabinet Ministers. Secondly, several labour correspondents 'move across' to 
take up positions within the administration and others enjoy enhanced status through 
appointment to government initiated enquiries, including the Donovan Commission on 
industrial relations. 
Against this background numbers in the Group grow to their peak (approximately 
seventy) and the procedures of the Group are formalised in a written constitution 
(1965) which seeks to regulate membership, maintain ethical standards, and promote 
the influence of the Group. It is in this period that the Group most seriously challenges 
the position of its arch professional rival, the Westminster Lobby. 
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1979 to the Present. 
The current condition of labour journalism is one of decline, in terms of membership, 
energy, political influence, and professional standing. The precise reason for this is 
disputed by members and trade union officials alike. The more optimistic believe that 
the current malaise is nothing more than a temporary phenomenon, a function of the 
cyclical nature of news values. Others, more pessimistic in outlook regard the Coal 
Dispute of 1984/85 as the turning point at which the fortunes of the Group began to 
wane with the final, crushing defeat of the trade union movement. Another view 
believes that labour journalism has suffered most sharply a destructive process which 
has blighted all national journalism, namely the relocation of national newspaper 
publishing away from Fleet Street and with it the death of the old social networks 
supplying the 'meat and drink' of journalism. 
The analytic framework employed here points to a rather different explanation and 
one which suggests that the process of decline began slightly earlier. An explicit aim of 
the Thatcher administration was the eradication of 'corporatist' arrangements from 
government. Accordingly, many of the forums and institutions which had formed 
important components in the 'labour beat' were deliberately neglected by the new 
administration and some eventually destroyed. As the new Government politically 
distanced itself from the representatives of both labour and industry, so the Labour and 
Industrial Correspondents' Group found itself also being pushed away from the centre 
of things. Indeed, after one less than cordial meeting during her time as Leader of the 
Opposition, Mrs Thatcher refused to meet the Group and briefings from Downing 
Street became extremely rare. The memoirs of incoming Ministers suggest that they 
had far less contact with labour and industrial correspondents than their counterparts in 
previous administrations. Labour and industrial journalists, then, lost some of their 
most important direct channels to Government and those that remained no longer 
produced a regular flow of information likely to make 'front page copy'. In addition, 
as the TUC was pushed from the centre of the political stage, journalists found that one 
of the next most important institutions on 'the labour beat' no longer routinely supplied 
copy of a quality likely to interest news editors and was no longer likely to supply the 
kind of 'intelligence' which used to justify a regular lunch time appointment. At the 
same time, the editorial and ideological perspectives of a number of newspapers 
encouraged the growth in other 'rival' specialisms, including financial, personnel and 
business journalism (Negrine 1993; Parsons 1989). 
The context for this, of course, was the broader ideological impact of the new 
Thatcher government on the perceptions of the public or, perhaps, more importantly 
upon the perceptions of news editors concerning the priorities of the public. Whether or 
not the Thatcher years represent the relentless unfolding of an ideological blueprint 
remains a source of debate amongst academics. However, it is clear that the Thatcher 
government worked hard to construct an ideological vision of a new Britain in which 
trade unions no longer played a part in most ordinary people's lives. This, too, was 
likely to influence the editors and managers of national newspapers and to shape the 
decisions they took in terms of the organisation of specialist journalists. Not only did 
Labour and Industrial journalists no longer enjoy access to routine sources of 'front 
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page copy' but their very specialism no longer appeared to describe something at the 
centre of most reader's lives. 
The creation and development of the Group: 1937 to 1965 
During the most severe days of the pre-war Depression in 1936, King Edward VIII 
undertook a tour of South Wales and the Rhondda. Shocked by the conditions in the 
which the people of the Rhondda were forced to live, the King made a spontaneous 
impromptu speech in which he apparently commented that 'something must be done'. 
The industrial correspondents accompanying the Royal tour were prevented from 
hearing clearly what the King said as the police held the crowds back but a few heard 
enough to appreciate the potential newsworthiness of the incident. In a political 
situation suggesting a striking parallel with contemporary relationships between 
government and monarchy, evidence of royal support for greater government 
intervention in welfare and regional policy was a very big story. However, a great deal 
rested on what precisely the King said and while some journalists were convinced that 
the King had demanded that 'something must be done', others believed that the royal 
response had been the politically milder, 'something should be done'. In terms of the 
political news agenda of the day, 'should' was very different to 'must' and rather less 
newsworthy. According to Trevor Evans, one of the first correspondents to work an 
industrial beat, in an effort to resolve the matter and produce a definitive account all 
journalists following the royal tour were required to a attend a meeting in the evening 
at one of the local hotels. Evans does not tell us whether this included only those who 
actually heard the King's comment or whether all journalists expressing an interest 
were allowed to contribute. Nevertheless, the view of the meeting was that the phrase 
employed was, indeed, 'must' and a dozen front page stories were filed accordingly 
(Evans 1953: 39). 
Of course, this was not the first time that journalists have gathered to collectively 
'construct' definitive accounts of reality. However, the story provides one indication 
that by the early 1930s a sufficient number of national newspapers employed 
journalists specialising in industrial news for some form of group consciousness to 
begin to form. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that, perhaps, the first 
industrial journalists' 'ring' (an arrangement to pool information) involving Trevor 
Evans (Daily Express), Hugh Chevins (Daily Telegraph) and Ian McKay (News 
Chronicle) had been in operation from the day Ian McKay was appointed as one of the 
first industrial correspondents in 1933 (Evans 1953:25). The story also points to the 
emphasis upon regional industrial developments which preoccupied labour and 
industrial journalists in the decade before the War. 
Few trade unions, with the exception of organisations representing white collar 
public sector workers (4), had put in place arrangements which would ensure a daily 
supply of labour news for correspondents, though during this decade the union 
conference season began to encourage a seasonal migration away from London. Herbert 
Tracey was appointed as the first press officer at the TUC in the mid-1930s (Tracey, 
1953) and industrial correspondents had begun to foster personal relationships with 
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senior trade union leaders in the largest labour organisations in the same period. It 
was, however, the state which first stimulated the emergence of industrial specialists 
when the Ministry of Labour began to organise regional tours to brief journalists on 
industrial affairs in the mid-1930s (Evans, 1953). It was the organisation of particular 
departments of state of which provided the infrastructure for the development of a 
labour and industrial beat because these departments offered a reliable and routine 
supply of information. While trade union contacts were recognised from the start as 
vital sources, few trade union organisations could offer the same volume of information 
on a daily or weekly basis. By the mid-thirties, tours organised by a number of 
departments of state had become a routine source of industrial information for 
correspondents. Though, by the end of the 1930s, many industrial correspondents spent 
a considerable period in the Spring and Summer away from Fleet Street, attending the 
larger union conferences, the essential foundations of the labour and industrial 
specialism rested upon the reliability of the departments of state as providers of routine 
industrial news. 
In the very earliest days of industrial reporting, then, a regional focus was quite 
prominent and much reporting concerned developments in particular industrial regions 
or sectors. This would explain the interest of industrial specialists in the royal visit to 
South Wales. Trade unions were unable to establish regular dialogue with government 
and mass unemployment brought both a decline in membership and political impotency 
(Bames and Reid, 1982). With prompting from the Ministry of Labour and other state 
departments, then, the attention of correspondents was often turned to industrial affairs 
broadly defined rather than the more specific issue of trade union politics. By default, 
the state was able to leave its imprint upon the framework which guided the daily 
routine for industrial correspondents. Indeed, it was while 'door stepping' outside the 
Ministry of Labour, awaiting the result of a court of enquiry established to resolve the 
1937 'Coronation bus strike', that journalists first proposed a formal Labour and 
Industrial Correspondents Group {5). It was not long before the invitations from the 
Ministry of Labour to join the conducted regional tours were being channelled through 
the secretary of the Group, thus announcing both official recognition of the legitimacy 
of the Group and enhancing the importance of membership in the eyes of 
correspondents. The three founding members were Trevor Evans (Daily Express), 
Hugh Chevins (Daily Telegraph), and Ian McKay (News Chronicle) (Jones, 1988: 11). 
The first chairman was John Ratcliffe who had been recently appointed as the first 
Industrial Correspondent for the Times, followed by Ian McKay who employed his 
wide range of political and labour movement contacts to further enhance the status of 
the Group amongst trade union leaders and the political elite (Evans 1953:39-52). 
McKay had formerly been a Lobby correspondent for the Western Daily Mail. 
Tunstall has noted the role of the state in stimulating the formal growth of particular 
branches of journalism (1971:225). Thus, the fortunes of the Education 
Correspondents' Group, formed in 1962, prospered as the Ministry of Education 
expanded in the 1960s and as successive Ministers, their standing strengthened as their 
budgets grew, encouraged close relations with correspondents. Similarly, the status 
and influence of the Labour and Industrial Group reached a peak as the departments of 
state concerned with industrial policy and economic intervention expanded under the 
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Labour administration of 1964 to 1970. However, this pattern first developed during 
the War with the collapse of the Conservative administration and the formation of a 
coalition government which included both a formal representative of the trade union 
movement, Ernest Bevin in charge of the Ministry of Labour, and several other 
Ministers who had very close links with the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' 
Group, including Herbert Morrison (Ministry of Supply), Hugh Dalton (Ministry of 
Economic Warfare) and David Grenfell (Minister for Mines) (Evans, 1953:54). Indeed, 
according to Trevor Evans, as these appointments were announced by the BBC, several 
of the appointees were listening to the radio whilst enjoying a drink with labour 
correspondents in a hotel bar during the union conference season. A crucial priority of 
the Coalition Government was to win the consent of organised labour and to avoid 
industrial conflict during the period of military crisis at the beginning of the war. It was 
recognised that the fostering of consent rather than the coercion of labour offered the 
better prospect of stable industrial relations. Hence, the formal representation of 
organised labour and the labour movement within the government (Barnes and 
Reid, 1982) (6). The value of contacts with key journalists in securing consent was also 
recognised. Bevin, for example, made little effort to conceal his determination to utilise 
the press in his campaign to suppress industrial militancy in the coal fields (Bullock, 
1967:300-301). 
It was this re-shaping of the state during the war with the creation of state 
departments with a far greater interventionist role, that hugely expanded the range of 
sources and the volume of information available to the Group. In addition to the 
Ministries, a framework to regulate industry was created which anticipated corporate 
developments in the post-war period. The National Joint Advisory Council, involving 
both sides of industry through the TUC and the BEC (British Employers Confederation) 
spawned a Joint Consultative Committee to take responsibility for wages and industrial 
relations. This committee, in turn, established the National Arbitration Tribunal to 
resolve industrial disputes. Thus, as the structure of the industrial state grew ever more 
elaborate so the industrial and labour beat expanded. 
The expansion in the number of relevant state departments and regulatory structures 
was not, in itself, sufficient to increase the volume of information flowing to the 
Group. The normative framework governing relations between politicians, civil 
servants and journalists also had to permit more open communication and greater 
frequency of contact. In other words, the culture within departments of state also had 
to be one which would encourage the growth of relationships between labour 
correspondents and the political elite. With the appointment of Ministers such as Bevin, 
Dalton, Morrison and Grenfell to the Coalition Government, members of the Labour 
and Industrial Correspondents' Group enjoyed 'insider' status for the first time. Bevin, 
in particular, appreciated the value of co-operating with journalists who had specialist 
knowledge of industrial matters and enjoyed close relationships with other trade union 
leaders. Issues such as conscription, the state regulation of war-time production, the 
constraints imposed upon trade union activity, and later the management of 
demobilisation, all required very careful presentation to the public. Under Bevin, 
members of the Group were provided with a room and telephone facilities inside the 
Ministry of Labour (Jones,l988). At this stage during the War, only the No 1 
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correspondents on each paper were allowed membership of the Group and, thus, even 
at this early stage the Group was able to strengthen its status through the tried and 
tested professional strategy of imposing mechanisms of exclusion. Bevin had been 
infuriated by press coverage of the 1937 bus strike which had presented the Transport 
and General Workers Union as an organisation deliberately setting out to sabotage the 
Coronation of the new King. In addition, he was suspicious of the Industrial and 
Labour Group for 'being hand in glove' with the rank and file strike leaders (Evans, 
1953:54). In retaliation he had restricted press comment to two formal statements each 
week and had, at one point, tried to insist that industrial correspondents provide a 
guarantee that his dictated statements be printed in each paper verbatim. In charge of 
one of the departments of state, however, he saw the advantage of a more formalised 
arrangement with the Group, one which provided a stable channel of communication to 
the news media but one which allowed him some significant measure of control. 
As we shall see, conflicts and tensions within the political elite have long been an 
important factor in accelerating the flow of information outwards to correspondents and 
labour journalists have been amongst the most grateful beneficiaries over the years. 
Bevin, locked in feud with Beaverbrook within Cabinet and suspicious of the critical 
coverage of labour issues in Beaverbrook newspapers, nonetheless fostered a 
particularly close relationship with Trevor Evans, despite the fact that Evans was 
employed by Beaverbrook on the Daily Express (Bullock,1967:98 and 135). It was to 
Evans who Bevin first turned when he sought to publicly 'trail' his ambitions for office 
after the war and it was Evans who wrote the first authorised biography of Bevin. It 
was also Evans who Bevin invited to attend special regional briefing sessions for the 
managers of local Labour Exchanges' as Bevin sought to lend a personal touch to the 
presentation of the ministry's strategy (Bullock 1967: 128). 
In the early years of labour and industrial journalism in the decade before the War, 
it was rare for newspapers to hire more than one specialist for the beat. Without a 
'number two' or a 'number three' to cover the less important union conferences, most 
industrial correspondents spent a great deal of their time in the conference season, 
which began in April and ended with the Labour Party conference in October, away 
from Fleet Street in a variety of conference towns (Evans 1953:41). In those days the 
TUC , itself, selected venues from a list which included not merely Blackpool and 
Brighton but even Weymouth and Norwich (Tracey, 1953:114). According to Frank 
Machin, northern industrial correspondent for the Daily Herald in the late 1930s and 
1940s, every town had a particular pub or hotel where labour correspondents would 
congregate, for example, 'the Marble Bar' in Newcastle or 'the Land of Green Ginger' 
in Hull (Machin, 1953). In London, the Cheshire Cheese had already become the 
'home' for labour and industrial correspondents (Walker,1953), a role it continues to 
play today, hosting most of the Group's formal functions and informal gatherings. 
Although the attraction of seaside and hotel was a powerful one, the daily routine for 
most industrial correspondents for much of the year would include a briefmg at the 
TUC by the TUC Press Officer, followed by a succession of briefings at the relevant 
Ministries (Tracey,1953). 
In the final decade before the War, then, a labour beat had emerged which displayed 
the main features which were to characterise it for the next four decades. It was a beat 
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shaped by the imprint of the departmental structure of the State and by a strong 
connection to the elite of the labour movement. It was centred upon London for much 
of the year and even when, during the conference season or Ministry sponsored 
regional tours, labour journalists strayed further afield, the close network of contacts 
with ministry officials and senior union leaders was retained. A problem which was to 
be a feature of labour reporting for decades to come, the difficulty in establishing 
effective contacts with grass roots union activists, can be detected at the outset. The 
bureaucracies within each Ministry generated almost daily supplies of information. 
Although few trade union organisations included a press office, it was possible for 
correspondents to develop regular contacts with senior officials within the mainly 
London based headquarters. It was much harder for journalists to find opportunities to 
foster routine contacts with union activists or local officials not attached to the formal, 
institutional structures which made up the routine beat. The tributes to Ian McKay 
collected by Trevor Evans (1953) reflect this. Very few of the accounts of life as labour 
correspondents contain more than a mere mention of rank and file trade unionists or 
workers. In the course of their daily routine, labour journalists simply did not 
encounter 'ordinary' trade unionists unless they were covering a dispute. In these 
circumstances, contacts with those involved at a local level would be sought but 
journalists would have to start from scratch and they often received little 
encouragement from senior officials within unions who were frequently suspicious of 
independent dialogue between activists and reporters. Hence, the fury of Ernest Bevin 
during the 1937 bus strike (Evans, 1953:54; Jones, 1988: 11). Only correspondents 
working for the Daily Worker/ Morning Star have over the years, through the network 
of union contacts developed by the Communist Party, enjoyed regular and routine 
relations with union rank and file members. Access to these journalists' 'contact 
books' has always been a much sought after prize within the Group. 
In the early years, relationships between the Group and the labour movement elite, 
were based upon a small number of quite specific personal friendships. The 
'triumvirate' of Evans, McKay and Chevins was able to establish cordial relations with 
senior union officials, as well as leading figures in the Labour Party and the Co-
operative Party. According to Evans, Ian McKay 'did more than anyone else to 
breakdown the barriers between labour leaders and journalists ... his capacity for 
anecdotes and drink was prodigious'(l953:22). After having formed the Anti-Luncheon 
League to promote the virtue of whisky over solid food at lunch times, McKay would 
often fail to attend the afternoon sessions at conferences. However, according to Evans, 
union leaders would regularly report to McKay to keep him abreast of events. 
'He was happier in their company than perhaps, in any other, 
save the companionship of his fellow newspapermen ... when they 
[TUC leaders] relaxed and became their natural selves at the 
adjournment of Congress, Ian was a welcome addition to their 
party.' (Tracey, 1953: 114) 
A considerable amount of this 'bridge mending' was required because relations between 
journalists as an occupational group and organised labour were problematic throughout 
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the two decades preceding the Second World. The rivalry between the two 
organisations seeking to represent journalists during this period is well documented 
(Christian, 1980). While the Institute of Journalists sought to appeal to journalists as 
members of a professional association, the National Union of Journalists offered 
journalists the benefits of collective unionised organisation. However, the tensions 
arising from this conflict over occupational identity and status surfaced inside the 
National Union of Journalists, itself, leading to furious internal debates over the 
question of affiliation to the TUC. The NUJ affiliated in 1920, only to disaffiliate three 
years later over the requirement of the TUC that all affiliates contribute to a 
propaganda fund which, in practice, involved primarily a direct subsidy to the Daily 
Herald (Mansfield, 1943: eh XIV). A small majority of NUJ branches considered this 
violated their professional code. It took eighteen years for the union activists within the 
NUJ to win the battle for re-affiliation. Tensions with the TUC were further heightened 
during the 1926 General Strike when the NUJ fudged the question of support for the 
print unions (Mansfield 1943:ch XVII). 
If a single labour and industrial correspondent was a familiar feature of most 
national and some regional papers by the end of the 1930s, the steady increase in the 
volume of industrial and labour news in the next decade stimulated a further growth in 
numbers. For example, Mary Stewart was appointed to act as number two to Ian 
McKay on the News Chronicle in 1945 (Evans, 1953:62) and by the end of the war 
sufficient pressure had been generated around Fleet Street for the rules governing 
membership of the Group to be amended to allow news organisations to nominate 
number two's and three's (Jones, 1988:11) Though the Times refrained from 
appointing an additional labour correspondent until1963 (Seaton,1982:278), the 
political climate in the 1950s provided conditions which continued to stimulate the 
expansion of labour and industrial reporting on most papers. As Middlemas notes, the 
pressing need for co-operation between the representatives of labour, capital and the 
state to ensure national survival during the War, established a 'corporate bias' in the 
development of state policy which continued through the 1950s. Under both Atlee and 
successive Conservative administrations (Middlemas, 1986:340- 342), a philosophy 
which promoted an unprecedented degree of economic planning and a central role for 
the state in securing the co-operation of labour and capital, was embraced by civil 
servants and ministers alike. The institutional arrangements of the post-war settlement 
came to represent, 'an organic part of the state' (Middlemas, 1986:342). As these 
institutional and departmental arrangements unfolded in the decade after the war so the 
labour and industrial beat expanded further. 
Middlemas notes that the political and administrative perspectives which grew out 
of the experience of the War defined not only an institutional structure for the state but 
also a set of concepts or rules describing the appropriate orientation of the key actors in 
the political process, towards one another and the state (Middlemas,1990:2). In short, 
the ideology underpinning the post war settlement achieved, for almost a decade, a 
hegemonic influence (Middlemas,1986:342) amongst policy makers and opinion 
leaders. Inevitably, this influenced the editorial thinking of national newspapers and 
encouraged a keener editorial interest in labour and industrial news. Thus, not only 
were industrial correspondents finding in the 1950s that their beats were expanding but 
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that also their copy was in more urgent demand within their news organisations. 
According to Middlemas, by the end of the decade the tensions between the main 
interests within the corporate consensus were already undermining its authority. By this 
stage, it began to be recognised that such a framework of co-operation was likely to 
benefit the state more than the other players in the game (1986:345). Nonetheless, this 
did not present an immediate threat to the institutional and departmental structure of the 
state which underpinned the expanding labour and industrial beat. Indeed, such 
tensions between the key players within these corporate arrangements were likely to 
generate even more copy. As we shall see in the following section such tensions and 
also rivalries within the state itself, between departments, proved to be very significant 
stimuli to the flows of information useful to industrial journalists. 
The dominance of the Conservative Party in office during the next decade after the 
war did not represent a set back for labour and industrial journalism. Before and during 
the war the Conservative Party had undergone an intense ideological debate over the 
extent to which it should draw upon its 'One Nation' traditions and renounce 
'Baldwinite' market liberalism, as a way of charting a new post war course. Against the 
right wing of the party, Butler and Macmillan were successful in winning sufficient 
support to ensure a stable commitment to the politics of the post war settlement. This 
was formalised in the proceedings of the 1947 Conservative Party conference where 
policies setting out an extended role for the state in the regulation of the economy and 
the development of a industrial strategy were presented by Butler and agreed by 
conference despite bitter attacks from the Beaverbrook press (Gamble, 1974:ch 3). 
Following the decisive defeat in the 1945 general election, it was recognised that to 
resist the overall framework of the post-war settlement would be nothing short of 
political suicide for the party (Gamble,1988:64). The new Conservative thinking on 
industrial strategy and the role of the state was contained in an 'Industrial Charter', 
presented to the 1947 conference. This had been drafted by Butler and included within 
it a 'Workers Charter', setting out a framework of workplace rights. This was the 
subject of vigorous debate between Tory progressives like Butler and Macmillan, on 
the one hand, and the market liberal wing of the party. This political in-fighting, in 
itself, generated valuable copy for both political and industrial correspondents but an 
added twist was given to this process by the political rivalry between Butler and 
Macmillan. Despite their common ideological position within the party both were 
extremely keen to be seen leading the movement for progressive reform. As a 
consequence, both wanted to be primarily associated with the Charter and this rivalry 
produced a sequence of stories for industrial correspondents in the months running up 
to the 1947 conference (Howard,l987:158-159). In drafting the Charter, Butler had 
spent months touring the country, talking to industrialists, party members and also 
trade unionists. In this process, relationships with journalists had also been strengthened 
and Butler continued to exploit these as the conflicts over the extent of the Conservative 
Party's new progressivism continued to be disputed right up to the publication of the 
final policy document in 1949 (Howard,l987:176). 
One of the leading lights inside the research department at Conservative Central 
Office who was involved in the drafting of the Industrial Charter was lain Macleod 
who had experience as a former journalist and still retained a number of contacts 
180 
(Fisher, 1973: 138). Once again, Trevor Evans was regarded as a personal friend but it 
is clear that Macleod retained links with a number of industrial correspondents. It was 
Macleod who, in becoming Minister of Labour in 1955, breathed new life into the 
ideas associated with the Industrial Charter. His predecessor, Walter Moncton, had 
been a less committed advocate. Under Macleod, the ministry moved more firmly 
towards the adoption of an arbiter role in the industrial relations process and through 
the National Joint Advisory Council (the forerunner to NEDDY), Macleod secured 
support from both sides of industry for the drafting of a code for industrial relations 
reflecting the philosophy of the Industrial Charter (Fisher,l973:110). 
So through the 1950s, despite the electoral dominance of the Conservative Party 
labour and industrial journalism continued to expand. As the state intervened more in 
the process of industrial relations, so more labour and industrial stories were 'defined' 
as important and through ministers such as Macleod, and to a degree Butler, informal 
channels of communication were established between labour and industrial journalists 
and the Cabinet. These lines of communication were not as significant as they were to 
become once the Labour Party arrived in office in 1964 but nonetheless they afforded 
labour journalists sufficient professional authority to ensure the growing status of their 
specialism. Further to this, a series of strikes in the car and ship building industries 
and on London Transport buses in the late 1950s placed industrial news on the front 
pages and compelled Macleod to establish a string of Courts of Inquiry, each of which 
became an important temporary feature of the labour beat. The 1957 bus strike 
generated so much media interest that journalists besieged Maclead at his home in 
Enfield (Fisher, 1973: 130). 
John Hare became Minister for Labour in 1959 but the government continued to find 
itself being dragged increasingly frequently into the industrial relations arena as the 
problem of rising wage demands became ever more acute. Prime Minister Macmillan 
pushed for a 'Pay Pause' in 1962 and sought to extend corporate decision making 
through the creation of the National Economic Development Council, together with 
'little Neddies' for each industrial sector, as a way of securing greater co-operation 
from capital and labour (Macmillan,1973:ch 3). This helped to expand the labour and 
industrial beat and opened up more channels through which labour journalists could 
obtain copy but appeared to have little impact upon industrial behaviour. At one point 
in 1962, railway workers, postmen, the lower grades in the Civil Service and even the 
makers of cricket balls were all on strike (Macmillan, 1973:50). Throughout the early 
1960s, industrial unrest generated a copious supply of copy for labour correspondents. 
It is clear that even when in opposition, correspondents were keen to develop 
contacts within the Labour Party as well as the government. Often, this occurred 
naturally as they dealt with officials in particular trade unions. For example, George 
Brown , later to head the Department of Economic Affairs, a key ministry on the 1960s 
· beat, first came into contact with labour correspondents as a T and G delegate to the 
Labour PartY conference in 1939. Over the next two decades, as he rose to prominence 
within the Labour Party he maintained close relationships, particularly with Trevor 
Evans, Ian McKay and John Anderson, the industrial correspondent of the Guardian 
throughout the 1950s (Brown,I971:64). Brown blamed his later notoriety and adverse 
publicity upon the erosion of trust and lack of integrity which he believed characterised 
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journalism in the years after the era of McKay and Evans. With the latter 'off the 
record' meant 'off the record', but for Brown the younger generation of industrial 
correspondents were merely 'eavesdroppers and gossip writers' (1971:64). 
Once Wi1son had been elected as leader of the Labour Party following the death of 
Gaitskell, he established a practice of briefing not only the Westminster Lobby but the 
Industrial and Labour Group on a regular basis as well (Jones, 1988). Wilson was 
invited as guest speaker when the Group celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1963 at the 
Hilton in London and a year later Wilson made a point of ensuring that the press party 
which accompanied his election campaign was made up of members from the Group as 
well as the Westminster Lobby. Just as in the 1940s, certain personal relationships 
between elite figures within the labour movement and members of the Group were to 
play a pivotal part in ensuring that the Group were accepted, even welcomed, as a 
familiar part of the labour movement's political landscape. During the War, Trevor 
Evans and Ian McKay were able to befriend an important group of ministers including 
Bevin, Dalton, Morrison and Grenfell. These friendships were important in reinforcing 
the legitimacy of the Group as well as in representing significant sources of 
information. Similarly, in the 1960s George Brown and Barbara Castle, in particular, 
enjoyed warm friendships with leading figures from the Group and as both were to 
occupy positions of great importance in the formulation of industrial and labour policy, 
the Group as a whole was to benefit from these personal relationships between 
members of the Labour Party elite and senior industrial correspondents. 
A similar process of consolidation occurred during the 1950s in terms of the Group's 
relationships with the elite representatives within the trade union movement. The TUC 
and the headquarters of the larger trade unions in London became regular components 
of the labour beat in the 1950s. Union leaders rarely attached a very high value to 
public relations and, often, journalists had to work hard in explaining to unions why 
they should attach more importance to the question of how they dealt with the news 
media. Eric Wigham, a distinguished labour correspondent for the Times between the 
mid-50s and the late 60s, devoted a chapter in a 1961 Penguin Special, 'What's Wrong 
With the Unions?' to listing the public relations failings of many of the largest unions 
(Wigham,1961:ch 9). The list is a familiar one which would be recognised by many 
journalists working throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s. Very few unions at that 
stage employed full time press officers, they were slow in responding to requests for 
comment or information, senior officials were too often unavailable for briefings and 
when officials did talk to journalists their approach was too often characterised by 
suspicion and caution (Wigham, 1961:ch 9). Nevertheless, there were some unions with 
more enlightened communication strategies (Wigham points to the approaches of 
NALGO, the NUR, USDA Wand the civil service unions) and, in terms of personal 
relationships with particular union leaders, the Industrial and Labour Group made 
significant progress. So much so that by 1961, it was possible for the Group to 
challenge the elite of the union movement to a game of cricket at the TUC Conference, 
an event which subsequently became a regular fixture and continues to the present 
today. 
Throughout the early post war years, then, the status and prospects of the Group 
improved. The post-war state displayed a 'corporate bias' which stimulated the growth 
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of a number of departments concerned with industrial and economic policy. These 
formed the foundations for a structure of routine sources around which the Group could 
cluster. The main organisations of the labour movement also came to represent 
important components of the labour beat and particular personal relationships between 
leading members of the Group and important figures within the labour movement were 
established. While the labour movement, as a whole, remained suspicious of the press 
for many good reasons, it was possible for union leaders and senior figures within the 
Labour Party to recognise that individual journalists, including many of the Labour and 
Industrial Group, were personally sympathetic to the values of the Left. 
For these reasons, by the beginning of the 1960s most national newspapers included 
an industrial news desk with at least two and often three specialists. A journalistic 
hierarchy within the news organisation would be reflected in terms of a division of 
labour on the beat, itself. Thus, the industrial editor or number one would expect to 
cover the more important stories, take responsibility for the cultivation of the more 
prestigious sources on the beat and delegate responsibility for the more routine tasks 
associated with the desk (7). By the early 1960s the process of specialisation had 
advanced to the point where a number of newspapers began to distinguish between 
industrial and labour specialisms (Tunsta11,1971:80-89). While some industrial 
specialists would deal with economic and industrial policy broadly defined, some 
labour specialists began to concentrate more upon the unions as sources and the other 
organisations within the labour movement. In this way they began to focus more 
sharply upon the political dimension, thereby exacerbating friction between the Group 
and the Westminister Lobby. The potential for rivalry had always existed because of 
the tradition, established during the thirties, for industrial correspondents to attend not 
only the TUC Conference but also the Labour and Co-operative Party conferences. 
Such tensions were notably heightened with the creation of new economic planning 
departments under the first Wilson administration, to be discussed in the next section 
and it is in this 'golden era' that the Group seriously challenges the position of the 
Westminster Lobby at the top of the specialist tree. 
1964 to 1979: 'the golden age' of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group. 
Few observers would dispute that the 1960s and 1970s represented a period in which 
the Group reached its peak in terms of professional status and authority (8). It was in 
this period that membership of the Group reached its highest total in its entire history; 
senior members of the Group achieved a new prominence through official recognition 
of one kind and another (knighthoods, appointments to Royal Commissions and even 
eo-option into government ), and the enhanced status of the Group was confirmed by 
the numbers of young graduates, many from 'Oxbridge', who chose Labour and 
Industrial reporting in preference to the Lobby. Labour and industrial journalism had 
become, in this period, the 'fast track' route for young ambitious journalists who 
wanted to make their mark quickly. 
For many journalists, these developments in themselves contain the explanation for 
the high standing of the Labour and Industrial Group. In terms of this explanation, the 
Group enjoyed unprecedented professional authority because of the importance attached 
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to labour and industrial news inside the newsrooms (9). So great was the appetite for 
copy from the industrial and labour desks that Jim Fookes (number two at the Press 
Association for much of this period) says, 'we were the peace time war 
correspondents'. The problem, of course, with this form of explanation is that it rests 
upon a circular argument. Industrial and labour journalism achieves a high standing 
because news organisations choose to rank it in this way. The task must be to pose a 
deeper set of questions in order to provide an analysis which can explain why news 
organisations attached such a priority to labour and industrial news at this time. Once 
again, it is necessary to consider the role of the state and the political-economic 
environment. 
There are four ways in which the state can be understood as exercising a vital 
influence over the fortunes of labour and industrial journalism. Firstly, although 
Middlemas (1986:ch 11) points to the growing difficulty of securing consent amongst 
the leading producer groups to corporatist political arrangements by the middle of the 
1960s, nevertheless the Wilson administration arrived in office with a programme to 
expand the departments of state responsible for economic planning and intervene even 
more directly in industrial policy. The political and ideological importance of this 
programme for the Labour Party gave it a momentum which was maintained for much 
of the government's term in office, until economic difficulties and opposition from 
within the Treasury led to retreat in the final two years before the 1970 general 
election. Similarly, in the post-Selsdon phase of the Heath administration and in the 
early years of the next Wilson government, with Tony Benn at the Department of 
Industry, the state was characterised by an expansion in departments with responsibility 
for planning and economic intervention. As we have seen expansion in these areas of 
state activity stimulates growth in the labour and industrial beat with the emergence of 
new potential sources for the Group. In addition, this period was also characterised by 
the growing importance of nationalised industries to the economy. Here, too, the Group 
found regular and reliable sources of information. 
Secondly, the Wilson government provided an important service for labour and 
industrial journalism in reaffirming the value of planning and intervention. Wilson's 
appeal to technocratic values in the 1964 election campaign and the subsequent 
presentation of policy within this ideological framework, helped to ensure the 
continuing 'hegemony' (Middlemas 1986:342) of a neo-Keynesian ideology promoting 
corporate agreement and rational economic planning amongst policy makers and 
opinion leaders. Thus, while many news organisations were committed to editorial 
perspectives hostile to Wilson and the government, a broad consensus existed which 
accepted the 'inevitability' of corporatist intervention and the importance, therefore, of 
labour and industrial copy in the hierarchy of news values. However, thirdly, the 
expansion of the state frequently generated internal tensions, often involving a 
Treasury jealous of its sphere of influence, and these tensions in turn, produced streams 
of 'leaks', all of which enhanced the cultivation of the labour beat. While it was in the 
interests of the Group for the state to continue to embrace the values of rational 
economic planning, it was also in the interests of the Group for the government to 
experience serious difficulties in implementing such policies. Political tensions and 
conflicts, either inwardly or outwardly directed, meant interesting copy. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, with the triumph of the Labour Party in the 
1964 election, the elite figures within the labour movement, with whom the Labour and 
Industrial Group had cultivated contacts throughout the previous two decades, had 
finally moved into positions of power. While the Group had always sought to maintain 
good relations with ministers in Conservative administrations, the culture of the Group 
and the politics of many of its members produced a stronger affinity with leading 
figures inside the Labour Party. Similarly, it was with union leaders and those 
managers in the nationalised industries with centre-left political sympathies, rather than 
the representatives of business and commerce, with whom most members of the Group 
were likely to develop an authentic rapport. With Labour in office and with particular 
individuals in charge of key departments, the Group was able to achieve 'insider 
status', in that it enjoyed the confidence of a number of leading political figures and 
more frequent informal contact. As the Wilson administration, initially, embraced the 
trade union elite, eo-opting Frank Cousins into the Cabinet, so the Group also found 
that its network of contacts extended into the centre of government, providing a 
channel for the communication of political information which was a serious rival to the 
Westminster Lobby. 
Changes in the structure of the departments of state and the composition of the 
political elite were important factors in producing a rising tide of labour journalism but 
the strength and consequent political power of organised labour, produced through the 
application of policies of full-employment for almost two decades, was also a crucial 
factor. Strong and politically potent trade unions were 'news'. 
The remainder of this section will consider the development of the Group in the 
period between 1964 and 1979 in the light of the framework set out above. 
The Structure of the State. 
The election of the Wilson government in 1964 resulted in an immediate expansion in 
the number of state departments dealing with economic or industrial policy and an 
enhanced role for existing departments and state sponsored regulatory institutions. 
Wilson created a Department of Economic Affairs to develop strategic economic 
planning and a Ministry of Technology, 'to be a ministry of industry' 
(Wilson,l971:8), under Frank Cousins, on sabbatical from the Transport and General 
Workers Union. The Ministries of Labour, Technology, Power, and Transport all 
enjoyed full Cabinet status. The National Research Development Corporation, 
established by Atlee in 1948, was expanded as was the role of the National Economic 
Development Council (Wilson, 1971:8). In an effort to come to terms with one of the 
enduring political problems of the administration's years in office,- the position of the 
state in relation to the regulation of incomes-, the National Board on Prices and 
Incomes was given statutory power in 1965 (Wilson,l971:133). The regulatory boards 
were regarded as routine sources for number two or three correspondents on the 
industrial desks of most papers (10). Not only did the new government expand the 
framework of industrial and economic regulation, it sought to actively intervene in the 
arena of industrial relations and this generated a great deal of copy for correspondents. 
The first Wilson administration took an active interest in the resolution of major 
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national industrial conflicts including two rail disputes (1966 and 1967), the seaman's 
strike (1966), the dock strike (1967), a dispute at Fords (1969),and the strike in the 
newspaper industry (1970) amongst others (Wilson,l971). In each case, industrial and 
political specialisms overlapped as Ministers sought to bring union leaders and 
employers together. The profile of the State continued to loom large in attempts to 
regulate industrial relations and steer economic development under Heath and the 
second Wilson administration. The spectacular unravelling of Heath's industrial 
relations policy between 1972 and 1974 over-shadowed the continuing growth in the 
size of the departments of state responsible for industrial policy with, for example, the 
creation of the Industrial Assistance Board in 1972. While the former ensured that the 
copy produced by the Group regularly appeared on the front pages, it was the latter 
which permitted the continuing development of the industrial beat. With the return of 
Wilson to office, the Industrial Assistance Board assumed a greater importance, 
representing a central mechanism in the state's attempt to 'pick economic winners' or 
candidates for state support (Wilson,1979: 149). The energy of the state in developing 
an industrial strategy was, of course, a theme which was promoted with enthusiasm by 
the press officers within the relevant state departments and the Chief Information 
Officer (head of the Ministry of Labour's information division) was granted access to 
the highest level policy making forums, including NEDDY (Ogilvy-Webb,l965: 105). 
Throughout this period the nationalised industries represented a very important 
section of the industrial beat. In contrast to the period after 1979, the state permitted 
many of the seni()r executives within this sector to be recruited from within. As a result 
a managerial culture specific to the public sector flourished in the post war period, one 
which placed considerable importance upon public service and often reflected the 
values of the post-war settlement in its orientation to labour relations. The concept of a 
partnership between management and unions in delivering a service to the public on 
behalf of the state was widely recognised, if not always applied in practice. Several of 
the most senior executives were sympathetic to social democratic or socialist 
perspectives, including Derek Ezra at the National Coal Board and, a little later, Sir 
Peter Parker at British Rail (Parker,1989). This culture was later to prompt the 
Thatcher administration to conduct a purge by stealth in which such senior managers 
were replaced by senior executives from the private sector. Common ground, then, 
was often to be found between journalists within the Labour and Industrial Group and 
the executives of the nationalised industries. Senior executives from the nationalised 
industries were frequently invited to speak at the "do's" arranged by the Group at the 
Cheshire Cheese in Fleet Street and some of the press officers working for nationalised 
industries were still regarded as the most helpful on the beat by the Group in the 1980s, 
according to data collected by MORI (11). 
It is in this period stretching from the middle of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s in 
which close relationships were forged between the 'leading lights' in the Group and 
particular managers within the nationalised sector. Geoffrey Goodman, for example, 
rose to prominence in the 1960s through his close political involvement with the 
Labour administration but also established important friendships with senior managers 
at a number of nationalised industries and particularly, Geoff Kirk, Ned Smith (the 
National Coal Board's director of industrial relations) and even successive chairmen, 
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including Ezra and Siddall (Goodman, 1985:34). Indeed, Goodman commanded 
sufficient authority to act later as a go between during the 1984 Coal Strike in an effort 
to re-convene negotiations (Goodman, 1985: 98). 
It was not necessary for the state to actively promote relationships between the 
nationalised industries and the Group but merely to tolerate and permit relationships 
which naturally developed as the 'common sense' of economic planning and industrial 
intervention became the received wisdom within news rooms as amongst the political 
elite. The capacity of the State to undermine such relationships and radically alter the 
structure of the industrial beat is dramatically underlined during the course of the 
Thatcher years. During the 1950s and, most particularly, during the years of Wilson 
and Heath the state regarded these relationships without the suspicion characteristic of 
the 1980s. 
It was in the late 1960s that a sharper specialisation began to emerge between labour 
and industrial correspondents. This could only occur when sufficient journalists were 
attached to the industrial desk and, in any case, rarely represented a hard and fast 
occupational division. Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1960s journalists within the 
Group were likely to regard themselves as either industrial journalists with a labour 
brief or industrial correspondents with an industrial brief (Tunstall,1971:78-85). The 
latter's beat would embrace the nationalised industries and the growing number of 
departments of state concerned with industrial policy while the former focused more 
precisely upon the organisations and institutions most closely involved in industrial 
relations. It was here that rivalry with the Westminster Lobby grew most acute 
(Tunstall,1971:144) because the labour beat was likely to include many of the political 
institutions which represented important features of the Lobby correspondents territory 
int:luding, for example, the monthly meeting of the Labour Party national executive 
and the Labour Party conference, as well as the political institutions responsible for the 
regulation of industrial relations. While news editors sometimes tried to insist upon a 
co-operative approach between the groups, the occupational culture within each camp 
was sufficiently crystallised by the end of the second decade after the War for this to be 
actively resisted by both sides (12). 
As both the Crossman Diaries and Barbara Castle's memoirs indicate, the Labour 
government of 1964 to 1970 was so preoccupied with problems of industrial relations 
and so inclined to establish Courts of Inquiry or Tribunals in an effort to resolve them, 
that a richly fertile territory was set out to expand the labour beat (see for example, 
Crossman,1979:653-654). Inevitably, as this territory was populated by employers, 
trade unionists, and the government, both labour correspondents and the Westminster 
Lobby gathered upon it. The Industrial and Labour Group, however, enjoyed the 
advantage of frequently superior contacts within the union and labour movement and 
for sometime they were able to exploit these to produce information or 'intelligence' of 
a quality which could not be matched by the Westminster Lobby. Later, however, as 
the Group sensed the tide of political events moving against them, its attempts to 
penetrate to the heart of the Lobby's territory inside Parliament were sharply rebuffed. 
Requests that press passes be allocated to members of the Group were denied. 
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The Development of the Group 
Against a background of expansion in the extent of the beats and an ideological climate 
fostered by the state, which encouraged the prioritisation of industrial news, the Labour 
and Industrial Correspondents' Group reached a point of maturity in the mid-1960s 
which was signalled by the adoption of a formal constitution in 1965 (13). Seaton 
(1982) estimates numbers in the Group reaching up to 100 at this point though this may 
be an over-estimate and former officers of the Group interviewed by the author place 
the figure at closer to 75 (14). Tunstall identifies 33 correspondents but this refers to 
the labour rather than the industrial beat. However, he also notes that only the Lobby 
recruited more specialists and that larger numbers were employed in industrial 
journalism than, for example, football, crime, or education (1971 :294). As the Group 
has failed to retain any written record of its business or its membership totals before 
1982, it is impossible to determine precisely what the total membership at the height of 
the Group's influence and status actually was. Nevertheless, the decline in membership 
from a maximum of 75 plus in the period up to 1979, to the present total of just under 
50 through the decade of the 1980s is an indication of the changes which the Group 
experienced in its fortunes as the political climate grew harsher and the state broke with 
the arrangements of the post-war settlement. 
In the period between 1965 and 1979, however, all the evidence suggests that the 
Group enjoyed unprecedented status and influence. Membership totals rose as more 
news organisations recruited second and third journalists to staff their industrial desks. 
Experienced senior industrial correspondents who had developed careers through the 
1950s achieved positions of eminence, sometimes confirmed through official 
recognition of one form or another. Trevor Evans was knighted while Eric Wigham 
was appointed to the Donovan Commission in 1967. Geoffrey Goodman was recruited 
by the government itself to advise on the presentation of income and prices policy at 
the Counter Inflation Unit. Goodman was also a member of the Royal Commission on 
the Press established during Wilson's second term in office, writing a minority report 
with David Basnett, leader of the General and Municipal Workers Union, which was 
published by the Labour Party (Basnett and Goodman,l977). Tunstall's material on 
specialist correspondents of the 1960s indicates that the average age of an industrial 
specialist was 37, average age of entry was 30 and that a quarter of industrial 
specialists had spent over 10 years within the specialism (1971:95). The rapid turnover 
in specialists, indicative of the decline in status which characterised industrial 
journalism in the period after 1979, was clearly not present in the sixties. Tunstall also 
noted that by the 1960s the industrial beat was regarded as a stepping stone for the most 
ambitious journalists who sought to gain entry to the Lobby. 
From the beginning of the 1970s, however, a new generation of university educated 
journalists, often influenced by the intellectual climate of the 1960s, began to arrive in 
Fleet Street and for many the industrial desk was a first preference, even above the 
Lobby (15). Paul Routledge, Donald Maclntyre, Peter Riddell, Christian Tyler, John 
Lloyd, Peter Jenkins and Mick Costello, for example, all arrived on the industrial beat 
from Oxbridge or the older red brick universities in the late sixties or early seventies. 
Together with David Fenton, Barrie Clement, and Chris Potter, these journalists 
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represented a group, largely graduate trained, who achieved very high reputations 
within newspaper journalism and accumulated considerable professional authority. A 
large number eventually moved on to positions of national prominence as political 
editors or senior executives. A number remained within industrial journalism 
throughout the seventies and the papers of the Group in the early 1980s confirm their 
continuing influence, though in this decade journalists with a stronger sympathy for the 
politics of 'new realism' in the labour movement also began to achieve positions of 
influence and, in addition, it was those industrial correspondents now regarded as 'the 
old guard' who were most affected by the traumatic upheavals in the mid-eighties, 
which triggered the crisis of labour and industrial journalism to be discussed below. 
The journalists arriving on the industrial beat in the late sixties and early seventies 
had, in their turn, supplanted the 'ancien regime' (as one describes it) of Goodman, 
Wigham, Keith McDowell, and, of course Evans and Chevins, those senior journalists 
who had established their reputations a decade or more earlier. They also brought with 
them the political perspectives which dominated university departments in the late 
sixties and early seventies and a rather more iconoclastic approach to journalism. It was 
this generation, for example, that introduced the annual 1 golden bollock1 award for the 
worst labour or industrial news item of the year, presented at the Group 1 s annual 
general meeting (the significance of this ritual is explored further in the next chapter). 
According to some of those involved the Group itself became more politicised with 
rival factions seeking to secure the officerships (the politics and culture of the Group 
will also be discussed at greater length below). It was clearly the case, however, that 
the industrial and labour beat at this time attracted the bright and ambitious in 
newspaper journalism who recognised the importance attached to industrial and labour 
news, the connections between the Group and the political elite and the sense of 
influence which these brought. The intellectual tides of the sixties also frequently 
brought a sympathy for the labour movement and the politics of the left. In this era it 
was easier, of course, to reconcile personal politics with professional career interests. 
Tunstall found that 7 out of the 9 specialist groups of journalists he interviewed in 
the 1960s ranked the industrial specialism in the top three of a status hierarchy, though 
only the industrial group ranked itself at the very top (1971:109). Many in the 
specialism had moved from other specialisms, regarding this as an enhancement in 
status. Industrial and labour reporting retained a very high professional standing 
throughout the 1970s and continued to offer the young, bright and ambitious extremely 
good career prospects (Seaton 1982:278). It was in the period after 1979 that these 
measures of status began to suggest a significant decline. Towards the end of the 1980s 
the turn over in journalists on the labour and industrial beat accelerated. The specialism 
is no longer regarded as a stepping stone to the Lob by or as a rung on the ladder 
towards a senior editorial career. Journalists are now much keener to move onto 
something new which might provide more opportunities. The membership of the Group 
has declined. Interviews with current and former industrial correspondents confirm the 
picture of a specialism in decline. Indeed, several articles have been written regarding 
precisely this (Jones 1988; Bassett 1988; Harper 1991). The reasons for this and the 
role of the State in this process will be discussed in a subsequent section. 
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The Group Adopts a Formal Constitution 
The confidence and optimism of this period for members of the Labour and 
Industrial Group is reflected in the arrangements formalised in the written constitution 
which was adopted in 1965. The constitution lays out a set of rules which will be 
familiar to students of professionalisation. The objects of the Group were to, 
" ... represent the interests of all Labour and Industrial 
correspondents, improve the facilities and amenities available 
for the collection of news and to stimulate informal contacts 
with appropriate departments and organisations. "(16) 
So the intention made explicit in the constitution was for the Group to act not only as a 
collective organisation to improve the working conditions for labour and industrial 
specialists but to act as a mechanism to open up a wider range of formal and informal 
sources of information. Through the regular events at the Cheshire Cheese in Fleet 
Street and the Clarence in Whitehall, the Group had always facilitated formal and 
informal briefings from key sources. This was now confirmed as a formal objective of 
the Group. At the end of the war membership limits had been increased from one to 
three correspondents per news organisation. The new constitution formalised an upper 
limit of three labour correspondents and three industrial correspondents per news 
organisation, thus doubling the upper limit on membership. This reflected the 
increasing numbers of specialists and the advancing division of labour internal to the 
specialism between the labour and industrial beats. The constitution indicated that 
labour and industrial journalists should be listed separately, thus confirming the 
division in specialisation as each membership list would be supplied to the press offices 
of key sources to make up separate mailing and invitation lists for news conferences, 
press events, and press releases. However, from an inspection of the Group's papers it 
appears that, in practice, the distinction between labour and industrial reporting was 
rarely employed by the Group's secretaries in compiling lists. It seems likely that given 
the need to rotate responsibilities in order to cover the desk at weekends and holiday 
periods, in practice it was found difficult to maintain a rigid division between the two. 
Negrine has recently argued that in practice specialist demarcations are frequently a 
matter of organisational convenience rather than a function of the distribution of 'real' 
expertise (1993). 
The constitution also confmns the importance of London as the centre of both the 
labour and industrial beats. Membership was open only to the: 
'London-based Labour and Industrial Correspondents employed 
by national and provincial UK newspapers and news magazines 
which are on public sale, the Press Association, the BBC News 
Division and ITN.' (17) 
The difficulty for London based correspondents dependent upon a London beat in 
seeking to develop significant contacts with ordinary union activists away from the 
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metropolis has already been noted and will be discussed further below. For the 
moment, it is sufficient to note that the adoption of this constitution in the mid-60s 
confirms both the expansion in numbers occurring at this time and the confidence of the 
Group in seeking to maintain the mechanism of exclusivity to reinforce professional 
standing. Membership clearly did open up opportunities to reach particular sources of 
information and was a convenient way ensuring one's name appeared on the most 
important mailing lists for industrial and labour sources. And at the same time, 
however, the constitution made it clear that membership and the associated access was 
not available to journalists who failed to satisfy the criteria for admission to the Group. 
Thus, at this time, economic and financial journalists, air correspondents (who 
overlapped with industry), science and technical writers, and those concerned with 
personnel management were excluded. It is significant that in a very different climate 
during the 1980s the papers of the Group confirm that serious thought was being given 
to proposals to slacken membership restrictions and widen the definition of 'industrial' 
to include, for example, business and personnel journalism, in an effort to combat the 
decline in membership. 
The Routine of labour journalism: relations with unions and the political elite, 
What was the routine for labour and industrial correspondents like in the 1960s? 
According to Tunstall (1971:77) labour and industrial specialists found that they could 
spend up to three quarters of their time devoted to their specialism. This, in itself, is in 
marked contrast to the contemporary scene where, with the exception of certain 
broadsheet papers like the Guardian and the Financial Times, many labour specialists 
said in interview for the present research, that they either had to double up specialisms 
(for example, with education on the Express) or were required by news editors to 
became flexible 'jacks of all trades', in the absence of newsworthy labour items. 
Journalists on both the labour and industrial beats, during the 1960s, reported 
attending two to three formal press conferences each week (Tunsta111971: 181). This 
would suggest that informal contact with key sources represented an important and 
daily part of the routine. Evidence from Tunstall also reinforces the point that the state 
played an important role in shaping the terrain of the beats. Labour correspondents 
reported enjoying excellent relations with the Ministry of Labour. It was, 'even more 
like a news organisation than most other ministries', (1971:180) with an organisational 
rhythm and a 'nose' for bad as well as good news. Given the likelihood of most serious 
regional disputes eventually leading to London-based negotiations, few labour 
correspondents reported, in Tun stall's study, making more than rare trips away from 
the capital. The hierarchical ordering of the specialism, however, made a difference 
here. If a story from the regions had to be covered, then unless it had the potential to 
be of exceptional importance, the 'number three' would be dispatched from the desk. 
Former correspondents remember being sent to cover the less important union 
conferences throughout each summer which often amounted to twelve or more (18). 
The industrial editor or 'number one', however, would insist upon venturing away 
from the capital for the most prestigious conferences, such as the Transport and 
General Workers' Union, the National Union of Mineworkers, the TUC itself and the 
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Labour Party. Similarly, the daily beat in London was structured along hierarchical 
lines. Number three correspondents would handle the smaller stories and be assigned to 
foster contacts at the less politically significant source organisations. Thus, contacts 
with members of the political elite would be handled by the 'number one' while routine 
press conferences were attended by the 'number three'. The 'number one' might spend 
lunch time dining with senior union elders at the TUC, while the 'number two' would 
meet officials at the General and Municipal Workers Union and the 'number three' 
would be dispatched at lunch time to the Marquis of Granby in Smith Square, opposite 
the headquarters of the Transport and General Workers' Union, where contacts might 
be established with union officials working at the level of trade group secretariat (for 
example, docks, buses, etc). The latter was a particularly useful source for informal 
briefings before the Labour Party moved out of Transport House to Walworth Road 
(19). One former 'number two' remembers attending a routine briefing from the press 
officer at the TUC in the mid-1970s where a 'number one' after glancing around, in the 
middle of the briefing, exclaimed, 'Hey, I' m the only number one here, where should I 
be?'(20). However, for important stories even 'number one' correspondents were likely 
to find themselves 'door stepping' outside ACAS or a union headquarters where 
significant negotiations were underway. Thus, Barrie Clement (former industrial editor 
on the Times and now the Independent) recalls the 'boozy nights outside ACAS' (Hill, 
1993). One former labour correspondent recalls the 'door stepping' process as usually 
running along the following lines: 
"We'd be there at the start as people went in to get some 
indication of how long they were going to be and then we'd 
go to the pub. But if you were an agency man [Press 
Association, etc] you couldn't afford to miss people 
coming out with new information. Stories might break. 
But often people would come out and go to the same pub 
themselves. There was a distinct pub culture." (21) 
The early morning, then, would be spent scanning the rival papers, mid morning 
two or three times a week might involve a press conference or ministry sponsored news 
event; lunch times would be devoted to informal meetings with contacts and by mid-
afternoon industrial staff would return to the desk to begin to select stories. The 
working day might end around 8. OOpm. It appears that there was relatively little 
resentment generated by the hierarchical ordering of relations with sources. 'Number 
two and three' journalists on the industrial desk usually accepted these kinds of 
arrangements as inevitable in Fleet Street. One 'number three' described his 
relationship with a very senior industrial editor as 'immaculately fair' and, of course, 
every one week end out of three and during the holiday season, the number three 
would take responsibility for all stories emerging, big or small. 
As one former journalist says, 'the job was all about building contacts' and it was 
partly for this reason that a 'number two' or 'three' would be sent to cover most of the 
union conferences through the summer. While the desk needed to ensure that potential 
sources of stories were covered, attending the conferences also served as a form of 
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apprenticeship for the labour beat. A new 'number three' would have the opportunity 
of meeting a large number of potential sources very quickly and would make his face 
familiar. One number three admits that the 'major object of any relationship with a 
politician or a union leader was to get a home phone number'. Contact books with key 
phone numbers were and still are the prize possession of journalists on the beat. The 
size of the contact book and the political status of the contacts within represented a 
measure of the professional success of the journalist on the beat. Conference debates 
were rarely as useful as 'what was happening in the corridors behind the rostrum' (22) 
where not only union leaders but often representatives of the 'big employers' might be 
present. 
As noted above, the routine for industrial correspondents was based for much of the 
year upon a London beat. This inevitably restricted the access of labour correspondents 
to ordinary union members or even shop floor activists. Much of the time away from 
London was taken up with union conferences, conventions organised by employers 
federations or events sponsored by state departments or nationalised industries. Only 
during exceptional, protracted disputes were journalists likely to stray sufficiently far 
from the routine beat to come into contact with shop stewards or ordinary members. 
This was not for a lack of inclination but primarily a lack of opportunity. Journalists 
were likely to welcome contacts at a grass roots level for the additional 'intelligence' 
they might provide but it was the case that the labour and industrial beats, structured as 
they were around the political and industrial elites and the institutions they 
commanded, simply did not permit sustained contacts to develop. It was for this reason 
that the Morning Star's labour correspondent usually commanded a particular authority 
within the Group. Through the Communist Party connections within the shop stewards 
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the industrial desk at the Morning Star was the one 
exception to the dependence of most labour correspondents upon London elite sources. 
Over the years, several journalists sought to 'tap in' to this network of contacts at a 
grass roots level. An industrial correspondent for one of the leading quality papers who 
entered Fleet Street in the early 1970s remembers: 
"I formed my own link with the Morning Star on the grounds 
that they were not competitors and they didn't deal with 
anybody else but it wasn't on a total swap basis. I'd talk to 
them because they had access to the stewards. It was very difficult 
for me as a newcomer,- I was only 27,- to make contacts with 
unions like the AEU. The Communist Party had this vast network 
of contacts and information through the shop steward movement. " 
(23). 
Correspondents working on the industrial desk in the 1960s confirm the authority which 
the Morning Star team commanded through their rank and file contacts. Significantly, 
such authority was not conferred upon correspondents from other 'far left' news 
organisations, such as Newsline. In the 1970s a journalist from the latter paper was 
only admitted to membership of the Group after heated debate and was never to 
gecome a fully integrated member. While the Group reflected a commitment to liberal 
193 
values which proscribed discrimination against journalists on the grounds of the 
political orientation of the news organisation which they worked for, at the same time, 
concerns were voiced about the ability of ministers and other members of the political 
elite to brief the Group in confidence in the presence of a Trotskyist. There was a 
danger that the normative framework which regulated interaction between the Group 
and sources would be undermined. It was also the case that such groups simply did not 
enjoy the range of contacts within union organisations provided through the Communist 
Party. There was much dismay within the Group, for example, when George Sinfield, 
the Morning Star's correspondent credited with introducing soccer to Russia, died in 
the late 1960s without passing on his 'legendary' contact book to his successor or any 
other member of the Group. 
Accounts of relationships between journalists and union leaders in the period of the 
1960s and 1970s suggest a paradox. Many of the leading union officials in this period 
appear to have attached relatively little importance to formal arrangements for dealing 
with journalists. Eric Wigham' s final book on trade unions written at the end of the 
1960s contains much the same list of complaints about the inability of most unions to 
meet the organisational needs of the news media as the first book he produced in 1961 
(Wigham 1961 and 1969). However, the conventional news values of journalism 
directed labour correspondents towards powerful individuals. The fondness of the news 
media for stories about 'personalities' has been well documented and in the 1960s and 
1970s labour news stories were frequently constructed around the 'personalities' of 
leading union officials, including Jack Jones, Joe Gormley, Hugh Scanlon, and a little 
later David Basnett and Alan Fisher. Of course, these individuals appeared to be 
closely associated with the centre of power in Westminster and while there is no reason 
to suppose that, in practice, they possessed very different personality traits to their 
contemporary counterparts, their apparent proximity to the political elite and the 
industrial muscle which they appeared to command, allowed the news media to lend 
them the 'charisma' associated with the public representation of power. The inclination 
now amongst some labour correspondents is to mourn the passing of such 
'personalities' (Pattinson,1993). Of course, it is much more likely that such 
'charismatic monsters' were a product of a historically specific period which was 
characterised by a close association between the elite of the labour movement and the 
state. 
Nevertheless, given the salience of 'powerful personalities' in terms of dominant 
news values, news organisations would encourage their labour correspondents to work 
hard at fostering good contacts with the elite figures of the labour movement. While 
few union leaders during this period attached great importance to the question of 
organisational arrangements for dealing with the news media, it was the case that some 
union leaders did develop quite amicable, even friendly relations, with some members 
of the Labour and Industrial Group. The hierarchical ordering of the specialism dictated 
that this invariably involved the labour editors and 'number ones' on the desk. Some of 
the relationships between union leaders and certain senior members of the Labour and 
Industrial Group were based upon strong friendship. Barrie Devney, industrial editor of 
the n:tly Express became a personal family friend of Joe Gormley, President of the 
NUM in the 1970s, and his wife. Without a full-time press officer, news media 
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enquiries were normally dealt with at that time by either the President or the General 
Secretary. A common complaint amongst journalists was the difficulty they experienced 
in contacting senior officials within unions. Nevertheless, Gormley had a sophisticated 
understanding of the news gathering prpcess and sought to use the normative 
framework underpinning the on/off record briefing arrangements to his advantage. 
'Of course, I recognise that there's a danger in this. Stories 
which ought to come out can get suppressed. And I've tried 
to be careful not to put too many things on a man's conscience, 
so that he has to keep quiet about them, and perhaps get scooped 
by someone who got the story from another source. But there are 
inevitably times when you have to say, "This is what's what, but 
don't use just yet because there are still certain things to do 
and argue about." It's a double-edged weapon, though, and you 
have to be careful how you use it, because we, and politicians 
need the Press just as much as the Press need us. ' 
(Gormley, 1982: 156). 
Under Gormley, relationships between the NUM and the Group were good and 
journalists valued the access the Group enjoyed within the NUM headquarters in 
London, described by some labour correspondents as an 'open door' in this period and 
contrasted sharply with the policy under the next President, Arthur Scargill (Adeney 
and Lloyd, 1986:242). Despite working for one of the more ideologically hostile 
newspapers, Barrie Devney proved a very valuable friend to Gormley, sometimes 
managing to insert sustained verbatim quotes from Gormley even in front page stories 
with the most critical headlines and on other occasions choosing not to bring certain 
information into the public domain (Gormley,1982:139). 'I'm sure the number of 
stories he's had and not used would get him sacked from the paper' 
(Gormley,1982:156). In one legendary incident, Devney was dining with Gormley and 
his wife at a restaurant. Being on 'call' Devney rang the newsroom to check in and was 
told to immediately follow up a story about the President of the NUM who had been 
sighted dining that evening with a big, fat man with glasses, suspected of being a 
Communist (1982: 157). Despite the ideological project of the Express newspapers, 
Devney's close friendship with Joe Gormley was common knowledge amongst staff and 
appeared to be tolerated by senior editors (24). Geoffrey Goodman, was another 
leading member of the Labour and Industrial Group who had particularly close contacts 
not only with Gormley but several members of the NUM executive which he 
maintained for most of his career (Goodman 1985: 175). 
Gormley, then, had a clear understanding of the competitive pressures on the 
labour beat, the importance of intelligence or strategic information, and the routines of 
news production. Certain other union leaders had a similar understanding of news 
media dynamics. The use made by Clive Jenkins of news media strategies to promote 
ASTMS m the 1960s have been discussed in chapter two. Representing a white collar, 
technical union, Jenkins targeted both labour and science correspondents but he grew 
particularly close to Mike Edwards, who rose to become labour editor of the Daily 
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Mail in the 1970s. Jenkins had a talent for devising short and concise sentences with an 
immediate news value and this made him a popular source on the labour beat (25). 
Frank Chapple (EETPU general secretary in the 1970s), too, developed a tradition, 
which was maintained by his successor Eric Hammond, of fostering good relationships 
particularly with labour correspondents working for papers which were on the right of 
the Fleet street spectrum. Chapple was in the habit of providing off record briefmgs to 
the Group in his hotel bedroom on the eve of TUC conferences to ensure that an 
EETPU perspective was an acknowledged part of the political context for the week 
(Chapple,l984: 127-133). 
The period between 1964 and 1979 was characterised by a recognised affinity 
between members of the elite of the trade union movement and the Labour Group. 
Though by no means all, a number of union leaders recognised the organisational needs 
of journalists and though most unions were not yet prepared to invest resources in the 
construction of formal arrangements for working with the news media, nonetheless, 
several leading union officials, though often hard to contact, were regarded as 'good 
sources'. The political perspectives which were dominant in the Group will be 
discussed further below but a number of union leaders, including Gormley, recognised 
that many members of the Group shared a sympathy for the values of the labour 
movement, if not an active commitment to the politics of the Labour Party. In short, 
there were some strong friendship networks which connected the Group to the union 
elite and there was a broader set of shared cultural assumptions about the legitimate 
role of unions in society, the nature of industrial relations, and the involvement of the 
state in the development of industrial policy. The political culture of the post-war 
settlement represented a bridge between the two and ensured a sharing of certain 
assumptions about the nature of the political and economic world. In addition, as 
Tunstall notes, union officials and journalists were likely to share broadly similar 
market positions and lifestyles. Journalists were more likely to feel at ease with union 
officials, willing to share a drink in the pub, than managers and senior executives who 
enjoyed very much higher salaries and different lifestyles (Tunstall,l971: 197). 
There were also, of course, some more mercenary connections. With union leaders 
enjoying high public profiles, there was much demand amongst publishers for 
autobiographies and authorised biographies. With the appropriate journalistic skills and 
the necessary contacts, members of the Labour and Industrial Group were well placed 
to cash in. Thus, Barry Devney acted as 'ghost writer' for Joe Gormley (1982), Robert 
Taylor (currently industrial editor at the Observer) wrote Sid Weighell's 
'autobiography' (Weighell, 1983) and Geoffrey Goodman produced a biography of 
Frank Cousins (leader of the Transport and General Worker's Union and a Labour 
Cabinet Minister in this period). Weighell took the advice of the Labour Group in 
seeking to make the NUR more accessible for journalists following his election as 
General Secretary in 1975 (Weighell, 1983: 106-7). One or two of the 'ancien regime' 
within the Labour Group also moved across in this period to take up positions within 
the press and publicity departments of trade unions. In the 1960s and 1970s, only the 
white collar and public sector unions were likely to resource departments with a 
specific communications and publicity function, though many had union papers or 
journals. Hugh Chevins, one of the 'founding three' of the Labour Group, spent the 
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final years of his professional career working as a press officer for NALGO. Later Jim 
Foulkes was to follow in his footsteps from the industrial desk of the Press 
Association. 
Were union leaders able to use their contacts with the Labour Group to exert a 
systematic influence over the content of industrial news? The relationship between 
Barry Devney and Joe Gormley might lead one to suspect so, but in practice Devney 
was subject to the same pressures as other journalists on the beat and there is very little 
evidence to suggest that other union leaders were able to exert even this degree of 
influence. Older labour correspondents remember certain stories being handled with a 
degree of delicacy or being passed to another colleague in order to preserve union 
contacts in certain rare circumstances (26). Tony Benn in his diaries reports hearing of 
pressure being exerted upon the editor of one broadsheet by trade union leaders in the 
late 1970s (Benn, 1990: 80) but with these exceptions it seems that union leaders were 
rarely able to exploit contacts through the Group to achieve an editorial influence. 
It is not difficult to explain why this was the case. As noted elsewhere in the 
research (see chapters four and five ) trade unions are inherently leaky organisations. 
Very few unions, including the NUM under Arthur Scargill, have been able to 
successfully control the flow of information from within and this has always 
strengthened the hands of journalists in their dealings with officials. The Labour Group 
has rarely been dependent upon one source within a union even if the perspective of the 
leading officials represents important strategic intelligence. As with the departments of 
state, so internal conflicts were always likely to generate flows of information as rival 
interests sought to exploit communication channels for their own purposes. In terms of 
formal conflicts, union elections often encouraged contact between union officials and 
journalists, as contestants tried to achieve vote-winning profiles. At the same time, 
though, many unions were highly politicised and continually divided between factions. 
Divisions within the AEU national executive were so fierce at this time that left and 
right factions routinely retreated to separate pubs after meetings. Journalists on the 
labour beat would organise a division of labour to receive the counter-briefings from 
each side in the pubs which were located at opposite ends of the same street near the 
union's headquarters in Peckham. The third dimension to internal conflict might arise 
when the union elite sought to exert control over 'difficult' rank and file branches, 
particularly if an 'unofficial dispute' was frowned upon. This, once more, was likely 
to generate additional, off the record briefings and quicken the flows of information for 
journalists to collate. Similarly, if a union leadership was required to consolidate its 
support at branch level in the face of competition from rival candidates or factions, 
correspondents would benefit from an increase in the volume of the information flows 
emerging from union headquarters. As one former labour correspondent remembers: 
"You needed to know the General Secretaries and, perhaps, even more 
importantly their number two and three's [deputy general 
secretaries] and whether they were keen to make progress. They 
would feed you information which was sound and tell you where 
they were making a speech, perhaps, and they would know you would 
be there to report it. The speech might not be great shakes but 
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if it was timed right it would go out on the P.A. and then his 
name would appear in the run up to a union election ... if you 
were working for the F.T. or the Times or the Telegraph, then 
General Secretaries like to see their names on these pages. It 
wouldn't do any harm with the members or those at Congress House. 
It enhanced political standing. "(27) 
Labour Correspondents and the Political Elite 
With the election of the Wilson administration in 1964 two things changed for the 
Labour and Industrial Group. As discussed above, as Wilson reconstructed the 
departments of state, so the labour beat expanded. Secondly, relationships and 
sometimes friendships which had been formed between senior members of the Labour 
Party and journalists within the Group now represented potential channels of 
communication between the Group and the members of the Cabinet. Doors which had 
only been ajar for the Group now opened fully. To celebrate his election victory 
Wilson held parties at Number Ten not only for the Westminster Lobby but also for the 
Labour and Industrial Group. The Group began to receive regular briefings at Number 
Ten on a basis almost as frequent as the Lobby (Jones ,1988). One former 
correspondent who was first a member of the Labour Group before becoming a 
political correspondent describes the opportunities which opened up for labour and 
industrial correspondents: 
'When Labour was in power and trade unions were so important in 
Labour Party affairs, the Labour Party conference and the 
national executive meetings were the property of the industrial 
correspondent which meant we were covering the policy making of 
the ruling party ... I remember going to my first Labour Party 
conference in 1969 for the Times, I had a hotel room so small 
you could pee in the sink without getting out of bed but the 
paper made sure I had a direct line installed and I generated 
a tremendous amount of copy. The Labour Party was "ours" and the 
NEC was "ours". (28) 
The memoirs of ministers in the administrations throughout this period from 1964 to 
I 979 suggest numerous examples of the reasons why the Labour and Industrial Group 
often proved of value to the political elite because of its well established connections 
with senior figures within the union movement. Barbara Castle was a member of the 
Cabinet as Minister for Overseas Development at the very beginning of the 
administration. Through her marriage to Ted Castle, by this time a senior editor on the 
Mirror, she knew many of the Labour Group socially, though the Diaires suggest she 
only enjoyed personal friendships with a much smaller number. Geoffrey Goodman 
was regarded as 'a close personal friend' (Castle 1984:115) and the evidence also 
suggests that Eric Wigham (The Times) was regarded as more than simply a contact. 
Barbara Castle took the trouble to send a note to him thanking him for the Times' 
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coverage of a rail dispute (Castle 1984:501). With Ted Castle, Barbara would 
sometimes attend social occasions for journalists including New Year parties at the 
Goodmans and when finally in charge at the Ministry of Labour, she made a point of 
arranging a regular Christmas party for the Labour and Industrial Group. Through the 
diaries there is quite frequent mention of particular labour correspondents, including 
Goodman (The Sun), Monty Meth (The Daily Mail), Jimmy Margach (Sunday Times), 
John Torode (The Guardian), John Elliott (F.T.), Eric Wigham (Times) and Keith 
McDowell (Daily Mail) (Castle, 1984). One of the former labour correspondents 
interviewed for the present study remembers: 
Interviewer: 'Were industrial correspondents working alongside political 
correspondents at this stage? ' 
Interviewee: 'Oh very much so and at a very high level. I mean Geoffrey 
Goodman was on very good terms with all the ministers. 
Ted Castle acted as liaison between the political and 
industrial sides. Barbara used to come to our staff 
parties. It was unlikely that we would come out with a 
bald attack upon Barbara, although Ted never tried to 
influence what Geoffrey and we wrote.' (29) 
The Diaries illustrate on a number of occasions the ability of labour and industrial 
correspondents to provide Barbara Castle with valuable information at an early stage. 
It was John Torode, for example, who provides a rapid briefing for Barbara Castle on 
the way in which George Woodcock (General Secretary of the TUC in 1969) had 
responded to the publication of 'In Place of Strife' (Castle 1984:592) and also Torode 
who let Castle know informally that Vie Feather (at this time a senior figure within the 
TUC) was becoming increasingly 'unhappy' with her policies at the Ministry of Labour 
(Castle 1984:594). The reaction of union leaders to her policies at the Ministry of 
Transport were conveyed to her via Goodman and Ted Castle (Castle 1984: 115) and 
even news of a fundamental restructuring of the departments and the closure of the 
Department of Economic Affairs was first communicated to her by Ted Castle, through 
Geoffrey Goodman (25th March 1968). Similarly, a decade later it was Paul Routledge 
(at this time labour correspondent for the Times) who was able to give Tony Benn, 
then Secretary of State for Energy, advance warning of Terry Duffy's emergence as the 
new President of the AUEW (Benn 1990:297). Benn was also close to Geoffrey 
Goodman who would dine quite regularly with the Benns. The diary comments, 'I like 
Geoffrey Goodman very much; in many ways I find myself more in sympathy with him 
than anyone else in Fleet Street' (1990:231). Goodman and Benn were also drawn 
together through the common experience of both being subjects of security service 
surveillance (1990: 231 and 383). Benn is given an inside account of the furious 
reaction of David Bassnett and other union leaders to the failure of Callaghan to call an 
early general election, by Paul Routledge whilst at dinner (1990: 358). Even Callaghan 
as Prime Minister relied upon the Labour and Industrial Group to provide an insight 
into the thinking and likely reactions of the senior union leaders regarding pay 
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restraints in the late 1970s (Callaghan, 1987 :eh 15). One labour correspondent 
working for a tabloid paper in the 1960s recalls: 
"Quite often because labour correspondents were so close to 
the TUC, the Number Ten political staff would ask, 'which way 
will it go, you know more about what's happened at the executive 
meeting than we do?' An elongated table at the TUC prevented 
everyone from seeing everything but because of our excellent 
contacts we knew exactly what had happened within a minute of 
the executive meeting finishing ... we had certain friends we 
would give names to, such as 'leakworthy', and not just within 
the TUC but even the Cabinet, including Conservative ones." (30) 
Similarly, a labour correspondent who worked for the Times in the 1970s, contrasts the 
experience of the Group during the two great coal disputes of the 1970s and 1980s. In 
1974, he had been told by his editor that the Prime Minister had complimented the 
paper's labour and industrial team for their coverage of the dispute. The Prime Minister 
regarded this as the most useful source of information for the purpose of assessing the 
thinking and possible tactics of the NUM. This correspondent was rewarded at the end 
of the disp11te by his editor with a free two week Thompson holiday in Greece. In 
1984, according to this correspondent, it was the frequent experience of the Labour 
Group to find that their own editors had better information and intelligence than them. 
This was because a government with a very different orientation and a distinct political 
agenda sought to exercise far greater influence in the management of industrial news 
during the dispute and did this by ensuring that strong channels of communication 
were established between ministers and key members of the senior management team 
at British Coal, on the one hand, and senior editorial staff and political correspondents, 
rather than labour correspondents, on the other. This will be discussed further below. 
For the moment it is sufficient to note that in the period between 1964 and 1979 the 
Labour and Industrial Group, through its connections with union leaderships, 
represented an important source of industrial and labour information for the political 
elite. There were few rewards for labour and industrial correspondents at the end of the 
1984 Coal Dispute. 
Of course, good relationships with the Group were likely to be of value to senior 
politicians for more familiar reasons, as well. Barbara Castle was advised by Harold 
Wilson, as soon as her predecessor as Minister of Labour, Ray Gunter, resigned that 
she should immediately speak to the Labour Group in order to counter-brief against any 
possible comments he might make (Castle 1984: 475). Similarly, in 1968 when the 
government began to face mounting press criticism of its handling of a rail dispute, 
Castle launched a public relations offensive in which she lunched with pairs of labour 
correspondents every day for a week in an attempt to ensure that a more favourable 
perspective emerged in the news coverage (1984 : 478-483). The British Rail Board 
had conceded a generous settlement to the rail unions and press comment had suggested 
that this was a consequence of Government encouragement for the Board to break the 
Government's own incomes policy. Significantly, Barbara Castle was told by a leader 
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writer on the Financial Times that this story had emerged from an off-record briefing 
from within the Treasury. Inter-departmental rivalry as an important source for the 
Labour Group will be discussed further below. ·Not only was the Group likely to be 
targeted by politicians interested in promoting a favourable account of the 
Government's record on industrial relations. For senior figures in the Labour Party, the 
support of leading trade unionists was very important for their personal careers and 
knowledge of which trade union leaders might be favourably or unfavourably disposed 
towards them was most valuable (for example, Crossman 1979: 316). Members of the 
Group were ideally placed, enjoying contact with both elites, to mark an ambitious 
Labour M. P. 's card in terms of union support and career prospects. 
Wilson's administrations were characterised by a considerable amount of leaking 
motivated by rivalry of one form or another. Whilst Wilson suspected all within his 
Cabinet as potentialleakers and denounced the practice in Cabinet meetings, Crossman 
found on more than one occasion that he was a victim of non-attributable briefings 
which could only have emerged from the Prime Minister's own press office (Crossman 
1979:79). Crossman was convinced that Wilson was providing off-record briefings to 
undermine the position of George Brown at the Department of Economic Affairs in the 
mid-60s (Crossman 1979: 103). He also believed that Wilson was briefing against the 
enemies of 'In Place of Strife' within the Cabinet in 1969 (Crossman 1979:559) In his 
own account of office, however, Wilson claims that he was compelled to leak 
information to the press on one exceptional occasion only (Wilson 1979: 143). 
Crossman both used the practice ruthlessly against others and frequently devotes space 
in his dairies to identifying other perpetrators, most frequent suspects being Tony Benn 
(suspected of leaking proposals before being submitted to Cabinet, 1979: 109) , George 
Brown (1979:81), Callaghan and Castle (1979:220), and Wilson himself (1979:198). 
The Political Lobby were likely to be the most frequent beneficiaries of such political 
jostling but the proximity of the Labour Group to particular Ministers meant that they 
were likely to receive a share of the non-attributable information flowing outwards 
from the political elite as a consequence of political rivalry. Thus, Crossman turns to 
Peter Jenkins, then still a labour correspondent, to spread rumours hostile to Wilson in 
1969 (1979:609). 
Given the degree of proximity between the political elite and Group in this period, it 
is little wonder that considerable professional rivalry was generated with the 
Westminster Lobby. As one former labour correspondent recalls: 
" ... there had always been intense jealousy between the Labour 
and Industrial Group and the Lobby. They hated the fact that we 
came to prominence in the 60s and 70s because of the sheer 
volume of stories and disputes which generated copy. The Lobby 
jealously guarded its access ... they have far greater self-esteem 
than us. We have a fairly robust view about ourselves and the 
job that we do. We're not as highfalutin and prima 
donna-ish ... They are an immensely self-esteeming group. We 
enjoy ourselves and we also take a more realistic view of our 
position in society and our position in the paper." (31). 
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However, the Labour Group never supplanted the position of the Westminster Lobby. 
In reading the diaries of Crossman, Castle and Benn or the memoirs of, for example, 
Wilson, Callaghan (1987), Brown (1971) or Ted Short (1989), one is struck by the 
relatively greater frequency with which the political elite communicated with political 
rather than labour correspondents. In Benn' s diaries only the most senior labour 
correspondents, the labour editors or 'number one's', such as Geoffrey Goodman or 
Paul Routledge, appear as dinner guests or regular contacts. In contrast, a large number 
of political correspondents and senior editors are wined and dined by the Benns, 
including Hugo Young, Harold Evans, Alan Watkins, Adam Raphael, a number of 
energy correspondents, and even Bill Deedes of the Telegraph. This point is confirmed 
in the memoirs of Joe Haines (1977) who acted as press officer at Number Ten for 
most of the Wilson era. Only Geoffrey Goodman, once again, from the Labour Group 
appears to be a significant player in Haines' universe. In the main, Haines spent his 
time dealing with the Westminster Lobby rather than the Labour Group. This was also 
confirmed by former labour correspondents who noted that despite the overlap in the 
political and labour beats, labour correspondents rarely approached Joe Haines as a 
source on their beat and never contacted the press office at Number Ten. Although 
Geoffrey Goodman was drafted into government at the Counter Inflation Policy Unit in 
1976 to take responsibility for the presentation of the government's anti-inflation 
strategy, it was to Alistair Hetherington (Guardian editor) that the political elite turned 
to advise on the handling of Wilson's land deal scandal (Haines 1977: 194), and to Bill 
Grieg (Mirror political editor) to work under George Brown as public relations advisor 
to the Department of Economic Affairs (Brown 1971: 194). Terence Lancaster, who 
succeeded Bill Grieg as political editor at the Mirror, was also very close to Wilson and 
Marcia Williams, providing them with advice regarding the negative publicity 
generated by their relationship and the land deal controversy (Haines 1977: 204). 
Crossman drafted in John Beavan and Alan Fairclough, both on the political staff of the 
Mirror, as policy advisors and both Crossman and Wilson approached the Mirror's 
editor, Hugh Cudlipp on several occasions (Crossman 1979:550). Under Labour 
administrations, then, as well as Conservative, close relationships evolved between the 
political elite and established figures within political journalism. Senior Labour 
politicians recognised the strategic importance of the few left of centre papers in Fleet 
Street and the potential political resource which sympathetic political correspondents, 
working for such papers, represented. In this sense, political correspondents and the 
Westminster Lobby always had the edge over the Labour and Industrial Group. 
News Flows and Tensions Within the State. 
Nevertheless, given the nature of the state under both Labour and Conservative 
regimes, and the departmental structure which reflected the inclination of the state to 
actively intervene in economic and industrial policy, it was inevitable that journalists 
.. 
, within the Group would begin to move in circles close to senior ministers. It was also 
inevitable, then, that they would benefit from the flows of information generated 
through tensions and rivalries, not only involving individual politicians but also at an 
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inter-departmental level. Perhaps, the sharpest of these and the most fruitful for 
members of the Group involved the Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs 
which had been originally established by Wilson in 1964 in order to develop a strategic 
economic perspective, within which the Treasury would be obliged to work on more 
immediate micro-economic issues. With the new department enthusiastic for policies of 
economic expansion but the Treasury traditionally more cautious and inclined to 
policies of retrenchment (Wilson 1971:710), serious political tensions were inevitable, 
as each department sought to challenge the authority of the other. George Brown was 
suspected of using the press to undermine the political authority of the Treasury as 
early as 1965 and Wilson addressed an appeal to the whole Cabinet in an effort to 
suppress the growing volume of illicit information which the inter-departmental conflict 
appeared to be producing (Crossman 1979:81). Nevertheless, such tensions continued 
and were actually exacerbated by Wilson's decision to break up and decentralise the 
Government's Office of Information, which he regarded as a 'Tory propaganda 
machine'. The result was that each department began to organise its own information 
services, advertising campaigns and briefings for journalists, on and off record 
(Crossman 1979:242). Naturally, the nature of each set of departmental briefings was 
likely to reflect the departmental perspective on policy and the performance of other 
departments. Thus, leaks and counter leaks between the Treasury under Jim Callaghan 
and the DEA under George Brown, continued throughout the early years of the 
administration (Crossman 1979:220) 
The Treasury continued to be at the centre of a number of departmental feuds which 
grew, on occasion, into three way departmental propaganda battles. Barbara Castle was 
tipped off by a member of the Group that the Treasury was suggesting to journalists, 
off the record, that she had been responsible, as Minister for Labour, for encouraging 
employers to settle above the government's pay norm (Castle 1984:481). However, 
Castle also found herself embroiled in an of the record briefing battle with Crossman, 
who opposed 'In Place of Strife' , the main policy proposal for the regulation of 
industrial relations developed by her ministry (Crossman 1979:564). Significantly, 
battles between the Treasury and other departments concerned with economic and 
industrial policy have continued through the 1970s and into the 1980s. Michael 
Heseltine reports conflicts between the Treasury, with an orientation towards the City, 
and the Department of Trade and Industry which sought 'a separate dialogue' with 
managers, companies and other government departments (Heseltine 1987 : 124). 
However, in the different circumstances of the 1980s, such tensions did not produce the 
copious flows of information to the Labour and Industrial Correspondents Group which 
characterised previous decades. 
Summary 
Perhaps the period between 1964 and 1979 represents the pinnacle in the Group's 
develoRment, although it failed to supplant the elite position of the Westminster Lobby. 
Nevertheless, it did represent a unique period for labour and industrial journalism. The 
state under both Conservative and Labour administrations continued to expand a 
departmental structure which extended the boundaries of the labour and industrial beats, 
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a process which began during the Second World War but accelerated through the 1960s 
and 1970s. Under Labour administrations, however, particular members of the Labour 
Party elite who were familiar with leading members of the Group and often had a 
common sympathy for labourist and social democratic perspectives, occupied key 
positions within the State's departmental structure. This meant that not only the 
departmental structure but the relationships and administrative culture associated with 
these departments frequently offered favourable terrain for labour journalism. The 
interconnections between Labour politicians and labour journalists allowed the latter to 
benefit from the flows of information both on and off the record which began to spring 
from the centre of the government. The strength of such interconnections was also 
reflected in the recognition of the authority of the Group which the Labour 
administrations offered through the eo-option of labour journalists to key positions 
within the state and the extent to which the advice of members of the Group was 
sought. Beyond the personal interconnections between labour correspondents and the 
political elite, the interventionist orientation of both Labour and Tory administrations 
and the continuing 'hegemony' of the values of the post-war settlement associated with 
these forms of government, ensured that the editorial perspectives of most news 
organisations continued to prioritise labour news. This, of course, was to significantly 
change in the next decade. 
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Chapter Seven 
Thatcher, the State and the Decline in the fortunes of Labour 
Journalism 1979 to 1994. 
As we have seen, the state through the political orientation of the government of the 
day, plays an important part in shaping the political environment in which labour 
journalism is undertaken. The political and ideological climates which are fostered by 
particular governments with distinctive political projects have a powerful influence in 
shaping the editorial perspectives of news organisations. The departmental 
arrangements of particular governments will order the boundaries of some of the most 
important news beats and the orientation of government ministers and their civil 
servants towards the news media will determine the degree of access to the political 
elite which specialist correspondents enjoy. While some journalists remain convinced 
that the decline in the fortunes of labour and industrial journalism is the product of a 
temporary cyclical down-turn, a 'natural' process connected to the internal rhythm of 
professional journalism, and others blame 'the Miners Strike' ('every labour story after 
that was inevitably an anti-climax'), more fundamental causes of decline are strongly 
associated with the arrival of a new government in 1979 with a very distinctive political 
project. 
It is not suggested that governments exercising control over the state have the power 
to order the marginalisation of those branches of journalism which are out of favour. 
Rather, the policies adopted and the political climate fostered around those policies will 
slowly, over a period of time (particularly if one party remains in office for more than 
one term), begin to affect the priorities of editorial teams and the decisions they make 
concerning the use of resources within their news organisations. If Thatcher had not 
been successful in emasculating much of the trade union movement and if trade unions 
had sufficient political power to insist upon the retention of their position close to the 
centre of government, then the fortunes of labour journalism may have remained more 
buoyant in the 1980s. 
There is, of course, considerable debate concerning the degree to which 
Thatcherism should be understood in terms of the political effectivity of the 
administration or the 'inevitable' political articulation of deeper economic forces at 
work in the re-structuring of British capitalism (1). The decline in labour journalism is 
not a process unique to Britain. Tunstall noted this process occurring in the USA in the 
1960s (1971 :95) where unionisation was already below 20% of the active labour force. 
In fact, in the USA evidence of decline in labour journalism can be found even in the 
early 1950s (Hoyt, 1984). However, it is too simplistic to equate the fortunes of labour 
and industrial correspondents only with the vitality of trade unionism. As we have seen, 
trade unions represented an important source but by no means the only source of 
information for labour correspondents. The departments of state were probably more 
significant in the supply of routine information on a more regular basis, even if the 
'bigger' stories often concerned trade unions. Beyond this, however, it is important to 
note the power of the state in framing news and offering political criteria with which to 
assess the importance of events. If trade unions were permitted by the state to enjoy 
permanent 'insider status', it is likely that even with a low membership base they would 
be regarded by editorial teams as 'significant' in terms of decisions over the allocation 
of staff and resources within news organisations. 
It is not hard to identify evidence of decline in the papers of the Labour and 
Industrial Correspondents' Group which have been retained since 1982. Tunstall found 
33 correspondents working a specific labour beat (excluding an industrial beat) in the 
mid 60s and estimates for membership of the Group in the 1970s suggest a minimum of 
at least seventy (according to former officers of the Group) and a maximum of 
possibly one hundred if Seaton's estimate is correct (Seaton,1982). At the beginning of 
each year the Group would publish a list of accredited members and the news 
organisations they worked for. This provides a good measure of the importance news 
organisations attached to labour and industrial journalism because the rules governing 
membership of the Group required journalists to be formally identified by news 
organisations staffing their labour and industrial desks (2). Thus, Group membership 
lists provide a good measure not just of professional interest amongst individual 
ljcmn1aliists but the importance attached to labour and industrial journalism by national 
and provincial newspapers, broadcasting newsrooms, and the news agencies (3). 
Nevertheless, the records of the Group reveal the following pattern of membership in 
the 1980s. 
Membership Total 
1983 58 
65 
65 
no record 
62 
57 
55 
.fernb1~rslhip records for subsequent years are less complete, itself an indication of the 
of organisational decline which the Group began to experience during this 
In 1993 the Group Secretary, Kevin McGuire (then at the Daily Telegraph), 
sti~nat<:d membership at 'just below fifty' (4). It is possible that even this figure is an 
•ve1r-e1>ti~t1at•e. If a calculation is made on the basis of known labour or industrial staff 
ttached to desks in the main news organisations, an accurate current figure may be 
forty. There has been a decline in the number of staff attached to every industrial 
In any case, during the period since 1979 membership has dropped by anything 
206 
between 25% and 55% depending upon estimates of peak membership in the 1970s. In 
1984, the Group's Chair reported 'for the first time in several years membership was 
increasing' (5), which resulted from the sudden increase in activity associated with the 
1984/85 Coal Strike. However, after this period in the mid-1980s, the long term 
pattern of decline in membership continued. It is important to note that this decline in 
membership could be detected before the Coal Strike and before the decrease in strike 
rates became most pronounced. After all, in the early 1980s there were a number of 
major disputes before the combined impact of mass unemployment and legislative 
constraints began to severely restrain union resistance. 
In terms of the national dailies, the Financial Times has cut its labour and industrial 
team from six in 1985 to three, the Guardian has moved from five to two, the 
Telegraph from four to one, the Mirror from four to two, the Sun from two to one, 
the Express from two to half (the industrial correspondent at the time of writing also 
covered the education beat), and the Daily Star scrapped its labour and industrial desk 
in 1987 (6). 
"The first national I worked on as an industrial correspondent was the Sun and 
before that I worked on the P.A. [Press association]. There were three industrial 
corespondents at the P.A. and when I joined the Sun I was number one out of 
three. I think they're down to one now. Same at the Standard [London Evening 
Standard], there used to be two, myself and other dealing purely with industrial 
stories and we'd both be writing trade union stories a lot of the time. Now there 
are fewer staff, they've all been thinned out. The Morning Star and, perhaps, the 
FT are only ones retaining staff levels." (7). 
only have news organisations reduced the numbers on the industrial and labour 
but journalists have found it increasingly necessary to embrace much wider 
ono~rs. Few can now specialise exclusively in labour news and many are keen to 
l>ro>ad!m their perspectives to include employment, personnel, industrial and economic 
in order to preserve their marketablity. Nicholas I ones estimated that in 1988 the 
bal:anc:e within the Group had moved away from labour towards industrial specialists 
the first time (1988) and more recently the F.T., renowned for its labour news, has 
1bru~doned the labour page in favour of an 'employment section' (Hill, 1993). 
The papers of the Group reveal a growing concern not only about the decline in 
ib~olute numbers but also about the loss of vitality and energy within the Group as the 
unfold. In 1982, the tone of the minutes of A. G. M. are still up-beat, with regrets 
expressed about the failure of the officers of the Group to find ways of spending 
:urp•lus monies on a 'really good thrash' (8). In 1983, however, fears concerning 
·edtmdam:y were already so significant that the rules of the constitution were amended 
the A. G. M. to allow journalists who had suffered redundancy and were no longer 
LCCI'edi.ted through a news organisation to retain membership. The records of meetings 
1983 also reveal growing tensions and conflicts between officers and members. At a 
~e!~tintg in September, there were formal calls for the resignation of all officers . 
.1mtut€:s record a row breaking out over the planning of a social event using Group 
to subsidise the bar, 'the original idea was for a piss up, it seems to have grown 
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out of all proportion'. More significantly, urgent complaints were registered about the 
failure of the Group to work effectively through the year to fulfil the functions for 
which it was originally formed to perform. The lunch time and evening events at 
which union leaders, ministers, representatives of employers and nationalised industries 
were invited to meet the Group had not been successful and had petered out through the 
year. Officers defended their record by pointing to the low attendances at the early 
events, 'only nine people for the director of the NEDC, only 14 people for the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer'. Speakers from the floor pointed to the failure of the 
officers to collect subscriptions or keep accurate membership records. As the meeting 
grew more chaotic, one speaker moved that the meeting should be abandoned because 
up to 25% of those present were probably not members (9). 
Records in subsequent years suggest a continuing problem of low morale, low 
attendance and inactivity, although not amidst such chaotic meetings. In 1984, the 
Group Secretary had to write to the AUEW to apologise for the low number of Group 
members who turned up for a social and briefing event organised around a trip down 
the river to the new Thames Barrier, paid for by the union. In 1985, the Treasurer, in 
his annual report, noted that the explanation for the depletion in funds is to be found in 
the low attendance at Group functions resulting in losses. The Treasurer signed off by 
'wishing everyone all the best for a redundant future once the Miners Strike is over' . 
By the late 1980s, the records suggest a picture which will be familiar to anyone who 
had experience of a moribund local branch of a political party, with evidence of a 
rapid turn-over in officerships, low attendance at meetings and by the beginning of the 
next decade, incomplete records of meetings in each year. There are far fewer papers 
dealing with the most recent years than the first half of the 1980s. In 1988, a letter sent 
the Secretary to all members asking for suggestions regarding the future of the 
Grcmp and how best to revitalise it, had itself 'received only a dismal response'. In 
991 , the Secretary reported that 'the absence of the Chair on business overseas for 
of the year resulted in 1991 being a wee bit quieter than usual' but the Secretary 
in an attempt to remain upbeat in tone, 'plans are underway to arrange a series of 
~ew•sm:akir1gand enjoyable events'. By 1992 the Secretary found himself writing to the 
uwrrdian in an attempt to persuade one journalist on the industrial desk to actually join 
Group (10). 
Twice in 1983 the Group attempted to secure the =e rights of access in the Palace 
Westminster as the Political Lobby (11). On both occasions requests for passes 
denied by the Sergeant at Arms. It might be supposed that these requests might 
reflected the confidence of the Group in seeking to make further advances upon 
traditional territory of political correspondents. However, the records suggest that 
attempts were prompted more by desperation than confidence. The decisions to 
·equtestaccess at Westminster were made in the context of a search for a strategy to 
1ols:ter the perceived decline in the standing of the Group. 
In 1985 the Group Secretary intervened to complain to the Directorate of Public 
• tt'"r• at British Rail about 'the growing tendency to hold selective briefings. And it is 
tnd!~rst<ood there was a briefing for the Lobby' (12). The complaint is significant not 
because it suggests that by the mid-1980s the Westminister Lobby was beginning 
threaten the traditional territory of industrial correspondents but also because the 
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practice of selective briefing infringed norms concerning the collective identity of the 
Group. The Group existed to benefit all accredited industrial correspondents, not a 
select few and certainly not the Westminster Lobby. Earlier, in 1983 for example, the 
Group wrote to Lord McCarthy to protest 'in the strongest possible terms' about the 
restrictions on numbers of correspondents permitted to attend the Rail Staff National 
Tribunal' (13). 
In 1988 officers of the Group undertook, 'a review of membership following the 
gradual decline from a peak of about 75 to the current total of around 50 .. .income has 
dropped accordingly'. A proposal arising from this review was 'to broaden the 
membership base to include energy, political, and financial correspondents who have a 
link with or interest in industrial and labour affairs'. This proposal partly reflected the 
blurring of traditional specialist boundaries which had been caused by the changing 
news priorities of editorial staff and the drive to increase the productivity of journalists 
by demanding greater flexibility and less specialisation. However, the proposal also 
suggested a degree of desperation in contemplating a survival strategy which would 
1 rumoun,~e for the Group a movement away from the distinctive field of labour 
ljooun!alism,- the Group's original raison d'~tre. The 'dismal response' from Group 
members to this and other suggestions, meant that officers felt they could not claim a 
mandate for such radical changes. The rule requiring membership to be restricted to 
ljournalis:ts working full time on the industrial and labour desk was not amended but 
loltticers decided to examine 'borderline cases' more carefully (14). In practice, it seems 
1c1earthat the membership rules have been relaxed as indicated by acceptance in 1991 of 
application from a journalist working for 'Personnel Today'. Very few of the 
lc•~rrent membership work exclusively upon labour news and many devote a majority of 
time to a wide industrial brief which may take in employment and personnel 
tssutes, economic and industrial developments, European or international labour 
ma•·ket:s_ energy and technological stories, not to mention financial journalism. This is 
contrast to 1983 when an application from a journalist on 'The Engineer' was 
reject:ed (15). 
"We've all had to change, otherwise you lose the job. There was a bit of time 
after the Miners' defeat when there was a move to switch to employment issues 
and we all trundled off to the Institute of Personnel Management and wrote worthy 
pieces about human resources and skill shortages. That seems to have gone away 
and people are looking at consumer type stuff. A lot of industrial correspondents, 
particularly on the tabloids, will go into the regulator stuff like OFfEL, OFW AT, 
OFGAS. Those are covered by industrial correspondents although they are actually 
consumer stories. British Telecom are a good example ... it's not what you expect 
to do, so yes the role has changed and is constantly evolving, a bit like the English 
language. " ( 16) 
factors are bound together in contributing to the decline in the fortunes of the 
The decline in the numbers of journalists staffing the industrial and labour 
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desks certainly contributed to the sapping of morale. However, this in itself could not 
explain the decline not only in numbers but vitality and dynamism. After all, the 
decline in numbers was being countered to a degree through the relaxation in 
membership rules. Clearly, the emasculation of trade unions through the 1980s was a 
process crucial in explaining the waning influence of the Group. However, here it is 
necessary to consider precisely why the decline in fortunes of the labour movement 
brought with it decline for the Group as well. It was not simply that union membership 
began to dramatically fall. Many relatively small unions had been regarded as highly 
newsworthy in the past (ASTMS or the NUS for example). More fundamental than the 
declining numbers of members was the loss of political potency and political 
significance which were associated with declining membership but not caused by it 
alone. Here, of course, the orientation of the state and ideological climate generated by 
a new government with a distinctive political project was important in conjunction with 
the broader economic processes through which labour markets were re-structured and 
many strongly unionised employment sectors severely weakened. A weakened union 
movement, increasingly bound by legislative constraints, was unable to effectively 
counter the propaganda emerging from government which repeatedly reinforced the 
message that unions had little relevance in the contemporary industrial environment and 
no longer could claim a legitimate place at the centre of government. 
In focusing upon the power of the state and the political project of a new government 
three crucial and inter-related processes can be identified in determining the declining 
lfc1rtunes of the Group: 
the erosion of the hegemony of the values of the post-war settlement amongst 
loJpinion leaders and senior editorial staff within news organisations, 
the gradual dismantling of the departmental structure of state which underpinned the 
pos1t-w:rr settlement and defined the labour beat, 
the growing political marginalisation of the Group which became a more and more 
?ro~tou~tced feature of the 1980s. 
unites both these processes is the power of the state both in influencing the 
lom1inruat ideological and political perspectives and in granting or denying 'insider 
to particular groups of journalists. 
One former labour correspondent remembers that in the fmal eighteen months of the 
:allagl1an administration, as tensions between the government and unions increased, 
Group sensed a 'cooling' in its own relationship with the political elite. There were 
briefings and less informal contact because the political perspective within 
:abi.net was already shifting away from the values of the post-war settlement and 
artne1·shiip with organised labour. With the arrival of Thatcher in office, however, the 
s world was suddenly turned upside down. 
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Interviewer: 'Some journalists believe that the decline of the Group 
started with the defeat of the miners in 1984-85 but it 
sounds as if it started a bit earlier?' 
Interviewee: 'It started long before that with the end of the Labour 
Government. Obviously we were closer to a Labour 
Government because our chief contacts were with the 
unions. Thatcher hated the Group [Labour and Industrial 
Correspondents' Group]. She saw us once, didn't like us 
and never saw us again. That's when she was leading the 
Opposition. Then all access to the roots of power were 
cut off and in the same way as the unions were thrown 
out of Downing Street so were we thrown out. Our power 
diminished sharply over night. It wasn't the Miners' 
strike, that was just the culmination of a process which 
had began in the last days of the Labour Government.' 
(17). 
This journalist worked as a labour correspondent throughout the I 970s and the first half 
of the 1980s to the end of the Coal Strike. For much of this period he was the labour 
editor of a leading quality newspaper. He recalls a growing reluctance on the part of 
Labour Party sources to maintain the traditional degree of proximity to the Group. The 
•L.ao<our Government, he believes, had already begun the process of pushing the trade 
•nniron elite away from the centre of government and 'just as the unions were being told 
take the medicine, so were we.' He continues: 
'That process was intensified as soon as the Tories took office. 
We were marginalised, just as the unions were marginalised because 
they [the Government] didn't want to know about unions and they 
didn't want to know about us. • (18) 
process of political marginalisation is confirmed in the papers of the Group. The 
recc1rds for the year 1982 (the earliest records still retained) indicate that the Group had 
.vril:ten to the Labour Party leadership seeking to re-establish pre-Conference briefings. 
records for 1983 formally note the 'shock' felt by members at the refusal of the 
...ao<our Party leader, Michael Foot, to accept an invitation to meet them. Perhaps even 
significantly, the papers for 1983, report that the Secretary had written to Bernard 
ngl1an1, seeking to re-establish briefing sessions with the Prime Minister and had been 
efm;ed. In his annual report for 1984, the Chair commented upon the 'need to re-build 
authority of the Group' but a year earlier speakers from the floor, at a meeting in 
:eptember 1983, expressed this sentiment in even stronger terms. The minutes record 
member, the labour editor of a left of centre broadsheet, commenting, 
' .. .it was quite obvious that the Group was going down ... at a 
time the trade union movement was in retreat and the Government 
was here for a long time, as a serious organisation the Group was 
211 
treated with derision by government departments. As serious 
journalists, something had to be done about it very quickly. '(19) 
One must be careful not to overstate the degree of change. The papers of the Group in 
the early 1980s suggest that at a formal level, the Group were not cast entirely into the 
political wilderness. In 1983, the Group Secretary wrote to a number of the institutions 
on the labour and industrial beat, including the Department of Employment, the 
Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Labour Party, suggesting 
formal meetings. The papers do not record how many invitations were accepted but it is 
clear that the Group anticipated continuing routine formal contact with departments of 
state. Neil Kirmock, the new leader of the Labour Party, agreed to re-establish contact 
with the Group but on a far less regular basis than in the Wilson era (one or two 
briefings each year compared to the weekly meetings at Number Ten in the 1960s). The 
political in-fighting between left and right inside Cabinet which characterised the early 
years of the Thatcher administration also generated some useful copy for the Group 
when particular ministers were involved. Jim Prior, for example, at the Department of 
Employment fought back against a campaign of hostile selective briefings to the 
Westminster Lobby by going off-record with the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' 
Group (Prior,l986:163). For a time, presumably, the Labour Group represented an 
attractive alternative point of contact with the news media for members of the 
Conservative administration who felt threatened by the very close relationship which 
formed between the Bernard Ingham, the Number Ten press secretary, and political 
correspondents on right -of-centre dailies. However, as Mrs Thatcher secured the 
balance of power within her Cabinet, such conflicts subsided. While political 
COJTe!ipolnde~nts sometimes appear in the memoirs of Conservative ministers who 
oc<:upied positions formerly of importance on the labour and industrial beat in previous 
decades, these accounts suggest very little interaction with the Labour and Industrial 
Group (Parkinson,l992; Heseltine,1987) by the mid-1980s. 
Annual invitations to speak at Group functions certainly continue to be accepted by 
mir1ist•ers. Gillian Sheppard, the current Employment Minister, was a guest speaker in 
992. Before her, Kenneth Clarke, during his spell at the Department of Trade and 
Tom King (Employment), Leon Brittan (D.T.I.), and Norman Fowler 
(Elnp:loyme:nt) have all attended formal functions as members of Conservative 
Cal)in,ets. Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and John Smith have similarly represented the 
Lat>ou1r Party front bench team in recent years. However, it is clear that the organic 
which the Group enjoyed with Labour administrations in the 1960s and 1970s is no 
lon,~erin existence. Since 1990, when the TUC- Labour Party Liaison Committee was 
1brundoned (Harper,1990), the Labour Party has continued to distance itself in 
~rganisational terms from the unions and with each subtle movement, so the political 
ms:ition of the Group has further been undermined. 
Rather than weekly briefmgs and daily informal contacts, the Group can anticipate 
annual ministerial appearance at a 'Group do' and the routine service provided by 
press offices within ministerial departments. Ministers may still want to talk to 
nuusmat correspondents when they have something to sell and the willingness of a 
1umber of former labour correspondents to accept a wider brief is sometimes rewarded 
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in these circumstances. Phillip Bassett, for example, recently got an 'exclusive' 
interview with Micheal Heseltine on the re-structuring of the DTI and the re-
introduction of departments dedicated to the sponsorship of key business sectors, 
which appeared on the business section of the Times (Bassett, 1993). However, the 
regular and routine flows of information and exchanges of 'intelligence' between the 
political elite and the Group have disappeared. Significantly, as the Labour Party seeks 
to re-fashion its relationship with the trade unions to allow a greater public distance 
between the two wings of the labour movement, so relations with the Group have also 
become more formal and distant. 
The Coal Strike and the Destruction of the Post-War Settlement 
The arrival of Thatcher in Government meant far more than the severing of the organic 
relationship between the political elite in Westminster and the Group. Thatcher's 
political project concerned the destruction of the framework of the post-war settlement, 
an end to 'corporatism', and the eradication of the political values and ideology which 
legitimated these arrangements. As we have seen, the importance of the post-war 
settlement for the Group lay not merely in the legitimate position of proximity to 
government it allocated to the trade unions but in the entire framework of institutions 
which were established to regulate industry, industrial relations and the planning of the 
economy. The Thatcherite project was directed not only towards the emasculation of 
trade unions but the dismantling of this entire edifice. It represented, therefore, a 
political project which would inevitably break up and re-cast the labour and industrial 
beat. 
We can see this most clearly in the case of the nationalised industries. Many senior 
managers employed within the nationalised industries at the beginning of the Thatcher 
years had spent most, sometimes all, their working lives in the public sector. Through 
the experience of working in only one industry, located within the public sector, many 
senior figures had acquired a set of organisational and social values which were at 
compatible with the social democratic or labourist perspectives characteristic not 
of trade union officials but many within the Labour and Industrial Group, as well. 
the strains placed upon the post-war settlement increased through the 1970s, it is 
that the State began to contemplate the need for a change of management culture 
the public sector. The appointment of Michael Edwardes at the head of British 
Le''lat1d under a Labour Government is one illustration of this. However, under 
Th:atclher the destruction of the traditional managerial culture within the nationalised 
tnd1ustlies and its replacement with a corporate culture familiar to executives in the 
Jriv'ate sector notably quickened. This was achieved in a variety of ways. In some 
nstanc:es, as in the case of gas, water, and telephone services, wholesale privatisation 
achieved in a way which was likely to ensure that senior executives had sufficient 
ncfmtives to divest themselves of any commitment to public service values. In other 
the government not yet in a position to fully privatise, sought to replace senior 
~r:sonnel with executives with 'robust' track records in the corporate world. Hence, 
example, the appointlnent of Ian MacGregor, first at the head of British Steel and 
British Coal. 
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This process profoundly affected the workings of the Group. Firstly, industrial 
correspondents began to lose valuable contacts within the management of nationalised 
industries. In some cases, strong friendships had developed between journalists and 
senior executives who had been promoted from within. New appointments arriving 
from the private sector, familiar with a very different approach to media relations, 
proved far less accessible. Secondly, the concept of partnership with organised labour 
was re-cast. The new breed of senior executives talked of partnerships with employees 
but implied that such relationships would be structured in terms of corporate values. In 
the past, the concept of public ownership had been employed to reconcile the interests 
of management and labour in terms of a consensual framework to manage industrial 
relations. This framework provided a number of stable landmarks on the journalists' 
industrial beat and, to a degree, encouraged a shared culture which allowed 
correspondents access to both managers and union leaders. The 'partnership' between 
Derek Ezra, as head of the Coal Board, and Joe Gormley, as President of the NUM, in 
seeking to represent the interests of the industry to government was widely recognised 
and immediately identified as a 'problem' by the in-coming Thatcher government. For 
journalists on the labour and industrial beats, stable relationships between managements 
and unions, involving routine dialogue, regular negotiation and occasional eruptions of 
open conflict represented very good news gathering terrain. Another consequence of 
the arrival of Thatcher was the breaking up of these relations. 
However, the crumbling of the post-war settlement was not merely caused by the 
arrival of a new government in office. Significant sections within the labour movement 
also began to move further from the values of social democracy which underpinned the 
post-war settlement. Thus, with the election of Arthur Scargill the leadership of the 
NUM moved leftwards, further undermining the traditional frameworks upon which 
labour journalists relied. The papers of the Group suggest growing difficulties 
ex1>eriienc~ed by labour correspondents in gaining access to contacts within the NUM 
he<tdquarters. The move from London to Sheffield, in itself appeared to announce a 
down-grading in the priority attached to relations with the news media. It was no 
longer 'open house', as one journalist described the headquarters of the NUM under 
Gormley. 
The Coal Strike in 1984-1985 brought these processes to crisis point. The dispute 
into sharp relief the changes which the Government was promoting in the 
org:ani.sation and culture of management within the National Coal Board, and the 
changiing role which the state was defining for coal as an industry. Most importantly, 
strike highlighted how far the politics of industrial relations could be fractured and 
JOl:arilsed once the state dispensed with the values of the post-war settlement. Such a 
JOl:arilsation led to sharper, much more visible conflicts between organised labour and 
state itself. It meant that the conflict manifested itself not only within the 
:onver1tional arenas of industrial relations but in a much wider range of contexts 
ncl.udiing public spaces, streets, motorways, and so on, and arenas where political ideas 
debated and disseminated including television studios and newspaper news rooms. 
The paradox for industrial correspondents and members of the Group was that in 
984-85 they faced, perhaps, the biggest labour story of the post-war era but also the 
severe crisis in terms of their practice and orientation as journalists. Much of the 
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'story' no longer centred around the familiar points of the labour beat, the structure of 
routine sources and contacts was de-stabilised and, perhaps most importantly, the 
political marginalisation of the Group was made highly visible. In contrast, a number 
of political correspondents and senior editorial staff enjoyed regular access to key 
sources within government and the National Coal Board, as a deliberate news 
management strategy evolved during the strike. One industrial correspondent recalls 
finally appreciating the extent to which the Group had been sidelined when his editor 
made it clear that he had been given MacGregor' s home telephone number and enjoyed 
regular access inside the National Coal Board at the highest level. This was a highly 
sought after contact number which had been denied to industrial correspondents 
throughout the strike. 'That's when I knew the game for us was up' (20). 
The movement of the NUM headquarters from London to Sheffield under the new 
presidency of Arthur Scargill had already created problems for the Group before the 
start of the strike. The minutes of Group meetings in 1984 note the difficulties 
journalists were already experiencing because the new facilities were inadequate and a 
plea was made to revert back to the 'old Euston Road arrangements' (21). The NUM at 
this time was still an important point on the labour beat and fortnightly national 
executive meetings would be covered as a matter of routine. In London delegates from 
around the country would stay in two hotels known to labour journalists, the left of the 
executive in the County Hotel, Upper Woburn Street and the right in the Cora Hotel, 
opposite. Labour correspondents would meet contacts in both hotels and the Marquis of 
Cornwall, the NUM executive's normal London pub round the back of the Euston 
Road headquarters. This part of the labour beat was destroyed with the change of 
headquarters. Now journalists had to travel to Sheffield and while the left of the 
executive from coal fields in Scotland, Kent and Wales might stay in hotels that 
journalists could target, much of the executive right travelled from nearby fields in 
Derbyshire and Nottingham and were consequently less accessible as they travelled 
home immediately after meetings (Wilsher, 1985:56). And, of course, in the post-
Gormley era journalists no longer enjoyed 'open house' at the union headquarters on 
a daily or weekly basis. 
While Arthur Scargill was often regarded as a 'good media performer', he attached 
much less importance to developing a sense of rapport with labour correspondents than 
his predecessor. Gormley not only had a very close personal friendship with Barry 
Devney (Daily Express) but enjoyed good relations with most of the Group. He would 
sometimes good humouredly threaten to throw out younger reporters who had spent too 
long talking to Arthur Scargill downstairs and were late for the official executive press 
conference during the 1970s but he had 'too many friends among labour and industrial 
correspondents to want to erect any serious obstacles for the news media' 
(Jones, 1986:56). Arthur Scargill by contrast, insisted upon a much more centralised 
and disciplined approach to the flow of information to the news media. Only the 
President or the President's personal assistant, Nell Myers, took responsibility for 
dealing with media enquiries. No one else within the union enjoyed such authority. The 
flow of information was tightly controlled and channelled through just one individual 
which meant that even Maurice Jones, the editor of 'The Miner', was not able to speak 
for the union in the absence of the President (Adeney and Lloyd,1986:242). 
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While Gormley adopted a critical but relaxed attitude to the ideological nature of 
newspaper journalism (Gormley,l982:156), Arthur Scargill's political analysis which 
prompted a movement away from social democratic consensual values, also inspired a 
deeper suspicion regarding established patterns of interaction between union officials 
and labour correspondents. As positions became more polarised during the course of 
the strike and the nature of media coverage itself became a major political issue, 
tensions between the union and the Group grew increasingly severe. The records of the 
Group include reports of members finding the atmosphere inside the headquarters of the 
NUM intimidating, press conferences were often crowded with members of the union 
and were routinely videoed, an experience journalists found disquieting (22). Some 
members reported suffering physical attacks on picket lines and even at the union • s 
headquarters in Sheffield (23). Significantly, the papers indicate that officers of the 
Group took a decision to play down the reports of physical intimidation in the light of a 
greater concern about the general deterioration in the relationship between the Group 
and the officials of the union and the failure of the Group to maintain channels of 
information. At least one meeting took place between representatives of the Group and 
Peter Heathfield, NUM General Secretary, in June 1984 in an effort to improve 
relations (24). In a letter dated 13th June 1984, the Group Secretary wrote to Peter 
Heathfield with a fifteen point action plan to help improve the union • s public relations 
and media coverage. More press officers and spokespersons were needed and work 
done on developing a union position which could be presented at branch and local level 
as well as nationally. The Government and NCB twice daily release of statistics should 
be matched with counter information, and information could be circulated more 
effectively by using the Press Association or UNS. Tellingly, the list also included a 
plea for more on or off record briefings for accredited labour correspondents. Clearly, 
the Group sought to distinguish itself in the eyes of the union from the vast numbers of 
non-specialist and political correspondents who had been allocated to cover the strike. 
Policy and research documents could be launched more effectively if press conferences 
were planned carefully and material packaged appropriately. 
All the evidence confirms a period of crisis for labour journalism. The traditional 
patten1s of interaction between industrial correspondents and trade unions were 
sh<tttered by the polarised conflict of the strike. It became increasingly difficult as the 
wore on for labour correspondents to maintain a 'balanced' position within an 
ind:ustrial consensus which embraced the two sides of industry. And this was not simply 
bec:awse the NUM viewed the practice of the news media through a much sharper 
political perspective. The Group itself became the focus of political attack from tlle 
Suspicions regarding the political sympathies of industrial journalists had always 
exi1sted arising from their daily proximity to union elites. Now some newspapers, and 
Ma.cGre~~or as Chairman of the NCB, raised this as a public issue. Paul Routledge, 
muusurtat editor of tlle Times, was accused by the Daily Express of being one of 
Sc:rrgill s seven shadows'. Routledge later sued and won. Paul Johnson launched a 
attacks aimed at the political bias of labour correspondents and • their dependence 
the union machine' in the Spectator (Johnson,l984; Jones,l986:117). MacGregor 
dentoUJn.ced the whole LaboUJr and Industrial Correspondents • Group, argning that many 
ne1nbers were sympathetic to the NUM and those who were not remained dependent 
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upon the union for copy (MacGregor,1986:313). John Lloyd of the FT was identified 
in particular as a target by MacGregor. Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, 
also identified the Labour and Industrial Group as biased to the political left 
(Jones,l986:115). These themes were developed further by Andrew Neil in a feature 
article on the editorial pages of the Sunday Times (Jones,1986:116). For perhaps the 
first time in the post-war period the social democratic and labourist values of the Group 
were being highlighted in the public domain and identified as a political issue by those 
on the political right. 
The position of labour correspondents became increasingly problematic as some of 
their own news organisations made more frequent political interventions during the 
course of the strike. The Mail on Sunday announced to its readers that it would 
sponsor 'Silver Birch', one of the leaders of the rebel 'working miners', the Daily 
Express also donated funds to support legal action against the NUM and newspapers, 
such as the Sunday Times, adopted overtly ideological stances in declaring that because 
the NUM represented a threat to democracy, 'ScargilJ and his forces had to be defeated 
and would be' (Nei!,l985). Bailiffs were supplied with a security pass normally used 
by a Sunday Express photographer to gain entry to the Labour Party conference to 
serve a writ upon Arthur ScargilJ (Wilsher,l985:123). Inevitably, these overtly political 
interventions in the course of the strike made it extremely difficult for labour and 
industrial correspondents to maintain routine relations not only with the NUM but with 
all the trade union contacts on their regular beats. Joe Gormley's old friend Barry 
Devney, the Express labour correspondent but also a Labour Party activist, simply 
gave up attending union press conferences because of the hostile reception he received 
(Jones,1986:117). As the political polarisation of the strike made visible the erosion of 
post-war consensual values, so the traditional normative framework which patterned 
interaction between the unions and the Group was also eroded. 
The crisis which afflicted labour journalism in this period not only affected relations 
with the labour movement. The Group found that its professional authority was 
undermined by the changes in the orientation of the State to media elites. Where as in 
the 1960s and 1970s the Group had enjoyed an 'organic' relationship with the political 
elite, sustained through the 'corporate bias' (Middlemas,1986) of government and the 
presence of trade unions at the political centre, now it found that it was no longer able 
produce the most informed 'intelligence' and that its traditional sources within the 
N~ttio,nal Coal Board were no longer, themselves, in control of events. The Group's 
'aultho:rity was undermined by the ability of political correspondents and even editors, 
ithllmlseb;es, to establish contacts with key members of the political elite who were 
lcor1ceJned to by-pass the traditional channels of labour reporting. After a very hesitant 
(Adeney and Lloyd,l986:194), the National Coal Board and Government 
[developc~d a much slicker public relations machine. Tim Bell, former chairman of 
ISa:atclhi and Sa:atchi and responsible for the 1979 Tory election campaign, was drafted 
by MacGregor in response to pressure from the Government, to handle public 
lrehitio:ns (Jones 1986:99). Bell was assisted by David Hart, a journalist and public 
rel<ttio1ns consultant with connections to Downing Street and the senior editorial team at 
Times (Goodman,l985:12l) and who was heavily involved in supporting 'working 
>n;,,p,.. groups' with resources and advice. He was able to supply Fleet Street editors 
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with detailed information on these developments. Increasingly, MacGregor allowed this 
team to supplant the senior management team with formal responsibility for industrial 
relations (Ned Smith) and public relations (Geoff Kirk) within the NCB. Smith and 
Kirk were both very experienced managers who had spent most of their careers within 
the NCB. Over the years they had developed a strong rapport with the Group. Kirk, in 
particular, was regarded by industrial correspondents as a highly reliable and accessible 
source (Jones,1986:99). To mark the retirement of Geoff Kirk, the Group organised a 
special dinner in his honour. Both Kirk and Smith were strongly committed to the 
traditional culture of nationalised industries. Both were alienated by the new corporate 
culture introduced by MacGregor (Goodman,1985:60) and both left the NCB in the 
wake of the dispute. Kirk had commented in his speech at his retirement dinner with 
the Group that it was a matter of 'great regret that the NCB and NUM were no longer 
able to work in partnership together' (25). Smith also expressed public doubts about the 
wisdom of open confrontation between management and unions in a Radio Four 
interview during the strike (Jones,1986:81). Smith was ordered to stop giving broadcast 
interviews (Adeney and Lloyd,1986:194) and members of the Group were astonished to 
witness Kirk being removed from his responsibility for press work in the course of a 
briefing to industrial correspondents (Wilsher et al,l985:195). Both Kirk and Smith 
were manoeuvred out of their positions of responsibility during the strike because of 
their reluctance to abandon the traditional normative framework for industrial relations 
and their unwillingness to engage in the kind of full-blooded ideological onslaught 
against the NUM which both MacGregor and Peter Walker were calling for (Adeney 
and Lloyd,1986: 194-197). 
Peter Walker exploited his own extensive contacts with political correspondents to 
try to marginalise the Labour and Industrial Group. He targeted Sunday papers over 
dailies and ensured that political correspondents were supplied with superior copy, 
denied to labour reporters (Adeney and Lloyd,l986:245) The BBC Radio's industrial 
correspondent describes the frustration of the group: 
'Specialist correspondents were often exasperated to find 
that their editors had been given a fuller briefing by Mr 
Walker than they themselves had been able to obtain in a whole 
days work. .. ' (Jones,l986:115) 
An•oth«:r former labour editor working for a broadsheet during the strike provides the 
followin!!: analysis: 
'The Thatcher government concentrated upon the centres of power 
in newspapers, not the centres of reporting ... the Daily Express, 
the Conservative Party, the working miners' groups, ... the 
Government plugged into the right contacts, the centres of 
authority, so editors were genuinely in a better position to 
assess what was going on. Somehow Andrew Neil was getting 
the minutes of NUM executive meetings, that was a bit of a 
facer for labour correspondents! These were things which 
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industrial correspondents should have been getting ... essential 
for assessing where we were. We were outpaced by our editors.' (26) 
Inevitably, the authority of industrial and labour correspondents was undermined by 
this process of marginalisaton. Journalists' power and influence within news 
organisations largely depends upon the value and range of their contacts, and the 
quality of the 'intelligence' which these produce. As members of the Group were 
'outpaced' by their own editors, so their authority was diminished inside the news 
rooms and they were less able to resist the frequent re-writing, subbing and substitution 
of alternative copy under their by-lines which occurred during the dispute 
(Jones,1986:115-115; Goodman,1985:121; Adeney and Lloyd,1986:245). This, in 
turn, further undermined their positions in relation to trade unions and the framework 
of the old labour beat. 
The Coal Strike did not in itself produce the decline in the fortunes of industrial and 
labour correspondents but it did accelerate and accentuate the political forces which 
were determining this process. The rise of Thatcherism and the successful attack upon 
the values of social democracy and post war consensual politics were inevitably going 
to wash away the foundations of the structures which supported the labour beat in the 
first three decades after the war. Sooner or later the political values and assumptions of 
the Group were likely to be spotlighted as an issue in the public domain. The change in 
the composition of the political elite which Thatcherism produced and the erosion of the 
organisational cultures which had characterised nationalised industries in the post-war 
period, were already leading towards the political marginalisation of the Group before 
the strike began. Nevertheless, this period in the mid 1980s remains significant because 
it is at this time that these processes became visible and were explicitly acknowledged 
by the participants. 
The Relationship between the Group and trade unions: 1979 to 1994 
The traumatic impact of the Coal Strike was intensified by the eruption of further 
polarised conflict during the dispute between print unions and News International at 
Watpping. Once again, industrial correspondents were placed in the centre of an 
industrial conflict in a way which made it impossible to avoid making visible a political 
commitment. All three journalists on the labour desk at the Times resigned rather than 
cross print union picket lines. Others were compelled to reconcile membership of the 
NUJ and the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group with the fact of being 
em]JloJred by an organisation determined to break the power of trade unions in the 
ne\vsp,ap!:r industry. The Sun resolved this dilemma for its staff by temporarily 
'""""'"'u.!!> the labour desk . The minutes of a meeting of the Group in 1987 record the 
pas:sing of a resolution barring 'News International employees from attending Group 
fun:cti•Jns if their presence was likely to prevent the attendance of a guest speaker' (27). 
Cl~:arly., the bitterness generated at Wapping had further undermined relations between 
lab•Jur correspondents and the labour movement. Similarly, in 1987 the Secretary wrote 
TASS to complain about the treatment a particular member had received at the 
of pickets during the Hanger dispute. A letter in reply from the strike committee 
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admitted that what had happened to Mr Burns was 'unfortunate' but insisted that it had 
to be placed in the context of the general bias in media coverage which had provoked 
members to the point where they felt compelled 'to storm the Daily Express building'. 
Mr Burns had apparently escaped relatively mildly in comparison (28). Several other 
instances are recorded through the 1980s. A series of resignations, applications and re-
applications in the same period appear also to be the result of Wapping inspired splits 
within the Group, itself (29). 
According to some industrial correspondents including Philip Bassett, formerly on 
the FT and now industrial editor of the Times (30), in the aftermath of the Coal Strike, 
news values in industrial journalism began to change. As annual strike rates declined 
and pickets were no longer to be seen outside factory gates, so labour correspondents 
sought to identify new themes and wider briefs. This is only part of a more complex 
explanation. Firstly, research has long suggested that the frequency of strikes or 
disputes does not determine their newsworthiness (GUMG, 1976 and 1980). Rather, it 
is the political context in which disputes occur that makes them newsworthy. And this, 
in turn, points to the importance of the values and ideological perspectives of the 
political elite and senior editorial staff within news organisations. The greater the 
success of the political elite in marginalising trade unions at the political level, the more 
likely it is that they will decline in the news value hierarchy, irrespective of how may 
disputes occur. Secondly, Bassett, himself, represented a new generation of journalists 
who became industrial specialists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. He and several 
colleagues ( for example, Tom Condon ex-industrial editor on the Sun) were members 
of a new cohort of labour correspondent whose journalism was shaped by the politics 
of 'new realism', associated with the EETPU and AEU inside the labour movement. 
By 1986 Bassett had already produced a sustained defence of new realism in the work 
place with considerable assistance from both the electricians and the engineers (Bassett, 
1986). Of course, new realism with an emphasis upon strike free deals and single union 
contracts, in itself, implied a different industrial news agenda, with less emphasis upon 
conflict stories and a greater preoccupation with employment practices, labour law, and 
wider issues of technological development and business strategy. 
Thirdly, as we have seen, many industrial specialists actively sought to widen their 
briefs in order to remain marketable and, fourthly, the reason they felt compelled to do 
this in the second half of the 1980s was precisely because they were aware of the down 
grading of trade union news by senior editorial teams. Andrew Neil had already told 
journallists at the end of the Coal Strike that industrial journalism would soon be totally 
eclipsc::d by financial specialists (Jones, 1988). The editor of the Times, Charles 
Wilso:n. told his staff that both unions and union news 'was finished' (Jones, 1987). 
Guardian replaced its labour section with a new section on employment 
OP!JOI1unities called 'Frontiers', while the Independent began a 'Workplace' feature, 
UJhif'h the editor specified should not 'preoccupy itself with the institutional troubles of 
trade union movement' (Jones,1987). Even the F.T. revamped its labour reporting 
the late 1980s and placed coverage of trade unions in a much broader context. 
The papers of the Group suggest that formal contacts continued with trade union 
lP,,IPr< but less frequently. The lists of guest speakers for Group functions also reflect 
broadening of industrial briefs and the increasing preoccupation with non-union 
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stories. In 1983, the Group sent formal invitations to eight trade unions to send 
speakers for lunch or evening events at the Cheshire Cheese or The Clarence in 
Whitehall, including the T and G, the GMB, NUPE, ASTMS, NGA and POEU. 
According to the minutes of the 1988 and 1989 AGMs only three union speakers were 
invited in 1987 and only one in 1988 (Eric Hammond). In their place invitations were 
extended to the Industrial Society, the Institute of Personnel Management, British Steel, 
and the Post Office. Of course, the records of formal events organised by the Group 
does not provide a complete picture of the Group's contact with trade unions. Indeed, 
by the late 1980s many of the larger unions had already appointed full-time press 
officers and, to a degree, their work made the formal invitation of members of the 
union elites to Group events unnecessary. Nevertheless, the decline in formal contacts 
and broadening range of alternative invitations is indicative of the changing industrial 
news agenda. By the late 1980s it was rare for union executive meetings to be regarded 
as routine points on the industrial beat and even the TUC General Council meetings 
were no longer routinely covered. In 1984 the Group had regularly held its own 
meetings before the General Council because this would guarantee a high attendance of 
correspondents. The cricket match between the Group and TUC, however, does still 
remain an annual event. 
History and the Present 
The second, much briefer, part of this chapter will relate the history of labour 
journalism and the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group to the empirical 
themes developed in the discussion of the practice of contemporary journalists and trade 
union officers. 
The formal and latent functions of the Group 
The formal constitution of the Group contains a number of elements which are 
characteristic of a professional occupation which is preoccupied with its own status. In 
practice, the Group sometimes drew more from the values of traditional trade unionism 
in managing its affairs. 
The constitution declares that the 'object of the Group shall be to represent the interests 
of all Labour and Industrial Correspondents, to improve facilities and amenities 
available for the collection of news and to stimulate informal contacts with the 
appropriate departments and organisations'. However, rules regarding membership 
were exclusive. Only three labour and three industrial correspondents per news 
organisation would be eligible providing that they 'were engaged mainly in reporting 
labour, industrial and related economic matters'. It was for the Group committee to 
rule in cases where applicants were 'borderline' in satisfying these criteria. 
Membership was 'conditional upon the strict observance of the recognised standards of 
professional conduct' and the Group Committee enjoyed the power to discipline 
members and to employ the ultimate sanction of expulsion from the Group (31). 
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At a formal level the Group took the view that it was appropriate for a specialised 
branch of journalism to be regulated according to appropriate professional guidelines. 
Restrictions on membership were justified on the grounds that it was necessary to keep 
the size of the Group within 'workable proportions' (32). In terms of latent functions, 
students of the sociology of professions will recognise a familiar pattern in which the 
status of a group is reinforced through a strategy which seeks to ensure exclusivity. 
This, of course, is the probable explanation for the ferocious rivalry between the Group 
and the Westminster Lobby in the period up to the 1980s. As we have seen, during the 
most buoyant period for labour and industrial reporting during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, 
membership of the Group was, indeed, much sought after. The Group provided formal 
and informal contact with senior figures in trade unions and the political elite. During 
the era of Wilson's briefings to the Group at Number Ten, membership actually 
afforded access to much of the same territory as that patrolled by the Westminster 
Lobby. Membership also ensured that one's name was automatically added to the 
various invitation lists for events, tours and public relations exercises organised by 
Government departments, companies and nationalised industries,- all important points 
on the beat. Strong demand for membership permitted the mechanism of restriction to 
successfully generate a status of exclusivity. The fact that the Secretary of the Group in 
the early 1990s was compelled to write inviting journalists to join underlines the change 
in the fortunes of the Group since the late 1970s and the collapse of the strategy of 
membership restriction. 
The Labour and Industrial Group promoted the collective interests of labour 
journalists in a number of ways. The most concerted effort appears to have been 
exerted when the Group perceived that collective access to information or sources was 
being restricted. It is on these occasions when the Group, in the past, has sought to 
exert collective pressure to maintain access to significant channels of information. 
'Intelligence' is the essential commodity which confers authority for correspondents in 
their relations with news organisations and professional rivals. The political elite and 
the more sophisticated elite figures within the trade union movement have long 
recognised the ways in which information as a commodity can be exploited to secure an 
advantageous position in their dealings with correspondents. In short, access to 
information is inextricably bound up with the distribution of power amongst political 
and media elites. It is recognition of this which underlay the nature of the Group 
response to perceived threats to its position of privileged access and prompted a 
collective 'trade union' response to attempts to restrict access to press conferences and 
significant sources, such as pay tribunals, as described in chapter six. As we have seen, 
in exceptional circumstances, (the 1984 Coal Strike and the 1987 disputes at Wapping 
and Hangers) the Group has found itself intervening on behalf of members whose 
information channels were threatened by the action of pickets. 
The Group also attempted to enforce an 'appropriate' normative framework to 
ensure that regular departmental and institutional sources complied with the 
expectations of correspondents. At the Group's AGM a tradition has evolved to award 
'bouquets' and 'brickbats' for the best and worst press and public relations work. If 
representatives of the nominated organisations are not present at the 'awards 
ceremony', then the Group Secretary will write to explain the reasons for the award. 
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Thus, in 1983 bouquets were sent to ACAS, the TUC, COHSE and NUPE, but 
brickbats were allocated to the DHSS, the Department of Employment and Arthur 
Scargill. In 1984, the public relations department at British Telecom was awarded a 
brickbat for its poor performance during the national dispute whilst the union, the 
POEU, was awarded a bouquet for the 'open and frank' approach and the efficiency 
with which press enquiries were dealt with (this supports much of the data obtained 
from current correspondents on their views of good practice for union press officers). 
Finally, as we have seen, the Group also sought to exert normative control 
internally, where it was feared that the behaviour of individual members might 
jeopardise the collective interest of the group. Hence, the protracted debate in the late 
1970s and early 1980s over whether or not to admit the Newsline correspondent to 
membership, given the danger that his presence might de-stabilise relations with 
ministerial sources. Membership was granted to Newsline journalists for a brief period 
during the mid-1980s. 
The Culture of the Group 
The purpose of this section is to establish a set of historical 'bench marks' with which 
to establish whether or not the patterns observed in the field work for this research 
represent significant departures from the past. It is impossible to determine whether or 
not there has been a decline in group solidarity, or a shift in political orientation, or 
even whether labour correspondents are now more desk bound unless a historical 
perspective is employed. 
The first point to make is that current and former labour and industrial 
correspondents are aware of significant generational shifts in the post war period. For 
one ex-industrial and labour correspondent, generational changes occurred on 'a decade 
pattern really', because 'in the sixties you had the senior guys with a lot respect, Mike 
Edwards, Trevor Evans, etc. In the seventies you had Routledge and so on. Very 
sharp.' In the late 1980s, according to this ex-correspondent, as the status of industrial 
journalism declined, news organisations began to employ younger journalists on their 
industrial desks who were less likely to be sympathetic to the traditions of the labour 
movement and often regarded the industrial desk as just another rung on the 
professional ladder. It is certainly the case that a number of the senior correspondents, 
many of whom had entered industrial journalism before or just after the war, continued 
to exercise considerable influence within the Group during the 1960s. Ian Mc.Kay had 
died at the Labour Party conference in 1953 but Trevor Evans and Hugh Chevins (the 
other two thirds of the original thirties triumvirate) remained in Fleet Street until the 
late 1960s. Labour correspondents who established their names in the 1950s, including 
Eric Wigham, Geoffrey Goodman and Mike Edwards, rose to positions of seniority 
within the Group during this period and their seniority was confirmed through their 
possession of knighthoods, places on Royal Commissions and positions in government 
departments (see chapter six). 
By the end of the sixties, however, the 'old guard' were beginning to be replaced 
by a new generation of Oxbridge and redbrick university educated journalists. Paul 
Routledge replaced Eric Wigham at the Times in 1969. Mick Costello, Donald 
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Mcintyre, and Christian Tyler, for example, all came from such backgrounds to take 
up posts as number one or two's on national newspapers in the very early 1970s. The 
elevated status of industrial and labour journalism at this time meant that news 
organisations could attract the most promising graduates entering daily journalism. By 
the late seventies a further generational shift began to occur. Journalists such as Philip 
Bassett, entered the specialism, similarly university educated but without the formative 
experience of the political atmosphere of higher education in the sixties. It was 
Routledge's generation who were most affected by the disturbance and disruptions of 
the mid-eighties. Rout! edge lost his job at the Times after the Coal Strike while 
Mclntyre found himself one of the News International 'refuseniks', sacked for not 
crossing the Wapping picket line. This period saw a great shake up of industrial staff. 
Some of the remaining correspondents from the sixties like Barrie Devney and 
Geoffrey Goodman retired from full-time journalism. Goodman left the Mirror 
following the difficulties of working for Maxwell during the Coal Strike, Barrie 
Devney (Joe Gormley's personal friend) retired from the Express in 1988, his position 
on the labour beat also having been undermined by the Express' political interventions 
during the Coal Strike. Other labour and industrial correspondents from the seventies 
cohort moved to other specialisms (Nicholas Jones, Donald Mcintyre and Paul 
Routledge to politics, Christian Tyler to feature writing, David Felton to Home 
Affairs). Mick Costello left journalism to become the industrial organiser for the 
Communist Party. 
Changes in generation brought changes in the political perspective of the Group. As 
we have seen a majority of the earlier generations of industrial correspondents were 
positioned in the mainstream of Labour politics. Most were broadly sympathetic to 
Fabian or social democratic traditions in the Party which , in many ways provided the 
seed bed for the 'hegemony' of the post war settlement (33). Themes stressing the 
legitimate role of trade unions in representing labour, balancing the power of capital 
and extending citizenship rights to the work place can be found in the published work 
of leading industrial journalists from the 1960s but also evident is an antipathy to rank 
and file militant politics, outside the social democratic consensus (Mason, 1981; Eric 
Wigham 1961 and 1969). In short, a majority of labour correspondents reflected in the 
'inferential structures' which shaped their journalism, a commitment to the corporatist 
values of the post-war settlement. Their perspectives reflected the institutional 
structures which organised their beat. The beat, itself, was likely to expose labour 
correspondents to the views and perspectives of the trade union elite and government 
more frequently than the voices of capital. Keith Mason (formerly on the labour desk 
of the Daily Herald and later the Sun) explained: 
"Most union leaders knew us by our Christian names and we were on Christian 
name terms with them. So did many Ministers. Most leaders in industry, on the 
other hand, probably would not know us by sight unless a prolonged strike 
brought us into frequent contact." (Keith Mason,l981:3). 
However, a minority of the Group in the 1950s and 1960s were more committed left 
activists (Goodman organised the Fleet Street Forum of Socialist Journalists in the 
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1950s, Barrie Devney was a Labour Party activist throughout his career at the Daily 
Express), while only a very few belonged right of centre (34). 
In the 1970s, with the influx of a new generation, the positions of responsibility 
were occupied by journalists committed to more left of centre perspectives. One former 
labour correspondent and officer for the Group in this period recalls: 
"The Labour Group was a hot bed of politics in the Seventies 
and early eighties. There was a left and a right. The 'ancien 
regime' of the late sixties was replaced by what was regarded 
as the hard left,- people like me , Glyn Alien [ London based 
correspondent for the Yorkshire Evening Post] and Mick Costello and 
we ran the show for the best part of a decade until we were ousted 
by the Labour right wingers from the Midlands, Tom Condon, Charles 
Rae and Richard Littlejohn, now a Sun columnist. 
We were called the 'SPO' ,- the self perpetuating officers, 
because we would exchange jobs. I'd be the Chair and Mick would 
be the Secretary. Top jobs were divided amongst those who wanted 
to do them, who wanted to influence the direction of the Group in 
relation to Ministers because remember the Group was very powerful 
in those days, its now just a shadow of itself, a kind of club. 
It did count and we were influenced by the politics of the Sixties, 
on the Left, from provincial universities, usually in the Labour 
Party but not always, some in the C.P . 
.. . the fortunes of the Industrial Group reflected the fortunes 
of the labour movement. When the labour movement was on the up 
we were on the up, when it was down we were down. When it was 
racked by divisions, we were racked by divisions so when 'new 
realism' came into the labour movement, it emerged in our Group 
too, so people like Phi! Bassett and Tom Condon mirrored the 
shift to the right and we [the left] were ousted because we no 
longer represented the majority view in the Group." (35) 
Similarly, a member of the generation who entered industrial journalism in the early 
1980s recalls : 
" ... I think one of the most important things is that there was when I started 
Barry Devney, Routledge, the man from the Telegraph ... John Boyd and so 
on ... a lot of them were quite political in ways and tied into unions ... there 
was a whole network of them who had been covering unions for years, 
knew general secretaries, knew executives, knew the routine of sitting in 
pubs and that was how a lot of business seems to have been done talking to 
people in pubs. By the time I came along, there was still a bit of that. .. 
there was the monthly trip to Sheffield for the NUM executive and we used to 
try to grab people afterwards before they caught their trains and sit in this pub 
trying to weedle out of them what happened. That was the end of that kind of 
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culture really. Since then, everything has changed, so more work is done by 
FAX and so on." (36) 
It is clear, then, that the politics of the Group have undergone a series of significant 
changes, linked to generational shifts and changes in the external political environment. 
What about the other empirical 'bench mark' questions, posed by the field work? To 
what extent does the history of the Group suggest that journalists are more desk bound 
now or that the Group has lost a close social network of contacts which bound labour 
correspondents to contacts within the labour movement? Was there a pub culture and 
has it disappeared? 
Out and about: the labour beat and social networks. 
Intelligence and information upon which industrial correspondents can form judgements 
and even make predictions has always been regarded as the crucial commodity on the 
labour beat. This will be discussed further below. The reputation of individual 
correspondents and their status within their own news organisations crucially depended 
upon the quality of their contacts and their record in judging 'which way it was going 
to go', whether this was a dispute, a union election or a tribunal judgement. In turn, 
the history of the development of labour and industrial reporting suggests that social 
networks involving correspondents and contacts within unions and nationalised 
industries were, indeed, an integral part of the job and that the pub often represented 
the appropriate arena for the fostering of such networks. Significantly, as we have 
seen, even the geographical distribution of pubs on the beat reflected the departmental 
architecture of the post-war settlement with the most popular being located close to 
Westminster, Whitehall, ACAS and the headquarters of the leading unions. 
The pub served a dual purpose. Through the 'doorstepping' routine labour and 
industrial correspondents gathered together and working relationships, even friendships 
developed. The pub next to the doorstep provided a focal point for these processes (the 
interaction between 'competitor colleagues' will be discussed further below). Secondly, 
the pub often represented a very important information gathering arena as union 
executive committee members or officials relaxed off-record. Thus, as we have seen 
labour correspondents knew in which pub to find the 'left' or the 'right' of the 
executive committees of, for example, the NUM or the AEU, and in which pub to 
meet, themselves, in order to put the pieces of the story together. It was for these 
reasons, presumably, that Tunstall found that only crime correspondents could match 
labour correspondents as 'heaviest drinkers' amongst specialist journalists 
(Tunstall, 1971: 197). 
Two pubs, in particular, became central meeting points for labour journalists. If 
before the War the Cheshire Cheese, in Fleet Street, had become a daily 'watering 
hole' for the Group, after the war the Clarence in Whitehall, where the civil service 
unions enjoyed a special arrangement with the landlord, also became a regular venue 
for both formal events and informal gatherings. Most of the correspondents interviewed 
for this research could produce at least one tale of outrageous behaviour at these two 
venues, particularly at the 'socials' which followed Annual General Meetings, or 'the 
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Group yearly freak out' as the Secretary described the fixture in 1985 (37). It is clear 
that such social events helped to reinforce the sense of solidarity which, as we have 
seen, was an important characteristic of the Group before the late 80s. Although a very 
small number of women have developed careers in labour journalism (38), the 
dominant culture inside the Group appears to have reflected traditional male 
preoccupations with beer and pub humour . The rituals involved in the Group's social 
events, including the annual award of 'the Golden Bollock' for the worst published 
copy of the year, reinforce this impression of a culture of male solidarity. 
The papers of the Group recording the most recent years in the late eighties and 
early nineties clearly confirm that older social ties and networks which bound labour 
and industrial correspondents together are now fragmenting. The Group is less active in 
organising formal events, these are now badly attended and few correspondents report 
contact with other labour or industrial correspondents on a daily or even weekly basis. 
Some contacts are maintained by telephone, the bigger annual events such as big union 
conferences and the TUC Conference will draw correspondents together. The annual 
cricket match, first introduced by Geoffrey Goodman in 1961, against a TUC eleven 
still takes place. Nevertheless, there appears no longer to be a very strong sense of 
group identity. This probably reflects both the declining importance of the Group for 
journalists seeking useful copy and the changing priorities of correspondents as they 
address the agendas of their news organisations. It also, of course, reflects the impact 
of 'Wappingisation', the removal of newspapers from Fleet Street, and the destruction 
of the journalistic networks around the nearby bars and clubs which represented 'a 
delicately balanced, intricate social system' (Waterhouse,1991). There is a danger of 
constructing a 'golden age mythology' around the end of Fleet Street but Waterhouse 
points to the value of the 'casual friendships' which permitted the exchange of 
professional advice, information and news of job opportunities in the pubs along the 
street. This may only have been a minor factor in the decline of the Industrial and 
Labour Group compared to the deeper processes at work at the level of the state and the 
political elite but it played a part. As one former labour correspondent recalls: 
"In the old days we were all within half a mile of each other 
and we would all drink in the same pub,- the upstairs bar of the 
Cheshire Cheese. And we did drink,- on a good day there could be 
ten or fifteen industrial hacks in there swapping stories till 
around 3.00 and then they might well go off to the clubs around 
Fleet Street. After Wapping everything was destroyed ... you' re 
tied to a screen. A new generation don't know what it was like, 
what they've lost." (39) 
Labour correspondents maintain links with trade unions but the nature of the social 
relationships has changed, the telephone and the FAX machine now sustaining such 
relationships as a frequent substitute for the personal contacts of the beat, - a 
~ 
'telephonic culture', as one former industrial correspondent describes the current 
situation. While the telephone represents an efficient means of seeking 'factual' 
information rapidly and with minimum of effort, it is doubtful whether it is possible to 
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establish a telephonic intimacy which allows the gathering of contextual and 
background 'intelligence' in quite the same way as the traditional social networks, 
involving journalist-union official and journalist- journalist intercourse. 
Significant changes, then, have occurred in the social nature and culture of the 
Group. Is it the case that industrial and labour journalists are now more desk bound? 
As we have seen, correspondents have been placed under pressure to accept wider 
briefs covering industrial, employment, personnel and even technological fields. One or 
two now double up with a specialism such as education. Journalists from all areas 
report increasing pressure which derives from earlier deadlines for copy because new 
production technology allows newspapers to run more editions. The impression 
amongst many journalists is that they are more firmly stuck behind their desks and that 
there are fewer opportunities to engage in intelligence gathering exercises outside the 
office. Ventures outside the office are more closely 'policed' by senior management in 
the news organisation ( 41 ). As one former health specialist comments: 
"Twenty or thirty years ago one could make a lot of visits to 
places on 'spec'. Now to get out, the story has to be better 
than anything which could be written from the office. More 
questions are asked by managers, 'Do you really need to go out? 
That could be done by phone.' As you do one story, another is 
plonked on your desk and then another so schizophrenia reigns. 
You don't get the stories you just tripped over like the old 
days. You rely more and more on people trying to flog you a story." 
(42) 
The 'desk bound thesis' has to be placed in context. Tunstall found that 59% of labour, 
aviation and education correspondents spent between 50% and 75% of their time in the 
office (1971:126) and that even in the 1960s, telephone calls often out-numbered face 
to face contacts (1971: 152). Nevertheless, Tunstall also found that most news 
organisations were willing to recognise, in those days, the need to invest time in the 
cultivation of sources and contacts (1971:116) and evidence from the thirties (Evans 
,1953) and the sixties (43) indicates a pattern whereby labour correspondents spent a 
considerable time away from Fleet Street during the conference season. One former 
correspondent recalls being sent by his 'number one' in the early weeks of his 
appointment to cover the union conferences simply in order to generate the contacts 
which would become essential for the job. According to MORI surveys of labour and 
industrial journalists, the number of correspondents mentioning the telephone as 'most 
useful source' has slightly increased between 1982 and 1993 as has the numbers 
identifying press releases (56% to 66% ), - another possible indicator of deskboundness. 
However, there are problems in using this data longitudinally and the data continues to 
underline journalists' commitment to 'unofficial sources' and 'personal interviews' ( 
three quarters of journalists sampled continued to identify these sources throughout) 
(44). 0 
In terms of subjective experience older correspondents remain convinced that 
something is lost when face to face contact is limited: 
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"You take a union official to a pub, you buy him a drink 
and he'll tell you a story. You get to know them as people 
and they get to trust you. That personal contact gives you 
stories. You can get stories down the phone, especially when 
someone's pushing something but I'm always deeply suspicious 
of something being pushed. Stories are usually found out, not 
given to you on a plate. We should be talking to union 
officials directly not through intermediaries ... 
. . . I' m always suspicious of news management of any kind, union 
or other and that is why I always preferred direct contact 
with the official in charge. A good labour correspondent 
should know the General Secretary and President on first 
names terms and should see them regularly in their offices, 
at conferences, and should always be at briefings so that 
they know who you are. I still ring officials not press 
officers. We still need an independent existence outside 
the machine." ( 45) 
This view is probably not typical of most contemporary labour or industrial 
correspondents. The appointment of press officers has generally been welcomed 
because it helps to alleviate the old perennial problem for journalists of being unable to 
easily contact officials who are in a position to answer routine press enquiries. 
However, there must be a danger that a combination of growing pressures within the 
news room combined with the increasing priority given to public relations by unions is 
leading to a more routinised form of news management which stifles more investigative 
and analytic labour journalism. The view of the older, senior labour correspondent 
quoted above almost certainly underestimates the extent to which journalists have 
always depended upon routine sources but it does illustrate the traditional professional 
values of labour journalism and the importance industrial correspondents used to attach 
to sources, contacts and 'intelligence'. Many still retain these value commitments but a 
combination of generational change and intensification in the work process for those 
journalists attached to the industrial desk is likely to lead to an erosion of such value 
commitments in the future. 
'Intelligence': the essential commodity of labour journalism. 
Every year since the late sixties, the Labour and Industrial Group have held an award 
ceremony which usually follows the Group's AGM at the end of the TUC conference 
week. Attendance for this particular event continues to be high. Indeed, at the time of 
writing it was sponsored by the Electricity Council. The chairman in 1984, for 
example, invited 'nominations ... for the prize coveted by every self respecting labour 
and industrial joumalist. .. your suggestions in a plain brown wrapper if necessary'(46). 
Correspondents are nominated for writing what is judged to be the worst labour or 
industrial copy published each year and the winner receives the 'Golden Bollock'. In 
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1985, the Group Secretary warned that, 'there is an amazingly long list of entrants, 
reflecting the unerring instinct of everyone to miss-forecast the course of the miners' 
strike' (47). 
In other years, correspondents have been nominated for predicting that a rail strike 
would begin in two days, 'on the basis of a ring round briefmg which everyone else 
checked and found to be untrue'; forecasting that the executive of the CPSA would 
remain in the hands of the right, 'four days before a landslide to the left was 
announced'; suggesting that talks between the NUM and the NCB would flounder 
following the arrest of Arthur Scargill on a picket line when, in fact, they continued, 
and confirming that water union leaders would settle for a 4.6% pay rise when 'at the 
end of the day the unions recommended to members an offer in excess of 5%' (48). 
The award of the 'Golden Bollock' is, in the first instance, an amusing exercise in 
self mockery which helps to strengthen group solidarity. Members of the Group are 
quick to contrast this exercise with the, perhaps, more pompous annual dinner at 
Westminster organised by the Lobby. However, the ritual of the award also serves to 
underline particular professional norms by publicly applying a symbolic sanction to a 
member who transgresses. In almost every case awards have been accepted with great 
good humour. Only one journalist, the labour editor of a broadsheet, has refused to 
accept with the additional threat of legal action. 
In each of the above cases, the nomination refers to a failure to use information to 
make an accurate assessment or forecast of likely developments. In terms of the 
professional norms of the Group, good labour and industrial journalism involves the 
exercise of shrewd judgement in assessing the quality of information combined with 
extensive background knowledge in order to make informed assessments of developing 
stories. The ultimate professional goal is the story which includes an accurate forecast 
of how events unfold. As the nominations above illustrate, journalists are quick to spot 
mistakes made by colleagues in failing to follow 'professional rnles' about checking 
the reliability of contacts against alternative sources and in drawing the wrong 
inferences from information supplied because of a lack of 'contextual' knowledge. 
Knowledge of 'context', for example, allowed one journalist in the sixties to avoid 
predicting the outbreak of a rail strike because he knew that 'when ASLEF threatened a 
strike, the NUR often withdrew from the brink'. It is 'contextual information' (49), 
corespondents believe, which allows judgements to be made about the veracity and 
accuracy of the information which is gathered. One former Press Association labour 
correspondent remembers that following a press conference, an immediate summary 
would be written up and sent to the agency for rapid circulation. The next step would 
be to head to the pub, - 'where the real stuff was done',- to meet sources who 'would 
provide the other side of the story', so that eventually a re-written item would be 
submitted which reflected background context. One former labour correspondent made 
the distinction between routine news gathering and work with sources: 
"You could send a basic reporter down to do that kind of 
stuff [press conferences and writing stories on the basis of 
press releases]. No, its what something really meant, the 
significance of an event, what it really means rather than 
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what they would like you to think it meant ... you need to know 
what to avoid as well, what information is unreliable. It's 
all right if you are forecasting something three weeks away,-
by the time the event comes around the story is forgotten,-
but if you forecast two days before and get it wrong, then ... 
. . . the job was also to know when a story was going to break. It 
was like court reporting. At the Old Bailey you needed to 
know the barristers and court officials in order to judge when 
a trial was going to produce a good story, so one could go away 
for three or four days and then return to it. Not dissimilar 
with industrial journalism,- you wanted to know how long pay 
talks were going to go on for, they may go on for a month 
or more and finally, the union says it will have to go back 
to its members. That was when the story needed to be written. 
In that era you started thinking about whether the railways 
were going to run or the mines stop." (50) 
These professional perspectives in part must be viewed as examples of the 
'professional gloss' or ideology which is likely to develop as a response to the 
organisational controls which newspapers seek to exert upon journalists (Golding 
,1974:65; Elliott, 1977:167-168). However, the degree to which this professional 
perspective is at odds with the reality of the daily grind of deadlines and production 
routines is not the immediate question. The point is that this occupational perspective 
shapes the practice of labour and industrial correspondents and directs them to prioritise 
the cultivation of sources, in unions, government departments, within the management 
of nationalised industries and so on. It is only through the acquisition of 'good 
contacts', it is believed, that journalists will gain access to the inside information which 
provides a 'contextual' perspective and allows 'forecasting' to be undertaken. In the 
labour and industrial specialism, it was the development of union contacts and the 
acquisition of inside political knowledge of the labour movement which provided the 
measure of the professional competence and status. Older, more senior industrial 
correspondents often share the view that today it is much harder for new entrants to the 
specialism to develop such 'intelligence' sources and that 'standards' in copy have 
deteriorated accordingly. 
This may mean one of two things for union press officers. As we have seen one or 
two experienced labour correspondents condemn the hiring of press officers by trade 
unions because such appointments interfere with the capacity of labour correspondents 
to develop relations with senior union officials. All press enquiries are channelled 
through the 'intermediaries'. The fear is that labour and industrial copy will become 
standardised and tame, with the main substance derived from the press release or 
off'ici:al briefing. However, others point to the part a skilful press officer may play in 
me;;e;;u••g the need correspondents have for 'contextual information'. 
"It is the job of the press officer to make the material 
available as interesting as possible, and one of the ways 
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of doing that is to provide for people who are reporting 
this area over a period of time a degree of contextual 
information ... We need to know enough about an organisation 
to tell if a development is significant or whether something 
is being dressed up." (51). 
In other words, press officers should be capable of supplying background material 
which is not designed for immediate publication but which represents 'intelligence' or 
information which provides context and the ability to predict. There are numerous 
reasons why the balance of power between union source and labour specialist is tipped 
firmly in favour of the latter. Nevertheless, the need for 'intelligence' which creates a 
dependency upon sources, does provide some counter-balance. This is all the more the 
case because, in the past at least, the professional standing of individual correspondents 
and the judgement of their peers was contingent upon such contacts. Further, their 
political standing within their own news rooms and in relation to senior editorial staff 
was shaped by the same factors. 
Competition and Co-operation 
As we have seen, in previous decades, the sense of solidarity amongst members of the 
Group was high. And yet the need for 'intelligence' or information to provide context 
and allow accurate assessment was likely to generate competition between rival 
colleagues and news organisations. Organisational pressures to meet the cyclical 
demand for fresh news copy were likely to encourage the search for ways of managing 
the tension between the values of the competitive market place of national news 
journalism and the collective values of the specialist group. Tunstall has already 
described these tensions, which have characterised most specialist groups of journalists, 
using the concept of the 'competitor-colleague' (1971: 222). Tunstall rejected the 
concept of the 'syndicate' because he found little evidence of such formalised 
arrangements of co-operation in existence in Fleet Street. However, he did find a less 
rigidly structured normative framework which often guided the behaviour of journalists 
within their specialist groups. Most specialists, for example, recognised a group 
obligation to engage in 'general exchange activity'(1971:229) or gossip. In most 
specialist groups, it was a common practice to 'help out' colleagues in serious difficulty 
(for example, journalists new to the specialism). In most groups, tensions between 
competitive and collective values were managed by drawing a distinction between 
routine and exceptional news. Routine news would be pooled, exceptional news 
regarded as 'exclusive'. These pressures and the group responses of journalists are, of 
course, now familiar in the literature on news production and journalists' cultures (52). 
Nevertheless, the history of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group does 
cor1firm the degree to which such arrangements were embedded in the traditional 
culltm·e of news journalism and were recognised as such by those involved. From the 
eat·lie:st period of labour journalism, during the thirties, it is clear that strong group 
nm·ms evolved which prompted but also regulated the offering of support and advice to 
colleagm~s(Evans 1953: 16-18). One former labour correspondent who first joined a 
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labour desk in the early sixties can remember attending his first ministry briefing and 
being gently taken through what a set of Government statistics actually meant by 
Trevor Evans, who by that stage was one of the most senior correspondents in the 
Group, a knight and a director of his news organisation. It is also clear that a number 
of 'partnerships' evolved at the same time. The 'triumvirate' of Evans (Daily Express), 
McKay (News Chronicle) and Chevins (Daily Telegraph) was just one example but it 
illustrated a familiar pattern whereby journalists working for news organisations located 
in different sections of the market, either in terms of politics or audience type, would 
combine (Tunstall 1971:229). It was rarer for colleagues working for news 
organisations working in direct competition to combine and while some 'partnerships' 
were unofficially tolerated by editorial staff, arrangements involving direct competitors 
would not be (Evans ,1953:25). Partnerships, of course, made the job easier because 
they relieved pressure in news gathering and provided additional help in producing an 
appropriate assessment. Given the demands of the job many specialists would consult 
colleagues, rather than employ other more time consuming reference and search 
strategies for information. As Evans comments the 'triumvirate' of the 
thirties,' ... ensured a sound news service, and yet gave time for all three of us to relax 
without anxiety' (1953 :25). 
However, all partnerships were likely to distinguish between information to be 
pooled and 'exclusives'. As Evans notes, there was always a 'contracting out clause for 
exclusive stories in which our respective offices had a distinct interest' (1953:25). 
Throughout the post-war period, such arrangements or partnerships continued. A 
former labour editor of a quality newspaper in the seventies and early eighties notes 
the normative framework which encouraged Group wide co-operation at a routine level 
but partnerships to facilitate not only more detailed information gathering but to 
combat rival 'rings': 
"There was co-operation at the basic level of, if you couldn't 
go to a news conference or you had to go somewhere else someone 
would cover for you or swap information. In the old days without 
screens . . . the information gathering process was a lot more 
laborious and there was so much to cover. Therefore, we would 
contact each other by phone to exchange 'basic information'. But 
exclusives you kept to yourself, except there were 'rings'. The 
Guardian and the Ff operated together. The Telegraph, the Mail 
and the old Sketch operated together. When I took over as labour 
correspondent in 1971, there were only three of us facing the 
Ff-Guardian axis. The Ff had five correspondents so were out-
numbered three to one. The first thing I did was to approach the 
Ff and say 'I can't seek to undermine your arrangement but I think 
it's wrong ... [they] didn't actually de-couple from the Guardian 
but they did seek a greater degree of independence ... 
I formed my own link with the Morning Star on the grounds that 
they weren't competitors and they didn't deal with anybody else. 
But it wasn't on a total swap basis. I'd talk to them, they had 
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access to the stewards and it was very difficult for me as a 
newcomer ... to make contacts with unions like the AEU,- the CP had 
a vast network of contacts and information through the shop 
stewards movement. 
It was never a formal deal like the FT -Guardian but the [ ... ] 
had no allies at this time and I had to find some ... " (53). 
As noted above, correspondents working for the Morning Star enjoyed a particular 
position within the Group precisely because of the extensive contacts the CP had 
developed with the labour movement away from the elites of London . One 
'partnership' which formed in the early 1960s involved two correspondents, one from 
the Morning Star and the other from the Times. As both correspondents achieved 
positions of prominence within the Group this arrangement was widely known about 
and confirmed by several former correspondents independently (54). Stories abound of 
the similarity in subject matter and, even occasionally, language between items in the 
two papers during this period. There is even some degree of support for these stories in 
one piece of research on the coverage of industrial relations in national newspapers 
during this period, though it would be unwise to regard this as definitive evidence (55). 
The general impression amongst former labour corespondents is that there are far 
fewer 'partnerships' within the specialism now. This conclusion also emerges from the 
present field work where no evidence emerged of co-operation on the scale which used 
to occur when the Group was a more formidable force. By contrast, interviews with 
some health and education correspondents suggested that lines of co-operation were 
established and in some cases growing more elaborate as these specialisms were 
required to expand their volume of copy (56). 
The Decline of Labour Journalism: summary and conclusion 
What bearing does this history have upon the overall theme of the enquiry which seeks 
to understand the relationship between trade unions as sources of news and labour 
journalists, and to assess the scope union officers have to make favourable interventions 
into the news encoding process? The short answer is that it illustrates some of the most 
important ways in which changes in the political-economic environment shape and 
constrain the practice of labour journalists and, therefore, also the opportunities for 
trade unions as non-official news sources. 
Labour journalists clearly experienced a period of severe trauma in the years after 
the 1979 General Election. The process of political marginalisation which, perhaps, 
began in the final months of the Callaghan Government, accelerated as both union 
elites and labour correspondents found themselves pushed from the centre of 
Government. The bitterest disputes involving the miners in 1984-85 and the print 
unions at Wapping in 1987 placed the Group under the most acute strains but this was 
be1:ause both disputes rendered visible and obvious, processes of erosion and 
enms•culati«Jn which were already set in motion. 
The underlying causes of this process are complex and cannot be described in terms 
a single determining concept. The labour movement was grievously weakened by the 
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accelerating levels of unemployment in the early years of the Thatcher administration 
which undermined a sustained opposition to the Government. The new Government set 
about employing the state to develop its political project with an almost unprecedented 
combination of astute political skill and ideological determination. At the same time, 
however, both the Labour Party and the trade union movement placed themselves on 
the political defensive as they engaged for a period in an introspective and debilitating 
internal post-mortem. And broader processes of economic change, some of them global 
in dimension, all played a part in weakening and re-positioning trade unions during this 
decade. It would be a mistake, therefore, to resurrect a version of the structural 
determinism which prioritised the role of state, above other forces, in the reproduction 
of political and ideological formations, characteristic of much critical theory a decade 
ago. 
These processes through which capital has sought to re-cast and rationalise the 
organisation of production have not left news journalism untouched. Changes in the 
nature of the news production process and the ways in which news organisations seek 
to utilise the labour of journalists, have also had profound consequences for labour 
journalsm and the fortunes of the Group. Although by no means all the evidence 
confirms the view that journalists are more desk bound and under more intense pressure 
to deliver copy to meet a faster cycle of deadlines, many journalists believe this to be 
so. The re-location of news organisations away from Fleet Street, 'Wappingisation', 
has also accelerated the forces which were already re-casting relationships between 
journalists and altering their day to day occupational practice. Networks of 
'telephonic' rather than personal contacts between journalists and between journalists 
and sources are now more characteristic of the news gathering process. 
Putting all these factors into the 'mix', the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' 
Group now finds itself in a situation where many of the patterns which characterised 
its role in the period before 1979 have now been broken up or weakened. The Group 
no longer has the 'political clout' to represent the collective interests of members in the 
way it used to do. It no longer has the authority to intervene to counter threats to 
established channels of information. The experience of journalists during the Coal 
Strike demonstrated that it was possible for political and media elites to by-pass the 
traditional intelligence gathering processes established by industrial correspondents. All 
this, in turn, has had a debilitating effect upon the culture and solidarity of the Group. 
From the perspective of trade unions these developments are all the more worrying. 
Industrial correspondents now acknowledge the decline in occupational status. A 
former chair of the Group (Kevin McGuire) commented that we, 'used to be up there 
with the Lobby ... we're now below city [fmancial] correspondents and about on par 
with home affairs' (57). Younger, ambitious journalists now see industrial journalism 
as 'way down the pack' (Patrick Hennesey). Hennesey made it clear that he regarded 
his time on the labour beat as merely a stepping stone; labour corespondents were 'a 
dying breed', particularly after the 1992 defeat of the Labour Party. Only three years 
into the job, he had already added education to his brief, 'I still cover industry but 
education is much more the string to my bow' (58). As an occupational specialism, 
Iao,our and industrial journalism no longer offers the rewards and prospects which are 
to retain ambitious correspondents. The 'turn-over' within the specialism is likely 
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to increase and this will make life all the more difficult for trade union press officers, 
seeking to establish stable 'exchange relationships'. Such relationships are dependent 
upon both sides sharing not only a recognition of the implicit normative framework but 
also a stock of common knowledge and both of these, in turn, depend upon a degree of 
stability in the staffing of the labour and industrial beat. 
The political-economic environment and the dilemma of incorporation. 
The government of the day exercises considerable influence over the routines and 
intelligence gathering practices of specialist correspondents. Firstly, through the 
exercise of political power members of the political elite in Westminster can allocate or 
deny 'insider status', thereby fostering or stifling the cultivation of political contacts. 
Of course, such decisions are likely to take into account the strategic value of particular 
types of correspondent. The Lobby are unlikely to experience the degree of political 
marginalisation experienced by the Group, though even political correspondents found 
the relationships and channels they had established with Government fairly brutally re-
fashioned during early years of the Thatcher-Ingham era (Cockerell et a!, 1985). 
Secondly, it is in the power of the government to confer status and authority upon 
particular individuals within news organisations. This is, in part, a function of the 
process whereby informal access is permitted to the higher levels of the political elite, 
but it is also likely to include a variety of ways in which formal recognition is 
announced. During the Thatcher years it was the turn of particular individual political 
columnists and senior editorial staff in favoured news organisations to recieve, through 
a combination of honours and political symbolism, the recognition of prestige and 
occupational authority. In the sixties and seventies, as we have seen, it was often the 
turn of labour and industrial specialists to receive such rewards. Such recognition 
opened doors and provided access to information flows which might, otherwise, have 
remained closed. 
Thirdly, every new administration will re-structure the departments of state to reflect 
its particular political agendas and ideological concerns. This took a dramatic turn 
during the years in which Mrs Thatcher set about dismantling the institutional 
arrangements of the post-war settlement. As the departments of state were re-organised, 
so too were the news beats for specialist correspondents and Mrs Thatcher's re-
fashioned departmental geography further helped to push labour and industrial 
journalism to the margins. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the Thatcher administration demonstrated 
the power of a determined administration to re-work the 'political common sense' of 
elite opinion leaders, including the senior editorial staff of news organisations. Just at 
the point at which the other changes identified above began to threaten the Group's 
access to the channels and information flows which provided 'good copy' and 'good 
intelligence', which in itself was likely to undermine the standing of labour and 
industrial specialists within the news room, so the view that in the wake of the collapse 
of the post-war settlement, trade unions would experience irreversible decline towards 
news insignificance, was gaining ground amongst editors. It was this which partly 
produced the devaluation in standing and resource allocation which the Group 
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experienced. The network which connected key sections of the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party, policy makers and researchers at Conservative Central Office, and 
the new right pressure groups, was able to generate a vision of the past and a set of 
prescriptions for the future which appealed powerfully to many of the senior editorial 
staff in national news organisations. 
A circular process of decline, already primed to unfold in the final years of the 
Callaghan administration, was sharply accelerated by the new Conservative 
administration. Thatcherism weakened trade unions and eroded their political power. 
The political profile of unions declined and as they became less visible, so they became 
less newsworthy in the eyes of editorial staff. An apparant decline in the 
newsworthyness of unions complimented the political and ideological perspectives of a 
number of senior editorial staff within news organisations who believed that in the new 
post-1979 era, unions had 'had their day'. With such editorial judgements informing 
the strategic planning of news organisations and their decisions regarding the 
distribution of resources and staff, so the profile of unions declined even further. Each 
step in this descent further politically marginalised unions and rendered them even less 
newsworthy. 
However, one must be careful not to exaggerate the effectivity of Thatcherism and 
the role of government, alone. The decline in labour journalism in the period since the 
late 1970s is the product of the intersection of a number of factors within the political-
economic environment. The decline in trade union strength and vitality reflects a longer 
terms process of economic structural change as well as the political project of a hostile 
government. The decline in labour journalism must be placed against this backdrop. 
Secondly, the forces producing the editorial re-appraisal of the position of labour 
journalism were simultaneously responsible for the rise in the prospects of other 'rival' 
specialisms. Where as bright graduates entering journalism might select the labour beat 
as a 'fast track' route to seniority in journalism during the 1960s and 1970s, their 
counterparts today are more likely to consider financial and business journalism. This, 
too, is in part a reflection of the editorial perspectives of news organisations and, in 
part, a reflection of 'real' changes in the political-economic environment including the 
huge expansion in financial activity and City institutions since the mid-80s and the rise 
in personal investment (Parsons 1989; Negrine 1993). 
What are the implications of this analysis for trade union press officers? Firstly, it 
is clear that as the fortunes of the Labour and Industrial Group have declined and news 
organisations' appetites for labour news have diminished, so the environment in which 
union press officers work has become harsher. The history of labour and industrial 
journalism also demonstrates, however, the extent to which the effectivity of the 
various communication strategies employed by unions is limited by broader processes 
quite removed from the control of particular union organisations. Chapter two traced 
the ways in which unions have responded to the events of the 1980s by re-assessing the 
importance of communication and belatedly investing more in media work. The irony, 
however, is that it is the conditions inducing this response from trade unions which also 
make the difficulties for effective union news work all the greater. 
This is not to suggest that a good union press officer makes no difference. Most 
journalists welcome the more frequent use of press officers and publicity departments 
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in union organisations. The case of the NUM during the Coal Strike provides an 
extreme illustration of the dangers which arise if media work is not prioritised. The 
media work of the NUM then and now is almost universally condemned by former and 
present labour correspondents, including those whose politics are very much to the left. 
The failure to provide daily briefings, ensure effective arrangements for handling press 
enquiries, and the blunders made in launching key media campaigns during the Coal 
Strike, have been documented in a number of places (Jones, 1986; Adeney and Lloyd, 
1986; Winterton and Winterton,1989). In other words, the NUM refused to work 
within the normative framework which regulates most interaction between journalists 
and union sources. By default the initiative in terms of the news agenda was frequently 
handed to the NCB and the Government. And yet there are two reasons to suspect that 
even the most sophisticated communication strategy would not have altered the broad 
contours of coverage of the Coal Strike. 
Firstly, as we have seen particular departments of state were active in seeking to by-
pass the normal process of labour news gathering. The state directed its media work 
towards editors and political correspondents, not the labour and industrial beat. 
Secondly, chapters four and five have demonstrated that in seeking to develop regular 
and stable relationships with specialist correspondents, unions must accept the 
normative framework, 'the rules of the game', which regulate union -source interaction 
but also place limitations on the themes and agendas which can be presented. The more 
union press officers are willing to accept the news values and selection criteria of news 
organisations the more highly they will be rated by labour correspondents. 'Good' 
union press officers are also willing to provide the 'intelligence' and 'contextual 
information' sought after by correspondents but it is not always in the interests of the 
union to divulge. The fact that 'rings' involving labour correspondents from the Times 
and the Morning Star would seek the same information and employ the same selection 
criteria underlines just how powerfully the common news sense and 'inferential 
structures' of labour journalists can shape the ways in which they 'construct' labour 
news. 
Similarly, the 'rules' which regulate on and off record briefings have to be embraced 
by both sides and here, once again, the imprint of the state can be found. The on/off 
record briefing system is the primary mechanism through which the state releases 
information to journalists. It is significant that where as Morning Star correspondents 
had always played a prominent role in the Group, anxieties arose over the application 
from Newsline, precisely because of the danger that correspondents from this news 
organisation would destablise the delicate normative framework regulating interaction 
between the state and labour correspondents. In short, the fostering of 'effective' 
working relationships with labour and industrial correspondents involves degrees of 
'incorporation' into a normative system, in part reinforced by the workings of the state, 
which limits and shapes the kind of news agenda which can be presented. 
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Chapter Eight. 
Union News and Communication Work: the journalists' 
perspective 
The intention now is to concentrate upon the current position of labour and industrial 
correspondents and, in particular, their perception of the media work of trade unions. 
The focus will remain almost exclusively upon the day to day practice of labour and 
industrial journalists, and other specialists in contact with trade union press officers, 
drawing mainly upon material collected through a set of interviews conducted between 
1991 and 1993 (1). It will deal with the news values and working assumptions which 
shape the daily work of labour correspondents; their expectations of trade union press 
officers, and the ways in which they recognise and describe the 'exchanges' which 
occur when trade union officers encounter the news media. 
Labour and industrial correspondents are keenly aware of the changing fortunes 
of their specialism. The forces at work impinge most directly, perhaps, in terms of the 
greater demands for flexibility and wider briefs which most labour correspondents now 
have to accept. As chapters six and seven have described, the number of staff attached 
to the labour and industrial desks have been reduced and some news organisations even 
do without a labour correspondent all together. The occupational status of industrial 
correspondents has declined within the hierarchy of national news journalism and those 
journalists remaining at the labour desk have either had to re-invent their own broader 
beats as survival strategies or their news organisations have done this for them. Rather 
than work.exclusively upon labour relations, most correspondents now contemplate a 
much more broadly defined canvas which includes general employment and workplace 
issues and even, perhaps, consumer affairs and news of the privatised 'public' utilities. 
'I've become a labour editor on this paper but my job has 
become multi-skilled. As unions have declined I've had to 
look at what else I can write about and basically I see my 
role as writing about people at work, which does not ne-
cessarily involve the trade unions but I' m no longer an 
industrial correspondent, I' m an industry wide correspondent 
writing about issues as they occur, privatisation, coal, 
railways - a big story that will keep running for two years-
privatisation and how it affects people at work, and what 
the trade unions are saying about it, but it's a far wider 
brief. 
We don't cover the TUC like we used to. Why should we? 
The debates aren't so important. The industrial unions are 
still important but not the debates. So, of course, there has 
been a re-appraisal of the job we do and on the Guardian we're 
looking at the European labour scene, at the single market, 
the problems for British firms which will occur in Europe, 
the development of European works councils, its a big story 
for us. There's still a role for us but it's more diverse.(2). 
Unlike the labour editor of the Guardian, working for a broadsheet paper still with a 
commitment to detailed coverage at least of workplace issues, the labour editor of a 
daily tabloid was compelled to become a 'jack of all trades', covering a story about the 
collapse of a holiday firm, on the day he was interviewed for the present study. 
Another tabloid labour editor, described himself as 'doing a bit of industry, a bit of 
commerce, a bit of David Melior' (the Melior resignation story broke during the week 
of the interview) (3). Some correspondents now even find themselves combining the 
industry brief with another specialism, such as education (4). Geoffrey Goodman, 
former labour editor at the Daily Mirror, believed that pressures to raise the 
'productivity' of staff within news organisations, combined with the trend towards the 
'tabloidisation' of news values, even amongst broadsheet newspapers, were now 
significantly constraining opportunities for specialised work (5). 
The geographical dispersal of news organisations away from Fleet Street, in the 
wake of the News International move to Wapping in 1987, has disrupted and broken up 
the social networks which used to support the culture in which labour correspondents 
were immersed, - a culture which often reinforced an understanding of, if not a 
sympathy for, the values and perspectives of the labour movement. As described in 
chapters six and seven, labour and industrial correspondents would meet on a daily 
basis at the Cheshire Cheese pub, off Fleet Street , or the Clarence in Whitehall; they 
would foster contacts with trade union officials and national executive members in well 
known pubs adjacent to union headquarters, usually located quite near to Fleet Street in 
London, and would meet again, as they 'door stepped' outside the offices of ACAS, or 
the venue for important national negotiations. Now newspapers offices are located 
along a ten mile 'corridor' from Kensington to Canary Wharf, and the opportunities for 
casual meetings amongst labour correspondents, meetings in which 'themes' could be 
'floated' and 'intelligence' assessed, are far more limited. 
A number of the correspondents interviewed believed that they were now more 
'desk-bound'. The introduction of new print technology has allowed newspapers to 
produce more editions but this means earlier deadlines. Several correspondents felt that 
the new regimes within the newsroom implied more stringent 'policing' of time outside 
the office. The result is that more of the information gathering work undertaken by 
labour correspondents is conducted via the telephone and the FAX machine. 
'I' m sure its fair to say that a lot more time was spent 
out and about meeting people in the old days. Nowadays, 
a lot more, eighty or ninety percent, is done over the 
telephone and a lot of this is because it's very easy to 
gather news electronically ... there's a lot more reliance 
upon electronic media. We can sit in front of a screen 
and receive statements, P.A. reports, freelance people, 
and get FAXes and write a very complete story without 
getting off your bum ... that's sad in a way but it's the 
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way of the world. ' ( 6). 
This view underestimates the extent to which news gathering remains a social process. 
The social relationships between journalists and news sources have not been replaced 
by electronic information gathering systems but it is true that in the case of labour and 
industrial journalism, at least, such social relationships have been re-cast. The 
exchanges between union sources and journalists are now much more likely to be 
conducted by telephone than over a pub table but, nonetheless, they remain based upon 
an implicit understanding of 'exchange relationships', essentially social in nature. As 
discussed in chapters four and five, a growing number of union press officers are 
reviewing their investment in the more expensive means of electronic information 
dissemination and this is because it is recognised that, essentially, it is not the 
sophistication of the technology but the nature of the social relationships which is of the 
greater importance. 
As this chapter will explore further below, from the perspective of labour and 
industrial correspondents, there remains a process whereby sources and journalists enter 
into implicit 'bargains' governed by a loose normative framework. However, the rise 
of a 'telephonic culture', as one union press officer describes it, has made a difference. 
While relationships between journalists and union sources remain essentially social in 
nature, it is possible to detect a distancing between the two when the present situation is 
contrasted to earlier decades. As we have seen, the geography of the old labour beat 
encouraged a proximity between journalists and union officials which, in turn, fostered 
a degree of sympathy and understanding, at least, on the part of many labour 
correspondents. Two decades ago even the labour correspondent of the Sun could 
write: 
'Often such men [union activists] were Communists and other 
left wingers. I recall with a lilcing and respect, such men 
as Jack Dash of the London dockers and George Wake and Charles 
Doyle of the power workers. Communists are often portrayed as 
villains of the piece in newspapers .•. But as people Commu-
nists are often remarkably likeable.' (Mason,l981:3). 
Telephonic communication is unlikely to foster such an intimacy for a new generation 
of labour and industrial correspondents, most a decade further removed from the post-
war settlement, and the agendas of the 1960s and 1970s. Geographical dispersal also 
means that the sense of community and common culture amongst labour correspondents 
is waning: 
'The propping up the bar bit has gone away, not so much be-
cause of staffing levels but because of the way the news-
paper industry has changed ... the industry has spread from 
800 yards around Fleet Street to eight miles from Kensington, 
here, down to the Isle of Dogs with Max in his little tower, 
so we're not in the same little puddle anymore. One of the 
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great traditions used to be that industrial correspondents 
used to get together in the cellar of the Cheshire Cheese 
in Fleet Street because you could guarantee to get ten or 
twelve union press officers staggering around looking for a 
drink. That doesn't happen anymore, the Group [Labour and 
Industrial Correspondents' Group] is still going but it's differ-
ent now.' (7). 
Paradoxically, the decision of more unions to invest in press and media work, may 
have encouraged a distancing and formalisation of relations. Journalists' attitudes 
regarding the appointment of more union press officers was ambivalent. On the one 
hand, there were numerous complaints about the difficulties experienced by journalists 
in previous years in gaining access to union staff: 
'Ironically, twenty years ago when they were really needed 
no union had one [a press officer]. Hugh Scanlon was never 
available. The second biggest union but no comment. Scanlon 
was a bit of a Stalinist. When he gave a press conference 
when he had finished that was the end of it. You either had to 
get Scanlon at the press conference or not at all. Similarly, 
the T and G didn't have one in those days but the GMB did.' (8). 
In the past, the large unions relied upon the presence and profile of their general 
secretaries and leading officials, Hugh Scanlon at the old AEU, Jack Jones at the T and 
G, Joe Gormley at the NUM or Frank Chapple at the EETPU. While a dependence 
upon the willingness of a general secretary or senior official to provide information 
frequently caused journalists difficulties, it also produced two benefits. It encouraged 
labour correspondents to invest considerable resources in developing a rapport with 
such senior officials and it also encouraged them to exploit the inherent 'porosity' 
(Ericson et al, 1989:214) of unions by searching out sets of informal sources. 
While journalists welcome the improved efficiency in the release of 'official' 
information which has been achieved through the appointment of more union press 
officers, they are sometimes suspicious that the formalisation of union-media relations 
in such a way, has provided unions with a better mechanism for defending their 'back 
regions' (Ericson et al, 1989:9). The job of the union press officer is to police the 
'front region' and regulate journalists' access beyond this arena. Several labour 
correspondents commented that, wherever possible, they still tried to by-pass the union 
press officer and get through to a senior official or informal source. And, as we shall 
see, the press officers rated most highly by journalists were those who they believed 
were 'on the inside track', close to the thinking of their general secretaries and the 
political undercurrents of their union executives. Though in some ways the ready 
availability of a union press officer on the end of a telephone has made life easier for 
labour correspondents, it may not have made the 'contextual information' (9), or 
intelligence, valued by labour correspondents more readily available. With the 
development of a 'telephonic culture' shared by journalists and union sources, the 
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process of gathering such 'higher grade' information may be more difficult. Given the 
earlier deadlines and tougher drives for productivity associated with the post-Wapping 
regimes within news rooms, it is possible that journalists will be compelled to rely 
more upon routinised and bureaucratic sources. This, in turn, might provide non-
official sources with more opportunities to successfully 'present' their own copy. There 
is some support for this view derived from studies of journalists working for news 
organisations where staffing levels have been reduced (Fishman,1980:chp 6; 
Franklin,l986; Anderson,1993). However, the present study found that in the case of 
labour news, few journalists were likely to digest raw, 'untreated' union copy, despite 
the earlier deadlines and broader briefs of recent years. 
Reporting trade unions: news values and journalists' perspectives 
In their understanding of what makes 'a good story', the labour and industrial 
correspondents interviewed in this study largely revealed a commitment to the 
conventional news values of mainstream journalism, documented in numerous studies 
(Tunstall,1971:pp15-21; Galtung and Ruge,l973;Elliott and Golding,l979:ch 5; 
Ericson et al,l987:ch 5; Cottle,l993:ch 2; etc). A search for the dramatic, the 
immediate and the personal characterised the majority of approaches, with the 
exception of the Financial Times. 
"Quite often we like to personalise things, there's no such thing 
as Virgin Airways but there is Richard Branson' s Virgin Airways, 
there's Arthur's barmy army ... Arthur Scargill's miners union, so 
that the individual becomes synonymous with the organisation ... 
like John Major's government." (10). 
Union officials 'with a natural charisma of their own' (11) were more likely to generate 
'useful' news stories. Jimmy Knapp (NUR), Eric Hammond (EETPU), Bill Jordan 
(AEU) and, of course, Arthur Scargill were most frequently cited as high profile, 
newsworthy personalities. An orientation towards the 'personalities' of industrial and 
labour news was matched by an 'individualisation' of events, whereby public issues 
were transmuted into private troubles (Cottle, 1993:79). As we shall see in chapter nine, 
the health unions were able to exploit this news value in the early phase of the 1989 
Ambulance Dispute to good effect. It was noticeable that some correspondents actually 
characterised the history of the most recent decade of industrial relations in terms of the 
personalities involved. Thus, for both Tony McGuire (Evening Standard) and Patrick 
Hennesey (Daily Express), the decisive moment of the 1980s was the 'defeat' of Arthur 
Scargill and the 'triumph' of Mrs Thatcher. 
Strikes, of course, have obvious appeal in terms of conflict, drama and immediacy. 
When John Monks, general secretary of the TUC, asked how the TUC could make life 
easier for labour correspondents, he was told by Roy Jones of the Morning Star, "What 
you need, John, is a bloody big strike" (Hill, 1993). But not every strike will offer the 
ingredients of a 'good story'. The work of the Glasgow University Media Group 
demonstrated that coverage of strikes and industrial conflict was highly selective, with 
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large sectors of strike-prone employment ignored and other areas 'over-represented' 
(Glasgow University Media Group,l976). To score heavily in terms of labour news 
values, industrial conflict must contain at least one of two possible features. Conflict 
which involves party political implications, and especially the likelihood of conflict 
with government, will certainly be defined as newsworthy by labour correspondents 
(Harper,1991). To argue that labour and industrial news has declined in salience for 
news editors because there are now fewer strikes, is to over-simplify. Many unions 
remain involved in industrial conflict of a routine nature. The essential point is that 
there are fewer conflicts which are of immediate significance to the mainstream 
political process. Industrial conflict offered the most in terms of labour journalism's 
news values, when 'industrial matters dominated decision making at Number Ten' 
(Harper,l991:33). At root, the news value of unions is intimately associated with 
perceptions of power. As the labour editor at the Daily Mirror commented: 
' .. .legislation makes unions impotent, they can no longer 
protect their members, and if they become impotent, they are 
no longer newsworthy.' (12). 
Secondly, for industrial conflict to offer maximum salience in terms of industrial 
news values, it must affect, in one way or another, a broader constituency than merely 
the immediate participants. National disputes, disputes which disrupt the daily lives of 
the general public, or local disputes which generate exceptional and 'publicly visible' 
conflict are most likely to attract the attention oflabour correspondents. However, the 
potential capacity to intervene in the daily lives of the public cannot guarantee news 
media interest. As one labour editor pointed out, despite the dwindling membership of 
the NUM, under 30,000 members and falling fast at the time of the field work, the 
union retained a salience in the eyes of the news media, not justified either by its size 
or its capacity to influence the daily lives of the public at large. The Inland Revenue 
Staff Association, on the other hand, with a capacity to cripple the workings of 
government, directly intervene in the lives of most adults, and with a membership 
roughly three times greater than that of the NUM, rarely attracted the attention of 
journalists (13). In labour journalism, as in other branches of journalism, news values 
are determined not only by 'rational criteria' but also by the deposits left by the ebb 
and flow of earlier ideological constructions and news media representations. It was for 
precisely this reason that the health unions were determined, in their dispute strategy, 
to minimise the opportunities given to the news media to invoke the imagery of the 
1979 Winter of Discontent, during the 1989 Ambulance Dispute (see chapter nine). 
Beyond the conflict of the workshop and the factory gate, political and 
organisational conflicts across the industrial stage are still likely to interest labour 
journalists. The tensions within the TUC over the question of 'new realism', no-strike 
and single union deals, in the late 1980s provided considerable copy (14). The 
notorious walk out by EETPU delegates from the 1989 TUC Conference, led by Eric 
Hammond, accommodated almost all the news values a labour journalist might desire, 
including conflict and drama, a high profile personality, and a significance for the 
' . 
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wider party political process at Westminster (15) , all occurring within neatly defined 
spatial and temporal parameters to satisfy the demand of 'event orientation'. 
Not all labour journalism is preoccupied with industrial conflict and not all 
opportunities for unions to gain publicity are derived from industrial disputes. The 
power of the familiar in determining news selection, - the appetite news editors have 
for previously established themes and imagery (Galtung and Ruge,l973)- produces a 
labour and industrial news agenda which is shaped as much by the interplay between 
the preoccupations of news journalism and popular discourse, as by 'external' criteria, 
such as union size or economic significance. 
'The size of an industrial organisation is quite important,-
if the GMB calls a press conference, then we'll tend to go. 
But it doesn't always follow, the amount of attention focused 
upon the NUM given its size is quite ludicrous and given its 
position in the economy .... It's not just Arthur, it's partly 
Scargill because he's by far the most well-known trade unionist 
in the country and one of these people who makes news editors 
hear the name and look up and the story automatically goes 
in the paper. People often don't understand this ... Scargill 
will always go in, anything to do with Ford will go in, 
Habitat, Vauxhall, Marks and Spencer. Oddly enough the NUM 
still has that quality.' (16) 
'Consonance' (Galtung and Ruge,l973:64), the extent to which a news item conforms 
to the previously established expectations of journalists, sometimes combined with 
journalists' search for 'currency' or 'immediacy', may provide some finite 
opportunities for union sources to score useful political points. According to one health 
correspondent, the 'horror stories' which began to emerge after the implementation of 
government reforms in the National Health Service, enabled public sector unions to 
interest journalists in a series of stories, all highlighting resource issues (17). However, 
as novelty diminished, so news salience, in the eyes of journalists declined and the 
health unions eventually found it much harder to attract interest in 'run of the mill' 
under-funding stories (18). As far as labour journalists are concerned, there is nothing 
more frustrating than contacting a union for a response regarding a topical or sudden 
development, to find that the press officers have not been informed by local branches. 
One labour editor remembered finding that union press officers were dependent upon 
journalists for information regarding a sudden crisis in the Scottish oil industry, local 
union branches not having communicated vital information to headquarters. 
Given this emphasis upon immediacy and topicality, and the essentially routine 
nature of much of the information union press officers have as their 'raw material' , one 
strategy is to acknowledge the fact that labour journalism is sensitised to the political 
and to infuse even the routine with a political inflection. This is what the EETPU used 
to be so good at doing, according to several labour correspondents. It was possible 
because of'the political ground which the union had chosen to occupy. 
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'For a newspaper, glossy stuff produced with Desk Top Publishing 
just goes in the bin, unless there's a story in it. The thing 
about the electricians was that they produced the glossy stuff 
but there was a story in it, which was, "we're doing this and 
we don't give a shit what other people think about it. This is 
our new financial package, this is our new insurance package ... " 
There was a story in it. A lot of other people started putting 
glossy stuff out, thinking there was a story in it but there 
wasn't on its own, or the story ran out...you know, union 
launches new cheap travel package or cheap mortgage and so on. 
For a couple of years, we were all writing stories along these 
lines but then they ran into the ground.' (19). 
Indeed, the labour correspondents interviewed for this study believed that it was now 
much harder to place routine industrial copy in their papers. As the political importance 
of unions declined, so a higher value in terms of selection criteria was demanded of 
labour and industrial copy by news editors. Kevin McGuire (Daily Telegraph) noted 
that stories which represented the bread and butter of industrial journalism a decade 
ago, concerning industrial tribunals and cases of discrimination, pay awards, or job 
losses, etc, were now much less likely to be accepted. A story now had to have a 
'quirky, off-beat' element to interest the editorial team (20). Even on the Financial 
Times, usually regarded as operating with distinct, 'specialist' news values, the appetite 
for routine union material has diminished: 
'When I first came [1986], one of my first stories was about 
an AEU executive meeting and whether or not they were 
likely to support a minimum wage at conference. That got 
about three hundred words and now that wouldn't get in the 
paper.' (21) 
Broadsheets. tabloids. and the FT. 
According to several labour correspondents, the same news values guide the selection 
criteria of most newspapers, left or right of centre, broadsheet or tabloid. 'Under the 
skin, they're all the same', was a typical view (22). In terms of the values discussed 
above, this is probably true. Certainly, labour correspondents appeared to be able to 
cross both the political and market divides between papers without undue difficulty 
(23). 
The exception to this rule was widely regarded to be the Financial Times, which 
was still held to operate with more specialised news values, comparable to the 
employment coverage to be found in the Wall Street Journal and Business Week, in the 
USA (Puette, 1992: 126). This was despite its abandonment of a daily page for union 
and industrial relations news. In comparison to the 'FT', news on the Daily Telegraph, 
for example, 'had to be racier and punchier, with more relevance to the general public' 
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(24). The Ff was likely to carry 'more big gun stories ... interviews with the chairman 
of ICI, business stories that would never get in the Standard (25). 
And yet, beyond the common news values discussed above, there are good grounds 
for believing that the differences between labour journalism for tabloid and quality 
newspapers ran deeper than merely the number of words permitted in copy. Cottle 
distinguishes between 'serious' and 'popular' journalism, partly in terms of the 
former's emphasis upon the deployment of 'expertise' in the assessment of information 
and the 'rationality' of the explanatory accounts (Cottle,l993:7-8). From the accounts 
provided by journalists in this study, it is possible to detect a drift 'down market', a 
process of progressive tabloidisation amongst popular papers. Both the Daily Star and 
the Sun, for example, only maintained an intermittent commitment to a labour desk, at 
all. Journalists working for tabloid papers have always had to acknowledge the driving 
force of 'revenue goals' (Tunstall,l971;Elliott,1977). However, Geoffrey Goodman 
believed 'tabloidisation' was blighting not only all the populars but, also, some of the 
broadsheet papers (26). It is possible that the 'non-revenue goals' of labour and 
industrial correspondents, - the acquisition and deployment of expertise in the analysis 
of 'intelligence' and the provision of information beyond the description of immediate 
events,- are being eroded as competition between rival newspapers increases and labour 
news slips down the news hierarchy. 
At the Daily Mirror, for example, until the 1984-85 Coal Strike, the labour editor 
had always been allocated a weekly slot for a discursive feature article dealing with 
contemporary issues in industrial and labour affairs. Under Maxwell' s proprietorship 
this disappeared. The current labour editor, at the time the field work was conducted, 
appeared not to mourn the lost opportunity for more analytic journalism. He believed 
that popular papers had to concentrate upon the immediate story, with a 'sharp sense 
for news', rather than indulge in more contemplative journalism and he recounted a 
story to illustrate the way in which the Mirror's labour desk had sometimes missed the 
essential, popular story. The weekly feature article was once based around an interview 
with Michael Edwards, then in charge at British Leyland. The article contained a 
comment made by Edwards regarding his salary but focused mainly upon the prospects 
for the car industry. However, the following day the headline on the front page of the 
Sun screamed, 'Edwards- Why I'm worth £100,000', with similar leads in the other 
populars, all re-working the material drawn from the Mirror.(27). 
While broadsheet and tabloid correspondents may share most of the news values 
identified above, the appetite for information and contextual knowledge is likely to be 
greater for broadsheet correspondents and this may influence their perception of 
sources. For example, in assessing the performance of various news sources on the 
medical and health beat, there were some notable differences between the views of 
health correspondents. The British Medical Association was rated highly by broadsheet 
correspondents because of its capacity to supply information and answer detailed 
inquiries. However, one health correspondent working for a tabloid, when asked if the 
resources at the disposal of the BMA made a difference, replied, 'No way! They [the 
BMA] are awful. The health unions are much more effective.' In contrast, broadsheet 
health correspondents, while recognising the importance of the unions on the health 
beat, were nonetheless critical of their 'axe grinding' (28). While these correspondents 
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acknowledged the political position of the BMA, they nevertheless had a tendency to 
cast it in the role of 'arbiter' rather than 'advocate' (Deacon and Golding,l994:15-17). 
'The BMA are very authoritative and always available. They 
have more press officers and invest more resources. They 
have lost some credibility under the chairmanship of Lee-
Potter because they were seen to be steering a line which 
was more visibly concerned with self-interest. Therefore, 
they are more vulnerable to the 'greedy consultant stereo-
type' and the government has begun to use this against 
them. But the BMA will also produce materials and reports 
on a wide range of issues and provide information for 
journalists on a range of issues and they campaign on 
certain issues where they can't be accused of self-interest, 
like tobacco advertising.' (29). 
The capacity of the health unions to provide information which satisfied Cottle' s 
criteria for popular journalism,- sentimental and empathetic material drawn from 'first 
hand testimony' (Cottle, 1993:7-8)- may explain why some tabloid health 
correspondents, at least, valued their media work more highly. Though popular news 
values repeatedly determine selection criteria in broadsheet journalism, in their dealings 
with unions, broadsheet correspondents applied, in addition, a set of more cerebral 
news values. Certainly, union press officers believed that more opportunities existed 
for placing detailed information, summaries of reports, synopsies of topical data 
analysis produced by their research departments, and so on, in the broadsheet papers. 
Charlie Whelan' s strategy, for example, in commissioning independent research 
around which an AEU theme could be 'wrapped', was welcomed by most broadsheet 
correspondents. In contrast, tabloid labour editors were less enthusiastic, questioning 
the extent to which such statistical material ever 'contained a story'. 
The Art of Using an Exclusive 
All journalists welcome exclusives and this aspect of the competitive nature of 
journalism can sometimes provide news sources with some additional leverage for 
securing coverage. However, a great deal depends upon the kind of 'exclusive' material 
which sources can offer and the news values of the organisation to which it is offered. 
While, for example, the health unions could sometimes offer NHS 'horror stories' as 
exclusives to the tabloid newspapers, for trade unions in the main, the scope for 
offering exclusive material to secure coverage was restricted to the broadsheet papers 
precisely because broadsheet corespondents had a larger appetite for political and 
contextual information, in addition to the personalised and dramatic. If a news source 
can offer an 'exclusive' this, in turn, enables a correspondent to make a stronger case 
for a story within the news organisation: 
'I need to be able to say to my news editor that this is an 
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exclusive - that other papers won't be running it.' (30) 
' ... an exclusive is a powerful mechanism which we can use 
to persuade news editors to support a story ... ' (31) 
Offering exclusivity can inflate the news value of an otherwise uninteresting item. For 
example, one education correspondent remembers the National Union of Students 
offering their views upon the proposed Student Charter as 'exclusive' to the Times, a 
paper the union had 'targeted' as being read by Conservative Ministers and back bench 
MPs. In itself, he regarded it as 'not particularly interesting' but as an 'exclusive' the 
news editor accepted the story (32). The calculation from the news sources' point of 
view is a fine one, however, because once a story appears as an exclusive in one 
newspaper, it often loses value to others. 
Industrial, health and education correspondents frequently expressed surprise that 
unions used the mechanism of exclusivity so infrequently. One health correspondent 
suggested that this was because unions suffered from being located by journalists lower 
down the 'hierarchy of credibility' (a point to be discussed further below). As 'axe 
grinders', or 'advocates' their 'exclusive' material lacked authority. However, there 
may be two further reasons. To exploit the mechanism of exclusivity, a news source 
must enjoy extensive internal control over the flow of information in order to both time 
the release of information and direct its communication. As discussed in chapters four 
and five, unions are inherently leaky or porous; little information is likely to remain in 
a union's 'back region' (Ericson et al,1989:9-10) for long if it has a political or 
contextual salience which would interest correspondents. Secondly, for many union 
press officers, working in a hostile ideological climate, their preferred strategy was to 
cultivate 'good relationships' with a number of correspondents, particularly broadsheet 
journalists, by offering them a place on 'the inside track'. The dissemination of too 
much material on an 'exclusive' basis to just one or two correspondents would 
undermine this. 
Underlying Assumptions and Inferential Structures 
The political perspectives to be found within labour and industrial journalism varied in 
a way which was associated with generational change. Many of the older labour 
correspondents who had cut their professional teeth in the 1960s and 1970s, appeared 
still committed to a 'corporatist' agenda. As chapters six and seven described in more 
detail, the fortunes of labour journalism prospered in the era of the post-war settlement 
and the labour beat grew around its organisational and departmental architecture; the 
Ministry of Labour, the Department of Economic Affairs, ACAS, the TUC and the 
headquarters of the leading unions. An intimate political relationship between the state 
and the main 'actors' in the industrial arena was taken for granted by journalists, as 
well as by the political elite. Generational change has brought a fragmenting of political 
perspectives. The 1970s, as we have seen, saw the arrival in labour journalism of a 
new generation of ambitious graduates, influenced by the political debates occurring 
within university departments during this era, and who were attracted to the specialism 
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because of its occupational standing, second only perhaps to the Lobby. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the political perspectives appear to have grown even more diverse. While 
some journalists, including Philip Bassett have developed views sympathetic to the 
'new unionism' (Bassett, 1986), others have embraced the politics of the 'New Times' 
debate, associated with Marxism Today, (Leadbeater,l989). However, some of the 
youngest correspondents who entered labour journalism in the 1990s, appear to have 
moved a very long way from corporatist values and the politics of the post-war 
settlement. For one new entrant to labour journalism, most trade unions were out of 
touch and 'still dominated by old sty le socialist thought ... modem newspapers, 
especially the tabloids, have a completely different agenda'(33). The latter view is still 
not typical of all labour correspondents. The underlying sympathy for the values and 
objectives of the labour movement which Tunstall found amongst labour 
correspondents twenty five years ago (1971:124) can be still be detected, at least in 
conversation with the correspondents whose experience pre-dates the 1990s. 
An examination of the underlying assumptions which direct labour and industrial 
correspondents in their work identifies two 'epistemological' guiding principles 
concerning appropriate practice for journalists in gathering and processing information 
( (i) and (ii) below), and two fundamental assumptions or 'inferential structures' (Lang 
and Lang, 1955) about the character of the industrial and labour world they are seeking 
to describe ( (iii) and (iv) below). 
(i) Empiricism and objectivity. 
In common with many journalists, one of the common operational assumptions which 
guides the daily work of labour correspondents, is the assumption that it is possible, 
through journalistic investigation, experience and shrewd judgement, to 'uncover the 
facts'. Allied to this view is the assumption that the raison d'etre of labour journalism, 
at least for broadsheet correspondents, is to provide accurate, impartial information and 
to make forecasts regarding future events, which command authority. 
For most of the journalists interviewed, their conceptual understanding of the 
relationship between the knowledge they gathered and the world 'out there', could be 
described as 'objectivist', in that an unproblematic, one to one correspondence was 
assumed between 'real events out there' and journalists' accounts.' A decline in the 
news value of labour news was explained as the result of a real decline in the 
significance of trade unionism. Few journalists in the interviews for this study began to 
explore the implications of what might be described as a 'constructivist' model,- the 
view that a decline in the news value of trade unions might be associated with the way 
in which news values are, themselves, constructed. After all, as Hoyt asks in the 
context of the decline of American labour journalism, 'how can a hundred million 
people be boring?'(l984:36) 
(ii) Intelligence and 'contextual information'. 
All the journalists interviewed for this study regarded as an essential attribute for labour 
journalists, the ability to gather 'intelligence' or 'contextual information' (34) which 
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would allow informed assessments to be produced. The skill of a 'professional' lay in 
acquiring the network of contacts or sources who could supply such information and in 
the degree of shrewd judgement, combined with experience, exercised in making the 
best use of this 'contextual information' . This is despite the point that, as Tuchman 
notes, there is always likely to be a tension between the emphasis upon interpretation as 
a professional skill and objectivity as a professional norm (Tuchman,l972:672). 
Nonetheless, most of the journalists interviewed for this study continued to adhere to 
the doctrine of the fact/value split; it was their job to present the facts, not side with 
either unions or their opponents. 
(iii) An 'individualised' view of the world. 
Some correspondents interviewed for this study employed explanatory frameworks for 
making sense of the world which did draw upon variants of social theory and did 
attempt to relate immediate events to underlying structures and social processes. 
Charlie Leadbeater's contributions to the 'New Times' debate on the nature of late 
capitalism provide one example, Philip Basset!' s work on the energies driving the 'new 
unionism' another. One or two of the older correspondents reflected, in their comments 
about the changing position of trade unionism and the future of labour journalism, an 
understanding of structure and power which drew upon the analysis of the traditional 
left. However, a majority of correspondents in their approach to labour and industrial 
. news, at least, employed analytic frameworks which attended to the impact of 
individual effectivity and experience, rather than structure or history. In the main, the 
assumption appeared to be that 'news' was about the here and now, the immediate, and 
not the charting of unfolding historical processes or the tracing of structural 
connections, even though the impact of such phenomena upon the daily lives of 
employees and trade unionists has rarely been more visible. 
(iv) Power 
A final assumption concerns the nature of industrial news. For all correspondents, 
industrial and labour news gained in salience and value in proportion to the extent to 
which it was associated with and had significance for the powerful in society. This was 
implicit in the practice of correspondents but not always made explicit in their 
reflections upon the nature of their work. As we have seen, many labour 
correspondents are likely to offer lowering strike rates as an explanation for the decline 
of their specialism. However, it is not lowering strike rates, as such, which has led to a 
waning of newsroom interest. Nor is it the declining size of unions because, as 
discussed above, size or economic significance were never, in themselves, guarantees 
of news interest (35). Rather, it is the declining frequency of the type of conflict which 
had immediate implications for the polity. Trade unions were high on the news agenda 
when their policy and practice made a difference at Westminster, in the short term or 
'here and now'. When union news occasionally rises to the top of the news agenda, 
once again, it is usually because journalists identify a political context. Much the same 
point can be made about 'welfare and social services' journalism (Golding and 
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Middleton,l982:114) and the reporting of health and medicine (36). In not making 
assumptions about the intimate relationships between labour news values and power 
explicit, labour correspondents tend to take existing social arrangements for the 
exercise of power, as given. As in trade union news, there is very little consideration 
of alternatives to the workplace status quo. 
In common with many other journalists, labour and industrial correspondents were 
prone to 'mythologise'. The idea of an instinct for news, inherited genetically or 
acquired through experience, was a concept frequently invoked to explain routine 
practice. Indeed, Terry Pattinson (Daily Mirror) claimed that a combination of 
experience and instinct determined whether or not he even attended press conferences ,-
'I'll ask myself is it a really good story?' (my emphasis)- while Kevin McGuire (Daily 
Telegraph) believed that his 'instinct' was able to detect whether a dispute was likely to 
escalate to a strike worthy of coverage (37). Accordingly, in the eyes of most industrial 
correspondents a good trade union press officer was one who shared such a news 
instinct, a common orientation towards what made a 'good story', and was 'switched 
on to what we need', as David Norris described it (38). In addition, the expectation of 
'good press officers' was that they could frame material according to common news 
values and encode it using an accessible 'popular discourse'. For some labour 
journalists, particularly those with long track records at the popular end of the market, 
the use of 'tabloid discourse' was habitual in their own conversation, which was 
characterised by a bewildering continuous 'code switching' between tabloid and more 
complex forms of language. Language and modes of explanation are, of course, bound 
together (Elliott, 1977: 151) and in the case of some labour correspondents, alternation 
between tabloid and more complex discourses, also implied an alternation in levels of 
explanation. Thus, one labour editor who had demonstrated a sophisticated 
understanding of the underlying, structural causes of the 1984/85 Coal Strike and was 
sympathetic to the case of the NUM, nevertheless continued to refer to 'barmy Arthur' 
throughout the interview and described the technical debate over energy sources as, 
'barmy Arthur speak'. Even the very direct impact of institutional power and structural 
forces upon his own profession, was personalised and 'individualised', using tabloid 
discourse, as 'Rupert Murdock's audacious moonlight flit to Wapping' (39). 
The Hierarchy of Credibility 
Inextricably bound up with the concept of 'objectivity' and the commitment to 
'intelligence' gathering, is a scepticism towards news sources, which correspondents 
regard as one of the attributes of 'professionalism'. A capacity to assess the credibility 
of information gathered; to distinguish the 'sound' sources from 'axe grinders', by 
separating 'facts' from 'values', was seen as central to a correspondent's work. 
However, news sources tend to be evaluated and ranked, not only according to the 
perceived veracity of the information they supply but in measures of political authority 
and significance. Information supplied by pressure groups, for example, may be 
assessed not only in its own terms but according to the size and political influence of 
the group concerned (Schlesinger,1978:51). 
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For the correspondents dealing with union news sources, it was clear that 'a 
hierarchy of credibility' existed. And yet, many correspondents appeared to work with 
a curious 'double think' in their orientation towards union press officers. On the one 
hand, it was quite clear that the political nature of press and media work was widely 
recognised; all the journalists interviewed for this study, acknowledged that union press 
officers were bound by the nature of their work to present a particular account or 
'line' . And yet, labour and industrial correspondents still sought to distinguish between 
union officers regarded as 'honest' or 'reliable' and those whose political position 
within their union and associated value commitments intruded too much in their work. 
Thus, some union press officers were 'wrapped in the leadership' and their information 
'parti-pris' (40); another was too strongly 'locked into the two guys who run the union' 
(41). Too close an intimacy between press officer and leadership was regarded as 
undermining the credibility of a press officer and yet, at the same time, the 'best' 
officers were those who were 'on the inside track' and who could reliably brief 
journalists on thinking at the highest levels. This was a conundrum which press officers 
often found difficult to solve. However, as discussed further below, some of the most 
highly regarded union press officers were those who were able to combine a proximity 
to the leadership, 'on the inside track', with sufficient autonomy to release a range of 
information, not merely the 'official line', but also some contextual material which did 
not always reinforce the 'leadership position'. 
Much the same approach was applied to union officials. Those most highly regarded 
by labour and industrial correspondents were those who either spoke for non-
factionalised unions or who were able to detach themselves from the pressures of the 
political conflicts within certain unions. On the other hand, for example, some general 
secretaries were located by correspondents at the bottom of the hierarchy of credibility 
because they were regarded as either representing their own personal ambitions through 
the news media or 'belonging' to one political faction. One civil service union general 
secretary was widely criticised because, 'all you ever get is the view from the right'. 
Another leader of an education union was treated with scepticism because 'the media 
limelight has gone to his head' (42). 
What is clear is that trade unions are never in a position to claim status as 'arbiters', 
rather than 'advocates'. Labour and industrial correspondents are prepared to 
distinguish degrees of reliability; some union sources are trusted, others less so, but 
none are granted the authority to 'evaluate assertions and interpretations made by 
[other] advocates' (Deacon and Golding,l994:15). Correspondents from other 
specialisms, who have dealings with unions, are likely to be even more severe. The 
health and education correspondents interviewed for this study all regarded unions as 
producer interests and were less likely to make finer distinctions in terms of reliability, 
either between unions or particular sources within unions. The association between 
several unions and the Labour Party, in contrast to the other consumer interests and 
professional associations in the health and education arenas, reinforced this view: 
'Health unions suffer because they are below doctors organi-
sations and nurses' organisations in the hierarchy of 
credibility. They tend to be seen as 'axe grinders' and 
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are too closely associated with the Labour Party. Journalists 
may feel that the information health unions provide is 
tainted with a particular aim. It is very important for 
a journalist to feel that a press officer is providing 
facts,- the BMA [British Medical Association] are good 
at supplying facts, where as the health unions are seen 
as more propagandistic .. .' (43). 
Although some health correspondents acknowledged that the role of the BMA as a 
producer interest group had become more visible in recent years, since the under the 
chairmanship of Lee-Potter it had entered into open confrontation with the government, 
nonetheless, it was still possible for it to deploy considerable 'authority' and to achieve 
a position as 'arbiter', at least in relation to some issues. Education correspondents 
applied a similarly sceptical approach to the teaching unions, although the more 
'militant' NUT was placed lower in the hierarchy of credibility, than the NAHT which, 
for some correspondents, still spoke with authority because it was seen to retain 
political standing and influence at Westminster (44). 
Media bias: an astructural explanation 
As discussed above, many labour correspondents, particularly more senior journalists, 
identified with the values of the mainstream of the labour movement and acknowledged 
that unions often had a difficult job in presenting their cases to the public. However, 
structural forms of explanation rarely surfaced when correspondents were asked to 
consider the reasons for these difficulties. Modes of explanation tended to be 
constructed around 'individualised' accounts or 'technical' accounts which pointed to a 
failure in understanding the mechanics of public relations. Kevin McGuire (Daily 
Telegraph), a graduate and relatively new entree familiar with 'media studies debates' 
(his phrase), specifically ruled out 'conspiracy' or the impact of political forces. He 
had never been required to alter or re-write a story on the basis of political rather than 
professional criteria (45). None of the journalists interviewed in this study 
acknowledged any such direct political pressures. Indeed, in his book Keith Mason 
claims that in working throughout the transformation of the Daily Herald from TUC 
sponsored left of centre paper to its final incarnation as the Sun within the News 
International empire, his job was quite free of political pressures and 'changed very 
little' (Mason,l981:1). 
For Kevin Mcguire, part of the problem for trade unions lay in the failure of many 
unions to fully understand how the national press actually worked. Kevin Mcguire 
recognised that some trade unions, such as the Transport and General Workers Union, 
were likely to experience more intense media scrutiny because of their close 
connections with the Labour Party. This might lead to more critical coverage from 
tabloid papers committed to the cause of the Conservative Party. Nevertheless, he 
believed that most union general secretaries were more interested in the 'qualities rather 
than the tabloids' and would get 'a fair crack of the whip with the locals and the P.A. 
[Press Association]' ( 46). So difficulties for unions in presenting an agenda, if 
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experienced, were largely the result of either unions' own failings or the consciously 
constructed political projects of particular tabloid newspapers strongly identified with 
the Conservative Party. Possible pressures arising from the structural location of 
newspaper production within specific capitalist markets and framed by particular 
ideological and political formations were not considered. Hardly surprising but 
important none the less. 
For one of the newer industrial correspondents, 'society's values had moved on and 
newspapers simply reflected that ... '. Trade unions, unreconstructed, were a thing of 
the past as demonstrated by the Labour Party's fourth electoral defeat. The absence of a 
union agenda in the press simply mirrored a public's lack of interest (47). 
At the same time, however, there was a common recognition that coverage of some 
industrial relations issues had failed to fully articulate the merits of the union case. The 
1984-85 coal dispute was frequently cited as an example. Several labour correspondents 
acknowledged that the NUM 'had a largely valid case' (48) but had simply failed to put 
its message across effectively. Once more illustrating the salience of the concept of 
professionalism for industrial correspondents, they argued that the NUM' s response to 
the news media has been impaired by its ideological orientation. The suspicion and 
hostility directed towards sections of the news media and a failure to meet the needs of 
journalists in terms of availability and the flow of information were primarily 
responsible for the one sided coverage. The ideological stance of the NUM was 
contrasted with Charlie Whelan, the AEU Press Officer, who could 'ride' with the 
politically partisan nature of the press, 
"because he's professional and recognises where we are, [journalists] 
what the politics of the paper are and understands that we have 
a job to do. He takes the view that as long as his union gets 
the best possible, effective message across, he's done his job." (49) 
However, in the case of some press officers including Nell Myers of the NUM, 
problems arose from a lack of professionalism ... 
" ... because they allowed their own political views or their 
own judgements of a newspaper's political stance to cloud 
their relationships with journalists. You mentioned Nell Myers ... 
she did say that along with broadcasting journalists 
working for the tabloids were 'our enemies front-line troops', 
so its a class struggle thing which is why she works for 
Arthur. She shares the same fundamentalist beliefs which is fine 
but it doesn't help in my job and, therefore, I would argue 
it doesn't ultimately help the union case, and doesn't ultimately 
help the miners of Wales and Geordieland and Yorkshire." (50) 
Other correspondents complained about accessibility, 'always too busy, no working 
journalists ever get to speak to Mr Scargill on the telephone' (51) and the apparent low 
priority attached to press work. 
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According to these accounts, if unions experience a hostile ideological climate this is 
not the consequence of the location of the news media within particular social, political 
and economic structures but the result of the adoption of inappropriate strategies in 
dealing with journalists. In an area of academic study strongly influenced by an 
understanding of the ways in which such structures do shape the production of meaning 
and constrain the possibilities which are presented to actors, it is tempting to regard the 
astructural explanations provided by journalists as superficial. However, as the field 
work with union press officers suggested, personal relationships are important in 
shaping the nature of the regular encounters between trade unions and the news media. 
Of course, these encounters are, themselves, constrained and patterned by structural 
determinants but, nevertheless, the nature of press officer-journalist interaction is 
important in opening up or closing particular possibilities for news communication. In 
this sense, the importance attached by many journalists to such inter-personal 
interaction is not naive. 
"Yes, he's very good [Charlie Whelan AEU Press Officer]. You get 
the other extreme like Nell Myers. She disseminates quotes from 
the President. She's never been known to put out a story . She 
gives these quotes to the P.A.[Press Association]. I don't think 
she has a relationship with any journalists except may be the 
Morning Star. No-one else." (52). 
Again, on the question of whether the possession of wealth or resources allocated 
greater access to the news media, labour journalists were likely to employ astructural 
perspectives. Was it the case, for example, that the NUM suffered during the 1984/85 
dispute because it lacked command over the very significant public relations resources 
at the disposal of British Coal? The scepticism of Keith Harper (Industrial Editor on 
the Guardian), in relation to this argument, was typical of the journalists in this study 
"I think it's true looking back on the Coal Strike that the National 
Coal Board had umpteen press officers all over the country who were 
able to push British Coal's view point very effectively. However, 
the NUM was very effective through its President, Mr Scargill, who 
was on every television programme in the Country. There were at 
least twenty members of the National Executive who spoke very 
-·volubly in different ways about the progress of the dispute. 
I think that despite the fact that a trade union begins with an 
initial disadvantage over public relations, the NUM case was put 
very well during the dispute by different men in the union and I 
don't think you can argue that the NUM lost the dispute because they 
suffered in comparison with the statements and coverage which 
British Coal and the Government were making. Why they lost the 
dispute was because it was badly handled by the leadership. 
I was on the phone constantly to NUM people as well as B. C. 
people at different times of the day and night, not necessarily 
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to Nell Myers who was a conduit for official stuff from the NUM 
but no no no ... there were always sections of the NUM, different 
regions, who would speak not only with the local press but the 
national as well." (53). 
This comment illustrates the importance of 'porosity' for correspondents but also 
illustrates the way in which journalists often conflate interpretation and evaluation 
(Deacon and Golding,l994:19). For Keith Harper, honour was satisfied and balance 
achieved providing an NUM voice was heard; the union complaints about the 
interpretative framework within which 'evaluative' material (comments from sources, 
etc) was located are not addressed. Most labour and industrial correspondents 
acknowledged that unions faced a set of ideological hurdles but did not regard them as 
insurmountable; they were not rooted in unyielding social, political or economic 
structures. Effective media handling strategies could be devised providing unions 
understood how journalists worked and applied appropriate news values. 
Journalists and Union Press Officers: the journalists' perspective 
In talking to journalists about their dealings with union press officers it is not difficult 
to develop a clear view of what they regard as effective media work, - there was a 
remarkable area of common agreement amongst the journalists in this study over what 
attributes made a good union press officer. While the opinions of journalists differed 
more widely on the performance of particular unions, it was still possible to identify 
one or two unions which enjoyed a high reputation amongst most labour and industrial 
correspondents. Conversely, there were several who were commonly regarded as poor 
in terms of press and media work (54). 
There appeared to be a common understanding of 'professionalism', shared by both 
parties. Thus, many union press officers, as well as journalists, acknowledged the 
importance of disseminating information speedily, recognising the salience of dominant 
news values, and subordinating political values to the 'priorities of the job'. Attempts 
by some union press officers to distinguish between newspapers according to political 
'criteria were regarded as highly 'unprofessional'. For journalists, the 'basic 
assumptions' or 'inferential structures' which guided their practice, should operate for 
'professional' press officers, as well. Hence, the belief that it was possible for union 
press officers to separate 'facts' from political values. 
A frequent comment made by correspondents was that an effective press officer was 
able to speak with 'authority', and was 'trusted' to work independently without being 
required to refer upwards continuously. As noted in chapters four and five, a frequent 
practice in some unions was to construct an official comment or quotation from a 
leading official first, issue it to the news media, and then confirm it with the official 
concerned, subsequently. Journalists recognised this as a legitimate technique which 
helped them in their work, providing the relationship between press officer and senior 
union official was, in their eyes, credible. If they believed that the press officer had 
the confidence of the official concerned then industrial correspondents were unlikely to 
question a 'constructed' quotation. 
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On the basis of the interviews with journalists conducted for this study a journalist's 
list of ideal press officer qualities would include the following: 
-the ability to speak with 'authority' (enjoying the trust and confidence of the powerful 
within a particular union). 
-availability (taking the practical steps necessary to ensure that journalists could easily 
contact a press officer at work or home on a 24 hours a day basis). 
- a position on the 'inside track', with access to decision making processes at the 
highest levels and with an understanding of the political currents at work within a 
union. 
- 'honesty' and 'reliability' (in practice a willingness to provide more accurate 
information than just the leadership 'line' on particular issues, but not necessarily all 
the information). 
-an awareness of current news values and the ingredients of a 'good story'. 
- efficiency and the capacity to respond quickly to enquiries. 
- the absence of political favour, hostility or defensiveness (as discussed above in the 
context of professionalism). 
Very nearly every journalist I spoke to, from right wing tabloid papers to the Financial 
Times, nominated, without prompting, Charlie Whelan of the AEU, as one of the best 
union press officers at the time the field work was conducted: 
'Charlie's brilliant. .. he's switched on to what we need and most 
of the time he can provide an immediate answer. Bill Jordan and 
Gavin Laird trust him and so there's no time wasting'. (55) 
'Essentially it's all about relationships. When you work on a 
national newspaper, you've got to have people you can rely upon, 
that you can get hold of, so communication is the key, instant 
access, someone who knows and can speak with authority, who 
doesn't tell lies. Someone like Charlie Whelan you can leave 
a message on his 'poser phone' or answer machine at home, he 
has direct lines at work, you can always get hold of him.' (56). 
'A background in journalism is not essential, as a baseline, 
enthusiasm and just working hard will get you a long way ... 
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For example, this week I was at the GMB annual conference 
watching the news at six o'clock on TV. There was a piece 
about John Smith (Labour Party Leader) on. At 6.10 the 
GMB' s bleeper went off, a message from Char lie Whelan of the 
AEU with an idea for a story to promote. He's always enthusiastic 
and on the look out for an opportunity.' (57) 
'It obviously helps if they [press officers] have a background 
in journalism but I' m thinking of one guy, Charlie Whelan at 
the AEU, who is in many ways the ideal P.O. You can ring him 
up and have a chat about anything from the price of potatoes 
to the Chelsea game and write a particular story. '(58) 
Efficiency and reliability, an understanding of news values as applied to labour 
journalism, and above all, a good working relationship with senior officials within the 
union, made Charlie Whelan an extremely good press officer, as measured by the 
labour correspondents' yardstick. In contrast Charlie Whelan's predecessor was 'an old 
union worthy' (58) who was often unavailable and never in a position to comment 
without referring upwards. As one labour correspondent put it, Charlie Whelan is 
.'more like a colleague'(60). The 'best' press officers, then, were those who could be 
regarded as colleagues or fellow professionals; who shared a common understanding of 
the practices and imperatives of the news process and who acknowledged the necessity 
of employing mainstream news values as a template for producing descriptions of the 
world. 
Some unions, Kevin McGuire (formerly Daily Telegraph, currently industrial editor 
at the Daily Mirror) says, , 'just belt on a press officer' but keep them 'permanently in 
the dark' (61). To be effective press officers must, 'know what's going on and speak 
with authority ... and have the confidence to actually say what's going on'. Laurie 
Harris (NUR), also, was highly rated by Kevin McGuire. All the claims made by other 
unions to be pioneering new media strategies were, 'bollocks ... Laurie was doing it 
first,- just one man on his own', mainly through being 'straight and honest', always 
being available, and being very close to General Secretary, Jimmy Knapp. Kevin 
McGuire pointed to the rail disputes in the late 1980s as examples of highly successful 
media campaigns. 'Many of the printed quotes were actually Laurie but Jimmy Knapp 
was quite happy, it worked very well ... '. Thus, Laurie Harris was able to respond 
quickly to enquiries from the press with a comment 'from' the leadership of the union, 
even in the absence of the leadership. Charlie Leadbeater (Financial Times) confirms 
the principle, suggesting that the best press officers were 'those trusted to do the job 
by those they work for'(62). 
Intelligence and What Happens When It is Missing 
'Good' union press officers, then, are privy to the thoughts of their leaderships, have 
access to the highest decision making forums, and are sensitive to the diverse political 
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currents moving within their organisations. This allows a 'good' press officer to 
provide the 'contextual information' or intelligence sought by correspondents. That the 
occupational standing and self-esteem of specialist correspondents largely depends upon 
the range of their sources, and not merely the quality but also the exclusivity of the 
information obtained from them, has already been noted by researchers 
(Tuchman,l978:68; Schudson,1989:272). As described in chapters four and five, union 
press officers working in a hostile ideological climate, have relatively few bargaining 
chips in their dealings with journalists but they do possess some which are derived from 
their ability to supply 'contextual information'. As the Times industrial correspondent 
explains: 
'It' s the job of the press officer to make the material 
as interesting as possible and one of the ways of doing 
that is to provide the people who are reporting this 
area [industry], over a period of time, a degree of con-
textual information. Obviously it is important that if the 
Financial Times reports Concorde, it knows more about it 
than just that it goes up and down. We need to know enough 
about an organisation to tell if a development is important 
or significant or whether something is just being dressed 
up in a particular way .. .' (63). 
The same correspondent recalled a story in which he knew that the information he had 
received from one source was untrue. 'I just knew that... because of the background 
knowledge I'd acquired' (64). As part of the service a newspaper provides for its 
readership, this correspondent believed that it was important that the comments from 
this source be reported. At the same time, it was equally important that their doubtful 
veracity also be made clear. However, professional norms and political considerations 
constrained the correspondent from including a bald statement asserting that such 
information was untrue. The solution was to include additional 'contextual information' 
which allowed the reader to make an informed judgement. So, according to 
correspondents, intelligence allows correspondents to evaluate information and to 
empower readers, in the sense that they are equipped to make informed assessments. 
Further to this, although perhaps less significant as labour news descends the news 
hierarchy, intelligence allows labour correspondents to 'play weather forecaster'. 
According to one former labour correspondent, forecasting the outcome of events,-
industrial disputes, union elections, negotiating sessions at ACAS, etc,- provided 
labour correspondents with opportunities to demonstrate the value of their contacts and 
their skill in deploying 'contextual information' to interpret developments (65). And 
with the decline in the number of labour correspondents employed by the main news 
organisations, remaining journalists on the labour beat are quick to point out what they 
regard as evidence of things going wrong, mistakes being made and forecasts proving 
wildly inaccurate, as a result of the loss of expertise and the resulting absence of good 
'intelligence'. Thus, according to Philip Bassett, both the Sunday Times and the 
Observer were 'caught short' by the wave of public sector strikes in 1988 
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(Bassett, 1988). Ill-informed predictions of a new 'winter of discontent' were unfounded 
but, according to Philip Bassett, arose from both papers' decision not to retain 
experienced labour correspondents. 
Several other labour correspondents pointed to the difficulties news organisations 
now experienced in covering major strikes, having assumed that industrial disputes 
were a feature of a previous era and re-organised their staffing accordingly ( 66). 
Difficulties can extend beyond coverage of disputes. The absence of expertise on the 
labour and industrial beat can mean, as Hugo Young pointed out in the Guardian, a 
complete failure of news reporters to pick up the significant 'news' in recent 
employment legislation, such as the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights 
Bill, which legalised discrimination in pay against trade unionists (Young,1993). In 
reducing the number of correspondents or in abolishing labour desks entirely, news 
organisations lose both expertise in a specialised and complex field but, just as 
importantly, networks of contacts within the bureaucracies and the political elites of the 
labour movement. 
Tunstall first pointed to the importance of 'intelligence' in securing the position of a 
specialist correspondent within a news organisation. Journalists on taking on a 
specialism, such as labour and industry, have to become 'instant experts'; it is unusual 
for a journalists to have formal qualifications in a chosen area (Tunstall,l971:116). 
However, correspondents can consolidate their positions in relation to their news 
organisations by fostering an extensive range of contacts and sources, and by the 
judicious deployment of information. Providing a journalist can accomplish this, a 
'news organisation's scope for exercising arbitrary control over him is already limited' 
(Tunsta11,1971: 116). 
Negrine (1993: 19) has applied a sceptical eye to the claims of correspondents to 
command specialist expertise, arguing that it is the needs of the news organisation, 
rather than the intrinsic nature of the subject matter which underpins the specialist 
division of labour. Journalists have 'mythologised' their expertise. The problem with 
this critique is that it fails to distinguish between types of expertise. In terms of 
'knowledge', it may be useful to question the extent to which most journalists have the 
opportunity to acquire substantial expertise, although a number of labour and industrial 
correspondents have contributed substantial books on various aspects of industrial 
relations and labour journalism (Wigham,1961 and 1969;Mason,1981;Jones,1986; 
Bassett, 1986; etc). However, a meaningful definition of expertise in relation to 
specialist journalism should also include the acquisition of sources, contacts, and the 
ability to make sense of the 'contextual information' they supply. This ability is 
enhanced by experience on the labour and industrial beat and an understanding of the 
politics within the labour movement. In this sense, it is a mistake to underestimate the 
'expertise' of experienced labour and industrial correspondents, as the recent examples 
of gaps and mistakes in labour coverage, discussed above, illustrate. 
News Rhythms and News Routines 
An understanding of the imperatives of the news production process; the pressure of 
deadlines (steadily advancing towards lunch time as new print technology allows more 
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editions to be published) and the importance of news values, were mentioned by all 
correspondents as essential attributes in a press officer. As Terry Pattinson points out 
if there are 'fifteen journalists working on a story, ten from national newspapers, ITV, 
BBC, BBC Radio, the Sundays, commercial radio, regionals, weeklies, all chasing a 
general secretary in a day .. .in an hour(!)', then a press officer has a vital role to play 
in dealing with enquiries quickly and efficiently. However, a bad press officer is one 
who does no more than this: 
'Some are very defensive. They see their role as simply 
disseminating information given to them by their general 
secretaries or national executives, and they do no more 
than that. They spend the rest of their lives parrying 
questions, purely defensively.' (68). 
This was a frequent complaint voiced by journalists; that some union press officers 
were unwilling to recognise the salience of news values, were unable to depart from an 
approved brief and were, thus, incapable of furnishing journalists with any of the 
'inside' information required to make a 'good story'. This, in turn, relates to the 
different roles adopted by various press officers (discussed in chapter four). Union 
press officers who conformed more strictly to the 'civil service' model appeared to fall 
into this trap. Several journalists in this study pointed to the civil service unions (the 
NUCPS in particular) and USDAW as being 'ineffective' for this reason. One senior 
ex-correspondent commented that, 'they're just churning stuff out, they're not taking 
any active initiative, they're not bringing you in, and this was what the AEU was like 
at one point in the old days, they are like civil servants, just servants of the executive 
or president. ' ( 69). 
Timing the release of information to maximise its value to news organisations was a 
skill recognised by journalists: 
' ... but who is very good at this [ timing the release of information] 
is Charlie Whelan. He was excellent at it when he was working 
for the AEU at Ford ... ! mean Charlie is one of the best. .. he really 
understands when to let things out, when not to, what has a certain 
value and how you can control it and that the point is not to try and 
stop everything but that the point is to use it.' (70). 
Similarly, in terms of awareness of timing and news values, Charlie Leadbeater points 
to the performance of the EETPU: 
" ... they [the EETPU] were absolutely brilliant at the game of 
briefmg journalists, getting close to them, feeding information 
to them, briefing behind the scenes on deals or what they were 
doing at the TUC or what they thought of this union or that ... 
Hammond and co really understood the press ... " 
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So according to Charlie Leadbeater, a journalist likely to be more critical of 
conventional professional wisdom than most, the application of specific encoding 
practices,- timing, an awareness of news values, and an understanding that the 
judicious release of 'inside' information to oil the wheels of exchange between press 
officers and journalists,- does make a difference. It is questionable whether the 
effectivity of these encoding practices holds in all cases,- the particular political and 
ideological positions of both the AEU and the EETPU were likely to provoke less 
critical coverage from certain sections of the news media, anyway. In the case of a 
union, such as the NUM, it is difficult to 'weight' for the relative effect several distinct 
variables; the politics of the union and its historic position within the labour movement 
which was likely to provoke the critical fire of newspapers closely associated with the 
Conservative government, the ideological legacy of earlier news media representations 
of miner militancy, and the refusal of the union's leadership to make many concessions 
to the practice of labour correspondents. 
Exchange Relationships: Conflict and Co-operation 
As discussed above, it is possible that the growing pressures upon journalists, with 
fewer staff and earlier deadlines, will lead to a greater dependence upon official, 
bureaucratic sources. If this is the case, then, press officers will be able to exert greater 
control over the information flows within their organisations, as less time is available 
for journalists to cultivate alternative sources and contacts. However, at the time of this 
study, journalists were still inclined to search for a variety of sources within union 
organisations. A number of journalists still adhered to the view that 'real stories don't 
come from press officers' (81). If the best labour stories are ultimately about power, 
powerful individuals and the implications of their actions for the polity, then the most 
useful information would be found at a level above the union press officer. This has 
important implications for the relationship between correspondent and press officer. 
The idea of describing interaction between correspondents and news sources in 
terms of 'exchange relationships' is hardly new (Goldenberg,l975;Chibnall,l977). 
Indeed, Seaton has applied the concept specifically to labour correspondents and union 
sources, though without pursuing the implications of the idea at length (1982:278). 
Several important points are implied by the concept of 'exchange'. Firstly, that the 
relationship is governed by a more less stable normative framework,- there are implicit 
rules to the game. Secondly, that such relationships are regulated by the capacity of 
both parties to exercise sanctions if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of an 
exchange or the performance of the other side. And thirdly, that such relationships have 
the potential for conflict, as well as co-operation. In this sense, they are inherently 
unstable. In the case of exchanges between news sources and journalists, a great deal 
depends upon the capacity of each side to exercise control over the flow of information. 
What are the terms of the exchange between union press officers and 
correspondents? Only some correspondents formally acknowledged that their 
relationships with union sources involved a concept of 'bargaining'. Nevertheless, it 
was clear that both parties worked within an implicit normative framework. In return 
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for information which satisfied correspondents' needs in terms of news value and 
'contextual information'; an expectation that a union perspective should be accurately 
represented in the news copy produced, was acknowledged. There is also, however, an 
important element of tension in the relationship between press officer and industrial 
correspondent arising from a fundamental conflict of interest. Press officers must seek 
to regulate and control information flows. They will try to ensure that their unions 
'speak with one voice' to the news media and this requires them to exercise effective 
control over the information which is disseminated. There is also a professional 
consideration because their own authority will be undermined if significant channels of 
communication open up between unions and journalists, over which they exercise no 
control. On the other hand, journalists will welcome 'leaky systems', unions where a 
number of key players, either at national or local level, supply information to the news 
media. Information of this kind, 'unofficial' information, often makes good copy and is 
more likely to satisfy the criteria defined by dominant news values. 
Seaton believed that union sources had, at their disposal, at least one powerful 
sanction, 'they can refuse to talk to a correspondent who has offended them - and they 
do' (1982:278). At the time Seaton briefly reviewed the scene, labour and industrial 
news was still high on the news agenda and this may have leant the threat of 
withdrawal of co-operation a greater potency. However, Seaton' s analysis ignores the 
inability of trade unions, as organisations, to control the number of information flows 
which correspondents may 'tap'. Companies often exert control over their employees 
dealings with the media through draconian contractual controls and the message that 
leaked information can hit share prices. Such powerful controls over their employees 
and members are not available to most trade unions. Given the factionalised nature of 
many unions, the springing up of alternative, unofficial information flows is almost 
inevitable and, in terms of exchange relationships, this will undermine the position of 
the press officer. 
Few journalists in this study offered a formal statement of the terms of the 
'bargains' which shaped relationships between themselves and union press officers. 
Some recognised that it was the job of the press officer 'to sell us a line' (Tony 
McGuire) and that it was unreasonable to expect union press officers to commit 
themselves to a policy of full disclosure in all circumstances. Nonetheless, several 
journalists did specify two obligations a 'good press officer' should meet. As Tony 
McGuire says, a good press officer 'does not tell porkies'. In other words, whatever 
information is volunteered should be accurate. Selling a union line should not involve 
lying. Secondly, all the industrial correspondents shared a common view that a good 
press officer recognised the obligation to respond in all circumstances, rather than 
'stonewall' in a situation of public discomfort. However, the complexity of the 
'bargain' went beyond these obligations. Charlie Leadbeater explicitly framed the 
relationship in the following terms: 
'I mean one of the things you have to accept with press officers 
is that you are engaging in some kind of bargain, you have to 
accept that both sides understand what the bargain is ... press 
officers go bad,- a bit like the [ large general union]- when 
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they become over-professionalised ... Where they know they're 
spinning you a line and they know that's their job and they know 
you've got a certain job to do, it's best when it works in this 
way and there's a certain mutual recognition of what's going on. 
When it's taken too seriously and it becomes too squeaky clean 
which is what the [large general union] are like, then it becomes 
a bit too much.' (82) 
Charlie Leadbeater argued that press officers were most effective when they 
acknowledged that they were playing an active part in the construction of news, 'people 
like Eddie [Eddie Barrett T and G) know what's going on' and 'know they are playing 
some kind of active role in it, not just passive, they' re not just reflecting, actually 
actively playing a role'. The active political nature of the union press role is underlined 
in the following example: 
" ... on a Sunday I called the union's press officer who was very 
good, very well informed, one of the best, and she said she thought 
a two year deal was under discussion to settle the dispute and I 
then put that to the union's general secretary separately and he 
said, ' I think that's very interesting, where did that idea 
come from?' And then I put it to B. T. and they said something 
like that is being discussed and I wrote a story saying that a 
two year deal was one possibility for ending the strike and that 
became the context for the next days talks, everyone started 
talking about a two year deal. That idea came from a press officer 
and was cooked up inside the NCU ... that's an example of how it can 
work together and that there's an understanding whereby it works 
to my advantage because I'm getting a story and it works to union's 
advantage because they' re getting a line out.' (83) 
However, the 'bargain' can play a part in a number of political arenas. For example, 
according to several correspondents, in a number of disputes the union press officer has 
been involved in briefmg, on behalf of the leadership of certain unions, against the 
union's own rank and file membership. In other circumstances, the press officer may 
have a political role in the context of inter-union rivalry: 
'They are most useful and most informative when they are doing a 
political job rather than just a press job because that's when 
they give you information. As a result of that you have to 
recognise that they are working for something, that they have 
certain interests. Press officers are good and union media 
operations are good when the press officers are trusted by the 
people they work for to do the job ... 
Often in the Ford negotiations this happens .. .in the 
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Engineering Employers Federation talks over new flexibilities ... 
people were briefing against other people all the time. You just 
knew where to go ... MSF, AEU and in the Ford talks as well ... 
[a former union press officer] would be part of the time speaking 
for the Ford unions and part of the time saying we' re not taking 
any shit from those T and G wankers. He was the best...he gave 
me some excellent stories in my time because he understood that 
it was better that they come out than not and that it was better that 
they come out from the AEU than anybody else. '(84) 
There was considerable pressure upon press officers, particularly upon those working 
for unions characterised by sharp internal political conflicts, where a number of 
individuals or factions were likely to seek to use the news media to gain tactical 
advantages. Union press officers were sometimes compelled to release information, 
placed in the context of a particular interpretation, in order to minimise the damage that 
might occur if the same information was obtained by journalists from unauthorised 
sources and, without the official 'spin' or 'gloss' provided by the press officer. There 
is also an additional pressure because press officers know that if they do not respond to 
journalists enquiries then industrial correspondents are likely to seek out alternative 
sources or attempt to by-pass the press officer by going straight to the top of the union 
hierarchy to the general secretary. 
'One of the good things about being a journalist and one of the 
problems for press officers is the access you get directly to 
officials at the top which you just don't get in companies, so 
in unions you can call people up because they are more open, 
they are more undisciplined, there are more centres of power, 
the structures are more visible ... you can get directly to the 
people managing a dispute and often that's the quickest way, so 
press officers get by-passed. In other words, the more dispersed 
a union. . . the less power a central press officer has, and the 
more factions a union has, the less influence a press officer 
has. '(85) 
An education correspondent provided a very similar example: 
'I mean, for example, this week I know for a fact that 
at NATFHE, this week, the negotiators were out-voted 
by the rest of the executive. I mean I must have been con-
tacted by half the executive, leaking about the other 
side,- they are split down the middle. It's not a good 
idea to take action over a dispute you claimed you won 
weeks before and now the employers can claim the moral 
high ground.' (86) 
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And correspondents actively sought to circumnavigate the press officer: 
'A union press officer won't be giving you any information the 
union doesn't want you to hear so you've got to dig, you've got to 
use your own contacts. Information about a union comes from 
different sources ... sometimes it comes from shop stewards, 
sometimes a regional official, sometimes from a national officer 
on an off the record basis, it means you can't identify the official 
but you've got your story. You could, if you were lucky, be 
telephoned by the general secretary but that is rare ... most 
good stories come from the national executive, past or present, 
disgruntled people, people with an axe to grind, people just 
saying, "this is a good story for you but it didn't come from me"'. 
(87) 
Factional feuding is a particularly useful stimulus for leaks, as one labour editor noted: 
'now the General Secretary of that [ a civil service union] 
union is a real political animal, right wing, the [Civil Service union] is 
the Beirut of the labour movement, it makes the NUJ look 
organised. It's split three ways, the young Trots, the right, 
and the old fashioned C.P. in the middle. The General Secretary 
is very much on the right, press officer, editor of the journal 
and now General Secretary so he's a useful contact for the 
right wing papers because he's always got stories about mad 
Trots but he's sufficiently professional to be aware of the 
general position of the union.' (88) 
From the journalists' perspective, the only sensible course of action for unions was to 
make the best of things. It was pointless seeking to exert centralised control over 
information flows because, 'we're going to get the story anyway, so it's better that the 
· press officer is there and we go through the press officer ... ' (89). 
There are several ways in which unions have sought to retain control over 
information flows. The NUM imposed a tightly controlled regime through the 
authority of the leadership. Within the union headquarters only the President, General 
Secretary or Nell Myers, on their behalf, answered news media enquiries, in contrast to 
a union such as NA TFHE, where press officers encouraged journalists to draw upon 
the expertise of researchers and officials in other departments. However, the strategy of 
centralised control was difficult to enforce, even for the NUM, given its federated 
structure and determinedly independent regional area organisations. During the Coal 
Dispute, as journalists experienced difficulties in reaching the union leadership, so they 
searched and found alternative sources. Nell Myers (NUM official responsible for 
media work) was 'a conduit for official stuff but 'there were always different sections 
of the NUM, different regions', where 'contacts would speak not only to the local press 
but the national as wel1'(90). As described in chapters four and five, the GMB has 
sought to exert central control in a rather different fashion. The development of a 
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'professional' communications strategy, with identified target audiences and 
'techniques' for placing stories in particular news media to reach key 'opinion leaders', 
requires that considerable centralised control be exerted over the deployment of 
information. And yet, here too, journalists were sceptical of the 'over-
professionalised', 'over-flash' strategy and determined to seek alternative sources to the 
GMB's Communication Directorate. The availability of the GMB's press and media 
officers was welcomed but the material they supplied was regarded as, too often, bland 
and mundane, reflecting official perspectives but without the 'inside' material which 
would have made it interesting (91 ). 
Several journalists (though by no means all interviewed) believed that in other 
ways, the 'professionalised' approach was effective. There was common agreement that 
the GMB 'had done a pretty good job in building a different image with limited 
resources' (92) but image building was distinguished from press work. In contrast, the 
T and G press office had a good sense for news values, performed press and news 
media work well, but the union was regarded as experiencing severe difficulties in 
trying to enhance its 'corporate image': 
' ... for a corporate identity to be sold you've got to create 
that identity and that means having to be fairly disciplined 
and organised. The T and G is a far flung warring confederacy 
so that if Eddie Barrett (T and G Press Officer) comes on the 
phone and says they have a fantastic plan for doing such and 
such a thing you know its just some Smith Square fantasy 
because what really matters is what they do out there in the 
regions. The more fragmented, fractious diverse, a union the 
more difficult it is to create a corporate image ... the GMB has 
been quite effective because it has had a sense of what you need 
to pull the package together and make the presentation work ... 
the AEU has some of the same elements of style about it. The 
magazine has always been good, they've always had some aspects of 
style but underneath it is terribly unstructured. The people who do 
both [press and image building work] are the EETPU." (93) 
So 'slick' and 'professionalised' press and media work is unlikely to succeed if it 
impedes the fostering of 'exchange relationships' between union sources and 
journalists. There has to be a recognition of the normative framework which can 
govern source-correspondent interaction; there has to be an understanding of what 
journalists need, the 'contextual information' which enhances their 'expertise' and a 
certain skill is required in deploying such material as 'bargaining chips'. Working as a 
union press officer is to engage in the 'art of the possible'. At heart, for union sources 
to work with labour correspondents 'successfully', there must be a recognition of the 
social nature of their relationship. This is why an over-reliance upon the technology of 
news encoding is unlikely to succeed any more than an 'over-professionalised' 
approach. There was almost complete agreement amongst the journalists in this study 
that services such as Universal News were ineffective and inappropriate, - 'a busted 
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flush' (94). Relationships with press officers were 'far more important' (95) than 
investment in technology. The 'basic tools of the job' (96) were now the 'telephone and 
the FAX', a conclusion which emerged strongly in talking to union press officers 
(chapters four and five). Rather than investing in communication technology, unions 
would be: 
'be better off investing in a person who knows the business, 
and then giving them unfettered access at all levels to the 
decision making process.' (97) 
Summary 
There is an implicit normative framework, with mutual obligations, which organises 
much of the interaction between union press officers and specialist correspondents. 
Implicitly, sometimes explicitly, this is recognised by journalists, as well as press 
officers. The union sources most highly regarded by journalists were those who most 
willingly and most easily embraced this normative framework. The ability of press 
officers to satisfy the expectations of correspondents depended, in part, upon their 
positions within their unions; their proximity to the leadership and their access to the 
main political currents. Journalists valued press officers who 'spoke with authority' and 
yet, were capable of providing additional 'contextual information' and intelligence. 
The most 'successful' unions, in their eyes, were not necessarily those who invested 
heavily in communication technology, or embraced the perspectives of 'corporate 
communications' but those where the quality of the social relationship with 
correspondents was prioritised, albeit more via telephonic communication than face to 
face contact, than in the past. 
'Professionalism' in journalism and press work was a unifying concept, shared by 
both correspondents and many union press officers. This concept encouraged both sides 
to define their roles in such a way as to allow the conventional values of journalism and 
the widely recognised 'imperatives' of news production to strongly shape their work. 
Thus, both journalists and most union press officers took the deadlines and rhythms of 
news production for granted, both frequently defmed 'stories' in terms of agreed news 
values, and there was common agreement amongst journalists and several, but not all, 
union press officers that professionalism should override political orientations, through 
the mutual acknowledgement that each party in the relationship was 'simply doing their 
job'. In a number of accounts of source-journalist interation it has been assumed that 
control over the flow of information has placed news sources in a position of relative 
advantage, and journalists at a disadvantage (Chibnall,1977; Cockerell et al, 1985; 
Seaton,1982;etc). Most trade unions, however, are porous and this provides 
experienced correspondents with a variety of information flows. In their dealings with 
the news media, trade unions, consequently, face a classical 'catch-22' or double bind. 
Most union press officers are unable to exercise effective control over all potential 
news flows from within their organisation, and accordingly they are likely to often be 
placed at a disadvantage in their exchange relations with correspondents. As several 
correspondents remarked, 'they know we'll get the story some how, anyway.' In this 
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sense 'news management' is not an option, at best such press officers can aim for 'news 
presentation'. On the other hand, a minority of trade unions are capable of largely 
controlling information flows, at least at the centre, either through a disciplined culture 
and historic antagonism towards the news media (NUM) or through the fostering of an 
organisational culture which emphasises professional, disciplined corporate 
communication (GMB). And yet, such strategies often mean that exchange relationships 
between union press officers and correspondents are impaired because in the eyes of the 
latter, the 'terms' of the exchange are not satisfied if the material offered for 
'exchange' is too bland. This, in turn, can lead to significant difficulties in presenting a 
union perspective. 
The problem of this double-bind presents unions with a difficult choice in terms of 
press and news media strategies. To acknowledge the advantages of developing 
exchange relationships with correspondents, is to embrace the imperatives of news 
values, production rhythms and, perhaps, most importantly the interpretative 
frameworks or underlying assumptions of labour and industrial journalism, with all the 
constraints over the type of message to be communicated, implied by this. Press and 
media work in these terms is very much the 'art of the possible'. To reject the implicit 
terms of the bargain is to risk marginalisation and a decreasing number of 
opportunities to present a union case in the public sphere. 
The majority of unions in this study chose to work on the inside; to accept the 
normative framework of exchange relations and the degree to which this implies an 
'incorporation' into the mainstream news encoding process. This is not to suggest that 
union press officers are either duped or bullied into submission. The union press 
officers in this study were mostly committed to the values of the mainstream within the 
labour movement and, on one level, they retained a critical view of the news media and 
the dominant ways in which labour news was framed and represented. And yet, just as 
a nlimber of labour correspondents were sympathetic to the values of the labour 
movement but tended to accept the practice of the news media as 'given', so many 
union press officers, in adopting a 'professional' approach, accepted the political 
geography of the news media as the 'given' landscape or external environment in which 
they had to get on with the job. And for both union press officers and correspondents 
dealing with unions, acknowledging the limited scope for explanation, the appetite for 
immediacy and the emphasis upon the individualised rather than collective nature of 
social experience, was all part and parcel of a 'professional' approach to media work. 
The following chapter examines the opportunities and constraints which are implied by 
such a 'professional approach' through a consideration of the national newspaper 
coverage of the 1989 Ambulance Dispute which has been frequently identified as a 
'model' for good union media work. What did the health unions achieve in terms of 
newspaper coverage and were there either any 'communication costs' or 'political 
costs'? 
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Chapter Nine 
Representations of Labour 
This chapter takes as a case study the national daily newspaper coverage of the 1989-90 
Ambulance Dispute. There are three reasons for selecting this example. Firstly, the 
dispute involved four of the unions selected for the study's panel (NALGO, COHSE, 
GMB and the T and G) and a fifth (NUPE), which was regularly identified by 
journalists and union press officers, interviewed for this study, as employing one of 
the best union press officers (Lynn Bryan). Secondly, the health unions' media and 
communication strategy during this dispute has been hailed as highly successful and an 
exemplar for other unions (Hutchings,1989; Woolas, 1990; Hi11,1993). If this view is 
accepted, then a case study of newspaper coverage of this campaign should provide an 
appropriate opportunity for the evaluation of the effectivity of co-ordinated union press 
work. Thirdly, the Ambulance Dispute was a landmark in the development of union 
communication strategies because for the first time unions co-ordinated their strategy to 
place media work at the centre, and to tailor industrial tactics to complement this 
priority. 
It is not the intention to provide a fully comprehensive analysis of news media 
coverage of this dispute. Neither, is it the intention to formally 'test' whether the use 
of public relations techniques 'works' in improving the image of trade unions in 
newspapers. Leaving aside the issue of what counts as 'positive' coverage, the term 
'testing' implies an exercise involving precise comparisons under controlled conditions, 
which are simply not available,- it is not possible to 'control' for the unfolding of 
-domestic news and world events. Even the most energetic and 'proactive' trade union 
press officer is at the mercy of news events. Thus, a carefully planned press ·cOnference 
to highlight the work of ambulance crews in disasters, planned by COHSE, can be 
wiped off the news pages by the publication of the findings of the inquiry into a 
disaster,- the railway accident at Clapham in South London. It is doubtful whether the 
most tightly designed research plan could effectively 'control' events such as these in a 
way which would allow direct and strict comparisons between union media strategies 
to be made. 
In addition, precise 'weightings' would be required for variables such as size of 
union, news media profile, the personality of the general secretary, structural 
positioning in the economy, proximity to the Labour Party, and recent levels of dispute 
activity, to mention only the most obvious potentially relevant factors. Rather than 
attempt to compact the complexity of this process within the constraints of a 
quantitative design, this section has the rather less ambitious objective of tracing the 
imprint of the unions' press and media work upon the contours of coverage, using a 
qualitative approach. A qualitative approach was more likely, it was assumed, to 
capture the nuances and inflections in the construction of stories (Berger,1991; 
GUMG,l980:xv; Burgelin, 1972;) which might constitute evidence of the success, or 
otherwise, of union strategies. 
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Union 'successes' in presenting their arguments and perspectives have to be 
assessed against the picture we have of industrial and union news coverage documented 
in earlier research. Briefly, then, the large body of research material on this theme will 
be critically summarised, in order to provide an indication of the extent to which 
newspaper coverage in the ambulance dispute departed from the familiar. 
Still Bad News? 
The broad conclusion drawn from the voluminous body of research in this area is, 
indeed, a familiar one. Unions suffer at the hands of the news media in a number of 
ways. In fact, the research literature, exploring patterns of coverage in Britain and the 
USA, suggested six ways in which trade unions are disadvantaged in news and current 
affairs content, though more recently 'revisionist' (Sparks, 1987) writing has challenged 
this interpretation. 
Firstly, as measured against a variety of 'benchmarks' (1), industrial relations 
coverage was likely to systematically distort the 'reality' of industrial relations and 
industrial conflict, in a way which undermined the standing of trade unions. Coverage, 
overall, was likely to be highly selective, dwelling upon particular industries to the 
exclusion of others (GUMG, 1976:ch 5; McQuail, 1977: 144); concentrating upon 
industrial disputes in certain 'high profile' sectors, rather than the most significant (as 
measured by official statistical data) (GUMG,l976:ch 5; Hartmann,l975; McQuail, 
1977:144); producing 'an overall skewing of the picture given of disputes in industry' 
(GUMG,1976: 169). While strikes were 'over-reported', industrial accidents were 
'under-reported' (GUMG,1980:400); the reality of the impact of industrial production 
upon the health of workers underplayed, the damage of workers' action upon 
companies overplayed (Parenti, 1986:85); the complexity of official economic and 
industrial data ignored and over-simplified (Griffiths,1977;Edwards,1979), so that 
'official figures from which a number of conclusions could have been drawn were used 
consistently to emphasise only one interpretation' (GUMG, 1980:49), hostile to a union 
perspective. The most recent research suggests that these patterns continue (Hutt,l987; 
Puette, 1992). 
Secondly, a 'hierarchy of access' (GUMG, 1980: 162) differentially filtered and 
controlled the frequency with which the key actors in the industrial arena secured 
opportunities to present their cases. The 'definitions of the powerful' (Hall, 1973) were 
likely to predominate in news coverage because both on television (GUMG, 1980:ch 5) 
and in newspapers (Hartmann, 1975), government and state representatives and 
members of the elite of the trade union movement enjoyed significantly greater access 
than either employers or ordinary trade unionists. The 'invisibility' of management and 
employers was a feature remarked upon by McQuail (1977:145) and confirmed in the 
other main studies (this does not necessarily imply that perspectives and organising 
frameworks sympathetic to employers were absent, as discussed below). Rank and file 
trade union perspectives tended to be marginalised (Downing, 1980:43-44). More recent 
research, again, suggests that differential access continues to disadvantage 'ordinary' 
trade unionists (Puette,l992:36-39), though one study of British breakfast television 
found an even narrower focus simply upon trade union leaders, as the principal figures 
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in industrial conflict with relatively few appearances even for government 
representatives (Hutt,l987). And even within the narrow category of the 'trade union 
elite', news values continue to direct news media attention exclusively towards a 
smaller group of 'high profile' leaders (GUMG,l980:105; Jones etal,l985:23-26; 
Puette, 1992:3 2-3 3). 
Thirdly, following from this last point, the range of themes and issues developed in 
industrial and labour coverage reflected a narrow set of concerns. There was, both in 
print (Hartmann,l975; McQuail,l977; TUC,l979a) and broadcasting media (GUMG, 
1976:202-4; Puette, 1992:35-39), an overwhelming preoccupation with industrial 
conflict, particularly of the kind which inconvenienced the general public; issues where 
trade unions had formulated constructive policy positions (for example, on investment 
in new technology, health and safety, links between industries and communities, etc) 
were much less likely to attract media attention (Philo and Hewitt, 1976; 
Parenti, 1986:80; Puette, 1992:36). Within the coverage of industrial conflict, itself, the 
range of issues explored was consistently narrow in focus; the 'event-orientation' of the 
news media producing a concentration upon the immediate and visible effects of 
industrial action, rather than either the more complex causes, usually not amenable to 
discussion within an 'event-oriented' framework (GUMG,l976:ch 7; Hartmann 1975; 
Morley,l976; Downing, 1980:35-39) or the eventual resolution of disputes 
(TUC,l979a:26). 
The concentration upon events and effects, rather than contexts and underlying 
explanations for industrial disputes, is a widely recognised feature of news media 
coverage, noted by researchers from a variety of theoretical positions. The 
interpretation of the significance of these features is rather more contentious. McQuail, 
for example, studiously eschewed the opportunity to make inferences about 'bias'. 
However, lie did comment that 'national daily newspapers are very similar in their 
selection and treatment of news', and that 'the "point of balance" ... on matters of 
controversy ... does not lie equally between the two "sides" of industry' (1977:147), 
unions being placed at a disadvantage. As McQuail recognised, the recurring nature of 
coverage and the correspondence in the themes highlighted between newspapers of 
divergent political orientation,- a feature noted by Hartmann (1976) too- could be 
interpreted in rather different ways, both as a measure of the extent to which newspaper 
reports are free from the imprint of editorial partiality, or as evidence of a common 
ideological structure ( 1977: 146). 
However, McQuail did not pursue, to any great extent, the nature of the 
correspondence between newspapers from different political stables or the detail of the 
common underlying assumptions which organised the coverage. In noting the "point of 
balance" being located in a position which disadvantaged unions, he was reluctant to 
pursue the analysis developed by the Glasgow University Media Group who argued that 
their evidence revealed a 'world view' in journalistic practice, a set of underlying 
assumptions or 'inferential frames', through which the world of industry and the 
workplace was represented. Such frames pre-structured news material so that only 
particular 'interpretations' were rendered plausible. Thus, the various causes of 
inflation were consistently conflated as 'wage push' inflation; problems of low 
productivity in the car industry were persistently associated with labour indiscipline 
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rather than other factors, such as under-investment; problems of conflict around the 
workplace normally placed in the context of social order and threats to the legitimate 
role of the state in maintaining cohesion, rather than in terms of the sources of 
grievance (GUMG,l976:ch 7; GUMG,l980;ch 1). Morley (1976) presented a very 
similar analysis of the underlying, taken for granted assumptions, organising selection 
and presentation. The result is that media coverage rarely makes visible the industrial 
status quo or the underlying relations of power which structure workplace relations; the 
'logic and priorities of the social and economic order thus remain unchallenged' 
(GUMG, 1980: 112). 
More recent research suggests that such underlying assumptions about the nature of 
the industrial world and the workplace continue to organise coverage. Puette finds 
much of the general coverage of industry and workplace relations constructed from a 
'class biased economic perspective' (1992:44). Puette's analysis of the 1990 West 
Virginia Coal Strike, for example, points to a series of notable parallels with coverage 
of the 1984/85 Coal Strike in the United Kingdom. The underlying strike issues were 
quickly obscured as the news agenda shifted towards the problems of violence; 
important legal and tactical distinctions between forms of industrial action were rarely 
highlighted (an important issue for the 1989/90 Ambulance dispute, too), and 'the 
problems of the industry' were presented in a way which privileged the analysis of 
management (the threat of international competition necessitating greater labour 
productivity and leaner workforces), and failed to acknowledge the alternative analysis 
developed by the United Mineworkers of America (1992:ch 7). The practice of some 
U.S. newspapers in assigning their police reporters to cover labour news, represents an 
organisational acknowledgement of these underlying news frames (Puette,1992:64). 
Fourthly, quantitative analysis can map out the broad 'contours of coverage' 
(GUMG;1976) which delimit the 'interpretative frames' organising news content but, 
in contrast to McQuail (1977) who restricted analysis to the manifest and quantifiable, 
a number of researchers have taken the view that in order to describe how such frames 
actually work as ideological mechanisms, it is necessary to explore the qualitative 
dimension of language, image and textual devices (headlines, boundary markers, the 
arrangement of material, etc). For the Glasgow team, for example, the slippery way in 
which 'stoppage' and 'strike' were conflated (GUMG,1980:154), the coupling of wage 
restraint with 'reasonable' (1980:70), or the classification of information in an opening 
sentence as 'good news', 'bad', or 'troubling', all illustrated the surface manifestations 
of the underlying 'inferential frame'. Similarly, language which juxtaposes union action 
against the 'normality' of routine life (Easthope, 1990: 110-111 ), or contrasts normal 
working with the 'chaos' of strike periods (Morely,1976), or selectively classifies 
behaviour between the militant and the moderate, (Hartmann,l976; Morely,l976), is 
identified as a key mechanism in the ideological representation of trade unionism. 
Headlines both in newspapers (Puette,1992:ch 4; Walsh,l988:208) and television 
(Easthope,1990; Hutt,1987; GUMG,1980:140-144) are regarded as offering particular 
frames for the understanding of events; the organisation and sequencing of material can 
suggest particular contexts and associations between themes whilst obscuring others 
(GUMG,1980:147-160). The routine use of taken for granted phrases ('the miners' 
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strike), assign responsibility for conflict and disruption firmly to organised labour 
(Jones et a1,1985:23). 
Fifthly, the overall consequence of the particular use of language, photographs, 
headlines and other symbolic elements in labour and industrial reporting, according to 
the critical research tradition, is to imply a 'differential legitimacy' (Hartmann,1975) 
between the main parties in labour and industrial reporting. A variety of symbolic cues, 
weaken the authority of unions in presenting their case and the 'event orientation' of 
news coverage limits exploration of underlying processes, which often inform the 
rationale of a union position. At the same time, while management and employer 
representatives appear less frequently both in print and broadcasting media, this is often 
because their perspectives and working assumptions are taken as 'starting points' for 
the interpretation of events (Walton and Davis,1977:129). For Easthope a 'hierarchy of 
realism' is constructed, a function of journalists' commitment to 'objectivity', which 
distinguishes between the dominant 'impartial' news text and the inadequate, 'partial 
knowledge' offered by trade unionists. A variety of devices within the dominant 
'mastering' discourse make it clear that the partiality of trade union perspectives 
renders them suspect (Easthope,1990:112-113). The identification of union sources as 
partial (and therefore suspect) 'advocates', rather than 'arbiters' (Deacon and 
Go1ding,1994:15-16) is made quite explicit. In contrast, sources associated with the 
state are much less likely to be subordinated in this hierarchy and more frequently may 
serve as 'the factual basis for industrial coverage' (Hutt,1988:94; Hartmann, 1975). It 
is for these reasons, that it is argued that while news coverage may be 'balanced' in 
terms of the acknowledgement of competing views, it may yet still be 'ideological' in 
the sense that only one account is accorded authority within the text (Puette, 1992:130-
132;Easthope, 1990: 114; GUMG, 1980:403-407). 
For this critical research tradition, then, the final conclusion drawn, which is 
reflected as strongly in the recent work (Hutt,1987; Walsh,1988; and Easthope,l990) 
as much as in the earlier and more familiar research, is that the news coverage is 
constructed from a set of implicit assumptions about the nature of the industrial and 
political world, which confine the activity of 'legitimate' trade unionism to a limited 
and mainly non-adversarial role. Perspectives which describe the rationale for union 
organisation in terms of inherent conflicts within workplace relations only infrequently 
appear, and are likely to be represented as beyond the sphere of legitimate political 
discourse. Such underlying assumptions or 'inferential frames' accept 'uncritically 
narrow consensus views of the nature of strikes in particular and the realities of 
industrial life in our economic system' (GUMG,1980:400). Rather than being 
understood as a response to situations of inherent conflict, unions are portrayed as 
sources of conflict in otherwise 'naturally' harmonious conditions (Puette, 1992:154-
155; Morely,1976:250). In this way an opposition is established between reasonable, 
consensually bounded behaviour and the pursuit of sectional minority interests 
(Morely, 1976), or, the 'national interest' and 'trade union action' (Easthope, 1990). 
It is important to note that for most of these researchers, the explanation does not 
lie in deliberate media bias. On the contrary, the source of these forms of 
representation lies in the 'routine cultural practices' (Walton and Davis,l977: 133) of 
news media personnel. As Hartmann argues, there are good reasons why news 
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coverage is likely to dwell upon conflict rather than the routine in industrial relations, 
given the nature of news values and the imperatives of the news room 
(Hartmann,l975:7). Given the general orientation of the national news media towards 
Westminister and government, it is hardly surprising if labour and industrial copy 
reflects a similar preoccupation (Hartmann,l976:2/54). In other words, rather than 
assessing evidence of bias, the search for an explanation of such patterns in content 
'must go much deeper ..• ', to consider the 'basic assumptions with which news is 
produced' (Philo et al,l977:4-5). These assumptions, according to the critical research 
tradition, produce a 'cultural skewdness' (GUMG,1980:401) in news coverage which 
disadvantages labour and presents a 'picture of the world which is such as to assist in 
the reproduction of the relations of domination existing in society' (Sparks, 1987:370). 
Rise of the 'Revisionists' 
As is well known, the critical tradition is not without its own critics both academic and 
from within journalism (Skirrow, 1980). During the 1980s, 'a new wave of revisionist 
writing' (Sparks,l987:370), developed a body of research findings which explicitly 
challenged the work of the Glasgow team, and by implication much of the remaining 
work in the critical tradition. 
Some of the criticisms developed by such 'revisionist' writing are well made. 
However, for the purposes of this study, what is important about these approaches 
(Anderson and Sharrock,l979; Hetherington,l985; Harrison,l985; Cumberbatch et al, 
1986) is that they illustrate the extent to which the 'imperatives' and taken for granted 
assumptions of journalism can become entangled in debates over the nature of 
coverage. A further point to emerge from the engagement between the 'revisionists' 
and the critical tradition, is the importance of going beyond quantitative analysis in any 
search of news content for evidence of contested agendas or struggles around political 
definition and meaning. 
Firstly, the problem of distortion in coverage. The difficulties in attempting to 
measure media representations against 'bench mark' measures of 'reality', such as 
official statistics, are well known (3). In Harrison's attempt to rebut the early Glasgow 
work, a critique is developed which rests upon the 'legitimacy' of mainstream news 
values and journalistic practice. It is unreasonable to expect the news media to provide 
a faithful representation of the Department of Employment's statistical series; media 
coverage is inevitably selective and, if that is the case, then the criteria employed by 
journalists, - the size and impact of disputes upon the general public, their political 
significance, etc, -are as good as any others (1985:33-41). In these terms, some strikes 
are simply more newsworthy than others. Further to this, Harrison argues, media 
coverage has to be assessed in the context of the organisational imperatives of news 
production, constraints of time, limitations of format, and so on (1985:39-43). These 
imply the necessity of selectivity and impose 'inevitable' constraints upon the depth of 
explanation which can be provided. Thus, to identify 'pay' as a frequent cause of 
disputes is not to over-simplify but to provide a reasonable account, given the 
circumstances in which news coverage is produced (1985:40-42). Similarly, the 
tendency to dwell upon leading personalities, rather than 'ordinary' figures is 
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explicable in terms of conventional news values and journalists' practice 
(Harrison, 1985:66; Hetherington, 1985: 182). 
Indeed, the 'revisionist' approach questions whether there actually is any other way 
of presenting the news. One of the central thrusts of the critical position is that in being 
driven by events, and in failing to provide substantial consideration of underlying 
processes or 'causes', the activity of trade unionists is represented as irrational. 
Harrison, however, insists in his re-interpretation of the Glasgow evidence, that 
'causes' are mentioned frequently in news reports (1985:53). A great deal depends 
upon the distinction between 'cause' and 'explanation' here; classifying one strike as a 
'pay dispute', another as a 'dispute over conditions' is hardly to discuss 'underlying 
reasons', as Harrison concedes (1985:59). Nevertheless, for Harrison the 'bare bones' 
of labour stories were covered in the ITN coverage he re-examines (1985:67); ITN did 
'what can be reasonably expected of a popular medium .. .' (1985:68), this represented 
'a reasonable compromise' (1985:66), given the resource and format constraints. 
Similarly, Cumberbatch in analysing coverage of the Coal Strike, agrees that 
'throughout the strike there was a tendency for the news to emphasise the conduct of 
the strike - the epiphenomenon of union ballots, talks and negotiations and picketing 
violence- rather than the causes of the dispute' (1986:135). However, for 
Cumberbatch, 'this is hardly surprising given the event driven nature of news' 
(1986: 135). 
The Glasgow team are taken to task for demanding the impossible. How 
'thoroughly', asks Harrison, can a limited news report explore underlying causes? The 
Glasgow team appear to be imposing standards of thoroughness in detail and 
explanation which are derived from their own ideological positions, rather than from an 
adequate understanding of television as a news medium (1985:68). Cumberbatch, again 
assuming the dominant conventions of television representation as given, argues that 
inadequacies in depth of explanation in news reports can be compensated for in current 
affairs programming (1986: 136). However, Anderson and Sharrock go further, 
suggesting that research which charts the absence of underlying analysis in news media 
coverage, represents no more than the complaint that journalists do not interpret the 
world like sociologists. To insist that deeper or more thorough accounts of events 
should be provided is merely 'to show that the media do not accept the same theories 
that are presently ... fashionable within sociology (1979:372). Underpinning this latter 
view is an early manifestation of a fashionable relativism which logically implies the 
abandonment of all bench marks against which to measure news coverage and, by 
implication, all efforts to hold news media accountable,- a position powerfully 
criticised in recent contributions (Philo,l990:194-195; Eldridge,l993). 
Now the assumption underpinning this study is that research which demonstrates the 
absence of particular explanations in labour and industrial reporting makes a valuable 
contribution because it allows us to map the relative success of the various social 
groups seeking to secure access as sources in the arena of labour and industrial news, 
and to the extent that such research identifies systematic patterns of 'success' or 
'failure', it provides important clues regarding the distribution of material and symbolic 
power. However, for Harrison, the extent to which the Glasgow teams' fmdings can be 
explained in terms of the routine practice of journalism and the constraints of the news 
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production process, he has succeeded in refuting the view that news content is 'biased' 
or 'skewed'. Critics (Eiliott,l981), of course, have pointed to ambiguities in the way 
the Glasgow team explain their findings,- either through an 'instrumental' conspiracy 
model or a version of the dominant ideology thesis (Goodwin,l990) (4). Harrison 
equates 'bias • with intent and appears to assume that in demonstrating that news format 
and production routine, rather than intent, can explain the contours of industrial 
coverage, the Glasgow critique falls 
One immediate point to make is that it is a mistake to under-estimate the 
determining influence of production routines and formats, in themselves, as recent 
research has demonstrated (Cottle,l993). An argument preoccupied only with the 
concept of conscious bias, misses the point that formats, production routines and news 
values, in themselves may produce dominant news frames which highlight particular 
interpretations, rather than others. Examples of conscious bias are probably quite rare. 
For example, as Goodwin comments, news values routinely direct journalists towards 
negativity or 'bad news' rather than 'good news', which explains why not only trade 
unionists but Conservative ministers complain about 'bias' (Goodwin,l990:57). And 
these features of news production are, in turn, related to the political and economic 
context in which news production occurs, including associated power relationships 
(Elliott and Golding,l979; Murdock,l980 and 1982). Cumberbatch et al acknowledge 
that 'bias' may be generated through production routine and format, as well as intent, 
and yet still imply that an approach 'sensitive to the vicissitudes of journalism' (Brown 
et al,l987:383) provides the key to understanding content rather than an approach 
which places the ideological nature of coverage in the foreground. 
To pursue this further, it is important to explore the nature of the coverage in some 
depth; to ask questions about the more subtle ways in which 'differential legitimacy' 
between actors and social groups may be suggested. This, in turn, is likely to require a 
qualitative consideration of language and imagery, which the 'revisionists' are reluctant 
to pursue. Instead, they consider the concept of balance which can be assessed in 
quantitative terms. If the Glasgow team and other critical research points to a 
systematic imbalance in the attribution of responsibility for social conflict and in the 
access afforded to different social actors and different perspectives, the 'revisionist' 
project involves seeking to demonstrate that, within reasonable limits (as measured by 
public opinion), a less partisan reading of the evidence actually confirms that balance is 
achieved. Cumberbatch et al consider that their quantitative analysis of television 
coverage during the Coal Strike demonstrates that 'balance was usually achieved' 
between 'the main political voices of government and opposition, NUM and NCB' 
(1986: 135). They concede that the 'balance of ideas was less evident' but insist that 
inadequacies in 'internal balance', here, were compensated by the external balance 
achieved through current affairs coverage (1986: 136). For Cumberbatch et al, then, 
balance is primarily achieved internally and numerically, through the representation of 
the elite groups within mainstream politics and the key elite figures involved in the 
conflict. The criteria for a 'balance in ideas' appear to be rather looser and are given 
less weight. 
One of the ways in which Harrison tries to refute the Glasgow thesis is by 
demonstrating that ITN news coverage achieved balance in reflecting the range of 
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perspectives and types of understanding within the political mainstream (1985:63-68). 
For Harrison, assessment of balance can only be made with reference to the perceptions 
of the audience and the range of political perspectives shared by a majority of the 
public. This view is adopted as a methodological principle by Cumberbatch et al, who 
compare television coverage of the Coal Strike with data gathered from their own 
survey of public opinion. What other benchmark is available with which to assess 
balance? The range of political perspectives shared by media researchers is clearly 
unsatisfactory as a benchmark. And yet, assuming for one moment that such a thing 
exists, how can 'the shop floor view', for example, actually be gauged by journalists 
(Harrison,l985:63)? Cumberbatch et al, in response to criticism, deny establishing a 
'hierarchy of credibility' with opinions drawn from their survey of the Castleford 
mining village at the bottom (Brown et al,l987:383) but, nonetheless, it is clear that 
these perspectives are not included in the equation when the assessment of 'balance' is 
ultimately calculated in their research. They, too, implicitly equate balance with the 
range of views associated with the political elites of the main parliamentary parties. 
A Critique of the Revisionist Critique 
The 'revisionist' critique is on strong ground in pointing to the problematic nature of 
any exercise which involves assessing news content against alternative 'interpretations' 
of events. The critique is less convincing in implying that media researchers face a 
stark choice between bench marks derived from opinion poll surveys or summaries of 
the political agenda offered by mainstream Westminster politics, on the one hand, and a 
set of arbitrary and idiosyncratic perspectives held by media researchers, on the other. 
Though the Glasgow work could be clearer on this issue, it is important to remember 
that their benchmark for assessing economic coverage, for example, was not wholly 
arbitrary but drawn from an extensive analysis,- 'the alternative economic strategy',-
which enjoyed substantial support within the labour movement and elsewhere, 
including parliament (London CSE Group,l980). This may have been a partial view 
but it was a partial view which carried very significant political weight and it is 
legitimate to ask questions regarding the extent to which it was 'represented' in news 
reporting. 
What this really points to is the importance of assessing the range of news sources 
and the nature of the agendas which each seeks to present in conjunction with content 
research. Connell (1980) is quite right to point out that the news media cannot be 
expected to represent every diverse viewpoint in news coverage. At the same time, it is 
entirely possible that the range of views and agendas, enjoying substantial political 
support, extends beyond the bounds of Westminster politics. As is now recognised in 
the work of Schlesinger et al (1991), Schlesinger and Tumber (1995), Anderson 
(1993), and others, a consideration of the range of social groups active in a news media 
arena and the agendas which they may seek to present, can inform the analysis and 
assessment of content. This helps to anticipate the danger of the idiosyncratic reading 
of the news media. A familiar criticism of the Glasgow work is their failure to 
supplement their analysis of content with a sustained investigation of news production 
(Anderson and Sharrock,l979:373;Elliott,l981; Cottle,l993:9) while Harrison points 
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to their relative neglect of the 'media work' undertaken by trade unions and employers 
(1985:ch 4). Much the same point, however, could be applied to the 'revisionist 
critique', itself. Both Hetherington and Cumberbatch et al' s work might have been all 
the richer for an empirical investigation of the competing news sources 'media work' 
during the Coal Strike. 
Secondly, as Sparks (1987:373) notes, there are few good grounds for assuming that 
a majority or consensual interpretation of events should always be privileged as 'more 
objective'. Thirdly, as Sparks argues, 'balance' is too often equated with 'impartiality' 
in the 'revisionist critique' (1987:375). And yet, of course, 'biased' accounts can be 
perfectly 'balanced' and this, in turn , returns the debate to the status of qualitative 
analysis. There are good grounds for supposing that the mechanisms which may 
produce an ideological construction, even within a 'balanced' text, are not always 
conveniently arranged in discrete and quantifiable categories on the manifest level. The 
ways in which language, lay out, headline, ordering, photographs and imagery, 
interplay to produce a 'representation' are not necessarily amenable to content analysis. 
Harrison and Cumberbatch are sceptical of the value of qualitative analysis. Harrison is 
particularly scathing about the Glasgow case study material and Cumberbatch et al tie 
their colours to the mast of 'scientific empiricism' (1986:9), which they appear to 
assume excludes qualitative work. Even where their own work cries out for an 
extended qualitative discussion (coverage of the notorious Orgreave incidents during the 
84/85 Coal Strike), they step back from the brink, choosing not 'to become bogged 
down in semiotic analysis of individual bulletins' (1986:73). This is unfortunate 
because as Philo argues (1988), their almost exclusively quantitative design does 
demonstrate the limitations of content analysis, as well as some of its strengths. 
Frequency does not always measure significance; some of the key mechanisms for 
organising the meaning of coverage lay in the interplay of language and image, not the 
frequency with which particular themes, personalities or 'tendentious verbs' 
(Cumberbatch et al,1986: 105) occur. There is a problem in focusing upon 'the words 
that are used rather the meanings which are conveyed' (Philo,1990:164). Most 
importantly, generic categories such as 'picketing violence' or 'talks and negotiations' 
are efficient coding categories but tell us little about the interpretative frameworks 
within which such politically significant episodes during the Coal Strike, were placed 
(Philo, 1988:517-518). 
It is unlikely that categories defined for the purposes of coding and quantitative 
generalisation will be sufficiently sensitive to the mechanisms through which a 
'differential legitimacy' (Hartmann,1975) between social groups is achieved, or one 
'dominant interpretation' (Philo,1990:169) secured. This is particularly important when 
one considers the distinction between 'balance' and 'bias'. As Philo argues, during the 
Coal Strike, it was clear that journalists did try to produce balanced coverage in the 
representation of viewpoints, but it was also possible to describe in qualitative terms, 
the way in which journalists' underlying assumptions shaped reporting in such a way 
that particular 'preferred meanings' were privileged in the news text (1990:170-171). 
In the Cumberbatch et al study, there is a frequent failure to think through the political 
and ideological significance of the coding categories which are employed to describe 
content. Thus, as Sparks shows, Cumberbatch et al' s very own frequency counts 
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demonstrate the dominance of 'law and order' issues in television coverage during the 
Coal Strike and the relative infrequency of occasions in which television dealt with 
'economic and social issues' (Sparks,l987:376), ~the sorts of issues which the NUM 
would have wished to highlight. 
Summazy 
Critics have pointed to a number of other weaknesses in the 'revisionist' case. 
Harrison' s failure to draw upon more than typed pre-broadcast scripts of ITN coverage 
rather than the video material actually used by the Glasgow team presents obvious 
difficulties (5). Harrison sometimes employs a 'sleight of hand' in swapping units of 
enumeration to refute the Glasgow case (6). He is guilty of several of the charges he 
levels at the Glasgow team in ignoring contrary evidence and selectively organising his 
material (Collins, 1986). There are further inconsistencies between the concluding 
section of the Cumberbatch et al study, and the evidence supplied in the main body of 
the report (Philo,l988). However, the most important conclusions to be drawn from 
this discussion concern the concepts of balance, bias, and the status of qualitative work. 
Balance does not ensure impartiality. It is a key organising principle around which 
journalists plan their information gathering strategies and through which they construct 
their copy. In terms of day to day routine, it is a rational strategy for coping with the 
imperatives of news production (Tuchman,l977). At the same time, balance is not 
necessarily equivalent either to impartiality or ideological neutrality. As a concept it is 
deeply embedded in the taken for granted assumptions or inferential frameworks which 
underpin the practice of journalism. In organising 'balanced' copy, journalists 
implicitly draw distinctions between mainstream and marginal news sources; between 
'commonly agreed' and 'extreme' political perspectives; between established, 
legitimate agendas salient to 'public opinion' and 'minority concerns'. This is why 
arguments preoccupied by intentional bias so often miss the mark. It is the 'bias' which 
occurs through the underlying and routine assumptions informing news gathering and 
the organisation of copy , rather than arising from intentional partiality, which is most 
important. 
And what is clear from the present study, is the extent to which in order to be 
'successful', union press officers have to embrace the same underlying assumptions and 
inferential frames. Union press officers frequently depend upon the organising principle 
of 'balance' to open up opportunities to insert a union response or encode elements of 
a union agenda. The exchange relationships between union officers and industrial 
correspondents depended upon a set of common understandings not only about what 
made 'good' copy but also about how it should be organised and described. Whilst 
often retaining quite distinct political orientations, to be regarded as 'professional' by 
journalists, union press officers had to acknowledge the priority of these elements in 
their work. In this context, Connell (1980) is quite right to insist that ideas and 
language are not imposed from above, as he believes the Glasgow team assume. He 
points out that 'ordinary' trade unionists frequently employ the language and ideas 
which the Glasgow team regard as 'culturally skewed'. In the case of union press 
officers, at least, to successfully engage with the dominant agencies of cultural 
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reproduction, it is necessary to employ particular ways of describing and particular 
frameworks for understanding and, to a degree, these become 'working assumptions' 
for both union officers and correspondents engaged in the production of labour news. 
In this sense, dominant frames and perspectives are 'shared'. 
The extent to which such a process of cultural incorporation occurs is likely to vary 
from issue to issue and will depend upon specific circumstances, - the position of the 
trade union, the type of news media, the disposition of public opinion and the political 
interests of the state, etc. What is clear is that to assess the extent to which trade unions 
have to make compromises in terms of language and agendas, or the extent to which 
they can exploit the conventions of journalism, such as 'balance', in order to secure 
news media 'successes' is an empirical but largely qualitative exercise. There are 
significant dangers in loading too great a theoretical weight upon slender qualitative 
foundations (Elliott, 1981) but, nevertheless, quantitative coding can only describe 
broad 'contours of coverage'. It is insufficiently sensitive to assess union successes in 
combating mechanisms conferring 'differential legitimacy' or in promoting alternative 
'preferred readings'. 
The Health Unions and the Research Tradition 
The critical research tradition, then, points to a number of potential difficulties which 
were likely to confront the health unions but also underlines the point that the balance 
of their successes and failures will be best assessed through the qualitative dimension of 
news content, rather than in purely quantitative aggregates. 
Clearly a protracted dispute involving ambulances and 'life saving' medical teams 
was likely to attract intensive media interest, given the nature of the conflict oriented 
news values documented in the research, and particularly if emergency services to the 
public were affected. Such a dispute was likely to offer 'drama', 'human interest', 
'conflict' and could be constructed in terms of event-oriented news frames. The unions' 
case was, not unusually, a complex one involving a number of technical arguments 
regarding pay and the terms of the existing agreement,- detail which was crucial to 
their case but which failed to meet the criteria of mainstream news values or the 
requirements of the main news frames. Given the contours of coverage documented by 
the critical research tradition, it was likely that the rationale for the union case would 
be obscured in news material by a concentration upon the immediate and particular 
consequences of industrial action. This was an especially sharp danger given the 
tendency of the news media to 'frame' disputes in terms of previously established news 
themes (GUMG,l976: eh 7) and the potential parallels to be drawn with the coverage 
of the 1979 'Winter of Discontent' (TUC,1979a). 
Another problem for the health unions was that in taking action against their 
employers, the regional Ambulance Services, they were also inevitably going to involve 
the government and the Minister of Health, Kenneth Clarke. The 'hierarchy of access' 
identified by the critical research tradition was likely to privilege sources representing 
the powerful, with the state enjoying, at least the potential capacity, to act as a primary 
definer, even if recent research offers some hope for subordinate groups challenging 
such primary definitions (Schlesinger,l990;Anderson,1993). Kenneth Clarke, himself, 
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was a 'good media performer' and there was a potential, given the government's 'arms 
length' relationship with the Ambulance Services, for the minister to present himself as 
a neutral 'arbiter', rather than active player or advocate (Deacon and 
Golding,1994:15). It was important for the health unions to embroil the minister 
politically, and to place the dispute in the context of the government's tight public 
spending limits, as quickly as possible. 
The likely challenge facing the health unions was not a matter of 'merely' correcting 
conscious 'bias'. Rather, if the critical research tradition is correct in emphasising the 
significance of underlying assumptions in shaping the practices of journalists, then the 
perspectives of the health unions were likely to be treated with a 'differential 
legitimacy', which positioned them at a disadvantage. The health unions, therefore, 
faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they might refuse to compromise the integrity of 
the messages they sought to present to the news media and, by implication, challenge 
some of the underlying assumptions governing journalists' practice. The danger of such 
'high risk' strategies is illustrated by the experience of the NUM during the 1984/85 
Coal Strike and the consequences of the widening gulf which emerged between the 
perspectives and expectations of Nell Myers, the union press officer, and those of 
labour and industrial correspondents. The NUM experienced considerable difficulty in 
making any in-roads into a news agenda increasingly shaped by the government and the 
NCB, as the strike wore on (Jones et al,1985; Jones,1986; Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989). On the other hand, the health unions might choose to accept the 
dominant underlying assumptions and 'inferential frames' of the news media as given. 
The task would then be to find ways in which these could be harnessed to communicate 
important elements of the union message, albeit within the inevitable constraints 
imposed by conventional news values and frames. 
The Health Unions' Strate~ 
Following difficulties experienced in attempting to co-ordinate the media work in the 
1988 multi-union nurses dispute, it was agreed by all five unions involved in the 
Ambulance dispute that a greater degree of central control had to be exerted. In 
contrast to the earlier nurses' dispute, where the autonomy of local branches had 
resulted in a confusion of duplicated and conflicting 'days of action' involving different 
branches from different unions, the character and tradition of the ambulance service 
helped because ambulance workers were already familiar with an organisational 
strategy which emphasised central control and hierarchical discipline. The Ambulance 
Service was smaller and 'almost militaristic in the way it worked' (7). Integration of 
the efforts of each union was facilitated by the fact that three of the five were already 
deep in merger negotiations. 
It was recognised from the outset that an open confrontation with employers and the 
government, involving strike action, was unlikely to succeed because by 1989, the 
employment laws regulating industrial action imposed very severe constraints and, in 
any case, the union leaderships were uncertain that their memberships had sufficient 
appetite for strike action given their roles as members of the emergency services 
(Hill, 1993). The dispute, then, was one of the first to identify public opinion as the 
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main lever with which to exert pressure, and to position this, rather than industrial 
action, as the cornerstone of the dispute strategy. The news media were to become the 
main arena for engagement. Given this plan, it was believed essential that the unions 
did their utmost to avoid the application of news frames drawn from the 1979 'Winter 
of Discontent' and for this reason, the leaderships actively discouraged calls for strike 
action. As Lynn Bryan, NUPE press officer commented: 
'Industrial coverage tends to concentrate on the effects of 
a dispute, rather than on the causes ... so the one thing 
we couldn't do was go on all-out strike.' (Hill,l993). 
This was to be a dispute without strikes and, instead, the intention was to generate the 
maximum publicity around an overtime ban which, the unions could justifiably claim, 
should not affect emergency services. In this way, it was hoped, the high public 
standing of the Ambulance Service could be preserved. As Bob Abberly, the COHSE 
officer given responsibility for parliamentary lobbying during the dispute, argued, it 
was possible to transform the memberships' reluctance to strike into the unions' 
'greatest strength', providing this theme was carefully represented to the news media 
(Hill, 1993). 
The five unions involved agreed a common set of objectives for media work and a 
division of labour for media and lobbying activity, which was designed to ensure that 
all five unions spoke with one public voice. The NUPE press officer, Lynn Bryan, was 
given responsibility for day to day work with journalists; Roger Poole, also of NUPE, 
was chosen to present the 'public face' of the union at press conferences and in 
broadcasting interviews, and two officers at COHSE, Bob Amberely and Charlotte 
Atkins, concentrated upon political campaigning at Westminster. Mary McGuire and 
staff within NALGO's press and publicity department contributed to the development 
of the communications strategy and provided the 'back room' support. The division of 
labour was widely regarded as a successful arrangement by union staff and journalists, 
at least in the early stages of the dispute. Lynn Bryan commanded considerable respect 
amongst industrial correspondents (8) and Roger Poole rapidly became an accomplished 
'media performer'. 
'Roger was very good ... he avoided ranting. He's a new 
style of officer, he had the right kind of image and came over 
as a reasonable kind of bloke ... Clarke [Secretary of State for 
Health] had this image of being a sort of thug, where as Roger 
came across as this sweet-natured trade union official' (9). 
According to Bryan and McGuire, the aim was to identify a limited number of 
uncomplicated themes to offer to the news media at every opportunity (10). Most 
importantly, these themes were to be wrapped within the image of essential 
reasonableness and moderation, as personified by Roger Poole,- 'all suit and selfless 
sincerity' (Hill,l993). In contrast to the union priorities of the 1984-85 Coal Strike, 
access for journalists to both Roger Poole and Lynn Bryan was prioritised above all 
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else, particularly as other union officers were instructed not to comment and to refuse 
all other temptations which the broadcasting media might offer. The press officers from 
each union conferred on a daily basis to review media strategy and confirm a common 
news agenda: 
'It was marvellous operation, being able to present our case 
with a united front. The press weren't able to put a playing 
card between us and this was a conscious strategy worked 
out by the press officers at each union.' (11) 
At first, the close lines of communication established between union press offices and 
local branches worked extremely well. Mary McGuire and Lynn Bryan were able to 
introduce correspondents to union members at local ambulance stations and a 
considerable number of reports and longer feature articles, examining the 'human 
angle' were generated as a result. Many of these were quite sympathetic in tone but 
more importantly, they allowed the unions to exercise some influence over the 
interpretative frameworks employed, as well as the evaluative elements (Deacon and 
Golding,l994:19). In other words, at the beginning at least, the health unions, partly 
through 'human angle' interviews with 'ordinary' ambulance workers, were able to 
explain and communicate some of the complexities of their case, without danger of 
their being obscured by other familiar interpretative frames, such as threats to the 
authority of the state or the 'inevitable' resource constraints of the NHS. 
However, in the later stages of the dispute, three factors began to undermine the 
effectiveness of the health unions media work, and these will be considered more fully 
below. Firstly , although wrong footed at first and unable to efficiently co-ordinate 
media work between the Ambulance Services, the chief executive of the NHS, Mr 
Duncan Nichol, and the Department of Health , eventually the government began to 
intervene more directly and more effectively. Secondly, as with any protracted dispute, 
the interest of the news media began to wane and as it did so, journalists searched for 
new angles, often not so suited to the purposes of presenting the health union 
arguments. And thirdly, the health unions themselves found it much harder to maintain 
the discipline both at local and national levels required to make the media strategy 
work. More militant branches pressed for tougher action and at a national level, the 
will to speak with one voice began to weaken; 
The Union Message 
In summarising the union preferred agenda, this study can draw upon the interviews 
conducted with trade union press officers, the analysis of union journals discussed in 
chapter three, and a number of contemporary newspaper and magazine articles. It is 
useful to distinguish between the elements of the agenda which were selected by the 
unions to highlight in their media work, and the evaluative contexts in which the unions 
hoped to present these elements. In making this distinction, the study draws upon 
Deacon and Gelding's distinction between two vectors or dimensions of communication 
and reception (Golding,l990:97; Deacon and Golding,1994:19). The health union task 
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was two-fold. One objective was to promote and communicate an interpretative 
framework which acknowledged 'facts' and information central to their argument. 
Here, the concern was to establish what the dispute was about,- what were the central 
issues. A second objective was to embed this interpretative framework in a positive 
evaluative context through its association with particular sets of symbols and cultural 
themes, rather than others. More specifically, as already discussed, the health unions 
recognised the temptation which the imagery of the 1979 'Winter of Discontent', a 
piece of powerful symbolic folklore regularly recycled by Conservative politicians, 
offered to journalists. The role of the Ambulance Service within the NHS offered 
alternative sets of symbols and themes with which to weave an evaluative context,-
ambulance staff as life-saving heroes, the notion of dedication to public service, etc -
and it was important that journalists were encouraged to embrace these, rather than the 
former. 
The basic elements which the unions hoped would be acknowledged as constituting 
the interpretative framework included the following. One aim was to emphasise the 
essential 'reasonableness' of the union_position; to underline their willingness to settle 
the dispute immediately through independent arbitration which, in turn, implied a 
reliance upon reasoned argument, rather than industrial muscle. Secondly, the unions 
wanted to place the issue of comparability with other emergency services, where pay 
was determined by an automatic cost of living formula, in the foreground. Whether or 
not the Ambulance Service should be regarded as a an 'emergency service' was 
disputed by the employers and government. Even at the beginning, the dispute actually 
hinged upon a number of rather complex issues revolving around the previous 
agreement in 1986 and subsequent changes in the pay of the emergency services 
relative to other health sector workers. Nevertheless, the union press officers (12) were 
keen to construct the union message around a limited number of simple propositions: 
(1) The unions are reluctantly taking action because the health service employers have 
offered only a 6.5% pay increase whilst inflation is running at over 8% and other 
groups of public sector workers have secured higher settlements. 
(2) The unions are seeking an automatic pay formula along the lines of those agreed for 
the fire and police services. Such formulae remove the need for conflict. 
(3) The previous settlement in 1986 offered comparability with the police and fire 
services but inflation and subsequent police and fire service awards have subsequently 
eroded the relative position of ambulance workers. 
( 4) The unions are not proposing to take strike action or to jeopardise emergency work. 
Part of the 1986 agreement placed a responsibility upon the employers to ensure that 
emergency cover, as opposed to routine ambulance work, was provided without 
reliance upon overtime working. In theory, then, an overtime ban should not affect 
emergency work, although the unions knew full well that in practice, given the 
restrictions on recruitment, the delivery of ambulance services (routine and emergency) 
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depended upon overtime being worked. In other words, the unions were seeking to 
exploit the employers failure to honour this aspect of the previous agreement. 
As described more fully below, the union 'keep it simple' strategy worked quite well in 
the early phases of the dispute. Many of the news items, particularly in the broadsheet 
papers, contained an account of the unions' position based upon three out of the four 
elements set out above. However, even at this stage, labour correspondents and news 
editors often appeared to regard the fourth proposition as too complex for inclusion. As 
a result, the important point that the unions' action could only be successful because the 
employers had failed to honour formal agreements on staffing levels was frequently 
missing from the newspaper coverage. 
Later as the dispute wore on, the unions found it increasingly difficult to contain the 
range of themes which began to interest journalists. The unions found that their 
capacity to control the range and complexity of the elements constituting the 
interpretative framework was undermined, as they became embroiled in issues relating 
to the way local branches organised working to rule. In the middle of the dispute, a 
highly complex argument erupted between management and unions over whether crews 
were being locked out of their stations. At this stage, the unions were forced to move 
away from their four element strategy but the complexity of technical detail involved in 
establishing evidence of lock outs, often proved impossible to compact into an 
appropriate news format. Towards the end of the dispute, the centralised system of 
control exerted by union leaderships weakened and a number of local branches began to 
escalate action towards full stoppages. Inevitably, at this point the unions preferred 
interpretative framework was obscured as news media interest became preoccupied with 
the prospects of an 'all out strike'. 
However, at the beginning, the unions also sought to embed these interpretative 
elements in a particular evaluative context. The intention was, as far as possible, to 
avoid the traditional symbolism and imagery associated with organised labour disputes 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. NUPE, in particular, still suffered from the symbolic 
legacy of the public sector cemetery workers' action in 1979. COHSE, too, was 
associated with 'militancy', perhaps in the mind of the public, and certainly in the 
memories of some senior medical correspondents (13),- again a legacy of the 1970s. 
Rather than allow these old and familiar associations to be resurrected, the unions 
hoped to supply symbolic materials which would encourage alternative evaluative 
contexts to be developed. For example, it is clear both from the analysis of the COHSE 
Journal in chapter three and the comments of the union press officers involved, that one 
objective was to 'feminise' (14) the dispute. Although, in 1984/85 women had been 
prominent in the Miners' Wives and Support Groups, the public memory of the Coal 
Strike and most other protracted disputes was of picket lines and expressions of 
collective masculine solidarity. 
The union journals are useful, here, in providing some indication of the unions' 
preferred evaluative contexts for the dispute. The COHSE Journal, as we have seen, 
carried very little 'agitational' material. Although the dispute lasted for over five 
months, there were very few items dealing with it in the COHSE Journals and there 
was an absence of photographs of picket lines, large crowds or images of traditional 
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union action. Instead, what discussion of the dispute there was emphasised the 
continuing sympathy of the public, the absence of violence, the 'responsible' approach 
of the crews, and in particular the involvement of women. The Journal frequently 
offered a new way of understanding union action which placed individuals rather than 
organised groups in the foreground. Thus, union action was de-coupled from the 
concept of masculine, collective power. NALGO' s 'Public Service', on the other hand, 
did give prominence to themes of traditional union activism and frequently deployed 
material to underline the suggestion that unions derived their strength, ultimately, from 
the potential to organise collectively (see chapter three). Nevertheless, even here there 
was emphasis upon the involvement of women as activists. 
In addition, 'Public Service' was frequently preoccupied with government under-
funding of the public sector and the damaging impact of government reforms. This 
provided another dimension to the evaluative context. It was in the interests of the 
health unions to encourage an association in the public mind between the Ambulance 
Dispute and wider public anxieties about funding and the future of the NHS. 
Furthermore, the character of Kenneth Clarke, already 'personified' government policy 
on the NHS, a point not missed by the union journals which had frequently 
'personalised' issues around Clarke's stewardship of the health service. In written 
comment and a number of cartoons, Clarke had been portrayed as both a bully and a 
Scrouge-like slasher of public funding. 
Through developing close relations with local branches, the union press officers 
hoped to sensitise journalists to these evaluative contexts. Interviews with local crews 
and visits to local stations, allowed journalists to 'individualise' (Cottle,l993:79) 
reports with human interest angles. In contrast to the images of massed picketing and 
assembled crowds, characteristic of many earlier national disputes, many news items in 
the ambulance dispute did, indeed, reflect a different context. Interviews with, for 
example, women ambulance workers strnggling to bring up families on under £10,000 
a year provided copy which was difficult to insert into the dominant news frames of 
earlier conflicts. Ambulance crews frequently made effective advocates and news 
angles which concentrated upon their working environments and daily routines, 
permitted the placing of the some of the technical detail necessary to communicate the 
unions' preferred interpretative frameworks, within 'human interest' articles. By 
encouraging 'ordinary' members, rather than, local officials to speak to journalists, the 
unions helped to ensure that the language employed was not bound by the union 
vocabulary which had sometimes rendered communication clumsy in the past. By 
encouraging the 'personalisation' of the dispute around the two leading figures, 
Kenneth Clarke and Roger Poole, the unions hoped to turn another conventional news 
value to their advantage. Through a continual stress in press releases and in the public 
statements of Roger Poole, himself, upon the ultimate responsibility of the government 
as 'paymaster', the unions were able to draw the Secretary of State for Health into the 
media arena. Kenneth Clarke's 'personality' as an 'intransigent' and 'bullying' 
government minister could then be opposed by the 'reasonable' Roger Poole, willing at 
any time to go to independent arbitration to settle the dispute. 
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A Chronoloi:Y of the Diwute 
September 1989 
7th. The result of the ballot is announced with strong support in favour of an overtime ban in pursuit of 
the union claim for a 9% pay increase and an automatic pay formula, as already applied to fire and police 
I se,rvic:es. The employers argue that other health service workers have settled for a 6.5% pay award, 
although inflation is currently running at over 8%. 
12th to 14th Unions visit ACAS and invite the NHS employers and Department of Health for talks. 
Sec:retary of Sate for Health, Kenneth Clarke, refuses on the grounds that to permit independent 
1 rurbitration for one group of health service employees but not others would be divisive. 
14th Overtime ban commences. 
Ambulance Officers (station managers) vote to join overtime ban. 
London crews begin work to rule, with restrictions on the use of radio communication and 
other procedures. The London Ambulance Service threatens to suspend crews who refuse to work 
I nc>rnlally. A situation described as a 'shambles' by the Chief Officer of the London Service results on the 
Fire service receives over 9% pay award on the basis of the automatic formula operating for 
'emergency services'. 
7th Troops called in for the first time to support the police and St John's Brigade in providing routine and 
emergency cover. 
14th to 30th London work to rule begins to spread outside the capital. Crews begin to be suspended for 
refusing to accept 'directed' radio calls produced via new computer equipment or 'greening up' (pressing 
a green button on vehicle radios to signify availability after completing a job). Unions continue to insist 
that their action is not intended to affect emergency calls. Suspended crews continue to accept emergency 
calls made by GP' s, hospitals and members of the public. 
2nd First 'unofficial' one day strike in Glasgow. National union officials accuse Kenneth Clarke of 
seeking to provoke a strike. 
27th Unions accused by Senior Ambulance Officer of placing a baby's life in danger in Hackney after 
delays in responding to emergency calls. 
2nd to Sth Controversy over Kenneth Clarke's letter replying to the daughter of a Nottinghamshire 
ambulance worker. Clarke con>ments that only a minority of ambulance workers had paramedical skills 
""d that most were drivers a worthwhile but not one'. 
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12th to 24th Unofficial strikes spread in Sussex, London, and the Midlands, despite pressure from 
union leaders. 
February 
6th Inquest held following death of a London man whose treatment was delayed by the dispute and a 
shortage of hospital staff. 
lOth to 19th Ambulance Services begin to seek court orders to prevent suspended crews from using 
stations, vehicles or equipment to provide emergency cover. 
23rd Dispute settled following talks. Unions accept 16.9% over two years but fail to secure recognition 
as an emergency service or an automatic pay formula. Roger Poole claims that the settlement is a triumph 
but a number of local crews are critical and Mersey crews threaten to continue strike action. 
A Qualitative Assessment of Coverage 
It is not the intention to provide a comprehensive description of all qualitative aspects 
of coverage. Rather, the intention is to consider evidence which will allow the success 
of the unions' media strategy to be evaluated. More specifically, the focus will be upon 
the extent to which the unions were successful in offering to the print media their 
preferred interpretative frameworks and the symbolic materials which would encourage 
journalists to develop the favoured evaluative contexts within which to embed such 
frameworks. 
Most of the broadsheet papers followed the dispute in considerable detail throughout 
its five month duration. In this assessment all the news reports, feature articles, and 
editorials in the Guardian (127 items), the Independent (116 items), The Times (99 
items) and the Financial Times (32 items) concerning the dispute have been examined. 
At the. other end of the market, the Daily Mirror, the Sun and the Daily Express were 
selected. The latter two were selected as particularly 'tough nuts' for the union press 
officers to crack, given their political orientation and familiar ideological perspectives 
on trade unions. Coverage in these papers was more erratic, being triggered by 
particularly sharp crises in the course of the dispute, although the Daily Mirror did take 
a consistent interest in developments throughout. The Sun, on the other hand, ignored 
the dispute throughout September, remained inattentive in October and only took a 
serious interest once troops had been called in to provide ambulance cover in 
November. 
The Early Phase of the Dispute: militants and public heroes. 
A view held widely amongst union press officers was that their most fruitful media 
terrain was delimited not by political affiliation but by position in the market. 
Broadsheet newspapers, irrespective of their political character, were more likely to 
carry items on union affairs than their popular counterparts. This view was largely 
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borne out in the early phase of the Ambulance Dispute, in which broadsheet papers 
demonstrated a consistent interest but populars maintained only sporadic coverage. 
Even in the early phase, however, it was possible to detect some potential tensions 
in media coverage. These were inspired by a series of thematic contradictions between 
the cumulative history of traditional industrial relations news frames, and alternative 
news frames suggested by other conventional news values and popular imagery. The 
earlier sections of this chapter have described the traditional industrial relations news 
frames which news organisations habitually reproduced; the association between union 
activity and 'militancy', the representation of the labour movement as a channel for the 
pursuit of self-interest, and so on. And yet, in relation to health care and medicine an 
alternative traditional media mythology (Karpf,1988) offered the opportunity to 
construct ambulance workers as public heroes or 'angels with blue flashing lights' (15). 
In fact, it is possible to set out a series of opposing symbolisations which offered news 
editors and journalists alternative ways of representing the ambulance crews. 
PUBLIC HEROES OR SELF INTERESTED PRODUCER GROUP 
COMPASSIONATE CARERS OR UNION MILITANTS 
To these two sets of iconographic oppositions, which are rooted in traditional popular 
mythologies, can be added a third, which also partly stems from a traditional media 
association between health care and the power of technology but owes its appearance to 
an intervention by the Secretary of State for Health, during the dispute: 
TECHNICALLY SKILLED PARA- OR SEMI-SKILLED DRIVERS 
MEDIC EMERGENCY TEAMS 
Of course, each side in the dispute had a powerful interest in encouraging the news 
media to embrace and reproduce one set of symbolic themes, rather than the other. As 
we shall see, whilst there was some evidence of national newspapers drawing upon sets 
of symbolic themes and imagery hostile to the union side in some of the very earliest 
examples of coverage, it is surprising how readily large sections of the print media 
placed ambulance workers in news frames which did promote a heroic 'mythology', 
during the first phase of the dispute. Only as the dispute grew protracted and more 
complex, was there an ideological shift towards the more familiar and hostile imagery 
of trade unionism. During the early phase of the dispute, imagery and symbolisation 
which associated ambulance crews with life-saving drama, compassionate caring and 
public service, provided the health unions with a very significant advantage in their 
battle to secure favourable evaluative contexts for coverage. 
Most newspapers identified the implications of the dispute for emergency and '999' 
services as a dominant theme from the outset and in the very earliest items 
responsibility for such disruption was, by implication, laid at the door of the health 
unions. Thus, for example, The Times (front page 8th September 1989) led with the 
headline, 'Overtime Ban May Hit 999 Calls', and continued: 
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'Leaders of Britain's ambulance crews, who voted by a 4 to 
1 majority yesterday for a national overtime ban in support 
of a pay claim, admitted for the first time that the 999 
service could be affected. ' 
The Guardian first reported the possibility of the dispute on the 5th September but 
selected very much the same news angle as The Times around which to construct its 8th 
September report, with the headline, 'Union Action Threatens 999 Service' (page two). 
Similarly, the Financial Times (page 13) on the same day, reported developments under 
the headline, 'Overtime Ban Likely to Hit Emergency Services'. The framing of events 
masks the complexity of the issues involved, even at this early stage, and obscures 
some key elements of the unions' preferred interpretative framework. The strategy of 
the health unions was to select a form of action which did not threaten the '999 
Service', providing employers honoured the earlier agreement on staffing and overtime 
working. As we shall see, the subtlety and yet crucial importance of this point was 
often lost in even the more detailed broadsheet reports, let alone tabloid accounts. Only 
the Guardian referred to the three year formal agreement which precluded ambulance 
services from relying upon overtime working for the provision of emergency service 
cover. 
However, while this point was frequently lost, the unions were successful in 
communicating a number of the other key elements in their preferred interpretative 
agenda. The first dispute report in the Financial Times (8th September page 13), for 
example, reported the size of the vote in favour of action, the point that parity with 
other emergency services had been conceded in 1986; that an offer of only 6.5% was 
below the inflation rate of 8% and that the union side was willing to immediately 
resolve the dispute through binding, independent arbitration. Items in the Guardian and 
Times also included these elements in the unions' interpretative frameworks, and also 
reproduced extracts from a press release written around a quote from Roger Poole: 
'Kenneth Clarke has provoked this dispute with his high 
handed rejection of our repeated requests for binding 
independent arbitration. Such contempt for the National 
Health Service's emergency service reflects this 
government's appalling treatment of Britain's health 
service.' (Guardian 8th September page 2). 
This statement offered an evaluative context in which the dispute is related to wider 
public anxieties about the future of the National Health Service and sought to exploit 
the news media inclination to personalise issues involving conflict. The calculation was, 
of course, that the placing of Kenneth Clarke's personality in the foreground would 
work to the advantage of the union side. For good measure, Roger Poole went on to 
suggest that it was 'intolerable' that Mrs Thatcher was in the habit of 'bathing herself 
in the glory of the emergency services' during disasters such as Hillsborough or 
Clapham and yet refuse to adequately reward ambulance crews. Even in this short press 
statement, the union side can be found encouraging symbolic associations between their 
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cause and the 'mythology' of public heroism. Both Kenneth Clarke and Duncan 
Nichols, Chief Executive of the NHS, responded but only the Guardian reproduced 
their attempts to stir public memories of the alternative symbolic systems with which 
public sector union action has been represented. Clarke suggested that 'they should not 
be taking this action ... It is bound to hurt the vulnerable and sick', while Nichols 
commented that, 'We are not prepared to give in in the face of threats of action which 
will damage patient care' (Guardian 8th September page 2). 
On September 11th the union side were able to put the employers and government on 
the defensive by visiting ACAS for 'last minute talks', with the action due to begin two 
days later. This placed the government at a tactical disadvantage. By refusing to attend 
talks at ACAS, the government was in danger of appearing 'intransigent' but to attend 
would be to move towards conceding independent arbitration. The union side took full 
advantage, Roger Poole issuing a statement to assembled industrial correspondents on 
the steps of the ACAS headquarters, which called upon Kenneth Clarke to accept the 
ACAS invitation and re-affirmed the health unions' willingness to call off action 
immediately in exchange for independent arbitration. This received coverage in both 
The Times and the Guardian (September 12th) without any response from either 
government or employers. Only the Guardian carried a reply from Duncan Nichol, the 
following day which simply reiterated the line that patients were bound to suffer and 
that the unions should 'think again' (September 13th page 3). At the same time, Roger 
Poole was able to push home the simple message that, 'we will call off the action now 
if the government agrees to go to independent arbitration'. 
Through the frequent repetition of this simple proposition, and through the persona 
of Roger Poole, the unions were able to present a durable image of non-militant 
reasonableness. This was maintained throughout the early phase of the dispute and was 
only undermined in the later stages as the union leaderships' influence over the tactics 
of local branches began to weaken. 
With the commencement of the dispute, the popular papers began to show more 
interest. The Sun, perhaps because the action involved a 'low key' overtime ban rather 
than a full-blown strike, continued to ignore developments but the Daily Express 
carried a short report on page two (September 15th), 'Ambulance Action Sparks 999 
Plans', which contained sparse detail of the union case but, predictably in the light of 
the volume of earlier research on labour coverage, emphasised the arrangements being 
put into place to cope with the efJects of the dispute, including the hiring of taxis. In 
this report, the union side had singularly failed to communicate the key elements of 
their preferred interpretative agenda. However, within the same issue of the Daily 
Express, an inside feature appeared on page 21, under the headline, 'What Price the 
Life Savers?', with a strapline, 'Daily Express Special Investigation on the Ambulance 
Teams Forced to Fight for Decent Pay' (see illustration six). The piece was written by 
a features journalist who had travelled with two crews on 14th September and was 
divided into two sections. The first described a dramatic account of one 'routine' 
night's work for the crews, the second was based upon an interview with one of the 
crew members, Jacqui Ross, 'who struggles to make ends meet, bringing up three 
young children on take home pay of £150 a week.' The main section allowed plenty of 
scope to deploy popular news values and to tap into the popular mythology of health 
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care and medical intervention, describing two life-saving call outs, one to a heart attack 
victim, another to an attempted suicide where the victim lay, 'slumped on his blood-
soaked bed'. Having leapt from his ambulance and raced to a high rise flat, Philip 
Paget, 'fought desperately to find a vein to inject a body stabilising fluid': 
' ... Suddenly the needle went home and the heart monitoring 
machine began bleeping. Then, the patient's eyes flickered 
open and a broad smile spread across Philip's face as he 
knew another life had been saved'. 
The article closed around a quote from the crew member, 'Don't you think after 11 
years doing this work I deserve to be given a bit more than £150 a week?'. The second 
section described fellow crew member, Jacqui Ross' difficulties in managing a family 
budget on low wages, where the children 'often have to go without the toys and treats 
their friends expect'. 
'I don't want to be called an angel or a heroine. I just want 
a wage which I can live on.' 
This example from the Express is illuminating for several reasons. The purple prose of 
emergency intervention and life saving illustrates that even strongly right of centre 
papers could be seduced by the popular medical imagery of 'heroines', 'angels' and 
'life savers'. However, it should also be noted that very little of the unions' 
interpretative agenda is communicated, either in the short news report or the feature 
article. The latter provides an emotive account which might assist the union side in 
fostering an advantageous evaluative context, but did little to explain the merit of the 
union case to an unenlightened Express reader. In arranging the visit, the health unions' 
press officers had pulled off something of a coup,- it was most unusual for the Express 
to treat union action with such a sympathetically emotive perspective,- but the 
resulting coverage represented a triumph for the health unions only in terms of the 
evaluative dimension, not the interpretative. The potential for the familiar hostile news 
frames of earlier eras to be re-imposed was demonstrated by the Daily Mirror. The 
Mirror's first report, a small item which appeared on page two (7th September) carried 
the headline, '999 Men Launch Pay War', together with a photograph of Rodney 
Bickerstaffe, NUPE general secretary and a familiar 'folk devil' from the 1979 Winter 
of Discontent. Here, within a traditional industrial relations news frame, the men of the 
unions are attributed responsibility for initiating social conflict in a familiar 
representation of industrial relations. However, by the 12th September, the Mirror had 
transformed the war-like men into much less belligerent figures under the headline, 
'Mercy Men Peace Bid' and an item which reported that Kenneth Clarke, 'would be 
urged to go to arbitration' by union chiefs who 'would immediately call off their action 
if he agrees'. And yet, two days later, under the headline, '999 Men Overtime Ban 
Goes Ahead', traditional news frames re-surfaced in the Mirror once more: 
'Last ditch attempts to avert the ambulance overtime ban 
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failed last night. 
The ban which could bring hardship to millions of old 
and sick people began at midnight. 
NHS Chief Executive, Duncan Nichol, urged ambulance 
workers, 'Think again and call it off. Any action will 
cause patients to suffer' . 
Union chief negotiator, Roger Poole, replied, 'We will 
call it off if the Health Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, 
agrees to arbitration' (Daily Mirror, 14th September) 
So, in the Daily Mirror, at least, the earliest reports are characterised by an alternation 
between traditional industrial relations news frames, containing within them the 
familiar imagery of union militancy and a sectional power exercised at the expense of a 
vulnerable public, on the one hand, and the alternative symbolism of 'mercy men', on 
the other. The ambivalence in early Mirror coverage is a reminder that the 
representation of ambulance workers as agents of 'heroic' and compassionate public 
service, was by no means assured. Just as the NUPE grave diggers in 1979 were 
portrayed as refusing to bury the dead, so the danger arose that for the health unions 
that NUPE ambulance crews would be portrayed as failing to save the sick and injured. 
A great deal depended upon the success of the union side in providing journalists with 
opportunities to construct 'human interest' stories, along the lines of the Express 
feature above. 
Availability, according to the union press officers, was also a crucial factor at this 
stage (16). The union side made sure that a fresh statement, quote, or press release was 
continually available and that Lynn Bryan or a colleague were at all times accessible to 
enquiring journalists. This sustained effort appears to be reflected in the early coverage. 
Almost every news item contains a union perspective, even if subordinate in position to 
other sources, whereas on a number of occasions government and employers either did 
not provide comment or failed to offer a fresh slant. In the days following the ACAS 
visit, for example, the unions provided a dominant interpretation of developments by 
default. It was during this period that the Daily Mirror abandoned, altogether, its 
application of traditional industrial relations news frames in favour of the 'public 
service heroes' angle. 
"ANGER AS CLARKE BLOCKS 999 PEACE" 
Health Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, again angered 
ambulance workers yesterday by urging health 
bosses not to settle their pay row at ACAS. 
But he added it would be wrong for him to 
intervene. 
As crews began their overtime ban Roger Poole 
union chief negotiator, claimed Mr Clarke was 
'the invisible hand' behind the managers' re-
fusal to go to arbitration. 
296 
And he accused Mr Clarke of 'cynically using 
patients as pawns.' 
Taxis and buses were called to take non-
emergency cases to hospital but many non-
emergency appointments had to be cancelled. 
Unions claimed that local health chiefs had 
paid out £80,000 in taxi fares. 
Roger Poole said that 'Ambulance workers are 
bending over backwards to ensure that all 999 
calls are answered.' 
Daily Mirror 15th September 1989 page 4. 
This report illustrates well the union success, at this stage, in setting the pace and in 
exploiting symbolic materials to secure a favourable evaluative context but, once again, 
it also illustrates the difficulties for the union side in communicating key elements in 
their interpretative framework. In offering a view and an interpretation of the situation, 
the unions are given a free ride in the absence of a government or employer response. 
Poole is able to portray the reasonableness of the union position in seeking arbitration. 
In this sense the evaluative context is favourable to the union side. However, there is 
an absence of discussion of key elements of the unions' preferred interpretative 
framework and this makes the claim by Roger Poole that his members were 'bending 
over backwards' to mitigate the effects of the action apparently inexplicable. This 
would only become intelligible if it was also explained that the employers were 
formally committed to maintaining emergency cover without overtime working, and 
that the strategy of the unions was to highlight in the public domain, the failure of the 
employers to honour this agreement. 
The inclination to 'individualise' what are essentially collective problems 
(Cottle,1993:79) is not confined to tabloid papers. And the union side were able to 
exploit this appetite for 'human interest' angles in ways which encouraged the 
highlighting of the symbolic themes of 'heroism' and 'unrewarded service', in a 
number of the broadsheet papers. The Guardian, for example, on the 14th September 
devoted the top half of page four to the dispute (illustration seven) with three articles, 
one reporting on the immediate consequences of the overtime ban and the other two 
concentrating in detail upon aspects of the ambulance workers' case. Keith Harper, the 
Guardian labour editor, provided a discussion of the union claim for parity with police 
and fire services, indicating that definitions of 'emergency service' were at the heart of 
the dispute, an essential element in the unions' preferred interpretative framework. 
However, the remaining two articles dominated the page, each based upon 'human 
interest' angles with photographs of 'ordinary' crew members at the top of the page and 
interviews with three ambulance crews based at stations in Forest Hill, south London 
and Park Royal in north west London, below. The angle of these reports concentrates 
upon the 'human cost' involved in working for the ambulance service with one 
interviewee attributing the anti-social hours and low basic wages to the break up of his 
marriage. All three interviewees provide succinct quotations pointing to the effects of 
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low pay, job stress and the role of the ambulance service in recent disasters such as the 
fire at Kings Cross and the Clapham rail crash. 
'I often worked 16 hours for several days running, including 
my time off, because even with £39 a week London Weighting 
I could hardly pay my bills. ' 
'Mr Dury told of the day his unit answered the 999 call to 
Clapham Junction and spent nearly three hours treating 
injured passengers. On the way back, they were diverted 
to a traffic accident. This was immediately followed by 
a maternity call when he had to deliver a baby at home. ' 
(Guardian 14th September page 2. See Illustration 2) 
The Guardian returned to the same station the following week to produce a 'fly on the 
wall' account of a routine shift, which included the task for one crew of explaining to a 
daughter that her mother had died ('No Soft Options for Crews in Ambulance Row', 
September 20th page four). Similarly, The Times, on the 18th September, produced an 
account by Tim Jones, 'Employment Affairs Correspondent', of the night shift at a 
station in Liverpool and a fresh statement from Roger Poole. Once again, the 
employers case went by default, and the unions were able to inject a political 
assessment into the interpretative framework underpinning the item. This was an 
attempt to anticipate the strategy of the government if the dispute dragged on. Roger 
Poole predicted that the government was, 'waiting for someone to be hurt so that they 
can turn the tide of public opinion against our members ... if this is in their minds and, 
God forbid, someone is hurt the public will know that it is the government to blame'. 
However, it is one of the first reports in the Independent, which illustrates how 
effectively a strategy of exploiting 'individualised' news values could work for the 
union side. On 15th September (page two), it carried an article based upon a visit and 
interviews with crews stationed at St Bartholomew' s Hospital in the City of London: 
"MIXED FEELINGS OF AMBULANCE STAFF" 
"For trade unionists who say that they are taking action be-
cause they cannot afford to live, the two women who crew 
a central London ambulance have a lot to learn about 
militancy. Debbie Ritchie and Jane Hullott' s main hope 
as they wait for their next call at St Bartholomew' s 
Hospital is that their ban on overtime and rest day 
working will not have an effect. 
'I want the public to know that they must call out 
ambulances only when it is absolutely necessary', says 
Debbie, 'otherwise people will find that there won't be 
crews to go on an emergency. Hopefully, this will be over 
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The answer given by the two women to the inevitable 
question as to how they can pursue their dispute, however, 
justified, if it will harm the sick, shows their devotion 
to the service. The overtime they work explains why they 
are taking action and why it will hurt. Jane Hulott earns 
£535 a month, all of which goes on her mortgage, fuel and 
her travel costs. To buy clothes and food for her two 
children, as she is a single parent, she works about 50 
hours a month overtime." 
The item continued to explain that staff turnover had reached 25%, and that the basis of 
the claim was parity with other emergency services who faced similar dangers and 
possessed equivalent skills. The report ended with Jane Hulott describing the painful 
dilemma she faced when her son woke in the middle of the night to beg her not to go 
out to do more overtime. 
'The way we see it, the policemen and firemen are well-
paid because they save the country money by stopping 
crime and saving buildings. We save lives but they don't 
seem to think that's as important'. 
The representation of ambulance crews as 'compassionate carers' and poorly rewarded 
'public heroes' is near enough complete in this account. In the place of the Mirror's 
early militant '999 men', we find women driven reluctantly to take action by low pay 
and a concern for their own children. In terms of the evaluative dimension, this article 
is highly favourable from the unions' point of view. However, a number of the key 
interpretative elements are also present; the issue of parity with other emergency 
services, the unions' willingness to abandon action for arbitration, and the deterioration 
in pay leading to an over-reliance upon overtime working, are all communicated 
effectively through the individualised, 'human interest' news frame. 
Summary 
The opening phase of the dispute can be regarded as a qualified success for the union 
side in terms of media strategy. The symbols and myths associated with the caring 
professions within the field of health care pre-dated the 1989 dispute, of course. 
Nevertheless, the unions' media strategy worked successfully in encouraging 
correspondents to draw upon this stock of symbols and myths by providing frequent 
opportunities to talk to 'ordinary crews' (17). The evaluative contexts produced through 
this,- dedicated staff rather than union militants, mothers and fathers struggling to 
manage family budgets, crews facing traumatic and stressful experiences on a routine 
basis,- were highly significant in limiting the degree to which the old familiar news 
frames, documented in the earlier sections of this chapter, were imposed. 
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At the same time, the unions were successful in 'personalising' the dispute around a 
contrast between the 'reasonable' Roger Poole and the 'intransigent' Kenneth Clarke. 
The 'open letter' which Roger Poole sent to the Secretary of State on the 14th 
September, and which was released to the news media, formally reinforced this news 
angle. 
However, in industrial disputes union cases are usually constructed upon complex 
and subtle arguments in relation to aspects of conditions of service and formal 
agreements. And, of course, it is this fine detail which has the least interest for many 
journalists. While the union side aimed to keep their messages as simple and free from 
jargon as possible, nonetheless, a full exposition of their preferred interpretative 
framework required quite detailed reference to the 1986 agreement on overtime and 
emergency cover, together with information on the relative deterioration in pay 
between 1986 and 1989. Only a limited number of broadsheet items communicated this 
interpretative framework intact. 
This early phase was characterised by a skilful harnessing of public events to good 
press officer practice, on the part of the health unions. The public visit of the unions to 
ACAS placed the employers and government on the defensive; a union team which 
repeatedly announced their willingness to settle for independent arbitration immediately 
appeared more 'reasonable'. Roger Poole's 'open letter' kept the pot boiling in the 
absence of any fresh 'hard news' development. Inevitably, the employers and 
government were cast in a negative role, rejecting and refusing, rather than offering 
and suggesting. The fostering of 'human interest' copy and the maintenance of a 
disciplined approach in which the unions matched their organisational rhythms to those 
of the news desk, with fresh material each day and a press officer available to answer 
enquiries at all times, allowed the health unions to seize the initiative. However, 
sustaining this strategy over five months proved much more problematic. 
The Dispute Deepens: the rise of the militant mercy men 
There are four reasons why it becomes increasingly difficult for a trade union to sustain 
the kind of media strategy employed by the health unions in the Ambulance Dispute, 
over an extended period of time. To begin with, 'novelty' quickly evaporates. In order 
for a dispute to remain front or inside page material in subsequent periods, a new or 
dramatic angle must emerge. It is likely that such dramatic angles will be generated 
through news of the 'effects' and 'consequences' of a dispute and here, of course, 
unions are frequently placed on the defensive in being required to 'justify' to the news 
media the impact of these disputes upon others. It was for this reason that the 
leaderships of the health unions were particularly concerned to prevent escalation 
towards strike action. 
Secondly, while it is often difficult enough to persuade journalists to include 
accounts of the intricate detail of a union case in the first few days of news media 
interest, as a dispute becomes protracted with news media interest spanning days or 
weeks, even sympathetic correspondents are unlikely to wish to submit copy which 
simply reproduces the same detail. Thus, it is likely that a number of the key elements, 
essential to ensuring that the interpretative frameworks which are communicated 
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support a coherent union case, are lost. Journalists may become preoccupied with news 
angles which may position unions in a less favourable light. 
Thirdly, while large employers and, even governments, may be caught cold in the 
first phases of a dispute, over a longer period of time, it is likely that they will identify 
ways in which their command over, normally, greater material, symbolic and political 
resources, can be made to tell in a public relations battle ( Jones,l986; MacGregor, 
1986) (18). As the Ambulance Dispute wore on, the NHS employers and the 
Department of Health grew more effective in countering the unions' media strategy and 
were able to exploit their waning influence over the interpretative frameworks offered 
in the news media. 
Finally, given the character of many unions as organisations, it is unlikely that they 
will be able to sustain the high degree of centralised control required to sustain the type 
of media strategy employed in the Ambulance Dispute. As Charlotte Atkins noted, 
ambulance crews were probably more used to centralised and hierarchical 
organisational relations than most groups of workers and, yet, even in the Ambulance 
Dispute over the course of nearly six months, tensions between union leaderships and 
many local branches grew more acute. A number of local branches in several regions 
became impatient with modest sanctions; local unofficial initiatives including single day 
and continuous strike action began to spring up as the dispute dragged on beyond 
Christmas and this, of course, weakened the central plank of the union leadership's 
media strategy. 
Overall, then, it became increasingly difficult for the unions to shape the nature of 
newspaper coverage and, increasingly, journalists were presented with a number of 
news angles which invited less favourable coverage. The danger from the unions' 
perspective was that such news angles would be derived from concentrating upon the 
effects of the dispute and its implications for readers. The unions' preferred 
interpretative framework was likely to become obscured if newspapers became 
preoccupied with the 'immediacy' and 'drama' of a possible interruption in emergency 
cover. The union side needed to devise their own 'fresh angles' and in the weeks 
leading up to Christmas this was done with some limited success but, inevitably, the 
number of such possibilities was finite. 
On the 24th October, The Times featured the dispute on its front page with the 
headline, 'Lives at Risk as Ambulance Crisis Worsens'. Above this a strapline read, 
"Clarke Says 'Unions Gamble with Patients' ". The item reported the escalation of the 
dispute in the London area where managers had begun to suspend crews 'working to 
rule • . All but nine out the seventy one stations in London were affected for twenty four 
hours. In effect, some crews were being 'locked out' but the item placed in the 
foreground the collapse in emergency provision in London, rather than the significance 
of these developments for the politics of the dispute. Comments from Kenneth Clarke 
were included immediately below the first paragraph of the item which detailed 
developments and views of Conservative back bench MPs followed at the bottom. The 
item included the views of the police and St John's Brigade regarding the possibilities 
for providing an adequate alternative service, and a call from the Secretary of the 
Casualty Surgeons' Association for troops to be called in. Adjacent to this item on the 
front page, The Times included a 'human interest' item, 'To hospital ... on duvets and 
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ladders', which described the unconventional way in which heart attack victims and 
others had arrived at hospitals in the London area, supported by a photograph of police 
employing the 'duvet technique' to deliver a patient. On page two, the theme of 
'coping' was explored further through a report on how doctors and police volunteered 
to help at the ambulance control centre in order to prioritise calls. A union perspective 
was only to be found submerged at the bottom of page one, in the fourteenth paragraph 
of the lead news item, where a union spokesman suggested that management in 
London sought to provoke an intensification in action. In short, The Times coverage at 
this point provided an interpretative framework which precluded a full understanding of 
the union position. From the union perspective, what was significant about the London 
developments was the London Ambulance Service was disposed to prevent crews from 
answering emergency calls. 
While there were variations in the way other broadsheet papers interpreted the events 
in London, the powerful appeal to conventional news values of such elements as 
volunteers 'lending a hand', 'do it yourself emergency arrangements, and the prospect 
of 'lives at risk', were too great for most papers to ignore. The Independent, for 
example, reported on the 23rd October, 'Police Stand By in Ambulance Dispute' (page 
two), followed the next day by a front page splash, 'London Crews Stood Down-
Police Take Over Ambulance Calls'. Similarly, the Guardian carried the page two 
headline, 'Ambulance Action Escalates in London' (October 23rd) and 'Ambulance 
Shambles- Crews Suspended, Police Ferrying Patients, Chaos may Spread' (front 
page) the following day. Unlike The Times, the Guardian and the Independent 
allocated more space within these items to the responses of the union side and the issue 
of 'lockouts'. The Guardian quoted Roger Poole in emphasising the unions' 
· willingness to settle through independent arbitration and his suspicion that the 
hardening of management attitudes was 'politically motivated' (24th October page one) 
and the Independent report included two paragraphs (four and five) which reported the 
willingness of crews to provide emergency cover, unpaid if necessary: 
"Mr Stuart Barber, union spokesman for London crews, said staff 
would have to be 'physically evicted' from stations to stop 
them answering 999 calls. He accused Tom Crosby [LAS Chief 
Officer] of 'attempting to use the unions as a scapegoat for 
his own inability to manage the service ... 
Our members will continue to receive 999 calls. If they are 
given an instruction which conflicts with their own professional 
judgement they will ignore that instruction. Given a couple 
of days we will give the public a better 999 service by 
freeing crews who are continually being tied up in non-urgent 
work' ". (23rd October page two). 
At first glance, the interpretative frameworks offered in the Guardian and Independent 
coverage, in contrast to The Times, allow a fuller union perspective to be 
communicated. However, three problems can be detected. Already, the union 
leaderships' control of the information flows emerging from union sources was 
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weakening. Thus, correspondents established contact with London shop stewards, 
including Stuart Barber, and this was to make the presentation of a common and 
consistent position more difficult. Secondly, as the events in London unfolded, it 
became clear that the unions were to fmd it very difficult not to surrender the news 
initiative to an interpretative agenda dominated by the effects of the dispute. This had 
obvious implications for the evaluative dimension of coverage, too. While the health 
unions' press officers remained committed to a 'proactive' approach (a dossier 
'documenting' twenty needless deaths arising from ambulance service delays in the last 
twelve months was publicly presented to government ministers on the 23rd October), 
the union side found itself more frequently on the defensive, responding to an agenda 
determined elsewhere. 
Thirdly, as the conflict intensified in October, so the issues grew more complex and 
this, too, presented a problem for the union side. At the heart of the escalation of the 
dispute in London, was a fourteen point set of guidelines on working to rule drawn up 
by the health unions in conjunction with the TUC. Amongst other things, these 
guidelines directed crews to return to their stations after completing a task, rather than 
'green up' (pressing a green button inside their cabs to signal availability for another 
job). Computerised calling equipment was 'blacked'. This action was directed at non-
urgent routine work but in retaliation managers in a number of sectors suspended 
crews. Without the detail required to grasp the complexity of the London situation, the 
union claims that their action was not directed at emergency services appeared 
implausible and even in the more sympathetic papers such detail was omitted from the 
interpretative frameworks presented. 
Only the Financial Times chose to attach less importance to the immediacy of events 
over this period selecting, instead, analytic pieces exploring the underlying issues of 
pay comparability, skilling and definitions of emergency service. Much of the data used 
by John Gapper (number one on the FT labour desk) for the item, 'When Heroism 
Confounds the Pay Logic' (25th October page 9), was supplied by the union side and 
Roger Poole was quoted at length in offering suggestions to resolve the dispute, 
including a no-strike deal in return for a pay formula. At least here, the reader was 
given the impression of a reasonable and constructive union approach, a willingness to 
compromise based upon a well documented case. The previous day, the FT number 
two, Fiona Thompson, had produced an item, 'Third Among Equals', which had once 
again used a visit to an ambulance station as a basis for developing a 'human interest' 
angle on the issue of comparability with other emergency services. Of course, this 
reflects the distinct news values of the FT, with a brief to supply its readers with more 
specialised information on employment issues and labour market patterns. 
Nevertheless, the union side were successful in recognising and exploiting the 
opportunities such news values afforded. 
Tabloid coverage offered far fewer opportunities. The Sun ignored events in London, 
only including coverage of the dispute in the following week as the prospect of troops 
being called in across the whole country loomed. The Daily Express framed an item 
which reported an agreement between management and unions in London to de-escalate 
the dispute, in the following terms: 
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"Troops on ambulance alert in uneasy peace. 
Minister accuses the union leaders of 
'sheer hypocrisy'". (25th October page 4) 
According to the Express, 'union chiefs scaled down their industrial action' as ... 
'the government put troops on standby to take over from idle 
ambulance crews. The breakthrough came when union leaders 
in London agreed to accept conditions laid down by health 
service chiefs'. 
Both the language and interpretative framework employed here are reminiscent of the 
familiar ideological patterns discussed in earlier research. Crews are 'idle' (rather than 
actively seeking to provide emergency cover), 'union chiefs' (by implication powerful 
and unaccountable) are responsible for escalating 'their' action. It is the initiative of 
the NHS management which is responsible for moderating developments. 
In the first week of November, the problems arising from the application of the work 
to rule in London had spread to a number of other regions. Crews working to rule were 
suspended and emergency cover threatened. From the union perspective, these crews 
were 'locked out'. On 3rd November, an 8.6% pay rise was awarded to the Fire 
Service, on the basis of an automatic pay formula, and this allowed Lynn Bryan to 
temporarily re-focus the attention of journalists upon the issue of pay comparability and 
the health unions' claim for an automatic pay mechanism to operate in the same way as 
those employed to determine the pay of police and fire staff. Only two papers, 
however, actually carried this story. The Sun briefly reported that Ken Cameron, leader 
of the Fire Brigades Union, had expressed support for the ambulance workers' claim, 
after the fire fighters award (3rd November page 2) and the Guardian (3rd November 
page 6) included a little more contextual detail. Other papers concentrated exclusively 
upon the prospect of troops being called in and it was at this stage that the tabloid 
papers began to take a sustained interest. 
'TROOPS ON STANDBY AS MERCY MEN TURN THE SCREW' 
Troops were on standby to run the ambulance service as 
union bosses upped the pressure in their pay battle. 
The unions ordered the country's 19,000 ambulance 
crews to ban all duties apart from answering 999 calls. 
That will plunge the ambulance men into a clash with 
health service chief, Duncan Nichol, who warned that 
he will stop the pay of crews who do not work normally. 
He is even prepared to suspend militant ambulance men 
which would leave the army having to take over the running 
of the service. 
Last week police officers had to ferry patients to 
hospital in London after crews stopped work over sus-
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pended crews. 
Unions chiefs decided to step up action yesterday. 
They want 11.5%. The government has offered 6.5%. 
chief union negotiator, Roger Poole blasted Health 
Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, for putting the troops 
on standby. 
'The government knows the crews will answer every 
emergency call. 
What they are trying to do is provoke the crews.' 
So far the crews have banned overtime and carried out 
a work to rule. The new ban means they will just sit 
and wait for 999 calls. 
And they will not carry out vital paperwork need-
ed by ambulance chiefs.' 
(The Sun 1st November page 2.) 
As we have seen, few union press officers believed that the Sun offered many 
opportunities for effective press work. However, in this item, it is possible to detect 
evidence of an effective 'defensive action' by Lynn Bryan and the health unions' press 
officers. Responsibility for the threat to emergency cover is certainly attributed to the 
union side, as the now rather more sinister 'mercy men' ... ' turn the screw'. A claim 
of over eleven per cent is likely to appear excessive without additional contextual 
detail. The ambulance workers are now portrayed as exclusively masculine and 
potentially 'militant'. Union 'bosses' enjoy the power to order crews to take action. 
Nevertheless, Roger Poole provides an appropriate response framed with a skilled use 
of 'Sun language' to highlight the continuing commitment of crews to providing 
emergency responses. There is, at least, the suggestion that the use of troops has a 
political and propaganda function. On both the interpretative and evaluative 
dimensions, this item contains contradictory ideological elements favourable to either 
side. 
During the first ten days in November, the news agenda in both tabloid and 
broadsheet papers fixed upon the introduction of troops as the dominant theme (19). As 
the 'effects' of the dispute grew ever more newsworthy, so the union side enjoyed a 
diminishing number of opportunities to shape the news agenda and broaden the 
interpretative frameworks presented by daily newspapers. One example illustrates the 
point. In conjunction with the TUC, the health unions organised a major press 
conference to publicise a potential propaganda coup, the announcement of public 
support for the union cause on the part of the Police Federation. The chairman of the 
Police Federation, Alan Eastwood, agreed to attend and explain to correspondents that 
the Federation would 'lend its weight' to the ambulance workers' cause by exerting 
pressure upon government ministers. However, this press conference took place on 6th 
November, two days before troops appeared on the streets. While the Independent did 
give the announcement and the highly unusual support of the Police Federation 
considerable coverage (7th November page 2), the remaining broadsheets submerged 
the news in items anticipating the arrival of troops. The Daily Mirror devoted a whole 
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page to a feature article under the headline, 'Mercy men are worth a good deal just like 
our MP' s' , which provided a detailed comparison between the salaries, holidays, perks 
and recent pay settlement of MP's and ambulance workers (Mirror 7th November page 
6) and while this provided favourable coverage on both interpretative and evaluative 
dimensions, it, too, ignored the Police Federation intervention. 
In short, from the last week of October, five weeks after the start of the dispute, it is 
clear that the unions experienced growing difficulty in actively harnessing conventional 
news values to their advantage. Similarly, while some success was still achieved in 
offering opportunities for journalists to construct reports around the popular 
mythologies associated with health care workers, efforts to lay out favourable 
evaluative contexts through the exploitation of these themes were undermined by the 
concentration upon the 'drama' and 'immediacy' of the dispute 'consequences', and the 
spectacle of troops manning the NHS. Both the interpretative and evaluative dimensions 
of news coverage began to reflect elements of the more familiar news frames associated 
with industrial disputes. 
Union successes should not be ignored. The Independent, for example, carried an 
individualised 'human interest piece inspired by the unions' press office, which was 
written by the paper's health correspondent one day after troops had been called in (8th 
November page 2). 'Bitterness Behind the Silent Telephone', explored the feelings of 
suspended crews who were prevented from answering emergency calls in some depth. 
Similarly, the Guardian carried an item based upon a visit to an ambulance station in 
Fulham (9th November page 2): 
'Outside the station the union banner fluttered with the 
plaintive message, "We are not on Strike". Inside, crews 
expressed their willingness to answer 999 calls and said 
they wouldn't go home. 
Evidence of this commitment came as three emergency 
calls were received' 
By the middle of November, however, examples such as these were exceptional. 
Coverage Near the End: paramedics and semi-skilled drivers 
In the closing phase of the dispute, the health unions found it extremely difficult to 
broaden the interpretative framework presented in newspaper reports beyond a narrow 
focus upon the consequences of the dispute. Even the term '999 dispute' which became 
a habitually used piece of shorthand in news reports, obscured the unions' preferred 
interpretative framework; the aim of the union action, after all, had been to mount a 
'non-999 dispute' and interruptions to the emergency service were the result of 'lock 
outs' rather than official strike action. 
However, by January 1990, the difficulties for the union side increased as rank and 
file pressure for an escalation of action intensified. A number of branches called for 
one day and, in a few cases, all out strikes. This, of course, threatened to further 
undermine the unions strategy in prioritising media work over the exercise of industrial 
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strength. On 1st January, The Times reported that the unions' leadership was resisting 
pressure from 'rebel ambulance crews' who were organising a campaign for 'a tougher 
line' (page 2). In the same report, Lynn Bryan emphasised that this was 'an unofficial 
move over which the unions have no control and we are urging our members to ignore 
it'. The two overriding tasks for union media work now became to, firstly, minimise 
the damage which such stories might do to the public standing of the health unions and, 
secondly, to target their own memberships with a communication campaign designed to 
retain rank and file commitment to the leaderships' strategy. 
The difficulties for the union side were temporarily alleviated when Kenneth Clarke 
perpetrated two 'public relations blunders'. In reply to a letter from the young daughter 
of a Nottinghamshire ambulance man, Clarke described the majority of ambulance 
crews as 'professional drivers' rather than skilled paramedics. The full-text of Clarke's 
letter was released by the health unions and generated considerable controversy in 
broadsheet and popular papers between the 3rd and 8th of January. In an editorial 
several weeks earlier, the Independent had criticised Clark for equating the skills of 
ambulance staff with those of mini-cab drivers (25th October 1989). Even the Daily 
Express, in an editorial on 2nd January, conceded: 
'It may be true, as he [Clarke] suggests, that the majority 
of ambulance staff are more or less professional drivers 
with a smattering of paramedical training. But to be so 
dismissive of their claim for parity with other emergency 
services is offensive both to the crews and the thousands 
of people who have reason to support them.' 
The Express editorial, then, worked to filter much of the interpretative framework 
which supported the unions' claim for parity with emergency services but certainly, on 
the evaluative dimension, acknowledged the legitimacy which public sympathy lent to 
the union argument. This reflected the experience of the unions in terms of news 
reports. Few of the interpretative frameworks in news items contained elements which 
would allow a thorough assessment of the complexities of the union case in establishing 
the skill level of ambulance crews, but along the evaluative dimension such reports also 
reflected a reluctance to accept Clarke's dismissal of the crews as 'merely drivers'. 
Against this background, Clarke's reply provided the unions with a means to 
'personalise' the dispute once again (20) with journalists contrasting the 'bellicose' 
Clarke (Independent editorial 18th January) with the even tempered Poole, 'who 
shunned abrasive rejoinders' (21). 
Nonetheless, it became an increasingly difficult task to manage the flows of 
information emerging from within the union organisations. The Guardian carried an 
item, 'Ambulance Strikers Snub Union 999 Plea' (13th January page 2), which 
reported the decision of the ambulance crews in Crawley to continue indefinite strike 
action, despite a plea from Roger Poole to continue providing emergency cover, 'for 
the sake of the public'. Of course, one danger was that such developments would invite 
a movement in newspaper coverage more fully towards the symbolisation of militancy 
and unaccountable union power associated with 1979 but associated with this was the 
307 
emergence of a growing number of unofficial union sources to whom correspondents 
could turn for additional contextual information. In this Guardian item, Roger Poole is 
restricted to a single line quotation where as a local branch representative is quoted at 
length. 
Unofficial union action provides a powerful stimulus for labour correspondents to 
seek out rank and file sources not subject to the disciplines which can be exerted at a 
national level within union organisations. As correspondents grew more familiar with 
the political geography of the unions beyond the capital in the final phase of the 
dispute, so the unions' strategy to exert centralised control over information flows 
collapsed. For four months, the unions had been surprisingly successful in ensuring that 
they spoke with one voice, often quite literally through the presentations of one man. In 
the final weeks a dozen or so different voices emerged to provide points of contact for 
j oumalists. 
The point should not be over-stated. As the Guardian item of the 13th January 
illustrated, the union side were still able to develop several positive themes, including 
the commitment of suspended crews to providing unpaid, unofficial services and even, 
with the help of two local authorities, a full alternative ambulance service with 
volunteer crews. For example, the Financial Times published an item, 'Unpaid workers 
of the emergency services' on 9th February (page 11). At Westminster, the work of 
Charlotte Atkins and Bob Amberley (COHSE) in briefing opposition shadow ministers 
and back bench MP' s of all parties, also assisted in generating some additional media 
coverage (22) and evidence of continuing public support for the unions (23) and a 
record donation of over four million pounds to their cause (Guardian 5th February 1990 
page 4), provided further symbolic material. 
And yet, the overwhelming preoccupation of journalists working for both 
sympathetic and more instinctively hostile papers was with the accelerating amount of 
· unofficial-strike action. On the 16th January seventeen stations in North London voted 
-for strike action, dubbed by the Guardian 'official' (17th January page 2) presumably 
because it followed a regional ballot, although the national union leadership opposed it. 
Two days later unofficial action spread to Manchester and in the following weeks to 
Dorset, Hampshire, Surrey, the West Midlands and Merseyside. Even in the more 
sympathetic papers, this coverage was often damaging to the union cause. Under the 
headline, 'London Crews Launch Unofficial Strike' (25th January 1990 page 3), it was 
reported that crews were beginning indefinite strike action, 'defying the appeal made 
by Roger Poole' and exacerbating a 'damaging split' in the unions. A NUPE branch 
secretary, Eric Roberts, was quoted as saying, 
'We talked it through and assessed the situation and the 
feeling was that the ordinary worker is not being 
properly represented. ' 
The item continued by detailing further unofficial action about to occur in Manchester 
and Cheshire. The following day the Guardian reported court injunctions being won 
against striking crews in Surrey and Oxfordshire. Similarly, in other papers headlines 
appeared such as, 
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'First Crews Strike as Dispute Intensifies' (Ff 12th January 1990 page 7) 
'Pressure for all Out 999 Strike Increases' (Independent 24th January 1990 page 2). 
These developments, of course, made the unions vulnerable to the imposition of the 
traditional news frames characteristic of coverage of industrial relations in earlier 
decades. Thus, despite the Daily Express' criticisms of Kenneth Clarke and sensitivity 
to the existence of public sympathy for the ambulance crews, it regarded the prospect 
of strike action as evidence of sinister forces at work: 
'999 PAY BATTLE HUACKED' 
'Political extremists were accused last night of 
trying to hijack the 19 week pay dispute last 
night. Union leaders said an organisation called 
the National Ambulance Delegates committee was 
trying to provoke an all out stoppage. 
The committee had already held a series of 
meetings in the Midlands which resulted in 
calls for strike ballots. Its organisers 
were denounced as 'wild eyed trots' by a senior 
NUPE source. 
But more ambulance staff look set to walk out 
despite pleas from union leaders. 
Strike ballots are to take place in Hereford and 
Worcester and crews in North London voted to 
walk out. Union leaders also failed to prevent 
a walk out in Tottenham.' 
(Daily Express 18th January 1990 page 2). 
The introduction of sinister 'extremists' as an explanatory mechanism with which to 
reconcile the involvement of consensually approved social groups ('mercy men'), with 
morally condemned behaviour ('going on strike'), is a familiar feature noted in several 
discussions of news media coverage of social conflict (Cohen and Young,l973; 
Morely,1976). A novel element in this case, is the apparent active involvement of a 
'senior' member of the deviant group in the construction of the ideological 
representation. As a 'fire fighting' line during this period, the unions sought to 
emphasise that strike action was not supported by the national leadership or most 
branches and that, secondly, responsibility for such developments lay with the 
Government which had deliberately provoked strike action in an effort to erode public 
support (24). 'Mr Kenneth Clarke is not going to provoke a strike in Britain's 
ambulance service. We are not going to crack' (Guardian 24th January page 2) claimed 
Roger Poole. Poole offered 'people power' (fifteen minute lunch time demonstrations 
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involving the public) as alternatives to strike action (Independent 24th January page 2). 
Nevertheless, the interpretative frameworks in news items shifted further and further 
from the unions' preferred interpretative agenda and, as a consequence, the unions' 
success in terms of the evaluative dimension also began to wane, as the theme of strike 
action dominated coverage. 
As unofficial action spread across the country, so the unions' problems intensified. A 
report in the Guardian, 'Mersey Crews Back All Out Strike' (20th February 1990) 
illustrates their difficulties. By this stage, the union leaderships found themselves 
drawing from the employers repertoire in pointing to the thinness of majorities in 
favour of unofficial action. Roger Poole claimed that he was confident, 'after speaking 
to the Branch Secretary that members will not depart from the national strategy for 
providing emergency cover' and yet this is contradicted in the very next paragraph by a 
local NUPE shop steward who insists that it is for the local branch to decide what will 
happen next. Such cracks were enthusiastically exploited by the employers side; an area 
health authority official commented that it was a 'great pity that crews had decided to 
go against their own national leadership'. 
The Si&nificance of the Unions' Media Campai&n' 
In considering only newspaper coverage, rather than the unions' interventions through 
broadcasting media, the conclusions drawn have to be qualified. Roger Poole, for 
example, was widely regarded as an effective 'television performer' (Woolas,1990). 
Nevertheless, print and broadcasting news media are inextricably and symbiotically 
linked; the broadcasting news media observe broadly the same rhythms and 
imperatives. The successes and subsequent difficulties experienced by the unions in 
implementing their media strategy were almost certainly reflected in broadcasting as 
well as newspaper output. 
An assessment of the overall success of the unions media work depends, of course, 
upon the yardstick employed. Public sympathy for the unions appeared strong 
throughout with opinion polls registering around a constant eighty per cent support for 
the crews (Hutchings,l989; Woolas,l990). As one health correspondent interviewed 
for this study pointed out, NHS technicians, also in dispute at the beginning of this 
period, probably had a better case for significant improvements in pay on the basis of 
the principle of comparability, but their cause received very little news media attention. 
The extent to which the union media strategy contributed to the continuing levels of 
strong public support in the Ambulance Dispute is impossible to determine precisely. 
Clearly, the ambulance crews and the nature of their work in an emergency service, 
saving lives with blue flashing lights, and their association with popular heroic medical 
mythologies, were an attractive raw material for news treatments, irrespective of the 
strategies employed by the unions. Nevertheless, the unions were able to exploit these 
intrinsic advantages to secure some notable successes in terms of the evaluative 
dimension in news coverage. This helped to minimise the danger that the old 'Winter 
of Discontent' news frames might be resurrected. Luck played a part here as no 
incidents occurred where it could be established beyond doubt that the dispute alone 
contributed to patient mortality (25). 
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Public support and effective media work, however, proved insufficient weapons to 
secure for the unions their main objectives, identified at the outset of the dispute. 
Indeed, Roger Poole and the union leadership had to engage in yet more media work in 
an effort to 'sell' the eventual agreement to members. Poole's claim that 'the staggering 
deal' had 'driven a coach and horses through the government's pay policy' (The Sun 
24th February page 2) was regarded sceptically by the press and many union members 
(the Sun, for example, headlined its report as '999 Men Accuse Poole of Caving In'). 
Although securing a slightly higher pay award over two years, the eventual agreement 
conceded neither the principle of parity with other emergency services, nor an 
automatic pay mechanism. 
However, for the purposes of this study, we need only to consider the success of the 
unions' media strategy in its own terms. Did the unions' relatively sophisticated media 
work 'make a difference' to the coverage which the health unions experienced in daily 
newspapers, or was the pessimism of NelJ Myers regarding union media work, five 
years earlier, justified in the case of the Ambulance Dispute, too ? Firstly, the union 
strategy demonstrated that broadsheet newspapers, political affiliations not 
withstanding, do offer opportunities or 'spaces' within which unions can insert and 
communicate important elements of their preferred interpretative agendas (26). 
Secondly, in the early phase of the dispute, the unions scored one or two extraordinary 
successes in the ideologically most hostile Tory tabloids, as wen as the broadsheet 
papers. This was achieved through a carefu11y constructed appeal to conventional news 
values and the popular mythologies of medicine. 
Thirdly, it is clear that without effective union work at the beginning of the dispute, 
the news frames employed were likely to be have drawn from the 'stock of 
representations' accumulated through earlier decades of industrial relations coverage, 
particularly the 1979 Winter of Discontent. The very early coverage of the dispute in 
the Daily Mirror (see page 295) provides one glimpse of how this might have unfolded. 
Later, during the final stages of the dispute, as more crews were 'locked out' and the 
prospect of strike action loomed larger, not only images of the 1979 Winter of 
discontent but also the 1984/85 Coal Strike began to appear in some newspapers. Thus, 
in January and February 1990, photographs of ambulance workers huddled around 
braziers were featured, reminiscent of the NUM pickets (27), and some reports began 
to anticipate a 'drift back to work' or more weakly a 'dribble' (28), even though the 
vast majority of crews had never sought to stop work in the first place. For a 
considerable period of time, the unions' strategy succeeded in minimising the extent to 
which these kinds of news frames were applied. 
It seems, then, that effective media practices, or a 'professional approach' as the 
union press officers would describe it, did 'make a difference'. A limited and 
simplified preferred interpretative agenda, one which could be communicated through 
concise and distinct propositions, helped to ensure that the union message was tailored 
to the requirements of both broadsheet and tabloid correspondents. Roger Poole 
phrased 'sound bites' to good effect and press releases and statements were crafted in a 
way which drew upon the conventional news values of drama, immediacy, human 
interest, conflict and personalisation. In the early phase of the dispute, at least, in 
which the unions by default were permitted to set the pace, a range of symbolic cues 
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were successfully highlighted to counter the danger posed by pre-existing industrial 
relations news frames. By encouraging journalists to draw upon the experiences and 
perspectives of 'ordinary crews' at local stations, the dispute for a time, at least, was 
both 'feminised' and 'individualised' and this undermined threatening images of 
masculine collective strength, allowing a much more favourable evaluative dimension 
to be communicated. Journalists continued to show an interest in ordinary members, 
particularly female staff, their families, the difficulties of managing on low incomes 
and the pressures of the work, for much of the dispute. The union side, aware of the 
need to provide 'fresh angles' to maintain media interest, managed this quite 
successfully through, for example, the visit to ACAS, an 'open letter' to Kenneth 
Clarke, an ambulance rally in Trafalgar Square, and the fifteen minute lunch time 
public protest. 
There were, however, some significant costs involved in developing the union media 
strategy, and the effectivity of the tactics employed was fmite. By explicitly framing 
their message in terms of dominant, mainstream values the union leadership had to 
embrace a set of political and ideological constraints. Militant unionism had to be 
explicitly disavowed; the traditional values of the union movement submerged below a 
discourse of 'reasonableness' and 'common-sense trade unionism'. In the course of the 
dispute searching questions were implicitly posed regarding the nature of work place 
relations and hierarchical control, as ambulance crews organised their own management 
and control systems, and in two cases, their own alternative ambulance services. 
However, a media strategy based upon the utilisation of mainstream values offered few 
opportunities to develop such themes, although the review of union journalism (chapter 
three) suggests little appetite amongst union leaderships for such projects, in any case. 
By offering opportunities for journalists to 'humanise' and 'individualise' the dispute 
through 'human interest' angles, the unions secured favourable evaluative coverage, at 
least in the early stages, but the inevitable price to be paid for this strategy was an 
obscuring of the institutional and structural context necessary for a comprehensive 
appreciation of the unions' preferred interpretative framework. 
The Ambulance Dispute provided an opportunity to assess the effectivity of 
proactive union media work because it represented a combination of favourable 
conditions. If a union media strategy was to 'work' anywhere, it would be in 
circumstances such as those of this dispute. After ten years of the Thatcherite 
onslaught, the pendulum of public opinion had swung back to the point where opinion 
polls indicated that trade unions were no longer regarded as unaccountable, baronial 
power-bases. At the same time, polls also indicated growing public anxiety regarding 
the future of the NHS and its funding and, in the public mind, low pay awards for NHS 
staff were all symptoms of these deeper problems. Ambulance staff, along with nurses, 
were held high in public esteem and benefited from the circulation of the popular 
heroic mythologies regarding medicine and the provision of care. And finally, in 
NALGO, COHSE, NUPE and the GMB, there were four of the most 'media 
conscious' unions in Britain. NALGO had the largest press and publicity department 
amongst TUC affiliates and invested very significant resources in media work. Lynn 
Bryan (NUPE) enjoyed an extremely high reputation amongst labour correspondents 
but the press officers at the other health unions were also highly respected. And finally, 
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the imminent merger between three of the unions to form UNISON, meant that 
tentative organisational links had already been established which smoothed the path 
towards a unified and co-operative approach. 
Certainly, it might be pointed out that news media organisations were no longer pre-
occupied with labour and industrial news. Labour correspondents were a declining 
breed and unions found it harder to interest journalists in union stories. And yet, even 
in this respect, the circumstances were relatively favourable as news desk appetites for 
'union stories' had recently been temporarily stimulated, once more, by a series of high 
profile public sector disputes (Bassett, 1988). 
However, it is clear that the unions' media strategy was at best only a partial 
success. While some stunning successes in terms of the evaluative dimension were 
secured, particularly in the early phase, it was much more difficult for the unions to 
maintain such success in terms of their preferred interpretative framework. Again, 
particularly in the early phase, a deliberately simplified interpretative agenda was 
communicated quite effectively, in the absence of a sustained response from employers 
or government. And yet, even here, as with many industrial disputes, the strength of 
the union case depended upon particular historic and technical detail which the unions 
recognised was extremely difficult to encode in news reports. To sustain news media 
interest in a protracted dispute is a difficult task which requires substantial material and 
symbolic resources. Almost inevitably, as the union side began to exhaust their supply 
of 'fresh angles', journalists' attention turned towards the traditional news frames of 
industrial reporting, the consequences of disputes and potential impacts for the general 
public. Power and control over material and symbolic resources cannot be ignored as 
factors in any assessment of media work. The greater an organisation's command over 
resources (particularly staft), the greater its capacity to generate 'fresh angles' and 
··work in imaginative or 'proactive' ways. Unlike a number of private and public sector 
organisations which enjoy either the formal or informal capacity to curb and police 
their employees contact with news media, trade unions are usually organised in ways 
which foster public debate and open criticism. Indeed, a number of unions have 
invested, over the years, significant resources in training their members to work more 
effectively with news media organisations. One consequence of this relative openness, 
· is that attempts to exercise centralised control over the flow information to the outside 
world becomes problematic. Hence, the public evidence of discord and friction between 
the union leaderships and branches in the final weeks of the dispute. In short, even in 
relatively favourable political and ideological circumstances, trade unions are still 
relatively disadvantaged because of their natures as organisations, because of the nature 
of the messages which they typically need to communicate, and because of their 
relatively limited command over material, political, and symbolic resources. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion 
The project commenced by asking whether Nell Myers, the NUM's press officer, was 
right to declare in despair that the use of media strategies and public relations 
techniques were simply not options for the union because in dealing with journalists, 
including labour correspondents, it faced its 'enemies front line troops'. We have now 
arrived at the point at which it is possible to answer this question and consider why it 
was worth asking. What is the theoretical significance of exploring the changing role of 
trade unions in Britain as news sources? 
The Nell Myers position, as an example of a 'class-fundamentalist' and 
instrumentalist account of power in the news media arena, is an over-simplification and 
from a union perspective unhelpful. Labour correspondents cannot be dismissed as 
'front-line troops', even if some of the news organisations they work for are 
institutionally hostile to the interests of the labour movement. This research has 
demonstrated that the relationships which develop between journalists and unions as 
news sources, are far more complex than the Nell Myers position acknowledges but , 
by the same token, the problems for unions posed by these complex relations are 
actually more intractable. To dismiss union use of media strategies, out of hand, as the 
'class fundamentalist' instrumental model of news media relations does, is to 
underestimate the extent to which, in particular circumstances, unions can secure some 
tactical successes through effective press and broadcasting work. The task for unions 
is to understand the nature of the relationships which develop between news sources 
and correspondents within the spheres of industrial and political journalism, and the 
opportunities, as well as the constraints, which are are implied by these. 
If the class fundamentalist model fails to recognise the possibilities which arise 
from the complexities of union-news media relations, it also fails to acknowledge the 
extent to which the features of news media coverage of trade unions which provoke 
complaint, are explicable not only through analysis of the workings and political 
positioning of news organisations but also from the practice and ideological 
positioning of trade unions, themselves. As this conclusion is being written, rumours 
circulate of the possible, imminent expulsion of the NUM, itself, from the TUC for 
consorting too intimately with the non-affiliated Offshore Industries Liaison 
Committee, a militant organisation disliked by the TUC as much for its insistence upon 
articulating a radical critique of existing workplace hierarchies and social relations of 
production, as for its threat as a recruitement rival (1). This throws into sharp relief the 
political and ideological boundaries which delimit the radicalism of the mainstream 
labour movement, - boundaries which are reflected in the agendas unions present both 
in their own journals (chapter three) and in those which they seek to present through 
the news media. And yet, it is also the case that the conservative tendencies within the 
labour movement are reinforced by the practices and constraints involved in fostering 
'successful' relationships with journalists and mainstream news organisations. As we 
have seen, for labour correspondents and other journalists, the most effective union 
press officers,- those for whom journalists will accord high status and invest time in 
listening to,- are invariably those who recognise the priority of conventional news 
values and news frames. For many union press officers, this is all part and parcel of the 
'professionalism' which they seek to bring to their position, for others it is a concious 
'price' which they choose to pay in order to implement their media strategies. Either 
way, the framing of their media work in terms of the requirements of mainstream news 
values and frames, imposes limitations upon what can be articulated as an industrial or 
political agenda. The integration of union agendas with mainstream news frameworks 
is not necessarily a process of friction,- Connell has pointed to the overlap between the 
ideological perspectives of those 'at the top', as represented through the mainstream 
news media, and those 'at the bottom', including many ordinary trade unionists (1980). 
Nevertheless, whether conciously or unconciously unions pay a price when they 
employ 'accomodative' media strategies (chapter two); to seek to communicate a 
political agenda through mainstream news media outlets is to accept, at least in part, a 
process of incorporation in which the requirements and possibilities determined by the 
practice of exisiting news organisations, shapes what is said and how it is articulated. 
As researchers have noted in the context of studying environmental groups 
(Cracknell,l993), the poverty lobby (Whitely and Winyard,1983) and community 
action groups (Goldenberg,1975), the classic insider/outsider dilemma (Grant ,1990) is 
faced not only by groups positioned ideologically and politically on the fringes or 
outside the arena of the party political elites but also by those similarly positioned in 
relation to news media elites. The problems for those groups remaining on the outside 
are illustrated by the experience of the NUM, during and after the Coal Strike. In 
making few concessions either to the news values and formats of mainstream 
journalism or the routine practices of news organisations, the NUM found itself in a 
position equivalent to an outsider group, frequently experiencing significant difficulties 
in communicating key elements of its preferred interpretative agenda. And yet, to 
move 'inside' in relation to media elites, just as with political elites, it is often necessary 
to compromise political positions and trim the interpretative frameworks which are 
presented to the public channels of political communication. The dangers in this 
situation are two-fold. Firstly, 'incorporation' into the news production process may 
encourage unions, themselves, to limit and truncate some of the essential, albeit 
complex arguments and observations, in their public analysis. As a NALGO press 
officer put it almost twenty years ago: 
" ... trade union news is likely to be covered if it is 'dressed up' in a manner which 
conforms to the media consensus view of what is a good story. This may involve 
the unions using techniques of the media in the way they are often used with the 
unions, for example, by learning the 'tricks' involved in interviewing, arranging news 
or 'newsworthy' situations. This has implications for the whole question of 'news 
management', some of which may be disturbing. It is disturbing, for example that 
producers of news and potential sources of news should come to collude in the 
stereotyping of information in crude news models because there are few other ways 
of access. This, however, may be the result of the unspoken consensus underlying 
the news about the established order of society." (Griffiths,1977:69). 
Secondly, there are dangers in becoming preoccupied with media presentation to the 
extent that it becomes a policy straight jacket, cramping and smothering the political 
and organisational work of a union. As an american labour commentator warned thirty 
five years ago, union leaders must be wary not to allow, 'publicity about the worth of 
unions to be a substitute for worthy activity' (Pomper,1959:491). 
However, having acknowledged these constraints and dangers, it is still possible to 
conclude that union media strategies, in certain circumstances and constructed in 
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particular ways, can demonstrate a significant effectivity. The evidence produced by 
this research project may help unions to think more selectively about which forms of 
media strategy are worth pursuing and what resources should be invested. From the 
present investigation we can conclude that two popular models for 'news media work' 
are likely to be ineffective and inappropriate for trade unions and, quite possibly, for 
most other 'advocate' organisations. The 'high technology, high investment' model 
which advocates large amounts of investment in news encoding technology and 
services (Universal News or other electronic news link services, media output 
monitoring services, etc) is likely to prove ineffective and cost-inefficient if the 
objective is to present a union's preferred interpretative framework to the news media. 
This is not to suggest that investment in media technology is not justified in relation to 
other communication goals, for example, enhancing communication between branch 
memberships and union leaderships. Secondly, the 'corporate public relations' model 
which employs the concepts and vocabulary of 'corporate PR' to define and organise 
strategic communication plans for months, perhaps years, in advance, and which 
present the process of 'corporate imaging' as a science, rather than an art, is equally 
inappropriate for trade unions. 
What both models fail to recognise is the importance, in the context of news 
media work, of the exchange relationships between news sources and journalists. It is 
not through investment in the technology of news encoding but through the 
development of an intelligent, strategic understanding of the needs of journalists and 
the control of 'contextual information', that trade unions are likely to make some 
impact upon the way in which labour and industrial stories are constructed. This, as 
many press officers were acknowledging as the study progressed, is now best done 
through the use of a telephone and a FAX machine, rather than investment in 
expensive equipment, however capable it might be of producing and distributing so 
many press releases per minute. Without effective exchange relationships and an 
understanding of the importance of 'contextual information', the vast majority of these 
press releases will end in the news room bin (2). Equally, the 'corporate PR' model 
implies an overly mechanical understanding of the relationships between journalists and 
news sources. These relationships cannot be condensed into a set of annual 
communication goals and differentiated targets; the efforts of the union in this study 
most wedded to the corporate approach left a majority oflabour correspondents 
unimpressed. 
What matters much more than the elegance of a corporate communications plan, 
for the purposes of news media work, is establishing, in the eyes oflabour 
correspondents and other journalists, firstly a reputation for possessing valuable 
'contextual information'; for being 'on the inside track', close to the important arenas of 
decision making. And secondly, demonstrating a 'professional' understanding of the 
needs of news organisations, of the news values and news frames which guide the 
practice of journalists, and of the importance of accessibility. Hard pressed 
correspondents are always likely to feel well disposed towards press officers who they 
can contact easily and who usually 'have something to say'. The most 'successful' union 
press officers, identified by journalists in this study, - Charlie Whelan (AEU), Mary 
McGuire (NALGO), Lynn Bryan (NUPE),- did not necessarily weild large budgets or 
wave complex corporate plans around the press office, but they all prioritised 
accessibility and responsiveness, a willingness to meet journalists halfway. 
Now, this is not to present an idealist account of relationships between the mass 
media and other insitutions in society. Material resources and material relationships are 
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absolutely crucial in structuring the nature and success of union news media work. 
However, these material resources are of a particular kind and they work in 
combination with symbolic and political resources (Goldenberg, 1975:39-47; 
Schlesinger, 1990:77). Thus, staffing levels, for example, within a press and publicity 
department are important in determining the extent to which unions can initiate rather 
than merely respond to journalists' enquiries. At NATFHE, the two press officers 
were often unable to depart from routine media work simply through a lack of time, 
given their additional responsibilites for the production of two union journals and a 
range of other publicity materials. Useful contacts at organisations beyond the routine 
education and labour beats (at, for example, BBC Radio) could not be exploited. In 
contrast, corporate organisations and departments of state, can often 'out-gun' non-
official news sources, as eventually illustrated during the 1984-85 Coal Strike. The 
capacity of union press officers to mobilise and exploit political and symbolic 
resources, often depends upon their concrete organisational position within a trade 
union. Indeed, the exchange relationships which develop between union press officers 
and journalists are essentially material in the sense that they are underpinned by the 
concrete practices involved in negotiating and exercising control over flows of 
information from within trade unions as organisations. 
The experience of the unions involved in the 1989 Ambulance Dispute provides 
some indication of both the possibilities and the limitations offered to unions in 
developing news media strategies. By employing accomodative techniques; by 
selecting themes which could be harnessed to mainstream news values, and in 
embracing the parameters determined by conventional news frames, the health unions 
secured some notable successes in news coverage. This was particularly the case, in 
the early phases of the dispute, when the employers and government allowed the 
unions to set the pace in terms of unfolding 'new developments', and when the unions 
were able to exercise effective centralised control over information flows to the news 
media, including 'contextual information'. However, the Ambulance Dispute also points 
to the limitations of such a strategy. It suggests that unions are more likely to 
experience success in terms of the evaluative dimension of coverage, rather than the 
interpretative (3), and that unions, even in relatively favourable circumstances, with 
considerable public goodwill and disenchantment with government, find it necessary to 
trim and considerably simplifY their preferred interpretative agendas. This is a dilemma 
which British unions do not face alone. In the USA, Douglas describes the price paid 
by American unions for seeking to harness elements of their prefered agendas to wider 
issues in the public domain: 
'It makes a good deal of sense to link tabor's public relations progranunes 
to broader issues wherever possible - both in ongoing programs and 
those that are developed to meet special circumstances. It must be 
realized, however, that when this is done, basic tabor-management 
issues often become sub- merged. The problems are humanized and 
dramatized by the media and short term solutions satisfY a concerned 
public. But the overall bias in labor coverage by the media is not 
significantly changed'. (Douglas,I986:285) 
Precisely the same could be said of the media coverage secured by unions in the 
Ambulance Dispute. Public anxieties about funding of the NHS and popular 
mythologies associated with nursing, health care and medicine were exploited skillfully 
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by the health unions to secure, sometimes, highly favourable coverage in terms of the 
evaluative dimension but this was, frequently, at the expense of more detailed 
information necessary to communicate the analytic detail of the union case within the 
interpretative framework. 
The Ambulance Dispute also suggests that if campaigns become protracted 
unions are placed at a growing disadvantage in battles to secure ground along both the 
interpretative and the evaluative dimensions. This again, is a product of the unequal 
distribution of material, political and symbolic resources. Ingenuity and creativity in 
devising 'fresh angles' and different news opportunities are not wholly determined by 
staffing and material resources but such factors can often tell over the distance of a 
protracted industrial dispute. At the end of the day, there are only so many ways in 
which non-official source groups can mobilise symbolic resources (public goodwill, 
medical mythologies of selfless sacrifice, etc) to secure access to the news media 
without resorting to the politics of spectacle (stunts, public demonstrations, etc) which 
are often futile because they secure 'coverage' but not 'access' (Ericson et a!, 1989:5), 
publicity but not opportunities to present a reasoned case. Political and corporate 
power, at least, when it is exercised publicly and visibly, has a news value in itself 
which, again, over the long term, will 'automatically' attract the interest of 
correspondents. And finally, the Ambulance Dispute demonstrated how difficult it is 
for trade unions to maintain, for a sustained period, centralised control over the 
information flows to which journalists can get access. Unions are inherently 'leaky' 
organisations, a consequence of their relatively open structures and the inevitable 
political currents which flow within, but also a function of their relative lack of power. 
As effective control over information flows weakens, so it becomes ever more difficult 
to maintain a coherent news media strategy. In contrast, employees in departments of 
state, private corporations, privatised utilities, NHS Trust hospitals and even academic 
institutions, will testifY to the ways in which powerful, relatively closed organisations 
can exert control over the nature of the information which their staff place in the public 
domain. 
Beyond these points which focus upon the immediate difficulties which unions face 
in developing news media strategies, this study has also pointed to the changes in the 
political and economic environment, - changes over which unions can exert little 
control, yet which have the most profound consequences for their capacity to 
undertake successful news media work. Chapter two described such changes; the 
collapse of manufacturing and traditional industry, the growth in service sector, part-
time, casualised and non-unionised employment; changes in the organisation of the 
labour process even within 'core' employment sectors; the consequent decline in union 
membership and further emasculation as the Thatcherite legislative onslaught 
simultaneously removed workplace rights and reached within to prescribe how unions 
should organise their internal affairs. The history of the development of labour and 
industrial journalism (chapters six and seven) further underlines the extent to which 
trade unions have always been dependent upon a media environment, the 'labour beat', 
over which they exercised far less influence than was commonly supposed. Ultimately, 
the labour beat proved to be more intimately connected to the geography of the state 
and the national political arena and its decline, just at the moment when unions began 
to perceive its importance to them, reflected both the erosion of union power in the 
workplace, the political marginalisation of unions resulting from the dismemberment of 
the corporate state, and a deliberate strategy exercised by the new Conservative 
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administration in 1979 to exclude previously influential labour correspondents from 
vital information flows. 
Leaving aside problems of conceptual clarity (would trade unions at the height of 
their political influence be included as 'primary definers'?) recent commentators are 
quite right to point to the ahistorical and overly mechanical ways in which the concept 
of 'primary definer' has been applied in the past (Schlesinger, 1990; Anderson,1993; 
Deacon and Golding,1994). Non-official sources do have a greater capacity to 
challenge and modifY the definitions or interpretative frameworks which are offered to 
the news media by 'primary definers' than has sometimes been suggested and 
newspaper coverage during the Ambulance Dispute provides further confirmation of 
this. At the same time, in tracing the relationship between the changing geography of 
the state and the shape of the labor beat and in noting the impact of changes in the 
political complexion of the dominant political elite upon the labour beat, this study has 
also provided one historical account of how the mechanics of primary definition are 
modified but maintained. By virtue of its capacity to exercise power, the state is 
'newsworthy' and this allows it an important capacity to both initiate and terminate 
information flows. This is not to suggest that the shrinking of the labour beat is 
entirely a consequence of changes in the orientation of the state since 1979; the decline 
oflabour journalism is the result of a much more complex process in which the 
responses of news organisations to perceived changes in political and ideological 
enviromnents are overlaid upon long term economic changes in the structural 
positioning of trade unions. Nevertheless, the story of the rise in the fortunes of labour 
and industrial journalism in the immediate post-war period, as the corporatist character 
of the state grew and its departmental structure expanded accordingly, and the 
subsequent reversal in the fortunes of this branch of journalism, with the arrival of the 
Thatcher administration after 1979, provides one illustration of the state's strategic 
power in relation to primary definition. By the same token, it further underlines the 
relative powerlessness of trade unions as non-official sources, and their inability to 
exert a comparable counter-gravitional pull upon news organisations. 
One of the paradoxes of the late capitalist modem age is that trade unions should 
awaken to the importance of political communication and respond to the structural 
transformations associated with late capitalism by prioritising media work, at the very 
historical moment when their capacity to engage in such work is significantly 
weakening. And here is to be found another paradox. With the proliferation in news 
broadcast channels and burgeoning communication technologies, it might be assumed 
that entry to the public sphere might be made significantly more accessible. Trade 
unions in representing, still, several millions of employees, have an important role to 
play in the advancement of citizenship through access to the public sphere. And yet, it 
is also clear that the costs involved in mobilising communication resources produce a 
widening differential in the capacity of different social groups to secure such access 
(Golding,1990). The main criticisms of Habermas' concept of the public sphere are 
familiar and have been touched upon in this study above (chapter one). A 
romanticisation of the early bourgeois public sphere of the eighteenth century is 
matched by, perhaps, an overly pessimistic account of the impact of media 
conglomeration, the growth of advertising and public relations industries, rising access 
costs and audience subordination, upon the public sphere of the twentieth century 
(Curran,1991). As Garnham forcefullly argues, in order to assess the contemporary 
health of the public sphere, we have to consider a process omitted in the original 
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fonnulation of the concept, namely that of mediation and more specifically, the 'role 
and social interests associated with knowledge broking' (Gamham,l986:44). 
Trade unions have an important potential role to play in the allocation of 
citizenship and in the associated presentation of particular fonns of knowledge to the 
public sphere. This study has pointed to some of the ways in which, despite the 
conflicting interests of other powerful 'knowledge brokers', trade unions can find 
opportunities to make effective interventions within the contemporary public sphere. 
However, equally importantly, it has traced the ways in which trade unions are 
significantly disadvantaged in relation to other more powerful social groups or 
'knowledge brokers' seeking access to the public sphere. To extend Gamham's critical 
point, in omitting the process of mediation from the original fonnulation, Habennas 
fails to consider the possible intimate connections between aspiring entrants to the 
public sphere and those, such as journalists, who can facilitate entry . As we have seen, 
trade union press officers are likely to have to embrace relationships with journalists 
which both promote opportunities for the presentation of trade union perspectives but 
which, simultaneously, delimit the parameters of debate within the public sphere. 
Beyond this, the position of trade unions in relation to the political and economic 
environment and their command over limited material, political and symbolic 
resources, constrains their participation in the public sphere. In this sense, the ability 
of trade unionists to claim communicative rights of citizenship within the public sphere 
is, at best, provisional and contingent upon a process of continual struggle in which 
they are significantly disadvantaged. 
This point, in turn, prompts more general questions regarding the theoretical 
application of the concept of the public sphere. As Golding (1995:29) comments, the 
concept as a spacial metaphor does not immediately direct attention to the symbolic 
and political practices and conflicts involved in the production of public discourse. This 
study may serve as a corrective to some of the more static accounts of the public 
sphere in which participants and institutional structures are taken as 'given' and in 
which insufficient account is taken of the dynamic processes of conflict and change, 
through which the institutional structures supporting the public sphere shift and the 
balance of advantage between participating groups alters. In examining the contested 
nature oflabour and industrial news; the relationships of tension and symbiotic 
dependence which characterise union-journalist interation, and the implications of inter 
and intra-union rivalry for news communication, we are reminded of the inherent 
conflicts which are bound up in relations between 'primary definers', non-official 
sources and news media. 
This study also underlines the point that the institutional structures which underpin 
the public sphere are not static but are subject to change and transfonnation, in part as 
a consequence of political struggle. Thus, the labour and industrial beat is re-cast and 
compressed through changes in the geography of the state and changes in the strategic 
thinking of news organisations. And yet, these conflicts and dynamic processes occur 
within the nonnative framework of the modem public sphere and the price of access is 
acceptance of these rules as legitimate. No longer are these rules or nonnative 
obligations a reflection of the culture of the patrons of the Eighteenth century coffee 
shop or members of the Nineteenth century debating society. They are now primarily 
defined in tenns of the needs and practices of the news media, on the one hand, and the 
ideological boundaries of the political elite, on the other. As we have seen, for trade 
unions the cost of access to the public sphere is a willingness to acknowledge the 
imperatives of daily news production and the perspectives of mainstream labourism. 
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Fears for the future of the public sphere are sometimes regarded as over-pessimistic 
(Curran, 1991 :46). Nevertheless, Golding identifies a number of continuing threats to 
the health of the public sphere including the uncertain future of public service 
broadcasting, the declining diversity of the British press, the rise of the 'centripetal' 
public relations oriented state, and the growing inequalities in access as costs of 
communicative work rise (1995: 30). This study further underlines the view that the 
grounds for a pessimistic reading ofHabermas may be justified. To begin with, it 
provides a further illustration of the extent to which the public sphere may be 
compressed, at least in relation to the claims of particular social groups and 
organisations. Schlesinger and Tumber found that for those non-official source groups 
seeking to develop public discussion of criminal justice issues, only the quality 
newspapers and public service broadcasting offered an arena for sustained media work 
(1995:271-273). Though environmental pressure groups have targeted a wider range 
of media including tabloid papers and popular magazines (Anderson,1993:57), in the 
main they, too, are preoccupied primarily with the broadsheet papers and public 
service broadcasting and this study confirms that trade unions are similarly positioned. 
At a national level, again only broadsheet papers and public service broadcasting news 
organisations offered even moderately fertile routine terrain for trade union press 
officers, although the importance for trade unions oflocalised or regional public 
spheres (Downing,l992) should not be ignored. The point, then, is that trade unions in 
company with many other social organisations representing important constituencies 
are dependent upon a relatively limited number of channels of access, some of which 
clearly face an uncertain future. And yet, as the costs of communicative work rise, 
unions and other similar groups grow ever more dependent upon such compressed 
channels of access. 
A related point concerns a dimension missing from many accounts of the modem 
public sphere but which is highlighted by the present study. Non-official source groups 
are heavily dependent upon the existence of groups of journalists with specialised 
expertise and interests. While Negrine (1993) may be correct to cast a sceptical eye 
over claims made by correspondents regarding the depth of their subject knowledge, it 
remains the case that the presence of specialised journalists with, at least, some 
expertise, professional interest, and personal contacts with relevant individuals and 
organisations within the field, is a pre-requisite for the maintenance of particular 
sectors within the public sphere. The decline of the labour beat brings with it a further 
shrinking of already compressed channels of access for all those groups seeking to 
promote public discussion of the politics of the workplace. 
There are further lessons to be learnt for other advocates, non-official news 
sources, and aspiring entrants to the public sphere in the experience of trade unions. 
We now live in a 'media saturated' environment, in which investment in communication 
work and media activity has never been so intense. It is tempting to regard media work 
and the art of presentation as a great panacea, particularly as developments in social 
theory over the last two decades have greatly encouraged this preoccupation. In the 
post-modem vision, we are encouraged to abandon attempts to distinguish reality from 
representation; the two are regarded as collapsing into one, as we enter the age of the 
simulacra.(Baudrillard, 1983). In such a society, it follows that processes of 
symbolisation and presentation should come to be prioritised as the central political 
activities to which social organisations should address themselves. In this light, the 
experience of some trade unions represents a modem morality tale. In their new 
commitment to public relations and media work, some trade unions have accepted a 
post-modem prescription for their ills, as have any number of other groups ranging 
from charities to other organised producer and consumer groups. There is, however, a 
fundamental flaw in this vision. However, sophisticated is the grasp of the techniques 
of symbolisation and presentation, they cannot act as a substitute for an understanding 
of the ways in which power is exercised or material and political resources mobilised 
(Eidridge,1993:343-349). Trade unions have grown more sophisticated in their use of 
communication techniques and news media strategies but the decline in membership 
levels has barely been stemmed; they remain politically marginalised and while the 
health unions won the 1989 campaign, their final settlement could only be represented 
as a triumph. While some recent research, particularly in relation to environmental 
campaigns, implies that successful media work is not essentially a product of material 
processes, - the deployment of wealth or the exercise of political power 
(Anderson,1993)- the experience of trade unions strongly suggests that skillful 
deployment of media techniques and public relations tricks, in the symbolic domain, 
will only go so far. To make an effective and sustained impact along both the 
evaluative and the interpretative dimensions of news coverage, to the mobilisation of 
symbolic resources, it also necessary to add material and political resources, as well. A 
post-modem prescription will not help trade unions to secure more effective access to 
the public sphere; an understanding of which material resources to deploy and how 
they should be combined with political and symbolic resources in an integrated media 
strategy will help- a bit (subject to changes in the political and economic 
environment). 
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Notes to the Introduction 
1. This draws upon Grant's distinction between insider and outsider pressure 
groups (Grant, 1990). 
2. This is discussed further in chapters three and nine. 
3. This is illustrated in the content of particular union journals (discussed in 
chapter three) and in the news work of particular 'leading unions' (discussed 
in chapters four and five). 
4. The 'Unions 93 Conference' sponsored by the New Statesman and Society 
and New Times, included two academic papers on union communication 
work. See Riley (1993). A recent issue of 'Free Press', the journal of the 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, was also devoted to 
academic and activist perspectives on 'Trade Unions and the Media', 
Number 75, July/ August 1993. 
5. See, for example, Seyd (1975 and 1976) on the orins of Shelter and the 
Child Poverty Action Group. Also Whitley and Winyard (1983 and 1984), 
McCarthy (1986) and Banting (1979). It is clear that both Shelter and the 
CPAG were essentially media orientated lobbying organisations in their 
early years, though the CPAG sought to draw upon the scholarly skills 
of its academic supporters whilst Shelter relied more upon the media 
'barnstorming' skills of its first director, Des Wilson. See Wilson 
(1970 and 1984). 
6. This is not to condemn pluralist accounts out of hand. As Paul Hirst has 
demonstrated in his rehabilitation of Dahl, it is possible to think through these 
wider questions within a pluralist framework (Hirst, 1987). 
7. For Schlesinger, this route offers the means to transcend 'the grand debates' 
between Marxism and Pluralism, structuralism and action theory, economic or 
cultural determinism (1989:305-6). This study does not necessarily have such 
grand ambitions but it is assumed that both theoretical traditions are helpful in 
describing the various aspects of the concrete practice of journalist-source 
interaction, the process of news production and political-economic 
environment in which these processes occur. 
8. This point anticipates a fuller discussion of debates over the nature of 
political and industrial news coverage in chapter 9. 
9. The term 'news work' (adapted from Schudson 1989) is used here 
to distinguish the strategies and work of union officers engaged in 
dealing with the press and news media, as opposed to the broader 
question of overall union communication strategies. 
10. Details of this assessment are included in appendix one. 
11. The GMB was added to the original panel of trade unions, after the content 
analysis of union journals was completed. No quantitative measure of 
GMB journal content is available. The reason for this was that the 
importance of the GMB as, probably, the most ambitious union in terms 
of media strategy only emerged at a later stage in the research process 
during interviews with other union press officers and journalists. By this 
time the methodological value of a constant union panel was already lost 
for the reasons outlined in the appendix. 
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introduces a range of cost cutting measures inluding using Red Star 
parcels to transfer patients and AA Relay for road casualties 
(January/February 1990). 
Chapter Four Notes 
1. Example provided by Midge Purcell (NATFHE), interviewed 16.7.93 
2. Interview with author, 12.7.93. 
3. Midge Purcell, ibid. Also, interview with Andrew Murray (TGWU) 13.7.93 
4. Interview with Charlotte Atkins (COHSE), 16. 7.91. 
s. Ibid. 
6. Interview with John Lloyd (EETPU), 24.5.91. 
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7. Correspondence with the author, 26.8.93. 
8. Interview with the author, 13.7.93. 
9. Interview with Midge Purcell, 9.7.93. 
10. Interview with Midge Purcell, 16. 7.93. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Interview with Ken Jones (NUCPS), 7.6.91. 
13 Ibid. 
14. Interview with Nell Myers (NUM), 20.9.91. 
15. Interview with a highly respected press officer working for one of the 
larger unions. 
16. Interview with Ken Jones, op cit. 
17. Interview with Midge Purcell, 21.6.91. 
18. Interviews with Mary McGuire (NALGO), 31. 7.90. and John Lloyd, op cit. 
19. Interview with Adrian Long (GMB), 21.6.91. 
20. Interview with Charles Harvey (IPMS), 21.6.91. 
21. Interview with Ken Jones, op cit. 
22. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
23. Interview with Eddie Barrett (TGWU), 6.3.91. 
24. A preliminary survey of media resourcing conducted by telephone was 
conducted in 1988. All unions with a membership over 45,000 were contacted 
a selected few with memberships below this. 
25. At 1992/93 prices. See, 'UK Services and Price List' (January 1993), 
Two Ten Communications, 210 Old Street, London ECIV 9UN. 
26. Interview with Ken Jones, op cit. 
27. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
28. Interview with senior officer within the NUCPS, summer 1991. 
332 
29. Interview with Charlie Whelan (AEU), 6.6.91. 
30. Interview with Midge Purcell, op cit. 
31. Interview with Charles Harvey, op cit. 
32. Interview with Laurie Harris (NUR), 25.8.1989. 
33. Interview with Adrian Long, op cit. 
34. Interview with Jim Fookes (NALGO), 10.6.93. 
35. Interview with Eddie Barrett, op cit. 
36. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
37. Interview with Adrian Long, op cit. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Interview with Charlie Whelan, 12.7.93. 
40. Interview with Ken Jones, op cit. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Interview with Nell Myers, op cit. 
43. Interview conducted with a union press officer during the summer of 1991. 
Chapter F1ve Notes 
1. Interview with Eddie Barrett (TGWU), 6.3.91. 
2. Interview with Charlotte Atkins (COHSE), 16. 7.91. 
3. Interview with Adrian Long (GMB), 21.6.91. 
4. Interview with Charlie Whelan (AEU), 6.6.91. 
5. Interview with Eddie Barrett, op cit. 
6. Interview with Charlie Whelan, op cit. 
7. Ibid. 
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8. Interview with a press officer working for one of the largest unions, 
conducted in the summer of 1991. 
9. Interview with a press officer working for a large union in the public 
sector in the summer 1991. 
10. Interview with John Lloyd (EETPU), 24.5.91. 
11. Interview with Ken Jones (NUCPS), 24.5. 91. 
12. Interview with Nell Myers (NUM), 20.9.91. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Interview with Midge Purcell (NATFHE), 21.6.91. 
15. Interview with Charlotte Atkins, op cit. 
16. Interview with Laurie Harris (NUR), 25.8.1989. 
17. Interview with Mary McGuire (NALGO), 31.7.90. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Interview with Midge Purcell, op cit. 
21. Interview with Charlie Whelan, op cit. 
22. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
23. Interview with Laurie Harris, op cit. 
24. Interview with Charlotte Atkins, op cit. 
25. Observations made during the course of a visit to the 
headquarters of a large private sector union during the summer, 1991. 
26. Interview with Adrian Long, op cit. 
27. Interview with Charles Harvey, op cit. 
' 28. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
29. Interview with Charlie Whelan, op cit. 
30. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
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31. Interview with John Lloyd, op cit. 
32. Interview with Adrian Long, op cit. 
33. Interview with Nell Myers, op cit. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
37. Interview with a union Press Officer, working for a large union on the right 
of the labour movement, conducted during the Summer of 1991. 
38. Interview with Charlotte Atkins, op cit. 
39. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Interview with Eddie Barrett, op cit. 
42. Interview with Adrian Long, op cit. 
43. Interview with Eddie Barrett, op cit. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Interview with Nell Myers, op cit. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Interview with John Lloyd, op cit. 
53. Interview with Charlie Whelan, op cit. 
54. Interview with Charlotte Atk:ins, op cit. 
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55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Interview with Nell Myers, op cit. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Interview with Ken Jones, op cit. 
60. Which supports the view of Anderson (1993) in that non-official sources 
are sometimes able to fill a news vacuum. However, I would add that this 
is unlikely to be sustained when and, if, official sources begin to 
concentrate their media resources and energies upon the issue over an 
extended period. 
61. Interview with Charlotte Atkins, op cit. 
62. Interview with Mr. Lomans (NUHKW), 15. 7.91. 
63. Interview with Eddie Barrett, op cit. 
64. Interview with Adrian Long, op cit. 
65. Interview with Eddie Barrett, op cit. 
66. Interview with Charles Harvey, op cit. 
67. Interview with Midge Purcell, op cit. 
68. Interview with Charlie Whelan, op cit. 
69. Interview with Mr. Lomans, op cit. 
70. Interview with Laurie Harris, op cit. 
71. Interview with a press officer working for a large 'progressive' union, 
conducted during the summer of 1991. 
72. Interview with Mary McGuire, op cit. 
73. Interview with Charlie Whelan, op cit. Quote also appears earlier in the 
text. 
Chapter Six. Notes 
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1.. Interviews were conducted with a specific focus on the history of labour and 
industrial journalism, with Henry Clover (former labour number three on the 
Sun 1965 to 1970 and subsequently press officer at the NUT), Paul 
Routledge (former labour editor of the Times between 1969 and 1987 and 
subsequently political correspondent on the Observer), Jim Fookes 
(former labour number two at the Press Association in the sixties and 
seventies and currently in the Publicity Department at NALGO), Terry 
Pattinson former number two and then labour editor at the Daily Mirror 
during the last two decades and Clare Dover (formerly science and then 
health correspondent for first the Telegraph and then the Daily Express 
throughout the seventies and eighties). In addition, material drawn from 
previous interviews with Geoffrey Goodman (formerly the Sun and later 
labour editor of the Daily Mirror until 1987) , Philip Basset! (Financial 
Times and now Times labour editor) and David Norris (Daily Mail labour 
editor since 1982), also proved useful. As with interiew material used in 
other chapters, a number of the interviews took place on the assumption 
that sources would not be identified. Interviewees are, therefore, not 
identified except in the cases of the most clearly uncontentious material. 
However, tapes and transcripts are retained by the author. 
2. The papers consist of two envellope files packed with unsorted items arising 
through the workings of the Group. These include, minutes of some but not 
all Group Meetings, draft programmes of events for the year, letters written 
on behalf of the Group by the officers, and bills and receipts for bookings 
and expenses. These are not kept in any systematic order and have been 
passed from Secretary to Secretary over the years. It is assumed that the 
papers concerning years before 1982 have been destroyed, as the 
culture of the Group does not encourage formal archival practice. 
3. Evans (1953) confirms the formal establishment of the Labour and Industrial 
Correspondents Group in 1937. A new constitution was introduced in 
1965 which may have given rise to Seaton' s assumption that the origin 
of the group can be traced to this year (Seaton 1982:278). 
4. The National Association of Local Government Officers introduced a press 
bureau in the 1930's as did the TUC. Civil service and white collar 
associations appear to have attached more importance to public relations 
than manual unions for a number of years before andafter the War. 
5. Evans (1953).See (3). 
6. A reluctance to enforce the law allowed over one thousand ilegal disputes 
to have occured by 1941. the number accelerated through the War. Bevin 
insisted that conciliation rather than legal coercion was likely to offer the 
best solution (Barnes and Reid 1982 ppl59-163). 
7. Author's interviews with former number two and number three labour 
correspondents, lOth June 1993, 15th and 27th July 1993. This 
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situation is confirmed in accounts of contemporary correspondents, too. 
8. Only one of those journalists interviewed for the present research disputed the 
chronological framework employed here. One insisted that the onset of decline 
should be located at the beginning of the sixties rather than 1979. 
9. See Jones (1988) for an example of this kind of explanation offered 
from within journalism. 
10 A former number three in conversation with the author, lOth June 1993. 
11. MORI Surveys of Industrial and Labour Correspondents, conducted 
on behalf of British Gas and later British Rail (1982 to 1993), regularly 
showed journalists rating nationalised industries like British Rail, the 
National Coal Board, and the Electricity Boards, as amongst the best 
sources and most efficient organisations in responding to enquiries. 
this was in marked contrast to most private sector companies. 
12. Author's interview with industrial correspondents, including those who 
also had Lobby experience, 15th June 1992, 22nd September 1992 
and 4th August 1993. 
13. Papers of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group. 
14. Membership Secretaries interviewed included Terry Pattinson, Kevin 
McGuire and Paul Routledge. Their terms of office all covered the 
period between 1971 and 1993. Their estimates for previous decades 
are based upon the 'folklore' of the Group but no official membership 
records appear to have been retained before 1982. Interviews conducted 
on 12th June 1992, 24th July 1992, 4th August 1993. 
15. Interviews conducted by the author with a former labour editor and a number 
two, lOth June 1993 and 4th August 1993. 
16. Copy of the constitution produced for the 1968 AGM of the Group now in the 
possession of the author. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Interviews with former labour correspondents. Ibid. 
19. Details confirmed by number one and number two correspondents. Ibid. 
20. Interview conducted 28th July 1993 .. 
21. Interview lOth June 1993. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Interview conducted 4th August 1993. 
24. Interview with former health correspondent on Daily Express. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Interview with former 'number two', lOth July 1993. 
27. Interview with former labour editor and political correspondent, 4th 
August 1993. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Interview with former 'number three', 28th July 1993 
30. Ibid. 
31. Interview with former labour editor and political correspondent, 
4th August 1993. 
Chapter Seven Notes 
1. Riddell (1983 and 1989), for example, develops a voluntaristic account which 
emphasises the political authority of Thatcher. Gamble (1988) and Jessop et al 
(1988) also focus upon the political and ideological projects developed by 
Thatcher 'on behalr of British Capitalism. Writers, however, such as 
Coates (1989), stress much more, the fundamental aim of Thatcherism to 
break the power of organised labour above all else, in order to renew 
opportunities for Capital to maximise profit and deploy labour 'flexibly'. 
2. With the exceptions of life-members who are nominated at AGMs and 
freelance journalists who are recognised as labour or industrial 
specialists. 
3. As staffing on the labour and industrial desks often changed with the 
departures, appointments and movements of staff to other desks, 
the annual membership lists required frequent amendment. As by no 
means all news organisations were prompt in informing the Group of 
changes in personnel, the annual list of members provides, at best, 
a 'snapshot' impression of membership levels. 
4. Interview with the Secretary to the Group, Summer 1992. 
5. Secretary's Report to the 1984 AGM. 
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6. Sources include the papers of the Group (Ibid), interviews with 
contemporary labour and industrial journalists, and Hill (1993). 
7. Interview with labour editor and former number two on the Sun, 
Summer 1992. 
8. All references to the papers of the Group refer to the papers and 
records retained by the Secretary of the Group (Ibid). Some photostat 
copies of the most important papers have been retained by the author. 
See note 2, chapter six. 
9. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
10. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
11. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
12. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
13. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
14. Papers of the Goup, ibid. 
15. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
16. Interview with current labour editor and former number two on the 
Sun, Summer 1992. 
17. Interview with the author, Summer 1993. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
20. Interview with the author. Ibid. 
21. Chairman's Report to the 1983/84 AGM of the Group, 23.2.84. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Original documents in the papers of the Group. Ibid. 
Copies of the notes made at the meeting and the letters exchanged 
are held by the author. 
25. Records of the Group, 1984. Ibid. 
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26. Interview conducted with former labour editor and plitical correspondent, 4th 
August 1993. 
27. Records of the Group, 1987. Ibid. 
28. Records of the Group, 1987. Ibid. 
29. Records of the Group, 1987. Ibid. 
30. Interview with the author, lOth June 1993. 
31. The Constitution of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group. 
Original in the possession of the Secretary. Copy held by author. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Interviews with former correspondents who staffed labour desks in the 
1960s suggest the overall dominance of Labour Party sympathies. 
This is also confirmed by Tunstall (1971: 171). 
34. Interviews with the author, 15th June 1992, lOth June 1993, 15th July 
1993 and 28th July 1993. See also Benn (1990:230). Though sometimes 
regarded as a moderate', Goodman was active in helping to form the Fleet 
Street Forum of Socialist Writers in the 1950s and stili in the late 1970s 
represented the dissident voice within the 1977 Royal Commission on 
the Press calling for significant state intervention into the newspaper 
industry, (Basnett and Goodman, 1977). 
35. Interview with author, August 1993. 
36. Interview with former industrial correspondent on the Financial Times, 
summer 1992. 
37. Papers of the Group, 1985. Ibid. 
38. Mary Stewart replaced Ian McKay as number one on the News Chronicle 
in 1953, after having worked as number two during the War. Julia 
Somerville, Julie Copley (Labour Weekly), Helen Hague (Independent), 
and Jill Hartley (Sunday Times) all worked as labour correspondents 
in the 1980s. At the time of writing there were two women working as 
labour or industrial correspondents (Celia Weston on the Guardian, 
Mary Pagan on the Independent). Otherwise, the world of labour and 
industrial reporting remains exclusively male. 
39. Interview with former industrial and political correspondent, summer 1993. 
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40. Interview with former industrial correspondent on the Financial Times, 
summer 1992. 
41. Interviews conducted with industrial, health and education correspondents, 
May,June and July 1993. 
42. Interview with health corespondent, June 1993. 
43. Interview with former industrial correspondent, June 1993. 
44. MORI has conducted surveys with labour and industrial correspondents 
since 1975, though only those conducted since 1983 are available at 
MORI headquarters in London. Unfortunately, because these surveys 
have not been conducted with a longitudinal perspective in consideration 
and, indeed, were conducted for different clients (first British Gas and 
then British Rail), question design and format vary considerably from 
year to year and direct comparisons over time are impossible. 
Approximately 29 journalists were successfully contacted in most years 
which means that half to two-thirds of the Group responded. There 
are quite wide variations in responses to particular questions from year 
to year which is almost certainly the product of the failure to retain a 
stable panel across years, rather than a reflection of 'real' changes of 
opinion within the Group. 
45. Interview with former industrial correspondent, summer 1993. 
46. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
47. Papers of the Group, ibid. 
48. Quotes taken from the papers of the Group for the years 1987 and 1985 
respectively. Ibid. The event continues annually and is usually held now at the 
end of the TUC Conference week. 
49. Phrase used by Phillip Bassett, labour editor on the Times, in interview 
with the author, June 1993. Ibid. 
50. Interview conducted with former labour and industrial correspondent, summer 
1993. 
51. Ibid . 
• 52. Ericson,R et al (1989:ch 3), Schlesinger (1978:ch 4), and Chibnall (1977:ch2), 
for example. 
53. Interview conducted by the author, summer 1993. 
54. Confirmation of the existence of this 'partnership' was provided 
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independently by three different former labour correspondents in 
interviews with the author (lbid). Reference is also found in Jones 
(1986). 
55. Hartmann,P (1976). 'The Media and Industrial Relations', unpublished 
report, funded by the Leverhulme Trust and produced at the Centre for 
Mass Communication Research, University of Leicester. Hartmann 
found some surprising similarities in the nature and range of coverage 
between the Morning Star and other daily papers. While there were 
predictable differences in rhetoric and editorial evaluation, it was 
possible to detect some evidence of a shared framework of news values. 
56. Interviews with several current industrial, health and education correspondents 
during May and June and July 1993. 
57. Interview conducted in Summer 1991. 
58. Interview conducted in the Summer 1991. 
Chapter Eight Notes 
1. Interviews were conducted with labour and industrial correspondents 
representing nearly all broadsheet and quality daily newspapers. Interviews 
with two education and four health correspondents were also conducted. 
Full details are supplied in appendix one. 
2. Interview with Keith Harper, Labour Editor, 22nd September 1992. 
3. Interviews with Terry Pattinson, formerly Industrial Editor on the Daily 
Mirror, 24.7.92, and Tony McGuire, Industrial Editor on the London 
Evening Standard, 24.7. 92. 
4. Interview with Patrick Hennessey, industrial correspondent at the Daily 
Express, 24.7. 92. Hennessey combined industry with education during 
1992. The down grading of the industry beat was particularly significant 
at the Express because Hennessey's predecessor, Barrie Devney, was a 
distinguished labour correspondent for two decades, and a close friend 
of Joe Gormley, former NUM President. 
5. Interview with Geoffrey Goodman, former industrial editor at the Daily 
Mirror and LBC industrial correspondent, 15.6.92 
6. Interview with tabloid labour editor, Summer 1992. 
7. Ibid. 
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8. Phrase used by Phillip Basset!, labour correspondent of The Times, in 
interview 10.6.93. 
10. Interview with Tony MacGuire, labour editor of the London Evening Standard 
24.7.92. 
11. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
12. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
13. Interview with Tony McGuire, op cit. 
14. Interviews with Philip Basset! and Tony McGuire, op cit. 
15. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, former labour correspondent at the 
Financial Times, 15.7.92 
16. Interview with Philip Basset!, op cit. 
17. Interview with Judy Jones, health correspondent at The Independent, 
24.5.93. 
18. Interview with Charlotte Atkins, formerly press officer at COHSE. 
19. Interview with a former labour correspondent at The Financial Times, 
summer 1992. 
20. Interview with Kevin McGuire, formerly industrial correspondent on 
the Daily Telegraph, currently industrial editor at the Daily Mirror. 
21. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
22. Interview with David Norris, industrial correspondent at the Daily Mail, 
7.7.92. 
23. For example, Barrie Clement left The Times for The Independent, Phillip 
Basset!, left the Financial Times for the Times and Kevin McGuire left 
the Daily Telegraph for the Daily Mirror, all during the course of the 
present study. 
24. Interview with Kevin McGuire, op cit. 
25. Interview with Tony McGuire, op cit. 
26. Interview with Geoffrey goodman, op cit. 
27. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
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28. Interviews conducted with four health and medical correspondents, see 
appendix. 
29. Interview with a former health correspondent at The Independent, 
summer 1993. 
30. Interview with Judy Jones, op cit. 
31. Interview with John O'Leary, education correspondent at The Times, 10.6.93. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Interview with young industrial correspondent recently appointed to a 
national right of centre 'middle brow' tabloid, Summer 1992. 
34. Interview with Philip Bassett, op cit. 
35. Seaton (1982:281) points to the example of USDAW, a huge union with 
members in everyhigh street and yet, a very low media profile. 
36. Health correspondents interviewed for this study explained the rising 
fortunes of the specialism in terms of the growing salience of health as 
a political issue, in the context of the New Right's critique of public 
provision, the Government's reforms, and 'the electoral cycle'. Interviews 
with Jack O'Sullivan (14. 7.93), Clare Dover (9.6.93),Jill Palmer (19. 7.93) 
and Judy Jones, op cit. 
37. Interviews with Terry Pattinson and Kevin McGuire, op cit. 
38. Interview with David Norris, op cit. 
39. Interview with a current labour and industrial editor, summer 1992. 
40. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
41. Interview with Tony McGuire, op cit. 
42. Phrases used by senior industrial correspondents in interviews, summer 1992. 
43. Interview with Jack 0' Sullivan, op cit. 
44. Interview with James Meikle, education editor, The Guardian, 28.5.93. 
45. Interview with Kevin McGuire, op cit. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Interview with young industrial correspondent recently appointed to a 
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right of centre 'middle brow' tabloid, Summer 1992. 
48. Interview with Tony McGuire,op cit. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Interview with a labour editor, Summer 1992. 
51. Former tabloid labour editor, Summer 1992. 
52. Ibid. This source's view of the NUM may have been 'coloured' by his 
experience in being placed in an inviduous position, by his news 
organisation which demanded that he took the lead in running the 
'missing Russian money' smear stories. These eventually led to the 
establishment of the Lichtmann enquiry into the NUM's finances and 
Arthur Scargill' s personal conduct. These stories were later proved 
unfounded but generated considerable tension between this labour editor 
and the union. 
53. Interview with Keith Harper, op cit. 
54. It is not suggested that journalists' assessments provide an objective 
benchmark. 
55. David Norris, op cit. 
56. Tony McGuire, op cit. 
57. Philip Bassett, op cit. 
58. Patrick Hennessey, op cit. 
59. Industrial correspondent working for a middle brow, right wing tabloid, 
summer 1992. 
60. Patrick Hennessey, op cit. 
61. Interview with Kevin McGuire, op cit. 
62. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
63. Interview with Philip Bassett, op cit. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Jim Foulkes, former number two at the Press Association industrial 
desk, now NALGO press officer, interviewed 10.6.93. 
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66. Interview with Tony McGuire, op cit. See also Jones, 1988. 
67. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
68. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
69. Interview with a former senior labour correspondent, summer 92. 
70. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
71. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Interview with senior labour editor, now retired, summer 1992. 
74. Interview with experienced labour correspondent, summer 1992. 
75. Interview with former chairman of the Labour and Industrial Group, 
summer 1992. 
76. Interview with current labour correspondent, summer 1992. 
77. Interview with Geoffrey Goodman, op cit. 
78. Interview with former Financial Times correspondent, summer 1992. 
79. Interview with David Norris, op cit. 
80. Interview with Patrick Hennessey ,op cit. 
81. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
82. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Former broadsheet Labour Correspondent, interviewed summer 1992. 
85. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
86. Interview with education correspondent working for a right of centre 
broadsheet, summer 1993. 
87. Interview with Terry Pattinson, op cit. 
88. Interview conducted summer 1992. 
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89. Interview with Tony McGuire, op cit. 
90. Labour editor of left of centre broadsheet, interview summer 1992. 
91. Comments made by several labour correspondents during the course of 
interviews, summer 1992. 
92. Former labour correspondent of Financial Times, summer 1992. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Interview with Tony McGuire, op cit. 
95. Interview with David Norris, op cit. 
96. Interview with Charlie Leadbeater, op cit. 
97. Interview with Tony McGuire,op cit. 
Chapter 9 Notes 
1. As is well known the early work of the Glasgow team was based upon 
assessing television coverage against bench marks established by official 
economic data,- a 'reality test' (Skirrow,l980). McQuail employs broadly 
the same research strategy. More recently, Cumberbatch et al, recognising 
the promblems implicit in using official data as measures of 'reality' opted 
for a survey of public opinion (1986). Most frequent criticisms of this 
strategy are usually developed by those writers who question whether it is 
possible to employ any effective 'measure' of a reality and who suggest 
that, in any case, audiences will construct their own readings of the 
'realities' presented to them (Fiske,l987:ch 15). Clearly, there are dangers 
in treating official government data naively; nonetheless, if one relinquishes 
the insistence that news media coverage be submitted to the discipline 
of evaluation in terms of empirical evidence then one moves towards a 
position of relativism in which the critical tools of media analysis are 
abandoned. 
2. Though McQuail found 'ordinary workers' and ordinary members of 
the public apearing quite frequently, his research confirms the inclination 
of newspapers to priviledge unioon elite sources over shop stewards 
and 'rank and file' members (1977: 139). 
3. See Hyman and Price (1979) and comments above at (1). 
4. The Glasgow team do no employ the concept of a dominant ideology 
but they refer to 'a cultural skewedness against one particular 
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class' (1980:401). 
5. Philo identifies over 200 discrepancies between Harrison's scripts and 
the video material of actual broadcasts (Philo,1976; 1977). In examining 
only scripts Harrison not only ignores BBC output but also the whole 
dimension of visual imagery. 
6. Harrison, for example, expresses dispute items as a proportion of total 
industrial reports, the Glasgow team in their analysis, expressed dispute 
items as a proportion of bulletins broadcast. Only by 'changing the goal 
posts' can Harrison depress the figure for dispute coverage. The point 
remains that on a day to day basis, viewers of television news were 
supplied with a great deal of dispute orientated material. 
7. Interview with Charlotte Atkins, COHSE press officer, 16.7.91 
8. A point confirmed both in the interviews with labour correspondents 
conducted for this study and in the published comments of journalists 
(Woolas,1990; Hill,1993). 
9. Charlotte Atkins, op cit. 
10. Interview with Mary McGuire (NALGO press officer) 31.7.90 and 
Charlotte Atkins, op cit. See also, Verzuh (1990) and Hill (1993). 
11. Mary McGuire, op cit. 
12. Interviews with Charlotte Atkins and Mary McGuire, op cit. Verzuh 
(1990) and Hill (1993). 
13. Interview with former senior health correspondent, 9.6.93. 
14. Charlotte Atkins, op cit. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Interviews with Charlotte Atkins and Mary McGuire, op cit. See also 
comments by Lynn Bryan in Verzuh (1990). 
17. The contrast with the 1984/85 Coal Strike is notable. During this dispute, 
journalists had to do most of their own background work in searching 
out material for items with a 'human angle' on miners, their families 
and the implications for the mining communities. The NUM offered 
little 'proactive' support for journalists seeking to develop these themes 
(Jones, 1986; Winterton and Winterton, 1989). 
18. During the 1984/85 Coal Strike, for example, despite a number of 
public relations gaffs by Ian McGreggor, NCB chairman, the sheer 
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weight of numbers in terms of staff, and the political resources 
available to the management team within the NCB, meant that the NUM 
was simply out-gunned. The public relations effort of the government 
and NCB together, meant that 'new' information regarding numbers 
returning to work, and other developments was produced and weighting 
for journalists to gather, on a daily basis. 
19. The Times carried reports on the following days of November, 1st 
(page 2), 6th (p5), 7th (front and p5), 8th (front and p5), 9th (plO), 
lOth (p24), 11th (p6), 14th (p2) and 15th (pi). The distribution of coverage 
in the Guardian and Independent was virtually identical to this pattern. 
The Financial Times only carried two reports during this period on the 
8th and 9th (p14 and pl respectively). Coverage in the Daily Mirror, Daily 
Express and the Sun was more patchy than the mainstram broadsheets but 
all three papers featured reports on the 8th and 9th, and on at least two 
other days. 
20. The full text of Clarke's letter was released to the news media by the unions 
and generated considerable coverage in both broadsheet and tabloid papers 
between the 3rd and 7th of January. In an effort to repair the damage and 
appease Conservative MPs on the back benches, Clarke briefed the 
Westminster Lobby over the weekend of 6th and 7th January. However, 
this led to further confusion as to whether the Government was prepared 
to authorise a higher pay offer. Clarke had to return to the news media to 
deny that any additional money might be available. Union spokespersons 
were able to condemn 'confusing and conflicting messages coming from 
government' and the episode generated front page headlines such as 
'Offer row isolates Clarke- ambulance unions condemn confusion over 
pay talks' (Guardian 8th January). While The Times report noted that 
Clarke still had the backing of Cabinet (8th January page!), it was 
clear that Clarke's political capital had been eroded. His use of the 
Westminster Lobby was a reminder of the suspicion with which labour 
correspondents were regarded by the Cabinet during Mrs Thatcher's 
administration. Clarke's briefings to the Lobby produced reports in 
The Times (2nd January page 2 and 8th January page 1), the Guardian 
(8th January page 1), the Financial Times 8th January page 1, and the 
Sun (4th January page 4). 
21. 'Tempers Cool in Clarke and Poole Duel', the Guardian (6th January 
page 3). 
22. 'Clarke Attacked on Ambulance Pay Policy', Financial Times (4th 
January page 1), 'Divided Tories Anxious to End the Dispute', the 
Guardian (9th January page 2), 'Minister Condemned Over Pay 
Shambles', Independent (20th January page 3),Guardian parliamentary 
report (31st January page 6). 
23. An NOP Poll conducted for BBC 2 'Newsnight' indicated that 80% of 
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those asked and two-thirds of Tory voters supported the union side in 
the dispute (The Times 9th January 1990 page 1). 
24. This was 'a fear' first publicly aired at the very beginning of the dispute 
and regularly repeated at intervals subsequently. For example, The Times 
(30th September 1989 page 2). 
25. One incident involving the death of a patient did receive some publicity. 
On 6th February it was reported in several papers that an 86 year old 
man had died from heart failure after delays in receiving treatment. An 
interval of several hours had passed between an emergency call being 
made and a police van arriving at his house to collect him. However, his 
admittance to hospital coincided with the shooting of Boxing promoter, 
Frank Warren, resulting in a further eight hour delay before the man 
was allocated to a ward. The coroner indicated that it was impossible to 
disaggregate the various contributory factors (Guardian 7th February 
page 2). The Times reported a 'casualty' of the dispute, a man who died 
of heart failure in a police car as he was rushed to hospital (9th November 
page 1) and the head of the St Bartholomew's Casualty Department 
estimated that every casualty department in London had experienced at 
least one 'avoidable death' since the precise causes, these incidents 
received little news coverage. 
26. Some correspondents from broadsheet papers were critical of the 
unions' press officers for failing to keep up the supply of detailed 
information as the dispute developed (interview with Charlotte Atkins 
op cit). Union press officers are inevitably constrained by the finite 
number of fresh angles which can be generated and by the ryhthm of the 
dispute, itself. 
27. See, The Times (lOth January page 2), 'Ambulance Staff Keep Fires of 
Pay Protest Burning'. Scope for such photographs and imagery was, 
however, limited because often crews sensibly contrived to be suspended 
and locked into their stations, rather than locked out. 
28. Financial Times (6th January page 1), 'Ambulance Action Intensifies' 
Financial Times (9th February page 11), 'Unpaid Workers of the 
Emergency Services'. 
Chapter 10 Notes 
1. The Observer, 16th July 1995. 
2. This may not be true of the local context where local papers and 
broadcasting organisations, run on very limited budgets and small 
numbers of staff, have according to some commentators, a greater 
appetite for 'ready made' copy. See Franklin, 1986 and Franklin 
351 
and Murphy, 1991. 
3. This is likely to be the experience of other non-official source or advocate 
groups including, for example, those working in the social policy and 
poverty arenas and those within the environmental movement. There 
is evidence of significant short-impacts achieved by non-official 
advocate groups, upon dominant interpretative frameworks which 
expand public understanding of the range of elevant perspectives and 
anlyses in each of these policy areas, is much scarcer (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982). 
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Appendix One: The Selection of Trade Unions 
In constructing a typology for this project, the aim was not to capture a 'representative 
sample' of trade unions. Given the unprecendented rate of change in the nature and 
composition of unions, produced through economic re-structuring and union responses 
to this process, which accelerated as the study progressed, this would have been a most 
difficult task to achieve. Indeed, decline in traditional and manufacturing industry, the 
growing dominance of the service sector in the British economy, the decline in the 
proportion of manual to white-collar work, changes in patterns of employment with a 
diminishing proportion of full-time, permanent jobs, and the impact of the introduction 
of new forms of labour organisation and technology to the production process, meant 
that many of the traditional distinctions between craft, industrial and general unions, 
upon which typologies were conventionally constructed, were simply no longer very 
useful. 
In I 988, when a panel of unions for this study was first considered these changes 
were apparant but the significance of the extent to which they would re-shape the union 
world through merger, adjustment and re-organisation, could hardly have been guessed 
at. Since the panel of unions was constructed, seven out of eleven of the selected 
unions have been affected by the outbreak of union 'merger mania' in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. NALGO and COHSE joined with NUPE to form UNISON, which 
now has more members than the Transport and General Workers' Union. The biggest 
union in the TUC is now a largely white collar and professional union, organising in 
the 'public sector'. The AEU and the EETPU have merged to form one powerful union 
with a profile not only in engineering but also, of course, in new technology and 
white collar sectors. The NUHKW merged with NUFLAT to form one larger union 
with a strong regional base in the East Midlands textile and leather industries, and 
finally, NUTGW disappeared only a year after the panel was finalised, being 
swallowed in a 'merger' with the GMB. To make matters even more complicated, two 
unions re-launched themselves with new names just before and during the research 
period (NUCPS and IPMS). 
Other changes, too, have rendered the assumptions underpining the panel out-dated. 
The NUM, for example, still claimed a membership of over 100,000 in 1987, allowing 
it to be selected as a 'large' union. Now, of course, the total number of miners 
employed in the industry may be below 7,000 and the NUM has become one of the 
smaller unions within the TUC. Even the distinction between public and private sector 
has become blurred as a result of the government's determination to proceed with 
policies of privatisation and marketisation. Accordingly, IPMS and NUCPS can no 
longer be described as organising exclusively in the public sector, as civil servants and 
government scientists now find themselves employed by agencies operating in 
competitive markets. 
Difficulties in drawing distinctions between types of union for the purposes of 
typology construction are not new and have been the subject of considerable discussion, 
even before the present period of rapid change. For some commentators, the analytic 
value of distinctions between white and blue collar (Cooper and 
Bartlett,l976:80;Jenkins and Sherman,l979:13), or between general, craft and 
industrial unions (Flanders, 1968:29), was declining long before the impact of 
Thatcherism or the most recent period of accelerated change in the organisation of the 
labour process. 
Given that such distinctions were already recognised as problematic at the beginning 
of the research project, and that, in any case, the focus was intended to be upon the 
nature of union media strategies rather than the general organisational characteristics of 
trade unions, it was decided to construct a panel which departed from conventional 
distinctions but which anticipated some of the likely determinants of variation in media 
strategy. It was recognised that there was not a simple relationship between size of 
membership and news media interest (Seaton,l982:281). Nonetheless, the size of a 
union was likely to influence its capacity to mobilise material and symbolic resources 
for media work and, at least, a negative relationship could be assumed between union 
size and media interest. That is to say, it could be safely assumed that the Society of 
Shuttlemakers (membership 92), the Sawmakers Protection Society (membership 167) 
or the Screw,Nut, Bolt and Rivet Trade Union (membership 1,100) were unlikely to 
attract sustained national news media interest (examples taken from Eaton and 
Gill, 1983). The dimension of size was, thus, incorporated into the original panel with 
unions enjoying a membership above 100,000 being regarded as 'large'. 
Although, even in 1988 difficulties in drawing distinctions between public and 
private sector unions were already apparant (the TGWU, for example, historically 
organised in both sectors), there was some evidence to support the view that public 
sector unions had a track record of greater commitment to media work (Philo and 
Hewitt, 1976; Jenkins and Sherman, 1979; Jones, 1986). For the purposes of illuminating 
a variety a approaches to media work amongst unions, the distinction between public 
and private sector appeared worth retaining. 
To size and position in public or private sectors were added two more variables. 
Very little information was available regarding trade union investment in media work, 
other than the early and limited work undertaken by the Glasgow team in preparation 
for the 'Bad News' studies (GUMG,1976:ch 6; Philo and Hewitt,1976) and the more 
recent survey undertaken by the TUC, which described only general patterns rather 
than investments commited by specific unions (TUC Standing Conference 1985). In 
order to gather more information, a simple telephone survey was undertaken of thirty 
seven trade unions, including all those with a membership of over 45,000 (based on 
affiliation figures at 31st December 1986). The results of this survey now have little 
but a historic interest for two reasons. 
Firstly, an interest in media presentation and a commitment of significant resources 
in media and symbolic work amongst large and medium sized unions has now become 
the norm rather the exception. In the telephone survey, only seven trade unions 
employed a full-time press officer to concentrate exclusively upon press and media 
work and only five had organised separate press and publicity departments. Now it is 
unusual for a large or medium trade union not to have a full-time press officer and 
most unions have established a press office , if not a 'communications directorate' . 
Secondly, although the costs of gaining access to the communication channels of the 
public sphere are usually regarded as increasing, in one particular respect the arrival of 
a new example of communication technology has produced an equalising effect 
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amongst unions. A number of questions included in the questionnaire refered to the use 
of 'news encoding technology', such as Universal News Services. However, the arrival 
of the cheap FAX machine as a ubiquitous feature of every news room and press office 
in the course of the research, meant that most unions could now afford effective 
encoding technology for the dissemination of press releases and other materials, thus 
eliminating any differential advantage which might previously have been enjoyed by 
investing in such relatively expensive services as Universal News. Nevertheless, at the 
outset, the appointment of a full time press officer was a factor which represented a 
significant line of differentiation between unions and, accordingly, this was included as 
another dimension within the panel, the relevant information being drawn from the 
telephone survey. 
It was also recognised that exogeneous factors would shape variations in media 
strategies and media performance amongst unions. One possibility was to incorporate 
variations in dispute and strike activity as a predictor of news media interest. However, 
two difficulties were immediately apparant. Official statistics describe dispute and 
strike activity using a range of measures across industries and sectors of employment 
but not by individual trade union. In any case, one of the established points to emerge 
from the older literature was the low correlation between strike activity and news 
media profile (GUMG, 1976). Stories, it was recognised, are selected by journalists and 
editors, often because they possess consonance (Galtung and Ruge,1973:64) and appear 
to represent further instances of previously established themes. Unions with historically 
established high media profiles were likely, therefore, to experience media interest 
which was not necessarily a function of their own media enterprise. To anticipate this 
point, newspaper interest in the period between January 1986 and October 1987, as 
measured by entries in The Times Index, was incorporated as a final dimension for the 
panal. Again, all trade unions with memberships over 45,000 (at 31st December 1986) 
were included. One difficulty was in finding a 'small' union with a membership below 
I 00,000 but a high media profile. Eventually, the IPMS were selected as a union with 
88,789 members and a relatively high number of Times Index entries (17), although far 
fewer than the NUM (104,000 members and 199 entries). COHSE (three entries) and 
NUHKW (nil entries) were selected as 'low profile' unions. The panel at 
commencement of the first phase in the research project was, thus, constructed on the 
basis of a random selection of unions satisfying the criteria of specified for each 
dimension of the panel: 
Panel of Trade Unions Selected for the Initial Research Phase 
Public Private Press Officer Times Index 
Sector FIT Entries 
Yes No High Low 
LARGE NALGO TandG EETPU AEU(3) NUM COHSE 
(I) (2) (4) 
SMALL NUCPS NUTGW NATFHE IPMS(7) NUHKW 
(5) (6) (8) 
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As described above, this panel was rapidly overtaken by events, as a majority of unions 
appointed full-time press officers, membership decline eroded the position of 'large' 
unions, distinctions between public and private sectors blurred and several unions 
disappeared in a wave of mergers. The panel now simply serves to provide a rationale 
for the initial selection of unions and to guard against the charges of arbitrary or 
contrived selection. The appendix has dealt at length with the process of selection to 
provide the reader with an indication of just how rapidly change overtook the union 
movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the implications of such change for the 
design and direction of this study. The great advantage was that the project was given 
the opportunity to study the behaviour and responses of trade unions as news sources in 
the middle of an unprecendented period in their history. The disadvantage, of course, 
was that such a rate of change made a research design which depended upon perfect 
consistency in panel composition longitudinally, untenable. 
NUTGW were absorbed into the GMB after the content analysis of trade union 
journals had been completed in 1990. As preliminary enquiries in preparation for 
interviewing trade union press officers had already indicated that the GMB had invested 
significantly in media work, it was decided to include the union in the next stage of the 
project which concerned the work of union press officers. 
(1) NALGO merged with COHSE and NUPE to form UNISON, now the largest union 
··affiliated to the TUC in 1993. 
(2) The EETPU merged with the AEU to form the Amalgamated Engineering and 
Electrical Union in 1992. 
(3) See (2) above. 
(4) See (1) above. 
(5) Formerly, the Society of Civil and Public Servants. 
(6) NUTGW were absorbed into the GMB after the content analysis of trade union 
journals had been completed in 1990. 
(7) Formerly the Institute of Public and Civil Servants. Re-launched as IPMS in 1989. 
(8) NUHK merged with the National Union of Footwear, Leather and Allied Trades to 
form the National Union of Knitwear, Footwear and Apparel Trades in 1992. 
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Appendix Two: Coding Schedule for Trade Union Journals. 
The aim of the content analysis was to establish a measure, albeit imperfect, of the 
prefered agendas entertained by the selected unions. It was assumed that the contents of 
the union journal gave a reasonable indication of what issues were understood to be 
important by each union and the interpretative framework in which they were viewed. 
Trade union journals may aim to serve a number of different purposes from simply 
disseminating information to developing political conciousness or simply entertaining 
readers. Clearly, then, even in the most 'agitational' journals, journal editors and union 
officials would not wish all content to reach a wider audience through the national news 
media. For these reasons, humerous articles, book reviews, and entertainment pages 
were excluded. The following content was included for coding: 
'Any news item, feature article, or editorial, mainly concerned with subjects of direct 
or indirect relevance to the union and it's members, in terms of pay, conditions, the 
policies of Government and opposition parties, internal union politics, 
economics, industrial issues, social policy, and current events as they affect that union'. 
CODING UST A. MAIN THEMES. 
CAMPAIGNING AND ACTION. 
I. Pay/Conditions of S~rvice Campaign details (news of imminent or current strike,over-time ban, or 
other form of action/dispute). 
2. Pay/ Conditions of Service Campaign background discussion.(action as defmed in 1.). 
3. Other campaign (eg anti-cuts, anti-privatization, etc) details. 
4. Other Campaign background discussion.(eg causes). 
5. Negotiations with employers about current industrial action. 
6. Effects of current industrial action. 
7. Possible escalation of industrial action (as main theme). 
8. Employer statements on industrial action. 
9. Causes oflndustrial Action. 
I 0. Poor management causing problems. 
11. Unreasonable employer behaviour related to industrial action (eg. employer threats, intransigence, 
refusal to negotiate during dispute,etc). 
12. Reports of other union's industrial action. 
13. Negotiations with employers afterindustrial action. 
14. Employer's use of Courts during industrial action or just before. 
15. Successful outcome to industrial action or campaign. 
ROUTINE WORK RELATED ISSUES AND NEGOTIATIONS.(not during action or dispute). 
16. Pay/Conditions Offer or Claim. 
17. News of Settlement or Agreement. 
18. Employer attempts to worsen conditions of service. 
19. Actual changes in conditions of service. 
20. Stories which emphasise worsening features of health and safety . 
21. Improvement in health and safety through negotiation. 
22. Other discussion of negotiation on conditions of service. 
OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS AND WORK. 
23. Threat of Redundancies. 
24. Government policy news item. 
25. Government policy discussion. 
26. Other Political Parties policies news items. 
27. Other Political Parties policies discussion. 
28. Public sector cuts, effects of: news item 
29. Public sector cuts, effects of: discussion. 
30. Public sector defence of: news item. 
31. Public Sector defence of: discussion. 
32. The economy news item. 
33. The economy discussion. 
34. News of firms re-investing. 
35. Failure of firms to re-invest/need for new technology. 
36. Need for worker participation/ involvement in decision making in industry. 
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37. Other developments in the industry/employment sector news item. 
38. Other developments in the industry/employment sector discussion. 
39. Announcements of union action on issues other than industrial action (other than 42- 51 below). 
40. Announcements of employer action on issues other than industrial action. 
41. News of tougher management attitudes/ interpretations of existing conditions of service. 
ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS. 
42. Unions providing leisure facilities. 
43. Unions making safety inspections or promoting health and safety practice. 
44. Unions representing employees in court/ tribunaVetc. 
45. Unions involvement in training schemes or educational support. 
46. Other stories of union work emphasising positive or constructive role. 
47. Other Benefits of union membership ( eg. fmancial, consumer, legal etc). 
48. Other stories of union work (eg.recruitement drives, union officer training, visits by union officials, 
etc). 
49. Role/work of the Wider Trade Union Movement, including support for other unions. 
50. Union elections, conference reports, and internal union politics. 
51. Appointments, retirements, and deaths within the union. 
OTHER. 
52. Health and safety education at work. 
53. General round up of minor news. 
54. Women's Participation in the Labour Movement. 
55. Conflict with other unions.(eg single union agreements, etc) 
56. Conflict with the T.U.C. 
57. International Issues. 
58. Issues of Equal Opportunity: inegualities of gender or race in work or the labour movement. 
59. Other. 
60. 'Nil' ie Missing Value. 
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CODING LIST C. CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION. 
I. Dissatisfaction with wages, pay claim, bonuses, etc. 
2. dissatisfaction with conditions of work, etc. 
3. Wages relative to Company Profits. 
4. Wages relative to other groups. 
5. Protest against the Government policy ( N.H.S., Education, Local 
Govt.etc) 
6. Work of militant</ agitators. 
7. Bad/incompetent management. 
8. Management obstinacy/ruthlessness/injustice/intransigence. 
9. Threatened/ actual Redundancies 
10. As tactic to force management to negotiate. 
11. Support/sympathy for other workers. 
12. Threat of cuts in expenditure. 
13. Employer attempts to worsen conditions of service. 
14. Employer attempts to worsen health and safety. 
15 .. None given. 
16. Other. 
17. Nil ie Missing Value. 
CODING LIST D. EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION. 
I. Loss of production! cost or inconvenience to employers. 
2. Demonstration of solidarity I support for cause. 
3. Drawn public attention to the issue. 
4. Sent signal to government. 
5. Sent signal to employers 
6. Brought employers to negotiating table. 
7. Successful conclusion to dispute /employers climb down. 
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8. Reduction in company profits. 
9. Loss of jobs. 
10. Inconvenience to public. 
11. Reduction in competitiveness. 
12. Danger of wage push inflation. 
13. Violence/distnrbances. 
14. None given. 
15. Other. 
16. Nil or Missing Value. 
CODING SCHEDULE FOR 'PERSONALITIES' 
!.JournaL (I to 11) 
2.Case No 
3.Page 
4. Type (I to 4) 
5. Theme (I to 59) 
6. Character 
1. Cabinet spokesman 
2.0pp. Spokesman 
3 Civil servant 
4.0ther political figure 
S.Union exec spokesman 
6. Trade union Gen Sec 
7.TUC Gen Sec 
8.0ther TUC spokesman 
9. Other union offical 
!O.Shop steward 
11. Ordinary union member 
12.Public personality (sports, entertainmnet,etc) 
13. Other 
7. Male (1) Female (2) 
8. Headline .................................................................. . 
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Appendix Three: Summary of interview and documentary data collected. 
Interviews 
Wherever possible the source of quotes has been attributed. However, several trade 
union press officers indicated that sections of their interviews were 'off the record' and 
material drawn from these sections has not been attributed to particular individuals. In 
the case of correspondents and journalists, a great deal more of the material was 
gathered off the record and the attribution of non-controversial comments to sources 
would allow those with a knowledge of the social networks and working environments 
of the national daily papers, to quickly identify the sources of more sensitive material. 
For this reason, very little of the material gathered in interviews with journalists has 
been attributed. However, a list of all interviews, interviewees and dates is provided 
below. 
1. Contemporary Trade Union Press Officers 
Mary McGuire (NALGO) 31.7.90 
Jim Fookes (NALGO) 10.6.93 
Eddie Barratt (T and G) 6.3.91 
Andrew Murray (T and G) 6.3.91 (follow up interview 13.7.93) 
Charlotte Atkins (COHSE) 16.3.91 
Charlie Whelan (AEU) 6.6.91 (follow up interview 12.7.93) 
Laurie Harris (NUR) 25.8.89 
Charles Harvey (IPMS) 21.6.91 
Ken Jones (NUCPS) 7.6.91 (follow up interview 9. 7.93) 
Nell Myers (NUM) 20.9.91 
Adrian Long (G and M) 21.6.91 
Mr. A. Lomans (NUHKW) 15.7.91 
John Lloyd (EETPU) 24.5.91 
Midge Purcell (NATFHE) 21.6.91 (follow up interview 16.7.93) 
Mike Smith (TUC) 26.6.93 
Total: 15 
2. Contemporary Journalists 
(i) Industrial Correspondents 
Phillip Basset! (Employment Affairs Editor The Times) 10.6.93 
Geoffrey Goodman (ex Labour Editor Daily Mirror and Sun) 15.6.92 
Keith Harper (Labour Editor The Guardian) 22.9.92 
Patrick Hennesey (Industrial/Education Correspondent Daily Express) 
24.7.92 
Charlie Leadbeater (Industrial Correspondent Financial Times) 15.7.92 
Kevin McGuire (Daily Telegraph Industrial Correspondent) 12.6.92 
Tony McGuire (Industrial Editor Evening Standard) 24.7.92 
David Norris (Industrial Correspondent Daily Mail) 7. 7. 92 
Terry Pattinson (Labour Editor Daily Mirror) 24.7. 92 
Total: 9 
(ii) Education Correspondents 
James Meikle (Education correspondent The Guardian) 28.5.93 
John O'Leary (Education Correspondent The Times) 10.6.93 
Total: 2 
(iii) Health Correspondents 
Clare Dover (Formerly Daily Express Health correspondent) 6. 9. 93 
Judy Jones (Health Correspondent Independent) 24.5. 93 
Jill Palmer (Health correspondent Daily Mirror) 19.7.93 
Jack O'Sullivan (ex Health Correspondent Independent) 14.7.93 
Total: 4 
3. Interviews with Former and Current Journalists for Historical 
Dimension 
Paul Routledge (Observer political correspondent and formerly F.T. 
labour correspondent). 4.8.93 
Terry Pattinson (Labour Editor Daily Mirror until April 93, now 
freelance) 15.7.93 
Henry Clother (formerly labour no 3 on Sun and then press officer for 
NUT during 1970s). 28.7.93 
Jim Fookes (formerly labour correspondent at Press Association and 
now press officer in Press and Publicity Dept. at 
NALGO) 10.6.93. 
Interviews with Philip Bassett and Geoffrey Goodman also relevant for historical 
dimension. 
Total: 4 
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Historical and Secondary Source Material 
4. Historical Material 
(i) Archive Material 
The papers of the Labour and Industrial Correspondents' Group. These are held by the 
Secretary of the Group, currently Robert Taylor, who can be contacted at The 
Observer. 
TUC papers kept at the TUC Library, Congress House, Great Russell Street, London 
WCI. 
(ii) Memoirs and autobiographies of labour correspondents (full 
references listed in the main bibliography) 
Evans,T.(ed) (1953): The Great Bohunkus. Tributes to fan Mackay 
Mason,K.(l981): Front Seat. 
(ii) Books on specific themes written by labour correspondents. 
Bassett,P.(1986): Strike Free. 
Crick,M.(1985): Scargill and the Miners. 
Goodman,G.(l985): The Miner's Strike. 
Jones,N.(1986): Strikes and the Media. 
Lloyd,J and Adeney,M.(1986): Loss H-lthout limit. 
Maclntyre,D et al.(1985): Strike: Thatcher, Scargill, and the Miners 
Taylor,R.(1978): Fifth Estate:Britain's Unions in the Modern World. 
Wigham,E.(1969): Trade Unions. 
Wigham,E.(1961) »hat's ~ong with Trade Unions? 
(iii) Articles written by labour correspondents. 
Bassett,P. (1993): 'Labour Reporting: alive and kicking into the 1990s', 
U.KPress Gazett, 13th June. 
Harper,K.(1991): 'The Spiking of the Strike Reporters', British Journalism 
Reliew,2 (4), Summer. 
Jones,N. (1987): 'Unions Quietly Languish', The listener, 1st August. 
Jones,N.(1988): 'Labour Pains', U.K Press Gazette,llthJanuary. 
Pattinson,T.(1993): 'Monsters Wanted', New Statesman and Society, 21st May. 
Woolas.P.(1990): 'Television First Aid' ,New Socialist, April. 
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(iv) Autobiographies Written by Union Leaders. 
Chapple,F.(1984): Sparks Fly. 
Gormley,J.(l982) Battered Cherub. 
Hammond,E.(l992) Maverick The lire of a Union Rebel. 
Jones,J.(l986): Union Man. 
Paynter,W.(1972): My Generation. 
Paynter, W.(1970): British Trade Unions and the Prospects for Change 
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Appendix Four Union Resources and Media Work 
I Union I Member- lrncome (£) I Political 
ship. Fund(£) 
NALGO 764,062 69,755,430 3,296, 329 
TGWU 1,036,586 59,834,870 2,975,531 
GMB 799,101 39,136,000 3,029,000 
COHSE 195,519 11,117,874 505,406 
NUCPS 111,831 10,548,029 584,507 
NUR 105,146 9,753,000 59,000 (i) 
AEU 595,537 8,154,000 342,000 
IPMS 90,008 7,935,342 62,714 
NATFHE 75,582 5,533,992 285,992 
EETPU 354,618 4,453,080 528,681 
NUKFA* 51,636 3,150,109 81,647 
NUM 93,684 1,331,943 210,486 
NUTGW** 
(i) Includes £43,000 spent lobbying Parliament. 
* NUHKW merged to form the National Union of Knitwear, Footwear and Allied Trades in 1992. 
** NUTGW 'merged' with the GMB in 1990. 
Union Spending on Media and Publicity Work. 
Expenditure on following items (£) 
!union I Total I Publications I Press and Other !Education I 
Adrninistra- Media Activities 
tion* 
NALGO 31,104,790 2,051,753 (103,200) 22,998 (i) 1,110,687 
TGWU 49,080,725 562,311 
GMB 31,645,000 726,000 (85,000) 127,000 (ii) 1,102,000 
COHSE 8,641,917 72,740 
NUCPS 10,204,867 19,384 1,216,356 141,034 
NUR 8,020,000 527,000 259,000 
AEU 6,898,000 (835,000). 
lP MS 5,448,015(iii) (459,000) 
NATFHE 4,350,296 (400,800) 
EETPU 4,231,198 
NUKFA 2,980,816 
NUM 65,758 (iv) 5,852 
Source: annual returns to the CertificatiOn Office for Trade Umons and Employers Assoc.atiOns, year 
ending 1992. 
Figures in brackets derived from information provided by press officers and union officials. 
(i) Includes £18,183 spent on arts sponsorship and £4,815 spent on parliamentary work. 
(ii) Spent on campaigning. 
(iii) £15,341 spent on GCHQ Campaign, £8,386 spent on TUC Jobs and Recovery Campaign. 
(iv) The Campaign Against Pit Closures. 
*1992/93 
The annual returns to the Certification Officer frequently fail to provide detail under specific budget 
headings such as 'press and media' or 'campaigning. The figure for total administration is derived 
from union returns to the Certification Officer. Subsumed within that heading unions sometimes 
provided additional information and this has been included in the relevant column. The absence of 
figures does not indicate that a union did not spend in this area but simply that such expenditure was 
not disaggregated from the figure for total administration. Where additional information was 
provided by union staff in the course of research for the current study this has been included in 
brackets. 
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